Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4409 of 2000
PETITIONER:
Chandrika Singh (Dead) by Lrs. and Anr.
RESPONDENT:
Sarjug Singh and Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/11/2006
BENCH:
S.B. Singh & Markandey Katju
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
ORDER
One Ishwar Dutta was the owner of the Property. He died leaving behind
three Sons- Mahadeo, Hira and Mahabir died issueless. His Interest in the
Property, therefore, vested in Mahadeo and Mewa (son of Hira) who
predecessor him. Mewa died in 1921-22 leaving behind a Son Damoder.
Koleshra Devi was the widow of Damodar whose exact date of death is not
known but he is Said to have expired sometime after 1932.
The plaintiffs herein are heris of Ram Layak- one of the sons of Mahadeo
whereas the respondent herein are heirs of Raja, another son of Mahadeo.
The Properties in question bearing plot Nos. 901, 902 and 907 were acquired
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The properties were
mutated in the name of Damoder.
The amount of compensation was paid to respondent Mona Devi.
The appellants herein filed an application under section 30 of the Land
Acquisition Act before the Collector whereupon a reference was made. One of
the issues which fell for consideration before the Reference Judge under
the Land Acquisition Act was as to whether the deed of gift executed by
Koleshra Devi in respect of her half share of Plot No. 901 full share of
plot No. 902 and three fourth share of plot No. 907 in Favour of the
appellants herein by deed of gift dated 7.5.1960 was valid in law.
It was inter alia held that Koleshra Devi being possessed of the Share
which vested in her on the death of her husband-Damoder in lieu of
maintenance,, she become the absolute owner in terms of Section 14 (1) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The judgment and decree passed by the Reference Court was reversed by the
First Appellate Court.
The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment allowed the appeal
preferred by the respondents herein and affirmed judgment of the trial
Court opining :
"....It is not in dispute that mostt. Kauleshwara was maintenance
holder and her husband had died before the year 1937. Nothing has
come on record that she was put in possession over the lands, in
lieu of maintenance, which she gifted to the respondents. In
absence of such evidence, she was not authorised to make a gift and
Ext.1 was invalid."
The extent of the share of the parties herein are said to be as under:
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Plot Originally in Share of petitioners Share of
No. name of respondents
901 Mahadeo Half Half
902 Mewa Full (gifted by Koleshra Devi) -----
903 Mahabir (Mewa Three Fourth (Half of Mawa One fourth (one
Mahadeo) gifted by Koleshra Devi &
One fourth of Mahadeo) fourth of Mahadeo)
Total Three fourth One fourth
The learned councel appearing on behalf of the appellants would contend
that having regard to the fact that a finding of fact had been arrived at
that Koleshra Devi was possessed of the property in question, the High
Court committed a manifest error in interfering therewith.
Our attention in this behalf has been drawn to a decision of this Court in
Raghubar Singh and Ors. v. Gulab Singh & Ors., [1998] 6 SCC 314. Mr.
Upadhyay, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on
the other hand would support the judgment.
We may before adverting to the question raised before us must observe that
the High Court dealt with the matter in a very slipshod manner. It
interfered with the finding of fact arrived at by the First Appellate
Court without assigning any reason therefor .While exercising its
Jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High
Court is required to formulate a substantial question of law in relation to
a finding of fact. The High Court exercise a limited jurisdiction in that
behalf. Ordinarily unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reasons, the
findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below are binding on the High
Court. The First Appellate Court clearly came to the following conclusion :
"....Mewa Mahto died leaving behind Demoder Mahto and Damodar Mahto died
leaving behind Kaulashwari who according to the discussed evidence came
into possession as limited owner and not as maintenance holder only as
alleged by the respondent. Before passing of the Hindu Succession Act 1956
She was limited owner and in that capacity she was competent enough to
remain in possession of the lands recorded in the name of Mewa Mahto and
fter passing of the Hindu Succeession Act she become absolute owner. The
gift deed dated 7.5.1960 was executed after passing of the Hindu Succession
Act when she has full authority to execute the gift deed. The learned
Subordinate Judge has given no importance to the gift deed Ext.1 and hold
that in the lost it importance in eye of law. As mentioned above
Kauleshwari has executed the deed after passing of the Hindu Succession Act
and in that circumstances it being documents of 30 years old carried
presumption of genuineness."
Once it was found that Koleshra Devi was possessed of the land in question
in lieu of her right of maintenance, in our opinion, Sub-Section 1 of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will clearly be attracted.
In Raghubar Singh and Ors. v. Gulab Singh & Ors., [1998] 6 SCC 314 this
Court stated the law in the following terms:
" 17. The obligations, under the Shastric Hindu Law, to maintain a
Hindu widow out of the properties of her deceased husband received
a statutory recognition with the coming into force of the Hindu
Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. the law on the subject was,
thereafter, consolidated and codified by the Hindu Married Women’s
Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 which came
into force on 23.4.1946. The right to maintenance of the Hindu
widow, as a Pre-existing right, was thus recognised by the two
statutes referred to above but it was not created for the first
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time by any of those statutes. Her right to maintenance exited
under the Shastric Hindu law long before statutory enactments came
into force. After the attainment of independence, the need for
emancipation of women from feudal bondage because even more
imperative. There was growing agitation by Hindu women for
enlargement of their rights as provided by the Shastric Hindu law
in various spheres. It was at this juncture that Parliament stepped
in and enacted various statutes like the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 providing for intestate succession.
18. The Hindu Succession Act, 1936 made far-reaching charges in the
structure of Hindu law by removing the traditional limitations on
the powers of a Hindu widow to deal with the property of her
deceased husband in her possession in lieu of her right to
maintenance and the Act made her an absolute owner of the property,
over which hitherto fore, she had only a limited right."
It was further held:
"24.....Accordingly, we hold that the right to maintenance of a
Hindu female flows from the social and temporal relationship
between the husband and the wife that right in the case of a widow
is ‘a pre-existing right ", which existed under the Shastric Hindu
Law before the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts
merely recognised the position as was existing under the Shastric
Hindu law and gave it a ‘statutory’ backing. Where a Hindu widows
is in possession of the property of her husband, she has a right
to be maintained out of it and she is entitled to retain the
possession of that property in lieu of her right to maintenance."
In Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla and Ors., [2005] 5 SCC 390] it was observed :
"11. However, the decision of this Court in the case of Balwant
Singh, [1997] 7 SCC 137 would have a bearing on the merits of this
case wherein it is held that suit for possession would not be
maintable on the basis of a declaratory decree as the declaratory
decree did not convey any title in favour of the reversioners. This
was a case under the Hindu Law wherein the widow of the original
owner in the year 1954 made a gift and got the land mutated in
favour of her adopted sons. The reversioners filed a suit seeking a
decree that the alienation made by the widow was not binding on
their reversionery rights. The suit was decreed and it was held
that the gift made by the widow would not affect the rights of the
reversioners. The property was remutated in the name of the widow.
In the year 1970, the widow again gifted the suit property to the
adopted sons and she died in the year 1973. In a suit for recovery
of possession by the reversioners on the basis of the earlier
decree, the court held that since the widow continued to be in
possession of the property even after the declaratory decree
obtained by the reversioners because of the enlarged rights she got
under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made her the absolute
owner of the property, the gifts of the property made by her to her
adopted sons in the year 1970 could not be set aside.
12. Almost similar are the facts of this case inasmuch as in this case also
since on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act by virtue of
Section 14 (1), the limited right got by Uttamdassi under the will got
enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property. Thus, she became
absolute owner of the property hence, any declaratory right obtained
earlier by the reversioner as contemplated in the will cannot be the basis
on which the suit for Possession could be maintained unless, of course, the
claimants in the suit for possession established a better title independent
of the declaratory decree obtained by them."
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As Koleshra Devi, in terms of the provisions of section 14 (1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1950 became absolute owner of the property and thus she was
competent to execute the deed of sale in the year 1960.
In view of the authoritative pronouncements of this Court, we are of the
opinion that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the well
considered judgment of the First Appellate Court and it is set aside
accordingly.
The appeal is allowed. No costs.