Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 466 of 2001
PETITIONER:
MANOHAR LAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
VINESH ANAND & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/2001
BENCH:
A.P. Misra & Ummesh C. Banerjee
JUDGMENT:
L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J
BANERJEE,J.
Leave granted.
Since the decision in Thawardass case [Thawardas
Pherumal & Anr. v. Union of India: AIR 1955 SC 468], the
issue of identifying the Arbitrator, as a court, did come up
for consideration before this Court on more occasions than
one. Thwaradas (supra) negatived it with a positive finding
that the Arbitrator is not a Court within the meaning of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Since then there has however,
been sea change of events: the repeal of the earlier
statute of Arbitration (Arbitration Act, 1940) and
introduction of the new Arbitration Act, 1996 (Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996) in the statute book has brought
about a major change in the sphere of Arbitration. Based on
uncitral model of law on International Commercial
Arbitration and Conciliation Rules, the Act is stated to be
best suited and to sub-serve the Indian conditions having
regard to the economic conditions and the effect of
globalisation of trade. Incidentally, the Statements of
Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
records it to be an act to consolidate and amend the law
relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial
arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as
also to define the law relating to conciliation and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. While
the earlier enactment of 1940 was to be the most expeditious
methodology of adjudication and disposal of disputes through
arbitration but practicability of the situation lately
produced a rather dismal picture and proved contrary to the
normal belief and expectation that arbitration would be an
otherwise expeditious method to do so. The uncitral model
on the basis of which this Act of 1996 was engrafted in the
statute book, in no uncertain terms recognises party
autonomy philosophy and minimum interference from the
Courts. In England also, similar such situation was the
felt-need and resultantly in 1996, a similar enactment came
into force but neither of the legislations however can be
attributed to be an exact copy of the uncitral model though
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11
undoubtedly based thereon.
Having given a brief introduction to the recent
legislation and adverting to the matter in issue presently,
it would be worth noting that the issue involved though
short but interesting enough to involve a useful debate on
the same Debate, of course, we will avoid, but discussions
we will indulge so that the law remains settled once for all
on this issue as involved in the matter. The issue being
applicability of the provisions of Section 340 Cr. P.Code
in a proceeding before the arbitrator undoubtedly an
ingenious effort but let us see as to how far the same
succeeds.
Before however, embarking on a discussion on the subject
issue, a look at the provisions would be best suited at this
juncture: The relevant provisions being Sections 340 and
195 sub-section (1) (b) and sub-Section (3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The provisions read thus: 340:
Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 -
(1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf
or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient
in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made
into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section
(1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in
or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case
may be, in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may,
after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks
necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having
jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the
accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is
non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do,
send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence
before such Magistrate.
(Corresponding Law: S.476 (1) of Act V of 1898)
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section
(1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that
Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in
respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the
making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which
such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of
sub-section (4) of Section 195.
(Corresponding Law : S.476A of Act V of 1898)
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be
signed,-
(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High
Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11
appoint;
(b) in any other case, by the presiding Officer of the
Court,
(Correspondent Law: S.476 (1)Proviso of Act V of 1898)
4) In this section, Court has the same meaning as in
Section 195.
Section 195: Prosecution for contempt of lawful
authority of public servants, for offences against public
justice and for offences relating to documents given in
evidence (1) No court shall take cognizance-
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the
following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205
to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is
alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or
punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of
the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been
committed in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt
to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in
sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),
except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of
some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.
(2)
Section 195 (3):
(3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term Court
means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a
tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or
State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the
purposes of this section.
Before adverting to the matter in issue and the rival
contentions advanced one redeeming feature ought to be@@
JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ
noticed here pertain to Criminal jurisprudence: To pursue@@
JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ
an offender in the event of commission of an offence, is to
sub-serve a social need Society cannot afford to have a
criminal escape his liability, since that would bring about
a state of social pollution, which is neither desired nor
warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus
the doctrine of locus-standi is totally foreign to criminal
jurisprudence. This observation of ours however obtains
support from the decision of this Court in AR Antulay v.
Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. : 1984 (2) SCC 500.
Another redeeming feature is the inclusion of an
explanatory provision by way of sub-section (3): The body
of sub-section (1)(b) refers to the expression Court and
the same stands explained in sub-section (3) : Without a
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11
reading of sub-section (3) Court may be interpreted in a
narrow context, but with the inclusion of sub-section (3)
widest possible connotation is to be made available provided
however, the statute declares it to be so!! The language
if declared by that Act seems to be very significant:
A plain look thus at the provisions above depict that
inclusion of sub- section 3 under Section 195 cannot but be
taken to be an explanatory provision. The body of Section
195 (1)(b) refers to the expression Court and the same
stands thus explained in sub-section 3. The restriction
imposed is easily ascertainable by reason of the inclusion
of the words if declared by that Act to be a court for the
purposes of this Section (Emphasis supplied) the user of
the words seems to be very significant. One of the golden
canons of interpretation is that the Legislature always
avoid surplusage and attributes a definite meaning to each
of the words mentioned in the statute. By the very
inclusion of sub-section 3 and the language as noticed
hereinbefore in this paragraph, the intent of the
Legislature cannot thus be far to seek it is connotative
of a definite meaning.
Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, the learned Senior Advocate took
some pains to take us through different provisions of the
Act and contended that the whole tenor of legislation will
have to be considered in a much broader perspective so as to
assess the intent of the legislature and citations on the
earlier repealed act ought not to be looked into or be
considered since the answer for any inquiry ought to be kept
within the parameters of the new law and when interpreting
or analysing the philosophy of party autonomy noticed above
should and ought to be the basis and de hors the
jurisprudential effect of the legal decisions under the old
Act.
The main thrust of the submission in support of the
Appeal however, rests on a simple proposition that Court
means and implies authority to decide controversy between
the parties authoritatively and the decision being binding
amongst the parties. Strong reliance was placed on the
decision of this Court in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v.
Jyoti Narain (AIR 1956 SC 66) wherein this Court observed
that the pronouncement of a definitive judgment is thus
considered the essential sine qua non of a court and
unless and until a binding and authoritative judgment can be
produced by a person or body of persons, it cannot be
predicated that he or they constitute a Court. It is on the
basis of the observations as above that the learned Senior
Advocate in support of the Appeal contended that mere look
at the new enactment would reveal the total exclusion of
courts in the matter of interference with the arbitral
awards there cannot be any manner of dispute that awards
are not to be interfered and the same, as per the provisions
of the statute has the status of a decree of a court and
thus executable forthwith but does that mean and imply
total ouster of jurisdiction of courts or one need not
approach the court at all in a arbitral proceeding, the
answer may not be in the affirmative by reason of different
statutory provisions with which we presently deal though not
in detail since the issue is little different from the usual
discussion on a question as to whether Arbitrator is a Court
or not? But before so doing another decision of this Court
on which strong reliance was placed ought to be noticed.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11
This Court in Virindar Kumar v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956
SC 153) in paragraph 5 of the Report observed:
5. The first question that arises for our decision is
whether the order of the District Magistrate passed on
17.9.1952 as returning officer is open to appeal. The
statutory provisions bearing on this point are Sections 195,
476 and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section
195(1) (a) provides that no court shall take cognizance of
any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the
Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the
public officer concerned or of his superior.
Section 195(1)(b) enacts that no Court shall take
cognizance of the offences mentioned therein, where such
offence is committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings
in any court except on the complaint in writing of such
Court or a Court to which it is subordinate. The offence
under Section 193 is one of those mentioned in Section 195
(1)(b). Section 476 prescribes the procedure to be followed
where a Court is moved to lay a complaint and that applies
only to offences mentioned in Sections 195(1)(b) and
195(1)(c) and not to those mentioned in Section 195 (1)(a).
Section 476-B provides for an appeal from an order
passed under Section 476 to the appropriate Court. The
result then is that if the complaint relates to offences
mentioned in Sections 195 (1)(b)and 195 (1)(c), an appeal
would be competent, but not if it relates to offences
mentioned in Section 195(1)(a). Now, the order of the
Magistrate dated 17.9.1952 directs that the appellant should
be prosecuted for offences under Sections 181,182 and 193.
There is no dispute that the order in so far as it relates
to offences under Sections 181 and 182 is not appealable, as
they fall directly under Section 195(1)(a).
The controversy is only as regards the charge under
Section 193. Section 193 makes it an offence to give false
evidence whether it be in a judicial proceeding or not, and
it likewise makes it an offence to fabricate false evidence
for use in a judicial proceeding or elsewhere. If the
offence is not committed in a judicial proceeding, then it
will fall outside section 195 (1)(b), which applies only
when it is committed in or in relation to a proceeding in
Court, and there is in consequence no bar to a complaint
being made in respect thereof unaffected by the restrictions
contained in Section 195(1)(b).
But if the offence under Section 193 is committed in or
in relation to a proceeding in Court, then it will fall
under Section 195(1)(b), and the order directing prosecution
under Section 476 will be appealable under Section 476-B.
The point for decision therefore is whether the returning
officer in deciding on the validity of a nomination paper
under Section 36 of the Act can be held to act as a Court.
The question thus raised does not appear to be covered by
authority, and has to be decided on the true character of
the functions of the returning officer and the nature and
the extent of his powers.
In our view, however, the observations made in Virindar
Kumars case (supra) does not, in fact, assist us in any way
in the present context. Two decisions of Calcutta High
Court have also been relied upon. The first being the case
of Sailaja Kanta Mitra and others v. State of West Bengal
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11
(AIR 1971 Calcutta 137) and the second being the case of
H.C. Ganti v. F.L. Harcourt (AIR 1931 Calcutta 436).
Turning attention on to the second case of H.C. Ganti
(supra), Buckland, J. while deciding the matter observed
that where a person is alleged to have given false evidence
before Arbitrator, an application under Section 476, in the
Court in which the suit was initiated is necessary. But the
question whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not
will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where the application is supported not by oral evidence, but
only by documents, no further preliminary inquiry is
necessary beyond that which the Court makes on the materials
before it.
In such cases it is not necessary that a notice should
be given to the person against whom the order is sought on
an application under Section 476.
The decision in our view, however, does not render much
of an assistance in regard to the issue. The other decision
of the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra), a
Division Bench of the High Court in paragraph 17 of the
judgment observed as below:
Thus the Arbitrator decides the lis before it,
having the powers like a Court, following the procedure as a
Court has to follow in the exercise of its ordinary original
civil jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The award of the Arbitrator, so far as the parties to the
award are concerned, if not appealed against, shall be
final. In the appeal by either party to the award against
the Arbitrators award direct to the High Court a time limit
has been prescribed for preferring such appeal which may
also be admitted beyond the prescribed period if the High
Court is satisfied about the grounds of the delay. An
appeal to the High Court against the award shall not lie
only where the amount of compensation awarded does not
exceed Rs.5,000 in lump or 250 per mensem. The dispute
between the claimant claiming the compensation and the State
resisting such claim is certainly a civil dispute and the
lis between the parties is of a civil nature. The
arbitration proceedings before the Arbitrator, originating
on a reference at the instance of the claimant by the
Collector before the Arbitrator under the D.I Act and the
Rules mentioned above in relation to such a civil dispute
are proceedings which refer to an original matter in the
nature of a suit. The Arbitrator in such arbitration
proceedings which refer to an original matter in the nature
of a suit shall have the like powers and follow the like
procedure as the Court has and follows in the exercise of
its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. So, the Arbitrator under the Defence
of India Act and the Rules discussed above in the
proceedings of an arbitration before it, is a Court of civil
jurisdiction and it follows the procedure that a Court of
civil jurisdiction follows in the exercise of its ordinary
original civil jurisdiction under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The Arbitrator, under the Defence of India
Act, 1939 and the Rules regarding arbitration for settlement
of compensation payable under Section 19 of the Defence of
India Act, 1939 so far as Bengal, now West Bengal, is
concerned, is, therefore, a Court of civil jurisdiction, and
follows the procedure in arbitration proceedings before it,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11
as provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
regard to suits since the Arbitrator under Rule 6 quoted
above shall have the powers like the Court and shall follow
the like procedure as the Court follows in the exercise of
its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. So, the combined effect of Section
141 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 19,
sub-section (1), clauses (b),(e),(f),(g), sub-sections (2)
and (3) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the Rules
regarding Arbitration for settlement of compensation payable
under Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 framed by
the Governor of Bengal as already discussed, is to make an
Arbitrator under the D.I. Act, 1939 so far as Bengal now
West Bengal is concerned, a Court of civil jurisdiction that
shall have the like powers and shall follow the like
procedure as the Court has and follows in the exercise of
its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908.
The decision apparently lend some credence to the
submission of the appellant but by reason of the factual
situation is clearly distinguishable of facts but as regards
the provisions of law, we will deal with little later in
this judgment.
Mr. Alok Singh however appearing for the Respondent
drew our attention to Section 27 of the Act of 1996 which
provides as follows:
(2 7) Court assistance in taking evidence- (1) The
arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the
arbitral tribunal may apply to the Court for assistance in
taking evidence.
(2) The application shall specify-
(a) The names and addresses of the parties and the
arbitrators;
(b) the general nature of the claim and the relief
sought;
(c) the evidence to be obtained, in particular,-
(i) the name and address of any person to be heard as
witness or expert witness and a statement of the subject
matter of the testimony required;
(ii) the description of any document to be produced or
property to be inspected.
(3) The Court may, within its competence and according
to its rules on taking evidence, execute the request by
ordering that the evidence be provided directly to the
arbitral tribunal.
(4) The court may, while making an order under sub-
section (3), issue the same processes to witnesses as it may
issue in suits tried before it.
(5) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such
process, or making any other default, or refusing to give
their evidence, or guilty of any contempt to the arbitral
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11
tribunal during the conduct of arbitral proceedings, shall
be subject to the like disadvantages, penalties and
punishments by order of the court on the representation of
the arbitral tribunal as they would incur for the like
offences in suits tried before the Court.
(6) In this section the expression Processes includes
summonses and commissions for the examination of witnesses
and summonses to produce documents.
Relying on the aforesaid provision Mr. Singh very
strongly contended that it is not otherwise right to contend
that the Arbitral Tribunal is supreme in its own field. The
Section itself provides for assistance in taking evidence.
The sub-sections 3, 4 and 5 have been strongly relied upon
so as to conclude that even though the general trend of
legislation is party autonomy but that does not mean and
imply total exclusion of jurisdiction of the court or the
conferment of such a power of court to the Arbitrator. In
any event Mr. Singh contended that the issue in the instant
Appeal is rather restrictive and the general principles of
Arbitrator being identified as a Court need not be gone into
by reason of this issue under consideration. The clear
language of Section 195 (3) of the Code of Cr. Procedure
unmistakably depict the restrictive intent of the
Legislature and if the intent was otherwise to include
Arbitral Tribunal within the fold of Section 195 (3) of the
Code, that is to say, if the Legislature wanted to confer
such a status there was no difficulty as such in
incorporating thereunder a provision as is contained in a
Debt Recovery Act (vide Section 22): Income Tax Act (vide
Section 136) : Motor Vehicles Act (vide Section 169 (2):
Administrative Tribunal Act (vide Section 22 (3): Consumer
Protection Act: M.R.T.P. Act: and Companies Act etc.
etc. since these statutes have definitely included and
declared the Tribunal being ascribed to be a court within
the meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The inclusion of explanatory provision by way of sub-section
(3) makes the situation abundantly clear and we need not
dilate thereon.
Mr. Singh while relying strongly on the decision of
this Court in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B.
Lentin and Others (1988 (4) SCC 419) contended that the
decision in Balirams case has been holding the field
without any contra note being sounded subsequently. But
before embarking to assess the situation, let us have a look
at the decision for its proper appreciation. This Court in
paragraph 24-25 of the Report, observed as below:
24. The crucial question that falls to be determined
in this appeal is whether sub-section (3) of Section 195 has
brought about a change in the law and therefore the majority
decision in Lalji Haridas case (1964) 6 SCR 700 no longer
holds the field as submitted by Dr. Chitale, appearing on
behalf of the appellant, or was merely declaratory of the
law as declared by the court in Lalji Haridas case, as
argued by the learned Advocate-General, and therefore the
decision in Lalji Haridas case is still good law. It cannot
be doubted that sub- sections (3) of Section 195 of the Code
has been enacted by Parliament to implement the
recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission
which brought about the unsatisfactory state of law due to
conflict of opinion between different High Courts as to the
meaning of the word Court in Section 195 (1)(b) read in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11
the context of Section 195 (2) of the earlier Code. The
interpretative exercise undertaken by the courts over the
years as to the precise meaning of the term Court as
defined in Section 195(1)(b) of the old Code prior to the
introduction of sub- section (3) of section 195 of the
present Code, reveals an endless oscillation between two
views each verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness.
As echoed by Lord Macmillan in his Law and Other Things at
p. 48:
In almost every case except the very plainest, it would
be possible to decide the issue either way with reasonable
legal justification and that in such cases, ethical
considerations operate and ought to operate.
25. In that uncertain state of law, the Law Commission
observed in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt that
in any concrete case this question is bound to create
problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change
in law for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code. It felt
that the term Court for the purposes of clauses (b) and
(c) should mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court,
properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act
has all or practically all the attributes of a court, it
might be regarded as a court only if declared by the Act to
be a court for the purposes of Section 195. Indibutably,
the introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition
of Court in sub-section (3) of Section 195 has brought
about a change in the law. No rule is more firmly
established than the principles enunciated in Heydon case
[(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which have been continually
cited with approval not only by the English courts but also
by the Privy Council as well as this Court. The principles
laid down in Heydon case have been enunciated in Craies on
Statute Law, 6th edn. at p.96 as follows:
That for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are
to be discerned and considered: (1) What was the common law
before the making of the Act (2) What was the mischief and
defect for which the common law did not provide (3) what
remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth (4) The true reason of the
remedy. And then the office of all the judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro
bono publico.
These rules are still in full force and effect, with the
addition that regard must now be had not only to the
existing law but also to prior legislation and to the
judicial interpretation thereof. The court applied the rule
in Heydon case in Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State
of Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 661] in the construction of Article
286 of the Constitution. After referring to the state of
law prevailing in the then Provinces prior to the
Constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was
brought about in interstate trade and commerce by
indiscriminate exercising of taxing powers by the different
provincial legislatures founded on the theory of territorial
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11
nexus, SR Das, Actg. C.J. speaking for himself and Vivian
Bose and Jafer Imam, JJ. proceeded to say: (SCR p.635)
It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to
preserve the free flow of interstate trade or commerce in
the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the Constitution-makers adopted
Article 286 of the Constitution.
An illustration of the application of the rule is also
furnished in the construction of Section 2(d) of the Prize
Competitions Act, 1955. In RMD Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of
India [1957 SCR 930] Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the
court after referring to the previous state of the law, to
the mischief that continued under that law and to the
resolutions passed by different state legislatures under
Article 252 (1) of the Constitution authorising Parliament
to pass the Act, stated: (SCR p. 939)
Having regard to the history of the legislation, the
declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we
are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be
controlled and regulated by the Act are only those
competitions in which success does not depend to any
substantial degree on skill. Balirams decision (supra) has
taken into consideration the entire judicial precedent
available till the date of the judgment and came to a
conclusion upon reliance of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
judgment in Puhupram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968 MPLJ
629) that the same lays down the correct law. This Court
observed:
36. The least that is required of a court is the
capacity to deliver a definitive judgment, and merely
because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character
and it has power to administer an oath will not impart to it
the status of a court. That being so, it must be held that
a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate
government under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act is not a court for the purposes of Section 195 of the
Code.
Needless to record here that on a proper appreciation of
judgment in Baliram (supra), there cannot be two opinions as
the scope and effect of Section 195 (3) of Code and we thus
record our concurrence with the view expressed by this Court
in Baliram: The law thus laid down by the Bench decision of
the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra) cannot be
said to be good law and thus stands over-ruled even on the
basis of the state of law under the 1940 Act (being a
repealed statute presently).
On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record
our concurrence with the submissions made in support of the
appeal that the Arbitrator can be termed to be a Court
within the meaning of Section 195 of the Cr. Procedure
Code, as such question of applicability of Section 340
Cr.P.Code in a proceeding before the Arbitrator does not and
cannot arise. The issue thus is answered in the negative.
The Appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed. No order as
to costs.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11