Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DEV KUMAR (DIED) THROUGH LRS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. SWARAN LATA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/11/1995
BENCH:
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
BENCH:
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 510 1996 SCC (1) 25
JT 1995 (9) 331 1995 SCALE (6)316
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
PATTANAIK.J.
This appeal is by the tenant, challenging the
revisional order of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
whereunder an order of eviction has been passed on the
finding that the premises in question has been sub-let and
as such the tenant has incurred the liability of eviction
under Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949, (hereinafter referred to as ‘The
Act’). The landlady Smt. Swaran Late respondent no. 1, in
the present appeal filed an application for ejectment of her
tenant Dev Kumar, the deceased husband of the present
appellant alleging therein that said Dev Kumar has failed to
pay the arrears of rent and has sub-let the premises in
favour of respondent nos. 2 to 4 and, therefore, has
incurred the liability of being evicted under Section 13(2)
(i) & (ii) (a) of the Act. The tenant before the Rent
Controller appeared and controverted all the allegations
made by the landlady. The allegations of subletting by him
in favour of respondents nos. 2 to 4 was also specifically
denied. The Rent Controller on appreciating the evidence led
before him came to the conclusion that there exists
relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent
no. 1 and appellant and the tenant had tendered the arrears
of rent which was accepted by the landlady. On the question
of subletting the Controller came to the conclusion that the
tenant Dev Kumar has sub-let the premises to respondents 2
to 4 who were carrying on the business in the premises in
question . The plea of the tenant that in fact he was
carrying on the business as Commission agent of respondents
2 to 4 was not accepted. On this conclusion the Controller
held that the tenant has incurred the liability of being
evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act and directed
that the possession of premises be given to the landlady
within 2 months. It may be stated that the Controller had
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appointed a local Commissioner calling upon him to find out
whether the premises has been sub-let to M/s. Ram Saran
Rattan Chand and the said Commissioner had submitted a
report which was accepted as Exhibit AW 5/4 and the
Commissioner was also examined before the Controller as AW
5. The conclusion of the Rent Controller on the question of
sub-letting was essentially based upon the said
Commissioner’s report and the evidence of the Commissioner.
The aforesaid report has also been annexed as Annexure ‘D’
to the Special. Leave Petition.
Against the order of eviction the tenant preferred an
appeal. The Additional District Judge, Amritsar, who was the
Appellate Authority re-considered the entire evidence on
record and reversed the finding of the Controller on the
question of sub-letting. The Appellate Authority came to
hold that except the solitary statement of AW 11 no other
evidence was produced by the landlady to show that
respondents 2 to 4 are in exclusive possession of the
disputed premises and that such possession is for valuable
consideration. He also held that even AW 11 has not stated
that the possession of respondents 2 to 4 is for valuable
consideration. The evidence of local Commissioner was also
fully discussed and the Appellate Authority held that the
said evidence indicates that the tenant Dev Kumar still
carries on his business in the disputed premises and has not
parted with the possession of the same in favour of
respondents 2 to 4. The order of evidtion passed by the
Controller thus having been set aside and the appeal having
been allowed, the landlady invoked the jurisdiction of the
High Court in revision under Sub-Section (5) of Section 15
of the Act. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated
3rd of April, 1992, has reversed the findings of the
Appellate Authority and relying upon the evidence of the
Commissioner has held that the respondents 2 to 4 are in
exclusive possession of the demised premises and tenant has
parted with the possession in their favour. Therefore, has
sublet the premises in their favour and the revision being
allowed with the direction that the tenant should handover
the vacant possession of the demised premises to the
landlady, the present appeal has been preferred by the
tenant.
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant essentially raised two contentions in
assailing the impugned judgment of the High Court :-
(1) However, wide the power of revision under Sub-
Section (5) of Section 15 of the Act may be, it cannot be
equated with the appellate power and as such the High Court
was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record
and come to its own conclusion while exercising its
revisional jurisdiction under the Act;
(2) The ultimate conclusion of the High Court about
subletting is also not sustainable in law, more so, when the
same is based upon the tainted evidence of the local
Commissioner.
Mr. Krishna Mahajan, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent no. 1, on the other hand, contended that the
revisional power under Sub-Section (5) of Section 15 of the
Act is wide enough to examine the legality and propriety of
the order passed by the Appellate Authority and in exercise
of such power the High Court was justified in re-
appreciating the evidence on record. The learned counsel
also urged that the conclusion of subletting rendered by the
High Court is fully justified on materials on record and as
such the same need not be interfered with by this Court.
In view of the rival submissions at the Bar, the first
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question that arises for consideration is to what extent the
High Court was justified in reappreciating the evidence and
interfering with the conclusion of the Appellate Authority
on the question of sub-letting. It will be appropriate at
this stage to extract Sub-Section (5) of Section 15 of the
Act:-
"The High Court may, at any time, on the
application of any aggrieved party or in
its own motion, call for an examine the
records relating to any order passed or
proceedings taken under this Act for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the
legality or propriety of such order or
proceeding and may pass such order in
relation thereto as it may deem fit".
In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur & Anr. vs. M/s. S.
Chokesiri & Co. (1982 (2) SCR (Suppl. 310) this Court
examined the revisional power of the High Court under Sub-
Section (5) of Section 15 of the Act and held where the
findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are
supportable of the evidence on record, the revisional Court
must be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-
assessment of the evidence and supplant the conclusion of
its own so long as the evidence on record admitted and
supported the one reached by the Courts below.
In the case of Nanak Chand vs. Inderjit & Ors. (1969
All India Rent Control Journal p.881) This Court construed
Sub-Section (5) of Section 15 of the East punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 and held that the revisional power
conferred on the High Court under Section 15(5) of the Act
is wider than that conferred by Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code and under Section 15(5) of the Act the High
Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety
of the order under revision and that would clearly justify
the examination of the finding by the Authority about the
requirements of the landlord under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of
the Act.
In the case of Ram Das vs. Ishwar Chander & Ors. (1988
(1) SCR (Suppl.) 239) this Court again examined the
aforesaid provision of Sub-Section (5) of Section 15 of the
Act and held that subject to the well known limitation
inherent in all revisional jurisdictions, the matter
essentially turns on the language of the statute investing
the jurisdiction. Examining the language of Sub-Section (5)
of Section 15 of the Act the Court further held;
"But here, Section 15(5) enables the
High Court to satisfy itself as to the
"legality and propriety" of the order
under revision which is, quite
obviously, a much wider jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction enables the court of
revision, in appropriate cases, to
examine the correctness of the findings
of facts also, though the revisional
Court is not "a second court of first
appeal’".
In our considered opinion having regard to the
aforementioned decisions of this Court laying down the
parameters of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Section
15(5) of the Act it is neither possible to accept the narrow
construction put by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant nor the wide construction put by the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant nor the wide
construction put by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Sub
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Section (5) of Section 15 of the Act, therefore, would
entitle the Court to examine the legality and propriety of a
conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider
than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be exercised subject
to the well known limitations inherent in all revisional
jurisdictions and cannot be equated with an Appellate
jurisdiction. This being the position, unless there is a
perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the
Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has
arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no
reasonable man can come, the High Court will not interfere
with the same.
Coming to the second question the expression "Sub-
letting" has not been defined in the Act. The conclusion on
the question of subletting is a conclusion on a question of
law derived from the findings on the materials on record as
to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said
transfer of possession being for consideration. As to what
is the true meaning of expression "Sub-letting", this Court
considered the same in the case of Jagdish Prasad vs.
Angoori Devi (1984 (3) SCR 216) in an eviction proceeding
under UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act. The Court held that merely from the presence
of the person other than the tenant in the shop, subletting
cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises
is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises
is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of
the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be
assumed. It was further held that in an application for
eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the
allegations that the premises has been sublet, the
allegation has to be proved. The question of subletting was
considered by this Court in the case of M/s. Shalimar Tar
Products Ltd. vs. H.C. Sharma & Ors. (1988 (1) SCR 1023) and
it was held that in order to construe subletting there must
be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of
legal possession means "Possession with the right to include
and also right to exclude others".
In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur & Anr. vs. M/s. S.
Chokosiri & Co. (supra) this Court considered the question
of subletting and held that the burden of making a case of
subletting is one the landlady. It was also held that the
transaction of subletting in the guise of licenses are in
their very nature clandestine arrangements between the
tenant and the sub-tenant and it would be difficult to get
direct evidence on the same. It exclusive possession of the
alleged sub-tenant is established then it may not be
impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the
transaction was entered into with mandatory consideration in
mind.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid legal position we would
now examine the question whether the landlady, respondent
no. 1 in the present appeal, has established her case of
subletting by the tenant and further whether the conclusion
of the High Court thereon is at all sustainable in law? The
case of respondent no. 1 in this context is that respondents
2 to 4 have been given the disputed premises where they are
transacting their business in their name and style Ram Saran
Rattan Chand. The case of the tenant Dev Kumar, on the other
hand, is that alongwith his own business, he was also
transacting business as commission agent of M/s. Ram Saran
Bhole Nath. The only evidence lead by the landlady in the
case is the oral testimony of the power of attorney holder
Gian Chand. The High Court, however, has relied upon the
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evidence of the local Commissioner and his report. The
report of the Commissioner merely indicates than on a
particular day the Commissioner went to the disputed
premises and purchased a piece of cloth and paid the money,
the bill for which was given by the seller in the name of
M/s. Ram Saran Rattan Chand, Moti Bazar. The disputed
premises, however, is not on Moti Bazar but on Pratap Bazar.
The report of the Commissioner also indicates that when the
Commissioner went for the second time, to the shop and asked
for the bill-book, a bill-book was produced in the name of
M/s. Ram Saran Bhola Nath having the rubber stamp having the
words "Sole Selling Agent Dev Kumar". Production of such a
bill-book on being asked by the Commissioner lends support
to the case of the tenant that he was transacting business
as a Commission agent of M/s. Ram Saran Bhole Nath, of which
firm respondent no. 3 is a partner. That apart on the mere
purchase of a piece of cloth under a bill M/s. Ram Saran
Rattan Chand as indicated in the Commissioner’s report, it
is difficult for any Court to come to the conclusion that
disputed premises was in exclusive possession of the alleged
sub-tenant, namely, respondents nos. 2 to 4. In this context
it would be appropriate to notice the conduct of the local
Commissioner as reflected from his evidence. He has stated
that he took a sum of Rs.77/- from Gian Chand, Power of
Attorney of the landlady, for purchase of the piece of cloth
from the disputed premises and after purchasing the same he
also handed over that piece of cloth to Gian Chand. The
statement of the local Commissioner, who was examined as
AW5, and which has been annexed as Annexure ‘E’ to the
Special Leave Petition unequivocally indicates that he has
acted at the behest of the landlady and the said evidence
must be held to be a tainted one which infact has
substantially formed the basis of conclusion of subletting
by the High Court. In this view of the matter the ultimate
finding of the High Court that the report as well as the
statement of the local Commissioner is enough to hold that
the Firm M/s. Ram Saran Rattan Chand is carrying on the
business in the demised premises and that the respondents
nos. 2 to 4 are in exclusive possession of the demised
premises and the tenant has parted the possession in their
favour is wholly unsustainable and we accordingly set aside
the said conclusion. At the most, the conclusion can be that
while the tenant was continuing his own business as well as
a business of Commission Agent of M/s. Ram Saran Bhola Nath,
the respondents nos. 2 to 4 have also been permitted to
continue their business in the name Ram Saran Rattan Chand.
But that does not establish either the exclusive possession
of respondents 2 to 4 or that the tenant has parted with his
possession. The exclusive possession of the premises being
the first criteria for establishing subletting and the same
not being established, the conclusion of the High Court
about subletting is vitiated.
In our considered opinion the landlady - respondent No.
1, has utterly failed to establish the plea of subletting
and the High Court erred in law in formulating its own
conclusion and reversing the finding of the Appellate
Authority. In the aforesaid premises the appeal is allowed.
The impugned order of the High Court in revision is set
aside and the order of the Appellate Authority is affirmed.
The application for eviction stands dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.