Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GWALIOR RAYON SILK MFG. (WVG.) CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS PALGHAT AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1990
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
SAHAI, R.M. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 1747 1990 SCR (2) 401
1990 SCC Supl. 785 JT 1990 (2) 130
1990 SCALE (1)689
ACT:
Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act,
1971: Sections 2(f)(1)(i)(C), 3(1) and (2): ’Private For-
est’--Vesting in Government--’Any other agricultural
crop’--Does not include all species of trees including
eucalyptus plantations--Only fruit bearing trees are exclud-
ed--Land planted with eucalyptus--Held vested in Government
--Object of the Act explained.
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (As amended by Amendment
Act 35 of 1969): Section 2(47)(iv): Scope and meaning ac-
corded to ’Private Forest’--Held inapplicable to Kerala
Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971:
The Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949--Object
of.
Statutory interpretation: Words defined in a
statute--Judicial interpretation of--Does not afford a guide
to construction of the same words in another statute unless
the statutes are pari materia legislations.
Legislative intention--Ascertainment of--Judges should
not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also
listen attentively to what the legislature does not say.
Words and Phrases: ’Agriculture’, ’Agricultural Crop’,
’Garden’ and ’Nilam ’--meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant company was maintaining a large eucalyptus
plantation for captive consumption in its production of
Rayon Grade Pulp. The State of Kerala claimed that as a
consequence of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and
Assignment) Act, 1971, the eucalyptus plantation being a
’private forest’ stood transferred to and vested in it. The
company resisted the State’s claim on the ground that the
term ’private forest’ excludes the eucalyptus plantation.
The High Court decided the question in favour of the State
and against the appellant.
402
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf
of the appellant that since the eucalyptus plantation was
covered by the expression ’any other agricultural crop’ in
section 2(47)(iv) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 the
similar expression used in section 2(f)(1)(i)(C) of the
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Vesting Act, 1971 must also carry the same meaning.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court.
HELD: 1. Judicial interpretation given to the words
defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construc-
tion of the same words in another statute unless the stat-
utes are pari materia legislations. [408G]
1.1 The definition of ’private forest’ in the Kerala
Land Reforms Act is not just the same as the definition of
’private forest’ in the Vesting Act. Indeed, there is a vast
difference between the two. Two separate definitions have
been provided in the Vesting Act; the first is applicable to
the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of Pri-
vate Forests Act, 1949 applied immediately before the ap-
pointed day; the second concerned is in relation to the
remaining areas in the State of Kerala. The definition of
’private forest’ as is applicable to the Malabar district is
not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to
which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act ap-
plied, and exempts there from lands described under sub-
clauses (A) to (D). This significant reference to this Act
in the definition of ’private forest’ in the Vesting Act
makes all the difference in the case. The scheme of this Act
appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest
on the date on which the Act came into force, it would
continue to be a forest, even if there was subsequent re-
plantation. [408H; 409A-D]
1.2 The lands involved in this appeal were all forests
as defined in the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act
and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force.
Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning
accorded to ’private forest’ from the Kerala Land Reforms
Act to the Vesting Act. [409E-F]
State of Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co., [1980]
Ker. L.T. 215 and State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji, A.I.R.
1984 Ker. 149 referred to.
Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala &
Ors., [1973] 1 SCR 399, Held inapplicable.
403
State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co.
Ltd., [1974] 1 SCR 671, referred to.
2. The term ’agriculture’ and ’agricultural crop’ have
wider as well as narrower connotation. The wider concept
covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent
operations. It takes within its fold among other things, the
products of the land which have some utility either for
consumption or for trade and commerce including forest
products such as timber, sal and piyasal, trees, casuarina
plantations, tendu leaves, coconuts etc. Of course there
must be present all throughout the basic idea that there
must be cultivation of the land in the sense of tilling of
the lands, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar work
done in the land. The forest growth or spontaneous growth of
any product, plants or trees, however, would be outside the
characteristic of agricultural products or operations.
[407D-F]
Commissioner of 1. T. West Bengal v. Raja Benoy Kumar
Sahas Roy, [1958] SCR 101, referred to.
2.1 Under Section 3(1), private forests vest in Govern-
ment. Subsection (2) however, excludes from such vesting
lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if
they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for
this purpose ’includes cultivation of trees or plants of any
species’. The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this
aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of
any kind of tree, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or
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pulp are not vested under section 3 sub-section (2). The
legislature has thus excluded from vesting under section 3
sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while pro-
viding for exclusion under sub-clause (C) of section
2(f)(1)(i), the legislature could not have again thought of
trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered
only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. Sub-
clause (C) refers to lands which are principally cultivated
with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It next refers to
lands which are principally cultivated with any other agri-
cultural crop. If the legislature had intended to’ use the
term ’agricultural crop’ in a wide sense so as to take
within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or other-
wise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denot-
ing only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. Therefore,
there is no indication that the words ’any other agricultur-
al crop’ in sub-clause (C) are quite wide enough to compre-
hend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations.
These words exclude only fruit-bearing trees. [410H; 41 1A-
D]
State of Kerala v. Amalgamated Malabar Estates, A.I.R. 1980
404
Ker. 137; State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd.,
A.I.R. 1981
Ker. 1 and State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji & Ors., A.I.R.
1984
Ker. 149, approved.
3. In seeking legislative intention, judges not only
listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen atten
tively to what the legislature does not say. [410G-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 698 of
1980.
From the Judgment dated the 2.5.1979 of the Kerala High
Court in M.F.A. 346 of 1978.
M.M. Abdul Khader, Darshan Singh and Praveen Kumar for
the Appellant.
P.S. Poti, P.K. Pillai (N.P.), T.T. Kunnhikannan and Ms.
Malini Poduval for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave from a
Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a short
question of construction of the plain words of a term
’private forest’ as defined in a statutory enactment called
"The Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 197
1 (called shortly "The Vesting Act"). The High Court has
decided the question in favour of the State and against the
appellant. The judgment of the High Court has since been
reported in AIR 1980 Kerala 137. The view expressed by the
High Court has been subsequently affirmed by another Full
Bench in State of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd., AIR
1981 Kerala 1 and reiterated by a larger Bench of five
Judges in State of Kerala v.K.C. Moosa Haji & Ors., AIR 1984
Kerala 149,
Losing the construction argument, the appellant has
appealed to this Court.
The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of
this judgment, save to state in the barest outline that the
appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered
in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial under-
takings is located in Bilakootam, Mavoor in Kozhikode Dis-
trict, Kerala State. This establishment pro-
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405
duces Rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other
species of wood as basic raw material. It has a large euca-
lyptus plantation coveting thousands of acres, maintained as
captive raw material for use in the factory. The State says
that as a consequence of the Vesting Act, the eucalyptus
8plantation being a private forest and not excluded there-
from is vested in the State with no fight, title and inter-
est subsisting with the company. The claim of the company,
however, is that the term ’private forest’ as defined under
the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptus plantation.
’Private forest’ has been defined in the Vesting Act as
well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as
amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 ("The KLR Act"). Since
counsel for the appellant largely depends upon the judicial
construction of the definition of ’private forest’ in the
KLR Act, it is necessary that we should set out hereunder
both the definitions placed alongside with each other:
THE KERALA PRIVATE FORESTS THE KERALA LAND REFORMS
(VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT) ACT (ACT 1 OF 1964) AS
ACT, 1971 AMENDED BY THE KERALA
LAND REFORMS (AMENDME-
NT ACT 35/1969)
(Act 26 of 1971)
(AS AMENDED BY ACT 5 OF 2. Definitions. In this
1978) Act unless the context
otherwise requires-
2. Definitions: In this Act (47) ’private forest’
unless the context otherwise means a forest which is
requires- not owned by the Govern
ment but does not inclu-
de-
(f) ’private forest’ means
(1) in relation to the Mala- (i) areas which are waste
bar district referred to in and are not enclaves
sub-section (2) of Section within wooded areas;
5 of the States Reorganisation
Act, 1956 (ii) areas which are
gardens or nilams;
(Central Act 37 of 1956)
(i) any land to which the (iii) areas which are
Madras Preservation of Pri- planted with tea, coffee,
vate Forests Act, 1949 (Madras cocoa, rubber, cardomom
Act XXVIII of 1949) applied or cinnamon; and
immediately (iv) other areas which are
culti-
406
before the appointed day
excluding- vated with
(A) Lands which are gardens or pepper, arecanut coco-
nilams as defined in the Kerala nut, cashew or other
Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of fruit bearing trees or
1964) are cultivated with any
other agricultural crop;.
(B) Lands which are used princi-
pally for the cultivation of tea,
coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardomom, or
cinnamom and lands used for any
purpose ancillary to the cultiva-
tion of such crops or for the pre-
paration of the smae for the market.
Explanation--Lands used for the
construction of office buildings,
godowns, factories, quarters for
workmen, hospitals, schools and
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playgrounds shall be deemed to be
lands used for purposes ancillary
to the cultivation of such crops;
(C) lands which are principally
cultivated with cashew or other
fruit-bearing trees or are princi-
pally cultivated with any other
agricultural crop;
(D) sites of buildings and lands
appurtenant to and necessary for
the convenient enjoyment or use
of, such buildings;
(ii) any forest not owned by the
Government, to which the Madras
Preservation of Private Forests
Act, 1949 did not apply, inclu-
ding waste lands which are encla-
ves within wooded areas.
407
(2) in relation to the remaining
areas in the State of Kerala, any
forest not owned by the Government,
including waste lands which are
enclaves within wooded areas.
Explanation: For the purposes of
this clause, a lane shall be deemed
to be a waste land notwithstanding
the existence thereon of scattered
trees or shrubs;"
We may first examine the scope of the definition of ’private
forest’ under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act. It means a forest
which is not owned by the Government, excluding thereby four
kinds of areas specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv). The
latter part of sub-clause (iv) contains the words" ..... Other
areas cultivated with any other agricultural crop". The terms
’agriculture’ and ’agricultural crop’ have wider as well as
narrower connotation. The wider concept covers both the primary
or basic as well as the subsequent operations. It takes within
its fold among other things, the products of the land which have
some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce
including forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal trees,
casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. (See: Commis-
sioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar
Sahas Roy, [1958] SCR 101 at 156. Of course there must be
present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultiva-
tion of land in the sense of tilling of the lands, sowing of the
seeds, planting and similar work done in the land. The forest
growth or spontaneous growth of any product, plants or trees,
however, would be outside the characteristic of agricultural
products or operations.
In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kerala &
Ors., [1973] 1 SCR 399, this Court while examining the
scheme of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter III
therein observed that ’lands under eucalyptus or teak which
are the result of agricultural operations normally would be
agricultural lands, but not lands which are covered by
eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a
forest.’ This is the wider concept of agricultural crop,
perhaps attributed to the latter part of sub-clause (iv) of
the definition under Section 2(47) of the KLR Act.
The latter part of sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(47) of the
KLR
408
Act, counsel for the appellant contended, is practically the
same as the second limb of sub-clause (C) of Section
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2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act. It was claimed that since
eucalyptus plantation is covered by the expression ’any
other agricultural crop’ in Section 2(47) sub-clause (iv) of
the KLR Act, Section 2(f)(1)(i) sub-clause (C) of the Vest-
ing Act with similar words must also carry the same meaning.
It was emphasised that the KLR Act and the Vesting Act
constitute a Code of agrarian reform and they are cognate
legislations with the Vesting Act as supplementary to the
KLR Act. The expression ’any other agricultural crop’ used
in both the enactments while defining ’private forest’ must
therefore, receive the same meaning as otherwise, it would
lead to anomalies. This is the line of argument for the
appellant.
This whole line of arguments with respect, is hard to
accept. As Felix Frankfurter, J. said: "Legislation is a
form of literary composition. But construction is not an
abstract process equally valid for every composition, not
even for every composition whose meaning must be judicially
ascertained. The nature of the composition demands awareness
of certain presuppositions ...... And so, the significance
of an enactment, its antecedents as well .,as .its later
history, its relation to other enactments, all may be rele-
vant to the construction of words for one purpose and in
one-setting but not for another. Some words are confined to
their history; some are starting points for history. ’Words
are intellectual and moral currency. They come from the
legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes it
remains unchanged. Like currency, words sometimes appreciate
or depreciate in value". The learned Judge further stated:
"Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief,
to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to
formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not
drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the
language of the statute, as read in the light of other
external manifestations of purpose. That is what the Judge
must seek and effectuate." (See: Courts, Judges and Politics
by Walter F. Murphy: ’Some Reflections of the Reading of
Statutes’ by Felix Frankfurter).
Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in
one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the
same words in another statute unless the Statutes are pari
materia legislations. In the present case, the aim and
object of the two legislations are not similar in the first
place. Secondly, the definition of ’private forest’ in the
KLR Act is not just the same as the definition of ’private
forest’ in the Vesting Act. Indeed, there is a vast differ-
ence in between the two. The object of the Vesting Act was
to provide for the Vesting in the Government
409
of private forest in the State of Kerala for the assignment
thereof to the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for
cultivation. The preamble of the Act provides that such
agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the
agricultural production in the State and to promote the
welfare of the agricultural population in the State. Two
separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act;
the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the
Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (’The MPPF
Act’) applied immediately before the appointed day; the
second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in
the State of Kerala. The definition of ’private forest’ as
is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in
terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF
Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under
sub-clauses (A) to (D). This significant reference to MPPF
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Act in the definition of ’priVate forest’ in the Vesting Act
makes all the difference in the case. The MPPF Act was a
special enactment. It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras
State to preserve the private forests in the district of
Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The Scheme of
that Act has been explained by several decisions of the
Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if the
land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the
MPPF Act,came into force, it would continue to be a forest,
even if there was subsequent replantation. (See: State of
Kerala v. Anglo American D.T.T. Co., [1980] Ker. L.T. 215
and State of Kerala v. K.C. Moosa Haji, (supra) (FB)-AIR
1984 Ker. 149 at 154-155.)
It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this
appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and
continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in
1971. In Malankara case (supra), this Court was not con-
cerned with the lands covered by the MPPF Act, and denuded
thereafter of forest growth and cultivated with fresh re-
plantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant
the meaning accorded to ’private forest’ from the KLR Act to
the Vesting Act. That wide concept cannot fit into the new
legal source.
In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Sm. Mfg. (Wvg.) Co.
Ltd., [1974] 1 SCR 67 1, this Court while upholding the
constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that
the Forest Lands in the State of Kerala has attained a
peculiar character owing to the geography and climate and
the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these
forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural
plantations. That much is clear from the following observa-
tions (at 683):
"It is therefore, manifest that when the legislature stated
in
410
the preamble that the private forests are agricultural
lands, they merely wanted to convey that they are lands
which by and large could be prudently and profitably ex-
ploited for agricultural purposes."
There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction
between private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in Kerala
State and the private forest in Malabar district. This
distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies
suggested by counsel for the appellant.
Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens
or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. ’Garden’ means lands
used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees
or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. ’Nilam’
means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause
(B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultiva-
tion of which in the general sense would be cultivation of
agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name
specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such
cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market
are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C).
It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated
with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to
only the fruit beating trees. It next refers to ’lands which
are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop.
If the legislature had intended to use the term ’agricultur-
al crop’ in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all
species of trees fruit-beating or otherwise, it would be
unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew
or other fruit-beating trees. It may be significant to note
that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used
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the words to identify the different categories of crops or
trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "associa-
tions, echoes and overtones". While construing such words,
judges must, as Felix Frankfurter, J., said "retain the
associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones"
(supra p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not
discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C)
"any other agricultural crop" are quite wide enough to
comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus planta-
tions.
It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative
intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legis-
lature but also listen attentatively to what the legislature
does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with
those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1),
private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause (2) however,
excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits
411
applicable to an owner if they are under his personal culti-
vation. Cultivation for this purpose "includes cultivation
of trees or plants of any species". The explanation to sub-
section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used
for the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit bearing or
yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3
sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from
vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every
variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause
(C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees
or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only
fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the inten-
tion was otherwise, the sub-clause(C) would have been in a
different language.
In our view as a matter of pure construction untram-
melled by authority, the words used in the latter part of
sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties
of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees.
This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only
in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subse-
quent two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K.C.
Maosa Haji cases (supra).
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the
circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to
costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dis-
missed.
412