Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3522 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd
RESPONDENT:
Coal Tar Refining Company
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/08/2007
BENCH:
Tarun Chatterjee & P.K.Balasubramanyan
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
[Arising out of SLP [C] No. 13775 of 2007]
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.
1. Application for permission to file special leave
petition is allowed. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment
and order dated 21st June, 2007 passed by a
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court whereby
an appeal preferred against an order dated 5th
June, 2007 of a learned Single Judge of the same
High Court was dismissed and the order of the
learned Single Judge was affirmed. The learned
Single Judge by his order dated 5th June, 2007 had
vacated an interim order of status quo granted
earlier on an application filed under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as \021the Act\022) for an order of injunction
restraining the respondent from receiving any
payment under a Letter of Credit.
3. At this stage, we feel it proper to narrate the
facts which have given rise to the filing of this
appeal in this Court.
4. The appellant entered into a contract on
29th May, 2006 with the respondent by which the
respondent had agreed to supply 26,000 metric
tones of Extra Hard Pitch (Reprocessing Grade) (in
short \023goods\024) to the appellant as per schedule set
out in the contract. In the said contract, one of the
terms of payment was that a Letter of Credit will be
opened and accordingly an irrevocable Letter of
Credit was opened by the appellant in favour of the
respondent. Initially, under the said Letter of Credit,
payment was to be made \023at sight\024. The document
against which payment was to be made, was
received directly by the banker of the appellant and
on presentation of the document it was found by
the banker of the appellant that the description of
the goods was not as per the terms of the Letter of
Credit. Accordingly, the banker of the appellant by
a Letter dated 11th September, 2006,
intimated the aforesaid fact to the appellant and
sought advice whether the appellant was willing to
waive the discrepancies indicated in the Letter
dated 11th September, 2006. In response to this
query of the banker, the appellant waived the
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discrepancies and accepted the documents by a
letter dated 3rd October, 2006 and also agreed to
make the payments in the following manner:
\023With reference to the above and further to your
swift message dated 3/10/2006, We are
accepting the documents with discrepancy and
the payment will be made after 180 days from
today. We accept to make the following
payments. (Emphasis supplied)
Total amount against above mentioned
three (3) Bills Euro 2348915.00
Less: Advance payment already
Made through Central Bank
of India Kol. Main Office Euro
387788.82
Amount to be paid against
the above three Bills Euro 1961126.18\024
5. Before accepting the documents and agreeing
to make payments, by a communication dated
28th September, 2006, the respondent had given
the appellant two options:- (i) either to negotiate the
document and resolve the quality issue; or (ii) reject
the shipment document.
6. Thereafter, correspondence was exchanged
between the appellant and the respondent and the
Letter of Credit was amended and payment \023at
sight\024 was substituted by the words \023230 days
from the shipment date\024. On the basis of the
amended Letter of Credit, the payment was,
thereafter, payable on or before 10th April, 2007.
The amendment of the terms of Letter of Credit
was informed to the bankers of the respondent
which was accepted by the respondent as well. The
issue regarding the quality of goods remained
undecided although an inspection report was
submitted by SGS India Pvt. Ltd. with the
concurrence of the respondent. Inspite of various
steps taken by the appellant and promises made by
the respondent, no effective step was taken to
resolve the dispute regarding quality of the goods
and hence the application under Section 9 of the
Act was filed by the appellant to stop release of
payment under the Letter of Credit without first
resolving the issue regarding the quality of goods of
the second consignment supplied by the
respondent to the appellant. Therefore, in the
application for injunction, it was pleaded that the
act of the respondent for not resolving the dispute
on the quality of goods in the second consignment
amounted to fraud as the respondent had
dishonestly and with ulterior motive not resolved
the dispute as raised by the appellant and in any
event, an order of injunction should be granted,
otherwise, it would not be possible for the appellant
to recover the money released under the Letter of
Credit as the respondent is a foreign company from
Iran and has no assets in India.
7. The respondent raised a plea for vacating the
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interim order of status quo granted by the learned
Single Judge on the application for injunction filed
u/s 9 of the Act alleging the following facts:- Goods
were dispatched to the appellant by the respondent
under two shipments. So far as the first shipment
was concerned, goods were received, documents
negotiated and payment released. Therefore, there
could not be any dispute in respect of the goods
relating to the first shipment. By the second
shipment, the respondent had dispatched 12,503
metric tones of goods to the appellant which arrived
at Calcutta from Iran by a vessel called M.V. Iran
Takhti. Out of the aforesaid 12,503 metric tones of
goods so dispatched and arrived at Calcutta,
documents relating to 2503 metric tones of goods
were negotiated by the Central Bank of India,
Calcutta and payment released. However, for the
balance 10,000 metric tons, documents were not
negotiated and no payment was released. It was
further alleged by the respondent that there was no
reason for not negotiating the documents or
effecting release of the payment as payments for
part consignment as noted hereinabove were
already released. It was also the case of the
respondent in support of its contention for vacating
the interim order of status quo that despite
discrepancies raised by the appellant, by its
communication dated 3rd October,
2006, the appellant had agreed to accept the
documents with discrepancy and make payments
in respect of the goods for which disputes were
raised by the appellant regarding the quality of
such goods. It was further the case of the
respondent that the defective quality of goods in
respect of which order of injunction of the Letter of
Credit was sought could not also be the reason for
grant of injunction as it was related to a payment
dated 29th May, 2006 which was also the
subject matter of an arbitration proceeding and the
claim, if any, could be recovered in the said
arbitration proceeding. According to the
respondent, since the Letter of Credit was an
independent contract and the appellant could not
satisfy any breach of the terms of the Letter of
Credit, no order of injunction could be passed by
the court for stopping the respondent from realizing
the payment relating to the price of the goods
supplied. The respondent further stated that the
appellant could not make out any case of fraud for
which an order of injunction restraining the
respondent from realizing the payment by
encashing the Letter of Credit could be granted and
therefore the application for injunction must be
rejected.
8. As noted herein earlier, the order of status
quo was passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court on the application for injunction filed
under Section 9 of the Act at the instance of the
appellant on 9th April, 2007, and by the said order,
the interim order of status quo was granted till 30th
April, 2007 and the same was extended from time
to time from 23rd April 2007 till 17th May, 2007.
Thereafter the matter was directed to appear on
16th May, 2007 and heard by the learned Single
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Judge on 17th May, 2007 and interim order of status
quo was extended till 25th June, 2007. As noted
herein earlier, the learned Single Judge by order
dated 5th June, 2007 vacated the interim order of
status quo granted earlier against which an appeal
was preferred by the appellant before a Division
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta which
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the
learned Single Judge vacating the interim order of
status quo.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and carefully examined the orders of the
learned Single Judge as well as that of the Division
Bench. We have also examined in detail the
application for injunction, the original contract, the
Letter of Credit as amended and the other
documents on record. Having noted salient facts
and materials on record, let us now consider
whether the Division Bench was justified in
affirming the order of the learned Single Judge
vacating the interim order of status quo in the
matter of stopping the payment in terms of the
Letter of Credit. But before dealing with this aspect
of the matter, let us consider the principles for grant
or refusal to grant injunction in the matter of release
of payment in terms of a Letter of Credit or a Bank
Guarantee.
10. The law relating to grant or refusal to grant
injunction in the matter of invocation of a Bank
Guarantee or a Letter of Credit is now well settled
by a plethora of decisions not only of this court but
also of the different High Courts in India. In U.P.
State Sugar Corporation Vs. Sumac International
Ltd. [(1997) 1 SCC 568], this court considered its
various earlier decisions. In this decision, the
principle that has been laid down clearly on the
enforcement of a Bank guarantee or a Letter of
Credit is that in respect of a Bank Guarantee or a
Letter of Credit which is sought to be encashed by
a beneficiary, the bank giving such a guarantee is
bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of
any dispute raised by its customer. Accordingly this
Court held that the courts should be slow in
granting an order of injunction to restrain the
realization of such a Bank Guarantee. It has also
been held by this court in that decision that the
existence of any dispute between the parties to the
contract is not a ground to restrain the enforcement
of Bank guarantees or Letters of Credit. However
this court made two exceptions for grant of an order
of injunction to restrain the enforcement of a Bank
Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. (i) Fraud committed
in the notice of the bank which would vitiate the
very foundation of guarantee; (ii) injustice of the
kind which would make it impossible for the
guarantor to reimburse himself.
11. Except under these circumstances, the courts
should not readily issue injunction to restrain the
realization of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of
Credit. So far as the first exception is concerned,
i.e. of fraud, one has to satisfy the court that the
fraud in connection with the Bank Guarantee or
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Letter of Credit would vitiate the very foundation of
such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit. So far
as the second exception is concerned, this court
has held in that decision that it relates to cases
where allowing encashment of an unconditional
bank guarantee would result in irretrievable harm or
injustice to one of the parties concerned. While
dealing with the case of fraud, this court in the case
of U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd. Vs. Singh
Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd. (1988) 1 SCC
174 held as follows:
\023 The fraud must be of an egregious nature
such as to vitiate the entire underlying
transaction. While coming to a conclusion as
to what constitutes fraud, this court in the
above case quoted with approval the
observations of Sir John Donaldson, M.R. in
Bolivinter Oil SA V/s. Chase Manhattan Bank
(1984) 1 All ER 351 at p. 352 which is as
follows, \023 The wholly exceptional case where
an injunction may be granted is where it is
proved that the bank knows that any demand
for payment already made or which may
thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent.
But the evidence must be clear both as to the
fact of fraud and as to the bank\022s knowledge.
It would certainly not normally be sufficient
that this rests on the uncorroborated
statement of the customer, for irreparable
damage can be done to a bank\022s Credit in the
relatively brief time which must elapse
between the granting of such an injunction
and an application by the bank to have it
charged.\024 (Emphasis
supplied)
12. In Svenska Handelsbanken Vs. Indian Charge
Chrome [(1994) 1 SCC 502], it has also been held
that a confirmed Bank Guarantee/irrevocable Letter
of Credit cannot be interfered with unless there is
established fraud or irretrievable injustice involved
in the case. In fact, on the question of fraud, this
decision approved the observations made by this
court in the case of U.P. Coop. Federation Ltd Vs.
Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd. [(1988)
1 SCC 174].
13. So far as the second exception is concerned,
this court in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Vs.
Sumac International Ltd. [(1997) 1 SCC as
considered herein earlier, at para 14 on page 575
observed as follows :
\023On the question of irretrievable injury which
is the second exception to the rule against
granting of injunctions when unconditional
bank guarantees are sought to be realized the
court said in the above case that the
irretrievable injury must be of the kind which
was the subject matter of the decision in the
Itek Corpn. Case (566 Fed Supp 1210). In
that case an exporter in USA entered into an
agreement with the Imperial government of
Iran and sought an order terminating its
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liability on stand by letter of credit issued by
an American Bank in favour of an Iranian
Bank as part of the contract. The relief was
sought on account of the situation created
after the Iranian revolution when the American
Government cancelled the export licences in
relation to Iran and the Iranian government
had forcibly taken 52 American citizens as
hostages. The US Government had blocked
all Iranian assets under the jurisdiction of
United States and had cancelled the export
contract. The court upheld the contention of
the exporter that any claim for damages
against the purchaser if decreed by the
American courts would not be executable in
Iran under these circumstances and
realization of the bank guarantee/letters of
credit would cause irreparable harm to the
Plaintiff. This contention was upheld. To avail
of this exception, therefore, exceptional
circumstances which make it impossible for
the guarantor to reimburse himself it he
ultimately succeeds, will have to be decisively
established. Clearly, a mere apprehension
that the other party will not be able to pay, is
not enough. In Itek case, there was certainty
on this issue. Secondly, there was good
reason, in that case for the Court to be prima
facie satisfied that the guarantors i.e. the
bank and its customer would be found entitled
to receive the amount paid under the
guarantee.\024 (Emphasis supplied)
14. From the discussions made hereinabove
relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant
of injunction to restrain enforcement of a Bank
Guarantee or a Letter of Credit, we find that the
following principles should be noted in the matter of
injunction to restrain the encashment of a Bank
Guarantee or a Letter of Credit :-
(i) While dealing with an application for
injunction in the course of commercial
dealings, and when an unconditional Bank
Guarantee or Letter of Credit is given or
accepted, the Beneficiary is entitled to realize
such a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit in
terms thereof irrespective of any pending
disputes relating to the terms of the contract.
(ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is
bound to honour it as per its terms
irrespective of any dispute raised by its
customer.
(iii) The Courts should be slow in granting
an order of injunction to restrain the
realization of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of
Credit.
(iv) Since a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of
Credit is an independent and a separate
contract and is absolute in nature, the
existence of any dispute between the parties
to the contract is not a ground for issuing an
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order of injunction to restrain enforcement of
Bank Guarantees or Letters of Credit.
(v) Fraud of an egregious nature which
would vitiate the very foundation of such a
Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the
beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the
situation.
(vi) Allowing encashment of an
unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of
Credit would result in irretrievable harm or
injustice to one of the parties concerned.
15. Keeping these principles in mind and applying
the same on the facts of this case, we can only
draw this conclusion that no good ground has been
made out by the appellant to interfere with the
impugned order. As noted herein above, there are
two exceptions when courts can grant an order of
injunction in favour of an aggrieved party in the
matter of encashment of a Bank Guarantee or a
Letter of credit. Condition Nos. (v) and (vi), as
noted herein above, are two such exceptions. For
this reason, let us first deal with the case of fraud
pleaded by the appellant in their application for
injunction. The particulars of fraud have been
pleaded in paragraph 45 of the application for
injunction filed by the appellant in the High Court.
From a close scrutiny of the facts pleaded in the
said paragraph of the application for injunction, in
our view, it cannot be held that such facts have
constituted fraud for which an order of injunction in
the matter of encashment of Letter of Credit could
be passed by the courts. The facts pleaded in
paragraph 45 of the application for injunction would
only show that although the respondent had agreed
to remove the defects in the goods by saying that it
shall take steps to reduce the ash content of the
goods to 0.3 % before the payment date of the
Letter of Credit as extended, but they deliberately
and with ulterior motive had not fulfilled their
intention to do so. It is not in dispute that the
particulars of the fraud prima facie were restricted
to 10,000 metric tones of the goods supplied by the
respondent in respect of which documents were not
negotiated by the appellant. The entire
consignment which was admittedly shipped by
M.V.Iran Takhti was 12,503 metric tones out of
which 2503 metric tones were negotiated and
payments released by the Central Bank of India.
Admittedly, as noted herein above, a case of fraud
was alleged only in respect of a part of the
consignment of the second shipment. It has been
rightly held by the High Court that this could not
constitute fraud as fraud must be in respect of the
whole consignment and not in respect of a part of
the same. In this view of the matter, we are,
therefore, in agreement with the High Court that the
pleadings made relating to fraud in paragraph 45 of
the application for injunction were not sufficient nor
any strong prima facie case of fraud could be made
out in the petition which would warrant a
continuance of the order of status quo.
16. That apart, as noted herein earlier, in the
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matter of invocation of a Bank Guarantee or a
Letter of Credit, it is not open for the bank to rely
upon the terms of the underlying contract between
the parties.
17. In view of the discussions made herein above
and in view of the admitted fact that in respect of
2503 metric tones of goods out of 12503 metric
tones of goods in the second consignment,
documents were admittedly negotiated and
payments were released and further in view of the
communication dated 3rd October, 2006 by the
appellant to the banker that it had agreed to accept
the discrepancies raised in respect of the goods
and also agreed to make payment of the same, we
are not satisfied that a case of fraud even prima
facie has been made out by the appellant for grant
of injunction. It is difficult to conceive that the
appellant having accepted a part of the second
consignment and having directed to release
payments in respect of the same, would be
defrauded by the respondent in respect of the
balance quantity of goods which had arrived at
Calcutta in the second shipment. In any view of the
matter, in our view, the defective quality of goods in
respect of which an order of injunction of the
encashment of the Letter of credit was sought
could at all be a reasonable ground for grant of
injunction as it was related to payment dated 29th
May, 2006 which was the subject matter of the
arbitration proceeding and the claim, if any, can be
recovered in the said arbitration proceeding.
18. Let us now consider the other exception,
namely, case where allowing encashment of an
unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit
would result in an irretrievable harm or injustice to
one of the parties concerned. In our view,
irretrievable injury was not caused to the appellant
by a refusal to grant an order of injunction
restraining the encashment of the Letter of Credit
for two reasons :-
(i) Exceptional circumstances have not
been made out by the appellant which would
make it impossible for the Guarantor to
reimburse himself if he ultimately succeeds.
Only a case of apprehension has been shown
in the application for injunction to the extent
that if ultimately, the application for injunction
is allowed, it would be impossible to recover
the amount encashed on the basis of the
Letter of Credit because the respondent is a
Foreign Company in Iran which has no assets
in India. In our view, this cannot come within
the second exception indicated above.
(ii) Admittedly in this case, the appellant
has already filed an Admiralty Suit No. 14 of
2006 in the original side of the Calcutta High
Court claiming damages in respect of the
same set of goods. In the said suit filed in the
month of November 2006, the respondent
was given liberty to furnish a Bank Guarantee
for a sum of Rs. 21,86,68,540/- being the sum
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claimed by the appellant on account of
damages to the credit of the said suit and a
Bank Guarantee to the extent of this amount
has already been furnished by the
respondent. Such being the position, the
question of irretrievable injury even prima
facie which would lead to injustice and harm
the appellant cannot at all be conceived of
since the appellant has been duly protected
by the furnishing of Bank Guarantee. In our
view, only because the respondent has no
assets in India would not lead us to hold that
the appellant was entitled to an injunction on
the ground that he would suffer an
irretrievable injury. In this view of the matter,
we echo the finding of the High Court in
refusing to grant an order of injunction in
favour of the appellant and hold that the High
Court was fully justified in doing so.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any
merit in this appeal. The appeal is thus dismissed.
We may, however, make it clear that whatever
findings have been arrived at by us in this appeal or
by the High Court while dealing with the prayer for
grant of an interim order of injunction, shall not be
taken to be final as to the disposal of the
application for injunction by the High Court. There
will be no order as to costs.