Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 75
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s).16536 of 2025)
POGADADABNDA REVATHI & ANR.
…. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF TELANGANA ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The instant appeal by special leave is directed
th
against the order dated 13 October, 2025 passed by
1
the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in
Criminal Petition No.13071 of 2025.
4. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of
the appeal are noted hereinbelow.
4.1 An FIR bearing No. 527 of 2025 was registered
th
on 10 March, 2025 at Cyber Crimes Police Station,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2026.01.20
15:26:01 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.
1
Hyderabad against unknown persons under Section
67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and
Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Sections 504 and 505
(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] on the basis of a
complaint filed by one Mr. S. Kailash.
2
4.2 The appellants herein, namely, Pogadadabnda
Revathi and Bandi Sandhya were arrested in
connection with the aforesaid FIR and were presented
before the learned XII Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate,
3 th
Hyderabad on 12 March, 2025 and were remanded
th
to judicial custody till 26 March, 2025 by an order
of even date.
th
4.3 On 13 March, 2025, the Inspector of Police,
Cyber Crimes Police Station, Hyderabad moved an
application before the learned Magistrate seeking
police custody of the accused-appellants for a period
of five days. The said application was rejected vide
th
order dated 17 March, 2025 and the following
reasons were assigned for declining police custody: -
“6. It is well settled law that the magistrate will have
to satisfy himself that the presence of the accused in
2
Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘accused-appellants’.
3
Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘learned Magistrate.
2
police custody is whether absolutely necessary. The
Court shall look into the evidence and material
collected by the investigating agency. Remand to
police custody should not be granted to collect the
material and evidence. In case, where it is impossible
for the police authorities to go further in the
investigation and in those cases only remand to the
police custody Is justified by law.
7. In the present case, admittedly the present
investigating officer examined the material witnesses
and recorded the confession panchanama of the A1
& A2 and also seized incriminating material i.e. One
Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two Segate Hard Disk,
One-Pulse Media Logo, TP Link Wifi Router and 7
CPU's under cover of seizure panchanama. In
addition to it the laptop, mobile phone of husband of
A1 are also seized by police. Under these facts and
circumstances, this court does not find any tenable
grounds to grant police custody of the accused
herein for the reasons assigned in the requisition
and it appears that the presence of the respondents
is not required for police custody to proceed with
further. The petition is devoid of merits and liable to
be dismissed.”
4.4 It is pertinent to mention here that the learned
th
Magistrate vide a separate order of even date i.e. 17
March, 2025 enlarged the accused-appellants on
bail.
4.5 Being aggrieved by the order of the learned
Magistrate rejecting the request for grant of police
custody, the respondent, the State of Telangana
3
through the Inspector of Police, preferred a revision
petition before the learned Sessions Judge at
th
Nampally, Hyderabad, who vide order dated 26
September, 2025 allowed the same and directed that
the accused-appellants be remanded to police
th th
custody from 6 October, 2025 to 8 October, 2025.
However, the said order was subsequently modified,
th
altering the period of custody from 13 October, 2025
th
to 15 October, 2025.
4.6 It is imperative to state here that in the order
granting police custody of the accused-appellants,
the learned Sessions Judge has completely glossed
over the fact that the accused-appellants had already
been granted regular bail by the learned Magistrate
th
vide a separate order dated 17 March, 2025.
4.7 Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order of
learned Sessions Judge, the accused-appellants
assailed the same before the High Court by way of a
criminal petition. The High Court, vide order dated
th
13 October, 2025, dismissed the said petition. The
aforesaid order of the High Court rejecting the
criminal petition forms the subject matter of
challenge in the present appeal by special leave.
4
5. Learned Counsel representing the accused-
appellants urged that the learned Magistrate rejected
the application filed by the investigating officer on
th
17 March, 2025, seeking police custody of the
accused-appellants by assigning detailed reasons
and the accused-appellants were granted regular bail
on the very same day. He urged that neither the
Sessions Court nor the High Court, applied mind to
the fact that the police custody remand had been
denied by the learned Magistrate by assigning cogent
reasons and the accused-appellants had also been
released on bail. Thus, directing police custody of the
accused-appellants nearly 7 months after they had
been released on bail and that too, without due
appreciation of the reasons assigned in the order
th
dated 17 March, 2025 passed by the learned
Magistrate declining police custody, is nothing but a
gross abuse of the process of law. It was submitted
that so long as the order granting bail remains in
force, no direction granting police custody could have
been lawfully issued.
6. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State vehemently and fervently
supported the impugned order and submitted that
5
the same was passed strictly in accordance with law
and does not warrant interference.
7. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced at bar and have gone through the
impugned order.
8. Learned Single Judge of the High Court while
rejecting the Criminal Petition filed by the appellant
took note of the provisions of Section 187 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
[Corresponding Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973] which provides that police custody
for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole or
in parts, may be granted by the Magistrate during the
initial forty days or sixty days, as the case may be,
out of the total detention period of sixty days or
ninety days.
9. In the present case, since none of the offences
are punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, the
statutory period applicable for grant of police custody
would be forty days.
10. Learned Magistrate, while declining the
application for police custody, took note of the factum
of extensive investigation already having been carried
6
out and the consequential recoveries of incriminating
materials viz . One Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two
Segate Hard Disk, One Pulse Media Logo, TP Link
Wifi Router and 7 CPUs from the accused-appellants.
In addition to the aforesaid recoveries, laptop and
mobile phone of appellant No. 1’s husband were also
seized.
11. Needless to say, the discretion whether or not to
grant police custody remand is vested exclusively
with the Magistrate and once the Magistrate exercises
such discretion accepting or declining the prayer for
police custody, by assigning reasons, such order
should ordinarily not be interfered with by the
revisional forum unless gross perversity is shown in
the order of the Magistrate.
12. We are afraid that the learned Sessions Judge,
while accepting the revision, has completely
overlooked the order passed by the learned
Magistrate and went on to record that further
recoveries were to be made from the accused-
appellants and their detailed confessional statements
had to be recorded and for the said reasons, police
custody remand was essential.
7
13. We find both the reasons to be unacceptable
and perverse on the face of record in view of the fact
that the order of the learned Magistrate specifically
refers to the recoveries of the subject devices used for
posting the offensive messages having been effected
and extensive interrogation having been carried out
from the accused-appellants.
14. In this background, we are of the firm view that
the learned Sessions Judge, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction ought not to have interfered in
the well-reasoned order passed by the learned
Magistrate. Rather, we find that the learned Sessions
Judge did not even advert to the order of the learned
Magistrate in the correct perspective while deciding
the revision.
15. The order granting police custody was passed
by the revisional Court after more than 6 months
from the date on which police custody was declined
by the learned Magistrate and the accused-
appellants were released on bail. Thus, the revisional
Court as well as the High Court clearly seem to have
fallen into error while directing the grant of police
custody of the accused-appellants for investigation in
connection with the aforesaid FIR.
8
16. It is pertinent to mention that the accused-
appellants had already been enlarged on bail.
Granting police custody for a period of three days
would necessarily require the accused-appellants to
be taken back into custody and curtailing their
liberty for that period of 3 days, which would, in
effect, tantamount to cancellation of bail in an
indirect manner, without adherence to the settled
legal parameters governing cancellation of bail.
17. It is a settled position of law that where the
investigating agency seeks police remand of an
accused who has already been enlarged on bail, the
proper and legally permissible course is to first seek
cancellation of bail in accordance with law and only
thereafter apply for police custody. The scheme of
criminal procedure does not countenance the grant
of police remand of an accused who continues to
enjoy the protection of bail, as such a course would
effectively defeat and nullify the order granting bail.
18. In this regard we may refer to Satyajit
Ballubhai Desai v. State of Gujarat reported in
(2014) 14 SCC 434 wherein this Court observed as
follows: -
9
“19. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
learned Magistrate as also the High Court appear
to have adopted a casual or a mechanical approach
permitting police remand of the appellants without
scrutinising the reasons, ignoring the fact that
the appellants had already been enlarged on bail
by the High Court and the dispute with the
complainant Surjaben who had lodged the
complaint had already been settled. Thus, the
existing facts and circumstance prima facie
were clearly not so grave or extraordinary
justifying police remand which could have been
overlooked by the High Court even though it
was for three days only as it was bound to have
ramifications not only affecting the liberty of
the person who was already granted bail but also
the Magistrate nullifying the order of the High
Court granting bail, even if it was for a period of
three days only.
20. In fact, when the accused had been enlarged
on bail by the High Court, it was all the more
essential initially for the police authorities and
thereafter by the Magistrate to disclose and
assign convincing reasons why investigation
could not proceed further without seeking
police remand of the accused and in case police
remand was sought on any ground of interference
with the investigation in any manner alleging
influencing the witnesses or tampering with the
evidence in any manner, straightaway it could have
been a case for cancellation of bail of the accused
and the Magistrate could have directed the police
authorities to approach the High Court seeking
cancellation or any other appropriate direction.
21. What is sought to be emphasised is that the
disclosure of reasons by the Magistrate allowing
10
police remand especially in a matter when the
accused has been enlarged on bail by the High
Court is all the more essential and cannot be
permitted in the absence of a valid and
sufficiently weighty reason seeking such
custody, as it clearly affects the liberty of an
individual who has been enlarged on bail by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid
decision makes it abundantly clear that when an
accused is enlarged on bail, police custody cannot be
granted so long as the order of bail continues to
operate. In the present case, the accused-appellants
th
stand enlarged on bail by effect of the order dated 17
March, 2025 passed by the learned Magistrate, which
has not been challenged before any forum and
consequently the grant of police custody in the face
of an existing bail order would amount to indirect
cancellation of bail.
20. In view of the above discussion, the impugned
th
orders dated 13 October, 2025 passed by the High
th
Court and 26 September, 2025, passed by learned
Sessions Judge do not stand to scrutiny and are
hereby set aside.
21. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
11
22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 09, 2026.
12
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s).16536 of 2025)
POGADADABNDA REVATHI & ANR.
…. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF TELANGANA ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. The instant appeal by special leave is directed
th
against the order dated 13 October, 2025 passed by
1
the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in
Criminal Petition No.13071 of 2025.
4. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of
the appeal are noted hereinbelow.
4.1 An FIR bearing No. 527 of 2025 was registered
th
on 10 March, 2025 at Cyber Crimes Police Station,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2026.01.20
15:26:01 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.
1
Hyderabad against unknown persons under Section
67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and
Sections 352 and 353(2) of the Bhartiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 [Corresponding Sections 504 and 505
(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] on the basis of a
complaint filed by one Mr. S. Kailash.
2
4.2 The appellants herein, namely, Pogadadabnda
Revathi and Bandi Sandhya were arrested in
connection with the aforesaid FIR and were presented
before the learned XII Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate,
3 th
Hyderabad on 12 March, 2025 and were remanded
th
to judicial custody till 26 March, 2025 by an order
of even date.
th
4.3 On 13 March, 2025, the Inspector of Police,
Cyber Crimes Police Station, Hyderabad moved an
application before the learned Magistrate seeking
police custody of the accused-appellants for a period
of five days. The said application was rejected vide
th
order dated 17 March, 2025 and the following
reasons were assigned for declining police custody: -
“6. It is well settled law that the magistrate will have
to satisfy himself that the presence of the accused in
2
Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘accused-appellants’.
3
Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘learned Magistrate.
2
police custody is whether absolutely necessary. The
Court shall look into the evidence and material
collected by the investigating agency. Remand to
police custody should not be granted to collect the
material and evidence. In case, where it is impossible
for the police authorities to go further in the
investigation and in those cases only remand to the
police custody Is justified by law.
7. In the present case, admittedly the present
investigating officer examined the material witnesses
and recorded the confession panchanama of the A1
& A2 and also seized incriminating material i.e. One
Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two Segate Hard Disk,
One-Pulse Media Logo, TP Link Wifi Router and 7
CPU's under cover of seizure panchanama. In
addition to it the laptop, mobile phone of husband of
A1 are also seized by police. Under these facts and
circumstances, this court does not find any tenable
grounds to grant police custody of the accused
herein for the reasons assigned in the requisition
and it appears that the presence of the respondents
is not required for police custody to proceed with
further. The petition is devoid of merits and liable to
be dismissed.”
4.4 It is pertinent to mention here that the learned
th
Magistrate vide a separate order of even date i.e. 17
March, 2025 enlarged the accused-appellants on
bail.
4.5 Being aggrieved by the order of the learned
Magistrate rejecting the request for grant of police
custody, the respondent, the State of Telangana
3
through the Inspector of Police, preferred a revision
petition before the learned Sessions Judge at
th
Nampally, Hyderabad, who vide order dated 26
September, 2025 allowed the same and directed that
the accused-appellants be remanded to police
th th
custody from 6 October, 2025 to 8 October, 2025.
However, the said order was subsequently modified,
th
altering the period of custody from 13 October, 2025
th
to 15 October, 2025.
4.6 It is imperative to state here that in the order
granting police custody of the accused-appellants,
the learned Sessions Judge has completely glossed
over the fact that the accused-appellants had already
been granted regular bail by the learned Magistrate
th
vide a separate order dated 17 March, 2025.
4.7 Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order of
learned Sessions Judge, the accused-appellants
assailed the same before the High Court by way of a
criminal petition. The High Court, vide order dated
th
13 October, 2025, dismissed the said petition. The
aforesaid order of the High Court rejecting the
criminal petition forms the subject matter of
challenge in the present appeal by special leave.
4
5. Learned Counsel representing the accused-
appellants urged that the learned Magistrate rejected
the application filed by the investigating officer on
th
17 March, 2025, seeking police custody of the
accused-appellants by assigning detailed reasons
and the accused-appellants were granted regular bail
on the very same day. He urged that neither the
Sessions Court nor the High Court, applied mind to
the fact that the police custody remand had been
denied by the learned Magistrate by assigning cogent
reasons and the accused-appellants had also been
released on bail. Thus, directing police custody of the
accused-appellants nearly 7 months after they had
been released on bail and that too, without due
appreciation of the reasons assigned in the order
th
dated 17 March, 2025 passed by the learned
Magistrate declining police custody, is nothing but a
gross abuse of the process of law. It was submitted
that so long as the order granting bail remains in
force, no direction granting police custody could have
been lawfully issued.
6. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State vehemently and fervently
supported the impugned order and submitted that
5
the same was passed strictly in accordance with law
and does not warrant interference.
7. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced at bar and have gone through the
impugned order.
8. Learned Single Judge of the High Court while
rejecting the Criminal Petition filed by the appellant
took note of the provisions of Section 187 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
[Corresponding Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973] which provides that police custody
for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole or
in parts, may be granted by the Magistrate during the
initial forty days or sixty days, as the case may be,
out of the total detention period of sixty days or
ninety days.
9. In the present case, since none of the offences
are punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, the
statutory period applicable for grant of police custody
would be forty days.
10. Learned Magistrate, while declining the
application for police custody, took note of the factum
of extensive investigation already having been carried
6
out and the consequential recoveries of incriminating
materials viz . One Dell Laptop, Asus Laptop, Two
Segate Hard Disk, One Pulse Media Logo, TP Link
Wifi Router and 7 CPUs from the accused-appellants.
In addition to the aforesaid recoveries, laptop and
mobile phone of appellant No. 1’s husband were also
seized.
11. Needless to say, the discretion whether or not to
grant police custody remand is vested exclusively
with the Magistrate and once the Magistrate exercises
such discretion accepting or declining the prayer for
police custody, by assigning reasons, such order
should ordinarily not be interfered with by the
revisional forum unless gross perversity is shown in
the order of the Magistrate.
12. We are afraid that the learned Sessions Judge,
while accepting the revision, has completely
overlooked the order passed by the learned
Magistrate and went on to record that further
recoveries were to be made from the accused-
appellants and their detailed confessional statements
had to be recorded and for the said reasons, police
custody remand was essential.
7
13. We find both the reasons to be unacceptable
and perverse on the face of record in view of the fact
that the order of the learned Magistrate specifically
refers to the recoveries of the subject devices used for
posting the offensive messages having been effected
and extensive interrogation having been carried out
from the accused-appellants.
14. In this background, we are of the firm view that
the learned Sessions Judge, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction ought not to have interfered in
the well-reasoned order passed by the learned
Magistrate. Rather, we find that the learned Sessions
Judge did not even advert to the order of the learned
Magistrate in the correct perspective while deciding
the revision.
15. The order granting police custody was passed
by the revisional Court after more than 6 months
from the date on which police custody was declined
by the learned Magistrate and the accused-
appellants were released on bail. Thus, the revisional
Court as well as the High Court clearly seem to have
fallen into error while directing the grant of police
custody of the accused-appellants for investigation in
connection with the aforesaid FIR.
8
16. It is pertinent to mention that the accused-
appellants had already been enlarged on bail.
Granting police custody for a period of three days
would necessarily require the accused-appellants to
be taken back into custody and curtailing their
liberty for that period of 3 days, which would, in
effect, tantamount to cancellation of bail in an
indirect manner, without adherence to the settled
legal parameters governing cancellation of bail.
17. It is a settled position of law that where the
investigating agency seeks police remand of an
accused who has already been enlarged on bail, the
proper and legally permissible course is to first seek
cancellation of bail in accordance with law and only
thereafter apply for police custody. The scheme of
criminal procedure does not countenance the grant
of police remand of an accused who continues to
enjoy the protection of bail, as such a course would
effectively defeat and nullify the order granting bail.
18. In this regard we may refer to Satyajit
Ballubhai Desai v. State of Gujarat reported in
(2014) 14 SCC 434 wherein this Court observed as
follows: -
9
“19. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
learned Magistrate as also the High Court appear
to have adopted a casual or a mechanical approach
permitting police remand of the appellants without
scrutinising the reasons, ignoring the fact that
the appellants had already been enlarged on bail
by the High Court and the dispute with the
complainant Surjaben who had lodged the
complaint had already been settled. Thus, the
existing facts and circumstance prima facie
were clearly not so grave or extraordinary
justifying police remand which could have been
overlooked by the High Court even though it
was for three days only as it was bound to have
ramifications not only affecting the liberty of
the person who was already granted bail but also
the Magistrate nullifying the order of the High
Court granting bail, even if it was for a period of
three days only.
20. In fact, when the accused had been enlarged
on bail by the High Court, it was all the more
essential initially for the police authorities and
thereafter by the Magistrate to disclose and
assign convincing reasons why investigation
could not proceed further without seeking
police remand of the accused and in case police
remand was sought on any ground of interference
with the investigation in any manner alleging
influencing the witnesses or tampering with the
evidence in any manner, straightaway it could have
been a case for cancellation of bail of the accused
and the Magistrate could have directed the police
authorities to approach the High Court seeking
cancellation or any other appropriate direction.
21. What is sought to be emphasised is that the
disclosure of reasons by the Magistrate allowing
10
police remand especially in a matter when the
accused has been enlarged on bail by the High
Court is all the more essential and cannot be
permitted in the absence of a valid and
sufficiently weighty reason seeking such
custody, as it clearly affects the liberty of an
individual who has been enlarged on bail by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid
decision makes it abundantly clear that when an
accused is enlarged on bail, police custody cannot be
granted so long as the order of bail continues to
operate. In the present case, the accused-appellants
th
stand enlarged on bail by effect of the order dated 17
March, 2025 passed by the learned Magistrate, which
has not been challenged before any forum and
consequently the grant of police custody in the face
of an existing bail order would amount to indirect
cancellation of bail.
20. In view of the above discussion, the impugned
th
orders dated 13 October, 2025 passed by the High
th
Court and 26 September, 2025, passed by learned
Sessions Judge do not stand to scrutiny and are
hereby set aside.
21. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
11
22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 09, 2026.
12