Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF ORISSA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BIDYABHUJSHAN MOHAPATRA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
19/10/1962
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION:
1963 AIR 779 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 648
CITATOR INFO :
R 1967 SC1353 (15)
R 1969 SC 966 (8)
R 1970 SC 679 (8)
RF 1972 SC1975 (9)
F 1974 SC1589 (12)
RF 1976 SC 232 (18)
RF 1977 SC2411 (19)
F 1989 SC1185 (20,23,25)
RF 1989 SC1854 (20)
ACT:
Public Servant-Disciplinary proceedings-Two parallel
procedures available-Right of appeal under one but not under
the other-If discriminatory-Punishment-If court can inter-
fere with-Orissa Discipilinary Proceeding (Administrative
Tribunal) Rules, 1951-Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930-Constitution of India, Arts.
14, 309, 311.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent, a non-gazetted permanent employee of the
State, was charged with (i) having received illegal gratifi-
cation on five occasions and (ii) being possession of
property disproportionate to his income. The Governor.
referred is case to the Administrative Tribunal constituted
under s. 4 (1) of the Disciplinary Proceeding,;
(Administrative Tribunal) Rules which had been framed under
Art. 309 of tile Constitution.. The Tribunal found four out
of the five heads under the first charge and the second
charge proved and recommended the dismissal of the
respondent. The Governor, after giving the respondent a
reasonable opportunity. to ,how cause against the proposed
punishment, dismissed him. The respondent filed a writ
petition before the High Court challenging the order of
dismissal on the ground that the Tribunal Rules were
discriminatory and that in holding the enquiry the Tribunal
had violated the rules of natural justice. Following a
previous decision the High Court held that the Tribunal
Rules were discriminatory but since that decision was under
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appeal before the Supreme Court, it proceeded to deal with
the second ground. It held that the second charge and only
two head,, of the first charge were established and directed
the Governor to reconsider whether on the basis of these
charges the punishment of dismissal should be maintained.
Held, that the Tribunal Rules were not discriminatory.
There were simultaneously in existence two sets of parallel
rules, viz. the Tribunal Rules and the Classification Rules
and proceedings could be taken against the respondent under
either of the at the discretion of the Governor. But in
substance there
649
is no difference in the procedures prescribed by the two
sets of rules. Mere adoption of one procedure in preference
to another permissible procedure does not justify an
inference ;of unlawful discrimination. The fact that under
the Classification Rules there is a right of appeal from an
order imposing a penalty whereas there is no such right of
appeal under the Tribunal Rules against the order passed by
the Governor was not a ground for sustaining the plea of
unlawful discrimination.
Sardar Kapur Singh v. Union of India, [1960] 2 S. C. R. 569
and Jagannath Prasad v. State of U. P., A. 1. R. 1961 S. C.
1245, followed
State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das, A. I. R. (1961) S. C.
1715, distinguished.
Held, further that the High Court had no power to direct the
Governor to reconsider the question of punishment. The High
Court has only to see whether the constitutional guarantees
have been violated; but it is not concerned with the penalty
imposed, provided it is justified by the rules. The reasons
which induce the punishing authority are not justiciable nor
is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the order
can be supported on any finding as ’to substantial
misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be
imposed it is not for the court to consider whether that
ground alone would have weighed with the authority
dismissing the public servant.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 17, 1959,
of the Orissa High Court, Cuttack in O.J. C. No. 216 of
1957.
R. Ganapathy lyer and P. D. Menon, for the appellants.
G. B. Pai, B. Parthasarthy, J. B. Dadachanji and O. C.
Mathur, for, the respondent.
1962. October 19. The judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SHAH, J.-Bidyabhushan Mohapatra hereinafter called ’the
respondent’-was a permanent
650
non-gazetted employee of the State of Orissa in the Re-
gistration Department and was posted at the material time as
a Sub-Registrar at Sambalpur. Information was received by
the Government of the State of Orissa that the respondent
was habitually receiving illegal gratification and that he
was possessed of property totally disproportionate to his
income. The case of the respondent was referred by order of
the Governor of Orissa to the Administrative Tribunal
constituted under r.4(1) of the Disciplinary Proceedings
(Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951 framed in exercise of
the powers conferred by Art. 309 of the Constitution. The
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Tribunal held an enquiry in the presence of the respondent
on two charges (1) relating to five specific heads charging
the respondent with having received illegal gratification
and (2) relating to possession of means disproportionate to
his income as a Sub-Registrar. The Tribunal held that there
was reliable evidence to support four out of the five heads
in the first charge ’of corruption’ and also the charge
relating to possession of means disproportionate to the
income and recommended that the respondent be dismissed from
service. The finding of the- Tribunal was tentatively
approved by the Governor of Orissa and the respondent was
called upon to show cause why he should not be dismissed
from service as recommended. The respondent made a detailed
submission in rejoinder and contended, inter alia, that the
Tribunal held the enquiry in a manner contrary to rules of
natural justice. After consulting the Public Service
Commission the Governor of Orissa by order dated September
26, 1957, directed that the respondent be dismissed from
service. The respondent then applied to the High Court of
Orissa by petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution. inter alia, for a writ quashing the "’entire
proceedings before the Tribunal beginning from the charges
and culminating in the order of dismissal" and directing the
State of Orissa to forbear from giving effec to the order of
dismissal dated September 26, 1957,
651
and for a declaration that he be deemed to have continued in
his post as Sub-Registrar.
In support of his petition the respondent submitted that the
order of dismissal was void because the rules relating to
the holding of an enquiry against non-gezetted public
servants, called the Disciplinary Proceedings
(Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951. were discriminatory
and that in holding the enquiry against him the Tribunal had
violated the rules of natural justice. Following their view
in Dhirendranath Das v. State of Orissa(1), the High Court
held that the impugned rules were discriminatory and on that
account void, and that the respondent was entitled to a writ
declaring that the order of dismissal was inoperative. As,
however, the case of Dhirendranath Das(1) was carried in
appeal to this Court, the High Court proceeded to deal-with
the second submission. The High Court held that the
findings of the Tribunal on charges 1(a) and 1 (e) were
vitiated because it had failed to "observe the rules of
natural justice",, but they held that the findings on
charges 1(c), 1(d) and charge (2) were supported by evidence
and were not shown to be vitiated because of failure to
observe the rules of natural justice. The High Court
accordingly directed that if this Court disagreed with the
Dhirendra nath Das’s case(1), "the findings in respect of
charges 1(a) and 1(e) be set aside as being opposed to the
rules of natural justice but the findings in respect of
charges 1(c) and 1(d) and Charge (2) need not be disturbed",
and "that it would then be left to the Government to decide
whether, on the basis of those charges, the punishment of
dismissal should be maintained or else whether a lesser
punishment would suffice".
"The State of Orissa has appealed to this Court with
certificate of fitness granted by the High Court under Art.
132 of the Constitution. The High Court in Dhirendranath
Das’s case(1) had held that at the material time there were
in operation two sets of
(1) I. L. R. (1958) Cuttack 11.
652
rules governing enquiries against non-gazetted public
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servants : (i) the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative
Tribunal) Rules, 1951 (called the Tribunal Rules) and (ii)
the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1930 with the subsidiary rules framed thereunder such
as the Bihar and Orisa Subordinate Service Discipline and
Appeal Rules, 1935 (collectively called the Classification
Rules), and these two sets of rules provided for different
punishments and justified commencement of proceedings for
different reasons, and whereas there was a right of appeal
against the order of a departmental head imposing
punishment, under the Classification Rules there was no.
right of appeal. against the order of the Governor, imposing
punishment, under the Tribunal Rules. The High Court
observed "’the main difference between the two sets of rules
arises from (1) the nature of the punishment proposed, and
(2) the right of appeal. Under the Tribunal Rules the
findings of the Tribunal including the proposed punishment
are submitted to Government are in the nature of a
recommendation which the Government may or may not accept.
But the Government are bound to consult the Public Service
Commission before they pass final orders. Government have
the power to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement
under sub-r. (2) of r. 8 of the Tribunal rules in addition
to the other penalties, described in r. 49 of the
Classification rules. The right of appeal is expressly
barred by sub-rule (3) of r. 9. The Tribunal Rules do not
say that every case against a Government servant, whether
gazetted or non-gazetted, in which the acts of misconduct
alleged are any of those described in sub-rule (1) of r. 4
of the said Rules, should be invariably referred to the
Tribunal. Thus, if there are two non-gazetted Government
servants both of whom have committed identical acts of
misconduct such as failure to discharge duties properly, it
is left to the unfettered discretion of the Government to
refer the case of one of them to the
653
Tribunal for enquiry under the said rule-,, and to allow the
enquiry against the other public servant to be held
departmentally by his superior Officers under the provisions
of the Classification Rules. The former public servant will
have no right of appeal, but he will leave the satisfaction
of his case being enquired into not by his immediate
superiors, but by an independent authority, namely, the
Member, Administrative Tribunal, whose recommendation will
be subjected to further scrutiny by the Public Service
Commission and the final authority to pass any order of
punishment will be the Government. The latter public
servant however, though denied the advantage of having his
case investigated by independent authorities, is given a
statutory right of appeal. The procedure laid down in the
Classification Rules may be described as the normal
procedure for taking disciplinary action against the
Government servants, whether gazetted or non-gazetted; and
the procedure laid down in the Tribunal Rules may be
described as a drastic procedure". The High Court then
observed after considering the arguments advanced at the Bar
"that so far as non-gazetted Government servants are
concerned the provisions of the Tribunal Rules are less
advantageous and more drastic than those of the
Classification Rules and the conferment of an unfettered
discretion on the Executive to apply either of these rules
for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against a non-
gazetted Government servant would offend Art. 14 of the
Constitution". Accordingly the High Court quashed the order
of dismissal passed against the public servant concerned.
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Against the order of the High Court, an appeal was filed to
this Court. In this Court counsel for the State of Orissa
in that appeal made no attempt to challenge the correctness
of the decision of the High Court, on the question of
discrimination. The Tribunal Rules and the Classification
Rules were not even included in the Books prepared for the
use of this Court at the hearing. The only argument in
support of the appeal
654
advanced by counsel for the State was that the Classi-
fication Rules, were not in operation when enquiry was
directed against the delinquent public servant and the only
rules under which the enquiry could be directed were the
Tribunal Rules and therefore by directing an enquiry against
the delinquent public servant the guarantee of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was not violated.
This Court held that if two sets of rules were
simultaneously in operation at the material time, and by
order of the Governor, enquiry was directed against the
respondent under the Tribunal Rules which were "more
drastic" and "Prejudicial to the interests of the public
servant", a clear case of discrimination arose, and the
order directing the enquiry against the public servant and
the subsequent proceedings were liable to be struck down as
infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Court
accordingly dismissed the appeal of the State. An
application for review of ,judgment was then filed by the
State, and it was contended that as the Bihar & Orissa
Subordinate Services Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1935 were
not statutory rules and they did not constitute "law", and
that there had been some misapprehension about "the
submission made at the Bar which had led to an apparent
error on the face of the record". Even at that stage it was
not urged that the view taken by the High Court that the
Tribunal Rules were "more drastic and prejudicial to a
public servant against whom an enquiry was directed to be
made" could not on a true interpretation of the rules be
sustained. This Court rejected the application for review
of judgment.
In this appeal copies of the Bihar & Orissa Subordinate
Services Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1935 and the
Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules,
1951 are produced. Under the latter rules which were
referred to as the Tribunal Rules ’misconduct in the
discharge of official duties
655
is defined in Rule 2(c), "failure to discharge duties
properly’ in Rule 2(d) and ’personal immorality’ in Rule,
2(e). By Rule 3(4) the Tribunal constituted by the Governor
is authorised subject to the directions of the Governor to
co-opt an Assessor to assist it, such Assessor being a
departmental officer higher in rank in the department to the
official charged. By Rule 4 the Governor is authorised to
refer to the Tribunal cases relating to public servants in
respect of matters involving-
(a) misconduct in the discharge of official
duties;
(b) failure to discharge duties properly;
(c) irremediable general inefficiency in a
public servant of more than ten years’
standing: and
(d) personal immorality.
By Rule 7 the Tribunal is required to make such enquiry as
may be deemed appropriate and in conducting the enquiry the
Tribunal is to be guided by rules of equity and natural.
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justice and not by formal rules relating to procedure and
evidence. Clause (3) of Rule 7 provides that before
formulating its recommendations the Tribunal shall give a
summary of the charges against the official and shall if he
is not absconding or untraceable, give him an opportunity
orally or in writing, within the time to be specified by the
Tribunal to offer his explanation in respect of the charges.
Rule 8 provides that after completing its proceedings the
Tribunal shall make a record of the case in which it shall
state the charges, the explanation and its own findings, and
it shall, where satisfied, that punishment be imposed, also
formulate its recommendations about the punishment. Rule 9
provides that the Governor may, after considering the
recommendations of the Tribunal, pass such order of
656
punishment as he may deem appropriate. By el. (3) of Rule 9
an appeal against the order of the Governor is expressly
prohibited. By el. (iii) of Rule 1. of the, Bihar and
Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1935
it is provided that the Rules shall apply to all members of
Subordinate Services under the administrative control of the
Government of Bihar, and Orissa, except those for whose
appointments and conditions of employment special provision
was made by or under any-law for the time being in force.
By Rule 2 the penalties specified in the order may be
imposed "for good and sufficient reasons". The procedure to
be followed before an order of dismissal, removal or
reduction is passed, is the same as is set out in Rule 55 of
the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules. It is further directed that in drawing up
proceedings and conducting departmental enquiries, the
instructions contained in rr. 172 to 178 of the Bihar and
Orissa Board’s Miscellaneous Rules, 1928, are to be followed
except where more detailed instructions have been framed by
the Department concerned. Rule 4 of the Rules provides a
right to appeal to every member of a Subordinate Service, to
the authority immediately superior to the authority
imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 2 and
terminating his appointment otherwise than on the expiry of
the period of his appointment or on his reaching the age of
superannuation. Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classifica-
tion, Control and Appeal) Rules which is referred to in the
note to Rule 2, in so far as it is material, provides for
information being given in writing of the grounds on which
it is proposed to take action against the public servant and
to afford him an adequate opportunity of defending himself :
the grounds on which it is proposed to take action are to be
reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which
have to be communicated to the person charged together with
a statement of any allegation on which each charge is based
and of any other circumstances
657
which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing
orders on the case : the public servant concerned has within
a reasonable time, to put in his written statement of his
defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in
person; if he so desires, or if the authority concerned so
directs, an oral inquiry is to be held, at which inquiry
oral evidence as to such of the allegations as are not
admitted is to be led and the person charged is entitled to
cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and
to have such witnesses called as he may desire, provided
that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for special and
sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call
a witness. Rule 55 further provides that the proceedings
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shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a
statement of the findings and the grounds thereof and that
all or any of the provisions of the rule, may in exceptional
cases, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in
writing, be waived where there is difficulty in observing
the requirements of the rule and those requirements can be
waived without injustice to the person charged.
It is manifest that whereas detailed provisions are made in
the Tribunal Rules as to the grounds on which an enquiry may
be directed against a public servant for misconduct in the
discharge of official duties, failure to discharge duties
properly, general inefficiency or personal immorality, under
the Classification Rules for "good and sufficient reasons’
penalties may be imposed. The expression used in the
Classification Rules is somewhat vague, but whatever other
ground it may include, it does in our judgment include
charges described in Rule 4 of the Tribunal Rules. The
procedure to be followed in the enquiry under the Tribunal
Rules is not described in any detail. But it is clearly
indicated, that the public servant must be given a summary
of the charges against him and he must be given an
opportunity to submit his explanation orally or in writing,
in respect
658
of the charges, and that the Tribunal must in holding the
enquiry be guided by rules of natural justice and equity, in
the matter of procedure and evidence. The procedure
prescribed by Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules which is assimilated by virtue of
the note under Rule 2 into the Classification Rules, is set
out in greater detail, but is in substance not different
from the procedure under Rule 7 of the Tribunal Rules.
It is true that the Tribunal Rules do not set out the
punishments which may be imposed whereas the Classification
Rules set out the various punishments such as-, censure,
withholding of increments or promotion, including stoppage
at an efficiency bar, reduction to a lower post or time-
scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale, recovery from pay
of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to
Government by negligence or breach of order, fine,
suspension, removal from the Civil Service, which does not
disqualify from future employment and dismissal from the
Civil Service which ordinarily disqualifies from future
employment. But failure to enumerate the penalties which
may be imposed also does not indicate any variation between
the Tribunal Rules and the Classification Rules. Rule 2 of
the Classification Rules merely enumerates the diverse
punishments which may be imposed. This list is exhaustive,
and no penalties other than those enumerated are ever
imposed upon delinquent public servants. Under the Tribunal
Rules there is no enumeration of penalties, but it is left
to the Governor in his discretion, after considering the
report of the Tribunal to select the appropriate punishment
having regard to the gravity of the delinquency.
This Court in Sardar Kapur Singh v. The Union of India(1)
has held that even if the procedure prescribed under a
particular method adopted for enquiry is more detailed than
that prescribed by Rule 55 of the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and
(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 569.
659
Appeal) Rules, if in accordance with both the sets of rules
notice has to be given of charges and the materials on which
the charges are sought to be sustained and if the public
servant so desires he can demand an oral hearing and
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examination of witnesses, it cannot be said that there is
any discrimination. In Sardar Kapur Singh’s case(1) it was
contended that an enquiry under the procedure prescribed by
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 was void as
discriminatory when an enquiry could have been made under
the procedure prescribed by rule 55 of the Civil Services
Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. This Court held
that the procedure under Rule 55 of the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was described in
terms elastic, but the procedure under the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 not being substantially different, an
enquiry directed under the latter procedure and not under
Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules did not result in any discrimination leading
to the invalidation of proceedings started against the
public servant under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act,
1850. It was observed in that case that in the absence of
proof of any prejudice to the public servant concerned, mere
adoption of one procedure in preference to another
permissible procedure will not justify an inference of
unlawful discrimination.
Under the Classification Rules there is a right of appeal
from an order imposing a penalty passed by a departmental
head to the latter’s superior whereas there is no such right
of appeal against the order passed by the Governor imposing
penalty upon a public servant. But this also cannot be
regarded as a ground sustaining a plea of unlawful
discrimination. In Jagannath Prasad v. State, _of U. P.(2),
the question whether an enquiry directed against a public
servant under the Rules of the State of Uttar Pradesh
similar to the Orissa Tribunal Rules which provided no right
of appeal from the order of the Governor
(1) [1960] 2 S. C. R. 569.
(2) [1962] 1 S.C. R. 151.
660
imposing punishment and not under Rules similar to the
Orissa Classification Rules which provided a right of appeal
against an order dismissing a public servant in the
employment of the State of Uttar Pradesh, was discriminatory
fell to be considered, and it was held that the enquiry
under the Tribunal Rules was not discriminatory. The public
servant concerned in that case was a police officer against
whom an enquiry was commenced before the Constitution, which
resulted after the commencement of the Constitution in an
order of dismissal. The enquiry against the public servant
was directed under the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings
(Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 by a Tribunal
appointed by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. At this time
there were in operation also the U. P. Police Regulations
which were framed under the Indian Police Act. which
authorised the Governor to dismiss a Police Officer employed
in the State. The Tribunal Rules of the State of U. P. were
framed in exercise of the powers vested under s. 7 of the
Police Act. The Police Regulations framed by the Government
of U. P. and Tribunal Rules in so far as they were not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
remained in operation by virtue of Art. 313 even after the
commencement of the Constitution. Therefore at the material
time there were two sets of rules for holding an enquiry
against ’a police officer. The Police authorities could
direct an enquiry under the Police Regulations and the
procedure in that behalf was prescribed by Regulation 490;
it was also open to the Governor of the State to direct an
enquiry against a public servant under Rule 4 of the U. P.
Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules.
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Relying on the existence of the two distinct sets of rules
simultaneously, and the power vested in the State
authorities to commence enquiry against the Police Officer
under either of these two sets of rules in respect of
charges set out in Rule 4 of the Tribunal Rules, it was
urged that in commencing
661
an enquiry against the public servant concerned under the
Tribunal Rules discrimination was practised and he was
deprived of the guarantee of equal protection of laws. It
was held that even after the commencement of the
Constitution, continuation of the enquiry against the
delinquent public servant under the U. P. Disciplinary
Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 did not
result in any unlawful discrimination infringing the
protection of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Under the Police
Regulation an appeal did lie from a subordinate police
authority to a superior authority whereas no appeal lay from
the order passed by the Governor accepting the
recommendations of Tribunal. In considering the effect of
the decision in State of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das(1) on
which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant in that
case, it was observed that the case was not an authority for
the proposition that where out of the two sets of rules in
force it is open to the authorities to resort to one for
holding an enquiry against a public servant charged with
misdemeanor and if one of such set of rules does not provide
for a right of appeal against an order passed against the
public servant and the other set provides for a right of
appeal, unlawful discrimination results: the only point
decided in state of Orissa v. Dhirendranath Das case(1) was
that at the material time there were in existence two sets
of rules simultaneously in operation, it being accepted that
the Tribunal Rules under which the enquiry was made against
the public servant were " more drastic" and "prejudicial to
the public servant". The Court then proceeded to hold that
the procedure under the U. P. Disciplinary Proceedings
(Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 and the procedure
under the enquiry commenced under the U. P. Police
Regulations were substantially the same and the mere fact
that there was a right of appeal against the order of
penalty imposed by a, subordinate police authority and there
was no such right against the order of the Governor
accepting the recommendations
(1) A.I.R. (196) S.C. 1715.
662
of the Tribunal did not make any discriminations justifying
this Court in striking down the Tribunal Rules as being
discriminatory under Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was
observed in Jagannath Prasad’s case (1):
"Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations sets
out the procedure to be followed in apt
enquiry by the police functionaries, and rr. 8
and 9 of the Tribunal Rules set out the
procedure to be followed by the Tribunal.
There is no substantial difference between the
procedure prescribed for the two forms of
enquiry. The enquiry in its true nature is
quasi-judicial. It is manifest from the very
nature of the enquiry that the approach to the
materials placed before the enquiring body
should be judicial. It is true that by
Regulation 490, the oral evidence is to be
direct, but even under r. 8 of the Tribunal
Rules,, the Tribunal is to be guided by rules
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of equity and natural justice and is not bound
by formal rules of procedure relating to
evidence. It was urged that whereas the tri-
burnal may admit on record evidence which is
hear-say, the oral evidence under the Police
Regulations must be direct evidence and hear-
say is excluded. We do not think that any
such distinction was intended. Even though
the Tribunal is not bound by formal rules
relating to procedure and evidence, it cannot
rely on evidence which is purely hearsay,
because to do so in an enquiry of this nature
would be contrary to rules of equity and
natural justice. The provisions for
maintaining the record and calling upon the
delinquent public servant to submit Is
explanation are substantially the same under
Regulation 490 of the Police Regulations and
r. 8 of the Tribunal Rules. It is urged that
under the Tribunal Rules, there is a departure
(1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 151
663
in respect of important matters from the
Police Regulations which render the Tribunal
Rules prejudicial to the person against whom
enquiry is held under those rules. Firstly,
it is submitted that there is. no. right of
appeal under the Tribunal Rules as is given
under the Police Regulations; secondly, that
the Governor is bound to act according to the
recommendations of the Tribunal and thirdly,
that under the Tribunal Rules, even if the
complexity of a case under enquiry justifies
engagement of counsel to assist the person
charged, assistance by counsel may not be
permitted at the enquiry. These three
variations, it is urged, make the Tribunal
Rules not only discriminatory but prejudicial
as well to the person against whom enquiry is
held under these Rules. In our view, this
plea cannot be sustained. The Tribunal Rules
and the Police Regulations in so far as they
deal with enquiries against police officers
are promulgated under s. 7 of the Police Act,
and neither the Tribunal Rules nor the Police
Regulations provide an appeal against an order
of dismissal or reduction in rank which the
Governor may pass. The fact that an order
made by a police authority is made appealable
whereas the order passed by the Governor is
not made appealable is not a ground on which
the validity of the Tribunal Rules can be
challenged. In either case, the final order
rests with the Governor who has to decide the
matter himself. Equal protection of the laws
does not postulate equal treatment of all
persons without discrimination to all persons
similarly situated. The power of the Legisla-
ture to make a distinction between persons or
transactions based on a real differential is
not taken away by the equal protection clause.
Therefore by providing- a right of appeal
against the order of police authorities acting
under the Police Regulations imposing
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penalties upon a member of the police force,
and by providing no such right of appeal when
the order passed is by the Governor, no
discrimination inviting the application of
Art. 14 is practised."
The plea that there was discrimination because there was a
right of appeal against an order imposing penalty under one
set of rules, and no such right under the other, was
rejected in Jagannath Prasad v. State of U. P. (1). It must
therefore be held that the existence of a right of appeal
against the order of an administrative head imposing penalty
and absence of such a right of appeal against the order of
the Governor under the Tribunal Rules, does not result in
discrimination contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The High Court has held that there was evidence to support
the findings on heads (c) & (d) of Charge (1) and on Charge
(2). In respect of charge 1(b) the respondent was acquitted
by the Tribunal and it did not fall to be considered by the
Governor. In respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e) in the view
of the High Court "the rules of natural justice had not been
observed". The recommendation of the Tribunal was
undoubtedly founded on its findings on charges 1(a), 1(e),
1(c), 1(d) and Charge (2). The High Court was of the
opinion that the findings on two of the heads under Charge
(1) could not be sustained, because in arriving at the
findings the Tribunal had violated rules of natural justice.
The High Court therefore directed that the Government of the
State of Orissa should decide whether "on the basis of those
charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or
else whether a lesser punishment would suffice". It is not
necessary for us to consider whether the High Court was
right in holding that the findings of the Tribunal on
charges 1(a) and 1(e) were vitiated for reasons set out by
it, because in our judgment the
(1) [1962] 1. S.C.R. 151
order of the High Court Directing the Government to
reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for reasons we
Will Presently set out,, be sustained. If the order of
dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1(a) and 1(e)
alone the Court would have jurisdictions declare the order
of dismissal illegal but when the findings the Tribunal
relating to the two of five a of the first charge and the
second charge was found, not liable to be interfered. with
by the ,High ’Court and those findings established that the
respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in
our view , the High Court had no power to direct the
Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal.
The constitutional guarantee afforded to a public servant is
that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and that he
shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until
he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
The reasonable opportunity contemplated has manifestly to be
in accordance with the rules framed under Art. 309 of the
Constitution. But the Court in a case in which an order of
dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned
to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is
justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the
gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which
induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry
consistent with the prescribed rules, is not justiciable:
nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High
Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the finding
the Tribunal were "unassailable", the order of the Governor
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on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining
the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the
High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to
review the penalty, for as we have already observed the
order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a
public servant., if the
666
conditions of the constitutional protection have been
complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order
may be supported on any finding as to substantial
misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be
imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that
ground alone would have weighed with the authority in
dismissing the public servant. The Court has no
jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the
Tribunal Prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to
direct the authority to reconsider that order because in
respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that
there had been violation of the rules of natural justice.
The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing
the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question.
The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed
by the High Court set aside. Having regard to the
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to
costs in this Court and the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
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