Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
CO-OPERATIVE CENTRAL BANK LTD. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, ANDHRAPRADESH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/04/1969
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 245 1970 SCR (1) 206
1969 SCC (2) 43
CITATOR INFO :
MV 1975 SC1331 (185)
F 1979 SC1203 (15,30,34,40)
RF 1981 SC 152 (16)
F 1982 SC 120 (2)
R 1984 SC 192 (15)
R 1988 SC1263 (11)
R 1990 SC1563 (20)
ACT:
Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act (7 of 1964), s. 61
and Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 10(1) (d)-
Industrial dispute-Whether could be referred to Registrar of
Co-operative Societies under s. 61 of Andhra Act-
Jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal if barred-’Touching the
business of Society’, meaning of-Scope of s. 16(5) of the
Andhra Act.
HEADNOTE:
Disputes between some Cooperative Central Banks of Andhra
Pradesh and their employees, relating to : (i) service
conditions such as salary scales, dearness and other
allowances, conveyance charges, working hours and promotion,
age of retirement, provident fund and gratuity, leave rules,
departmental enquiries, probation and confirmation; and (ii)
the question whether transfers of some employees were
justified, were referred to the Industrial Tribunal under s.
10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the
question whether the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to decide the disputes, because : (1) the disputes could be
referred to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under s.
61 of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964;
(2) the Registrar, in dealing with the disputes referred to,
him under s. 61 of the Andhra Act, could grant relief by
amending the bye-laws under.s. 16(5); and (3) If the
Industrial Tribunal gave relief to the employees it would be
altering the bye-laws thus making orders contrary to law.
HELD: (1) (a) The Andhra Act is an enactment passed by
the State Legislature and received the assent of the
President. Therefore, if any provision of the Industrial
Disputes Act (a Central Act) is repugnant to any provision
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of the Andhra Act, the latter would prevail. But s. 61 of
the Andhra Act requires reference of a dispute to the
Registrar only if the dispute is capable of being resolved
by him or his nominee, and if the dispute between the
cooperative society and its employee touches the business of
the society. The word ’business’ means actual trading or
commercial or other similar business activity of the
society. Therefore, whatever a society does or is required
to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as
laying down the conditions of service of its employees,
cannot be said to be a part of its ’business’, and hence, a
dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen
employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute
touching the business of the society. [2O9 E-F; 215 B-D, G-
H]
(b) The Registrar could not have granted the reliefs
claimed because of the limitations placed on his powers by
the Andhra Act. Most of the Conditions of service which the
workmen want to be altered to their benefit have been laid
down by the bye-laws, so that, any alteration in those con-
ditions of service will require a change in the bye-laws.
But such a change could not possibly be directed by the
Registrar, because, under s. 62(4) of the Andhra Act, the
Registrar or other person or arbitrator to whom the dispute
may be referred under s. 61 is specifically required to
decide the dispute refer-red to him in accordance with the
provisions of the bye-laws. [2l6 B-D, F]
206
The Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. m/s.
Dulichand Jugraj fain, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 887, followed.
South Arcot Cooperative Motor Transport Society Ltd. v. Syed
Batcha, [1960] 11 L.L.J. 693, approved.
(2)The provisions of s. 16(5) of the Andhra Act are
irrelevant in,, considering the scope of the jurisdiction of
the Registrar under s. 61 of the Act, because : (a) any
action taken by the Registrar under s. 16(5) will not be a
decision in a dispute referred to him under s. 61; (b)
though the Registrar has the power to amend bye-laws under
s. 16(5) any other person or arbitrator, to whom the
disputes may be referred, has no such power; and (c) even
the Registrar’s powers under s. 16(5) to amend bye-laws is
to be exercised only if he is of the opinion that it would
be in the interests of the society and are not contemplated
to be exercised in the interests of the workmen or for the
purpose of resolving industrial disputes. [219 B-E]
(3) The principle that rules framed under a statute have
the force of statute does not apply to bye-laws of a
cooperative society. They merely govern the internal
management, business or administration of a society and may
be binding between the persons affected by them but are
neither law nor do they have the force of law. They are
just like conditions of service laid down by contract
between the parties, or like bye-laws under the Articles of
Association of a company under the Companies Act, or
Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders)Act, 1946. Therefore, the circumstance
that in granting relief, the Tribunal may have to vary the
special bye-laws framed by the Cooperative Banks does not
lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be making
orders contrary to law and therefore is incompetent to grant
the reliefs claimed. The jurisdiction granted to the
Tribunal by the Industrial Disputes Act is not the
jurisdiction of merely administering existing laws and
enforcing existing contracts. The Tribunal has the
jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service between
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employer and employees. Further, in the Andhra Act there is
no prohibition that the conditions of service prescribed are
not to be altered. Therefore, the reliefs could only be
granted by the Industrial Tribunal and could not fall within
the scope of the Registrar’s powers under the Cooperative
Societies Act. [217 H; 218 D-H]
Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1961] II
L.L.J. 130 (S.C.)The Management of Marina Hotel v. The
Workmen, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 1, Cinema Theatres v. The Workmen,
[1964] 11 L.L.J. 128 and The Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, [1964] 1 S.C.R. 234, distinguished.
Since the competence of the reference to the Tribunal as a
whole was challenged on the ground that it was barred by s.
61 of the Andhra Act, the question whether a particular
issue forming part of the reference was competently referred
or not did not arise. [219 F, G-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2093 and
2094 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 5, 1968 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 2339
and 2742 of 1968.
C. B. Agarwala, K. Srinivasa Murthy, B. P. Singh and
Naunit Lal, for the appellants (in both the appeals).
A. S. R. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. Pappu, Madan Mohan,
207
A J. Ramamurthi, Vineet Kumar, P. S. Khera and Bindra
Thakur, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals)
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. An industrial dispute arose between 25 Co-
operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and
their workmen represented by the Andhra Pradesh Bank Em-
ployees Federation, Hyderabad, which was referred by the
Government of Andhra Pradesh to the Industrial Tribunal,
Hyderabad, under section 10(1) (d) of the Industrial
Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. The subject-matter of the
dispute was divided into three issues. The first issue
comprised a number of service conditions, viz., (1) Salary,
Scales and Adjustments, (2) Dearness Allowance, (3) Special
Allowances, (4) other Allowances, (5) Uniforms and Washing
Allowances for subordinate staff, (6) Conveyance Charges,
(7) Provident Fund and Gratuity, (8) Leave Rules, (9)
Joining Time on Transfer, (1) Rules relating to departmental
enquiry against employees for misconduct, (11) Probationary
Period and Confirmation, (12) Working Hours and Overtime
Allowance, (13) Age of Retirement,, (14) Security, (15)
Common Good Fund, (16) Service Conditions and (17)
Promotions. The second and the third issues both related to
the question whether the transfers of some employees of two
of the Banks, The Vijayawada Co-operative Central Bank,
Ltd., Vijayawada, and The Vizianagaram Co-operative Central
Bank Ltd., Vizianagaram, were justified and, if not, to what
reliefs were the employees entitled. Before the Industrial
Tribunal, one of the grounds raised on behalf of the Banks
was that the reference of the disputes to the Tribunal was
invalid, because such disputes were required to be referred
for decision to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies
under section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative
Societies Act No. 7 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ’the
Act’), and the effect of the provisions of the Act was to
exclude the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals to deal
with the same disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act.
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Various other pleas were also taken by the Banks in
resisting the claims of the workmen, but, in these appeals,
we are not concerned with them, because the Tribunal dealt
with the point, mentioned by us above, as a preliminary
issue and rejected the contention of the Banks. Twenty-four
of the Banks thereupon challenged the preliminary decision
of the Tribunal on this question, treating it as a
preliminary award, by filing two Writ Petitions Nos. 2339
and 2742 of 1968 under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court also rejected
the plea of the Banks. These two appeals have been brought
up before us by certificate against the orders of the High
Court dismissing the two writ petitions. In Civil Appeal
No. 2093/1968, the appellants are 10 Banks who
208
were petitioners before the High Court in Writ petition No.
2339 of 1968, while 2 of the petitioner-Banks in that writ
petition have been impleaded as respondents. In Civil
Appeal No. 2094 of 1968, the appellants are also 10 Banks
who had joined in filing the other Writ Petition No.
2742/1968 in the High Court, while one of the petitioner-
Banks in that writ petition has been impleaded as
respondent, and another has not joined the appeal as a
party. In these appeals, therefore, we are only concerned
with one single question as to whether the jurisdiction -of
the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate on the industrial
dispute referred to it under s. 10(1) (d) of the Industrial
Disputes Act was barred by the provisions of s. 61 of the
Act.
The Tribunal, and the High Court, in rejecting the plea
taken -on behalf of the Banks, expressed the view that the
disputes actually referred to the Tribunal were not capable
of being decided by the Registrar of the Co-operative
Societies under S. 61 of the Act and, consequently, the
reference to the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial
Disputes Act was competent. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Banks took us through the provisions of the
Act to indicate that, besides being a local and special Act,
it is a self-contained Act enacted for the purpose of
successful working of Co-operative Societies, including Co-
operative Banks, and there are provisions in the Act which
clearly exclude the applicability of other laws if they
happen to be in conflict with the provisions of the Act. It
is no doubt true that the Act is an enactment passed by
State Legislature which received the assent of the
President, so that, if any provision of a Central Act,
including the Industrial Disputes Act, is repugnant to any
provision of the Act, the provision of the Act will prevail
and not the provision of the Central Industrial Disputes
Act. The general proposition urged that the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act
will be barred if the disputes in question can be
competently decided by the Registrar under s. 61 of the Act
is, therefore, correct and has to be accepted. The question,
however, that has to be examined is whether the industrial
dispute referred to the Tribunal in the present cases was
such as was required to be referred to the Registrar and to
be decided by him) under section 61 of the Act.
In order to properly appreciate the submissions which have
been made on behalf of the Banks by their counsel, it is
necessary to set out the provisions of sections 16, 61, 62
and 133. of the Act which are as follows :-
"16. Amendment of bye-laws of a society :-(I)
No amendment of any bye-law of a society shall
be valid unless such amendment has been
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registered under this Act. Where such an
amendment is not expressed to come into
operation on a particular day, then, it
209
shall come into force on the day on which it
is registered.
(2) Every proposal for such amendment shall
be forwarded to the Registrar who shall, if he
is satisfied that the proposed amendment
fulfils the conditions specified in subsection
(1) of section 7, register the amendment
within a period of sixty days from the date of
receipt of such proposals :
Provided that the Government may, for
sufficient cause which shall be recorded in
writing, extend the said period for a further
period of sixty days.
(3) The Registrar shall forward to the
society a copy of the registered amendment
together with a certificate signed and sealed
by him, and such certificate shall be
conclusive evidence that the amendment has
been duly registered.
(4) Where the Registrar is not so satisfied,
he shall communicate by registered post the
order of refusal together with the reasons
therefore, to the society within the period
specified in sub-section (2).
(5) If in the opinion of the Registrar, an
amendment of the bye-laws of a society is
necessary or desirable in the interest of such
society or of the co-operative movement, he
may, in the manner prescribed, call upon the
society, to make any amendment within such
time as he may specify. If the society fails
to make such an amendment within the time so
specified the Registrar may, after giving the
society an opportunity of making its
representation, register such amendment and
forward to the society by registered post a
copy of the amendment together with a
certificate signed by him; such a certificate
shall be conclusive evidence that the
amendment has been duly registered; and such
an amendment shall have the same effect as an
amendment of any bye-law made by the society.
6 1. Disputes which may be referred to the
Registrar
(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for
the’ time being in force, if any dispute
touching the constitution, management or the
business of a society, other than a dispute
regarding disciplinary action taken by the
society or its committee against a paid
employee of the society, arises-
(a) among members, past members and persons
claiming through members, past members And
deceased members; or
210
(b) between a member, past member or Person
claiming through a member, past member or
deceased member and the society, its committee
or any officer, agent or employee of the
society; or
(c) between the society or its committee and
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any past committee, -any officer, agent or
employee, or any past officer, past agent or
past employee or the nominee, heir or legal
representative of any deceased officer,
deceased agent, or deceased employee of the
society; or
(d) between the society and any other
society;
such dispute shall be referred to the
Registrar for decision.
Explanation :-For the purposes of this sub-
section a dispute shall include-
(i) a claim by a society for any debt or
other amount due to it from a member, past
member or the nominee, heir or legal
representative of a deceased member, whether
such debt or other amount be admitted or not;
(ii) a claim by a surety against the
principal debtor where the society has
recovered from the surety any amount in
respect of any debt or other amount due to it
from the principal debtor as a result of the
default of the principal debtor whether such
debt or other amount due be admitted or not;
(iii) a claim by a society against a member,
past member or the nominee, heir or legal
representative of a deceased member for the
delivery of possession to the society of land
or other immovable property resumed by it for
breach of the conditions of assignment or
allotment of such land or other immovable
property.
(2) If any question arises whether a dispute
referred to the Registrar under this section
is a dispute touching the constitution,
management or the business of a society, such
question shall be decided by the Registrar.
(3) (a) Every dispute relating to, or in
connection with, any election to a committee
of a society referred to in clause (a) of sub-
section (3) of section 31, shall be referred
for decision to a
211
Subordinate Judge or where there is no Sub-
ordinate Judge, to the District Judge having
jurisdiction over the place where the main
office of the society is situated, whose
decision thereon shall be final.
(b) Every dispute relating to or in
connection with any election to a committee of
such class of societies as may, by
notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, be
specified by the Government in this behalf and
referred to in clause
(b) of sub-section (3) of section 31, shall
be referred for decision to a District Munsiff
having jurisdiction over the place where the
main office of the society is situated, and
his decision thereon shall be final.
(4) Every dispute relating to, or in
connection with, any election to a committee
shall be referred under sub-section (1) of
sub-section (3) only after the date of
declaration of the result of such election.
62. Action to be taken by the Registrar on
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such reference
(1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the
reference of a dispute under section 61--
(a) elect to decide the dispute himself; or
(b) transfer it for disposal to any person
who has been invested by the Government with
powers in that behalf; or
(c) refer it for disposal to an arbitrator.
(2) Where the reference relates to any dispute involving
immovable property, the Registrar or such person or
arbitrator, may order that any person be joined as a party
who has acquired any interest in such property subsequent to
the acquisition of interest therein by a party to the
reference and any decision that may be passed on the
reference by the Registrar, or the person or the arbitrator
aforesaid, shall be binding on the party so joined as if he
were an original party to the reference.
(3) The Registrar may, by order for reasons to be recorded
therein, withdraw any reference transferred under clause (b)
of sub-section (I ) or referred under clause (c) of that
sub-section and may elect to decide the dispute himself or
transfer it to any other person under clause (b) of sub-
section (I ) or refer it to any other arbitrator under
clause (c) of that subsection.
212
(4) The Registrar, such person or arbitrator shall decide
the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and the rules and bye-laws and such decision shall, subject
to the provisions of section 76, be final. Pending final
decision on the dispute, the Registrar, such person or
arbitrator, as the case may be, may make such interlocutory
orders as he may deem necessary in the,, interests of
justice.
133. Act to override other laws :-The provisions of this Act
shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law."
Reliance was placed on the non-obstante clause "Notwith-
standing anything in any law for the time being in force"
occurring in s. 61 of the Act which has the effect that a
dispute covered by this section must necessarily be referred
to the Registrar for decision, so that it cannot be referred
to any other authority under any other law. Further
strength is sought in support -of this proposition from the
provisions of section 133 of the Act which clearly lays down
that the provisions of the Act have overriding effect if
there be any provision in any other law inconsistent with
the provisions of the Act. Then, it was argued that the
language of s. 61 of the Act is wide enough to cover the
disputes referred to the Tribunal in these cases, because
the disputes are between co-operative societies and their
employees and they touch the business of the co-operative
societies. In support of this submission, learned counsel
referred us to a number of decisions of various High Courts
in which the scope of the provisions contained in s. 61 of
the Act or of similar provisions in other local enactments
was considered. Most of these decisions were concerned with
laying down the meaning of the expression "touching the
business of the society" so as to include within its scope
disputes of different nature between the co-operative socie-
ties and their employees. The cases which have been brought
to our notice are :
(1) a decision of a learned single Judge of the Bombay High
Court in G.I.P. Railway Employees Co-operative Bank Ltd. v.
Bhikhaji Merwanji Karanjia-Employee(1), in which a similar
provision contained in s. 54 of the Bombay Co-operative
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Societies Act No. 7 of 1925 was interpreted;
(2) a decision in Sagar Motor Transport Karamachari Union,
Sagar v. Amar Kamgar Passenger Transport Company Co-opera-
tive Society, Sagar and Another(2), where the Madhya Pradesh
’High Court interpreted section 55(2) of the Madhya Pradesh
(1) A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 341. (2) (1969) 18 Indian
Factories and
Labour Reports, 27.
213
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 which required a dispute
regarding terms of employment, working conditions and
disciplinary action taken by a society, arising between a
society and its, employees, to be decided by the Registrar
or any Officer appointed by him;
(3) a decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in
M. S. Madhva Rao and Others v. D. V. K. Surya Rao, Member
of the Pithapuram Co-operative Bank, Pithapuram and
Others(1) in which section 51 of the Madras Co-operative
Societies Act No. 6 of 1932, which was very similar to s. 61
of the Act, was interpreted; and
(4) a decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Farkhundali Nannhay v. Potdar (V.B.) (2), in which also s.
54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act No. 7 of 1925
came up for interpretation.
Learned counsel for the appellants also brought to our
notice a decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High
Court in Cooperative Milk Societies Union, Ltd. v. State of
West Bengal and others(3), where a dispute as to wages,
wage-scales and dearness allowance was held not to be a
dispute within the meaning of that word as defined in the
Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, and sought to
distinguish it on the ground that the decision in that case
turned on the meaning specially given in that Act to the
word "dispute".
It appears to us that it is not necessary to examine in
detail the reasons given by the High Courts in the above
cited cases for the interpretation placed by them on
provisions similar to s. 61 of the Act in view of a very
recent decision of this Court in The Deccan Merchants Co-
operative Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Dalichand Jugraj & Others(4).
In that case, this Court had to interpret section 91 of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra
Act 32 of 1961), the relevant provision of which is
reproduced below
"91 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, any
dispute .touching the constitution, elections
of the office bearers, conduct of general
meetings, management or business of a society
shall be referred by any of the parties to the
dispute, or by a federal society to which the
society is affiliated, or by a creditor of the
society, to the Registrar, if both the parties
thereto are, one or other of the following :-
(1) A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 103.
(3) [1958] 2 L.L.J. 61.
(2) [1962] I L.L.J. 51.
(4) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 887.,
214
(a) a society, its committee, any past committee, any past
or present officer, any past or present agent, any past Or
present servant or nominee, heir or legal representative of
any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of
the society, or the Liquidator of the society;
One of the questions which the Court formulated as requiring
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an answer was : what is the meaning of the expression
"touching the business of the society"’? In order to decide
this question, the Court analysed the provisions of s. 9 1 (
1 ) and held : -
"Five kinds of disputes are mentioned in sub-
s. (1); first, disputes touching the
constitution of a society; secondly, disputes
touching election of the office bearers of a
society, thirdly, disputes touching, the con-
duct of general meetings of a society;
fourthly, disputes touching the management of
a society; and fifthly, disputes touching the
business of a society. It is clear that the
word ’business’ in this context does not mean
affairs of a society because election of
office-bearers, conduct of general meetings
and management of a society would be treated
as affairs of a society. In this sub-section
the word ’business’ has been used in a
narrower sense and it means the actual trading
or commercial or other similar business
activity of the society which the society is
authorised to enter into under the Act and the
Rules and its bye-laws."
In that case, this Court was concerned with the question
whether a dispute touching the assets of a society was a
dispute touching the business of the society, and it was in
that context that the interpretation mentioned above was
given by this Court. In considering the full scope of s. 91
(I) of the Maharashtra Act 32 of 1961, the Court further
proceeded to hold :-
"While we agree that the nature of business
which a society does can be ascertained from
the objects of the society, it is difficult to
subscribe to the proposition that whatever the
society does or is necessarily required to do
for the purpose of carrying out its objects
can be said to be part of its business. We,
however, agree that the word ’touching’ is
very wide and would include any matter which
relates to or concerns the business of a
society, but we are doubtful whether the word
’affects’ should also be used in defining the
scope of the word ’touching"’.
215
This comment was made when taking. notice of the decision of
the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Farkhundli v.
Potdar(1). The Court also held : -
"One other limitation on the word ’dispute’
may also be placed and that is that the word
’dispute’ covers only those disputes which are
capable of being resolved by the Registrar or
his nominee. "
Considering the similarity between S. 61 of the Act and S.
91 (1 of the Maharashtra Act 32 of 1961, we are of the
opinion that the interpretation already placed by this Court
on the provisions of S. 91 (I) of the Maharashtra Act 32 of
1961 is fully applicable to the provisions of S. 61 of the
Act with which we are concerned. Consequently, in deciding
these appeals, we must proceed on the basis that S. 61 of
the Act requires reference of a dispute to the Registrar
only if the dispute is capable of being resolved by the,
Registrar or his nominee, and, further, the dispute between
the co-operative society and the employee touches the
business of the society in the sense explained by this Court
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in that case.
Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the
dispute covered by the first issue referred to the
Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly
be referred for decision to the Registrar under S. 61 of the
Act. The dispute related to alteration of a number of
conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only
be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an
industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the
provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the
reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations
placed on his powers in the Act itself, It is true that S.
61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the
Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration
of conditions of service of the employees if a registered
society; but the meaning given to the expression "touching
the business of the society", in our opinion, makes it very
doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of
conditions of service can be held to be covered by this
expression. Since the word "business" is equated with the
actual trading or commercial or other similar business
activity of the society, and since it has been held that it
would be difficult to subscribe to the proportion that
whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do
for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying
down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said
to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute
relating to conditions of Service of the workmen employed by
the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the
business of the society. Further, the position is clarified
by the provisions of sub-s. (4) of S. 62 of the Act which
limit the power to be
(1) [1962] I.L.L.J. 51.
216
exercised by the Registrar, when dealing with a dispute
referred to him under s. 61, by a mandate that he shall
decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the
Act and the Rules and bye-laws. On the face of it, the,
provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws could not
possibly permit the Registrar to change conditions of
service of the workmen employed by the society. For the
purpose of bringing facts to our notice in the present
appeals, the Rules framed by the Andhra Pradesh Government
under the Act, and the bye-laws of one of the appellant
Banks have been placed on the Paper-books of the appeals be-
fore us. It appears from them that the conditions of
service of the employees of the Bank have all been laid down
by framing special bye-laws. Most of the conditions of
service, which the workmen want to be altered to their
benefit, have thus been laid down by the bye-laws, so that
any alteration in those conditions, of service will
necessarily require a change in the bye-laws. Such a change
could not possibly be directed by the Registrar when, under
S. 62(4) of the Act, he is specifically required to decide
the dispute referred to him in. accordance with the
provisions of the bye-laws. It may also be noticed that a
dispute referred to the Registrar under S. 61 of the Act can
even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have
been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf,
or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator by the
Registrar. Such person or arbitrator, when deciding the
dispute, will also be governed by the mandate in S. 62 (4)
of the Act, so that he will also be bound to reject the
claim of the workmen which is nothing else than a request
for alteration of conditions of service contained in the
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bye-laws. It is thus clear that, in respect of the dispute
relating to alteration of various conditions of service, the
Registrar or other person dealing with it under S. 62 of the
Act is not competent to grant the relief claimed by the
workmen at all. On the principle laid down by this Court in
the case of the Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd.(1),
therefore, it must be held that this dispute is not a
dispute covered by the provisions of S. 61 of the Act. Such
a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under s. 62
of the Act and must, therefore, be held to be outside the
scope of section 61.
In this connection, we may take notice of the view expressed
by a learned single Judge of the Madras High, Court in South
Arcot Co-operative Motor Transport Society, Ltd. (for ex-
servicemen) v. Syed Batcha and others(2) where dealing with
an industrial claim, the learned Judge held :-
"Therefore, in regard to an industrial claim, like the
retrenchment compensation, the remedy for the
(1) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 887.
(2) [1960] II L.L.S. 693.
217
worker would be only to enforce it by the
machinery created by the Industrial Disputes
Act, namely, by ss. 10 and 33C(2). The Madras
Co-operative Societies Act being itself a
special statute, the authority, acting under
it, would have no jurisdiction beyond what the
enactment itself conferred on him. lie could
not, therefore, have jurisdiction to decide a
dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act."
That decision also related to s. 51 of the Madras Co-
operative Societies Act, 1932, which was similar in terms to
S. 61 of the Act.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Banks,
however, urged a new point to challenge the jurisdiction of
’the Industrial Tribunal to deal with the dispute relating
to conditions of service to the effect that the conditions
of service having been made the subject -matter of bye-laws,
an Industrial Tribunal will not be competent to alter them,
because even an Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to
make orders contrary to law. For this purpose, he referred
us to a number of decisions of this Court in Dalmia Cement
(Bharat), Ltd., New Delhi v. Their Workmen and Another(1);
The Management of Marina Hotel v. The Workmen (2) ; Cinema
Theatres v. Their Workmen(3); and The Hindustan Times Ltd.,
New Delhi v. Their Workmen & Vice Versa(4). In all these
cases, it was held that an Industrial Tribunal acted
illegally in prescribing leave in excess of the number of
days laid down by the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act,
1954. In S. 22 of that Act there was a specific prohibition
that leave for sickness or casual leave with full wages
shall not exceed 12 days; and it was held that a direction
made by the Tribunal granting to the workmen more than 12
days’ sickness or casual leave was illegal. The principle
of the decisions in those cases does not, however, appear to
us to be applicable to the cases before us, because, in the
present cases, there is no prohibition contained in the Act
that the conditions of service prescribed are not to be
altered. The argument on behalf of the Bank, however, was
that the bye-laws, which contained the conditions of
service, are themselves law, so that any direction made by
an Industrial Tribunal altering a condition of service con-
tained in a bye-law would be an order contrary to law and,
hence, illegal.
We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of
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a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions
of
(1) [1961] II L.L.J. 130
(3) [1264] II L.L.J. 128.
Ll 2Sup.CI/69-1 5
(2) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 1.
(4) [1964] T. S.C.R. 234.
218
the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law.
It has no doubt been held that, if a statute gives power to
a Government or other authority to make rules, the rules so
framed have the force of statute and are to be deemed to be
incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle,
however, does not apply to bye-laws of the nature that a co-
operative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-
laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those
which govern the internal management, business or
administration of a society. They may be binding between
the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force
of a statute. In respect of bye-laws laying down conditions
of service of the employees of a society, the bye-laws would
be binding between the society and the employees just in,
the same manner as conditions of service laid down by
contract between the parties. In fact, after such bye-laws
laying down the conditions of service are made and any
person enters the employment of a society, those conditions
of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by
the employee when entering the service and will thus bind
him like conditions of service specifically forming part of
the contract of service. The bye-laws that can be framed by
a society under the Act are similar in nature to the
Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the
Companies Act and such Articles of Association have never
been held to have the force of law. In a number of cases,
conditions of service for industries are laid down by
Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that,
though such Standing Orders are binding between the
employers and the employees of the industry governed by
those Standing Orders, they do not have such force of law as
to be binding on industrial Tribunals adjudicating an
industrial dispute. The jurisdiction which is granted to
Industrial Tribunals by the Industrial Disputes Act is not
the jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws
and enforcing existing contracts. Industrial Tribunals have
the right even to vary contracts of service between the
employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be
exercised by a civil court or a Registrar acting under the
Co-operative Societies Act, so that the circumstance that,
in granting relief on issue No. 1, the Tribunal will have to
vary the special bye-laws framed by the Cooperative Bank
does not lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be
incompetent to grant the reliefs sought in this reference.
In fact, the reliefs could only be granted by the Industrial
Tribunal and could not fall within the scope of the powers
of the Registrar dealing with a dispute under s. 61 of the
Act.
We may also, in this connection, take notice of the
submission made by learned counsel that the Registrar could
have granted relief, under S. 16 (5) of the Act if he
thought that it was advis-
219
able to grant that relief to the workmen. in our opinion,
this submission must be rejected for two reasons. The first
reason is that action taken by the Registrar under s. 16(5)
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of the Act will not be a decision on a dispute referred to
him under s. 61 of the Act. When dealing with the dispute
under s. 61 of the Act, the Registrar is bound to decide the
dispute in accordance with the existing bye-laws, so that,
if the dispute relates to alteration of conditions of
service laid down in the bye-laws, he will be incompetent to
grant the relief claimed. It is also to be noticed that a
dispute referred to a Registrar under s. 61 of the Act may
be transferred for disposal to a person who has been
invested by the Government with powers in that behalf or may
be referred for disposal to an arbitrator. On the face of
it, such person or arbitrator cannot possibly exercise the
powers of the Registrar under, s. 16(5) of the Act. The
second reason is that, under S. 16(5) of the Act, the power
given to the Registrar to propose amendments in the bye-laws
and to enforce them if the proposal is not accepted by a
society is to be exercised only when the Registrar is of the
opinion that it is necessary or desirable to do so in the
interests of such society or of the co-operative movement.
Amendments in bye-laws under S. 16(5) of the Act are not
contemplated in the interests of the workmen or for the
purpose of resolving industrial disputes. The provisions of
s. 16(5) of the Act thus appear to us to be irrelevant when
considering the scope of the jurisdiction of the Registrar
under s. 61 of the Act. Consequently, the decision of the
High Court holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
deal with the industrial dispute referred to it
must be upheld.
We may also take notice of an argument advanced at the last
stage by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Banks
that, in any case, matters covered by issues Nos. 2 and 3
referred to the Tribunal could have been competently decided
by the Registrar, and the reference in respect of those two
issues at least should be held to be incompetent. We do not
think that at this stage there is any need for us to decide
this question, because such a point was not raised at all in
the petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution
before the High Court. In those petitions, the competence
of the reference to the Industrial Tribunal as a whole was
challenged on the ground that it was barred because of the
jurisdiction of the Registrar to deal with the dispute under
section 61 of the Act. Consequently, we need not deal with
the question whether a particular issue forming part of the
reference has been,.competently referred or not.
The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing
fee.
Appeals dismissed.
220