Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1119 of 2007
PETITIONER:
C.M.C. LTD
RESPONDENT:
UNIT TRUST OF INDIA & ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/03/2007
BENCH:
P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN & V.S. SIRPURKAR
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 69 of 2004)
P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.
Leave granted.
1. The appellant and respondent No. 1 entered into an
agreement dated 23.10.1992 for a Technology Upgrade Project
of the latter. The said agreement contained an arbitration
clause. The same read:
"20. In the event of any dispute or difference
relating to the interpretation or
application of any of the provision of this
Agreement or as to the performance of
any obligation by either party shall be
settled by arbitration. Each party shall
appoint an arbitrator and the arbitrators
so appointed shall appoint an umpire to
whom the matter on which the
arbitrators disagree will be referred. The
decision of the arbitrators and in the
event of there being disagreement
between the arbitrators, the decision of
the umpire shall be final, conclusive and
binding on the parties with respect to the
matter referred to arbitration. The
decision of the arbitrators or the umpire
as the case may be shall constitute
arbitrators award for the purpose of
Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The
arbitration proceedings shall be
conducted in accordance with the rules
prescribed by the Indian Council of
Arbitration."
2. Disputes arose between the parties. On 16.5.2002,
respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking the arbitration
clause and calling upon the appellant to refer the dispute and
differences to be settled through arbitration in terms of the
arbitration agreement. Respondent No. 1 named an arbitrator
with the suggestion that he may be accepted as the sole
arbitrator. But, if the appellant was not willing to treat him as
such, it was stated that the arbitrator named by respondent
No. 1 may be treated as the one appointed by it in terms of the
arbitration agreement and in that event, the appellant was
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5
called upon to name its arbitrator and the said two arbitrators
can then appoint a Presiding arbitrator. The appellant replied
stating that the parties have agreed to follow the Rules
prescribed by the Indian Council of Arbitration by
incorporating the said Rules by reference in the arbitration
clause and since respondent No. 1 had not acted in terms of
the said Rules, the appellant regretted its inability to accept
the stand of respondent No. 1 or to appoint an arbitrator in
terms of the arbitration agreement. The appellant regretted its
inability to act on the basis of the notice issued by respondent
No.1.
3. Respondent No. 1 thereupon moved the Chief
Justice of the High Court under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Respondent No.1
contended that the appellant had failed to act in terms of the
procedure for appointment of an arbitrator and hence the
Chief Justice or his Judge designate, may appoint an
arbitrator to act along with the arbitrator named by
respondent No.1 and direct the two arbitrators to appoint the
third, a Presiding Arbitrator, within the time fixed and to refer
all disputes and differences between respondent No.1 and the
appellant arising out of or in connection with the Technology
Upgrade Agreement as per the provisions of the Act. The
appellant resisted the application essentially pleading that the
Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration and the mandate
thereof had not been complied with by the applicant before the
Chief Justice and that the arbitration clause had not been
properly invoked and there is no failure on the part of the
appellant herein to act in accordance with the procedure
accepted by the parties. No occasion had therefore arisen for
the Chief Justice to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Section
11(6) of the Act. It is said that the appellant as directed by the
court had named an arbitrator without prejudice to its
contentions and it is common ground before us that the said
two arbitrators have also named the Presiding Arbitrator and
an Arbitral Tribunal had come into existence, but subject to
the decision in this appeal filed by the appellant.
4. The learned designated Judge of the High Court
held that on a true construction of clause 20 of the Agreement
which is the arbitration agreement, the right or duty to
appoint or name an arbitrator each, rested with the parties to
the contract and what was provided for in the arbitration
agreement was only regarding the following of the procedure of
the Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration. The arbitration
agreement did not contemplate the appointment of the
arbitrator to be as per the Rules of the Indian Council of
Arbitration or only from the panel of arbitrators maintained by
the Council. Thus, on a construction of the arbitration
agreement in the light of the decisions brought to his notice,
the designated Judge, noticing that the appellant had also
named an arbitrator without prejudice to its contentions and
that the two arbitrators had nominated a Presiding Arbitrator
and that Tribunal can proceed to arbitrate on the dispute
allowed the application and constituted the Tribunal as
chosen by the parties. The designated Judge also noticed that
the question about the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal
could be decided by the Tribunal itself.
5. It may be noted that his decision was rendered
before this Court spoke on the nature of the jurisdiction of the
Chief Justice or of the designated Judge in SBP & CO. VS.
PATEL ENGINEERING LTD. & ANR. [(2005) 8 S.C.C. 618]
and held it as a judicial function. The appellant therefore,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5
filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
challenging the decision of the designated Judge, on the basis
that the said order was only an administrative order. The
Division Bench held that in view of the restricted jurisdiction
that the court had in such matters and in the absence of any
injury of any kind to the appellant, there was no reason to
interfere with the decision of the designated Judge merely
because a writ petition was maintainable to challenge the
same. The Petition for Special Leave to appeal was filed
originally challenging the decision of the Division Bench in the
writ petition. But subsequent to the decision in SBP &
Company (supra), the appellant was permitted to convert the
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal as one challenging the
order of the designated Judge and pursue its challenge thereto
directly in this Court. Thus, this appeal challenges the
decision of the designated Judge interpreting the arbitration
clause quoted above and holding that the parties retained the
right to nominate the respective arbitrators and there was no
obligation on any of the parties to choose only an arbitrator as
per the Rules of Arbitration of the Indian Council of
Arbitration or to proceed only in terms of those Rules for
appointment of an arbitrator.
6. It is settled that getting resolution of a dispute by
arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties. So long
as the contract does not militate against the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, nothing in law prevents the arbitration
agreement between the parties being given effect to in full.
What is contended by learned counsel for the appellant is that
the arbitration agreement clearly specifies that "the arbitration
proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules
prescribed by the Indian Council of Arbitration" and this
would mean that the procedure for appointment of an
arbitrator and making a claim for arbitration must all be in
terms of the Rules of the Indian Council of Arbitration.
Learned counsel points out that under Rule 15 any party
wishing to commence arbitration proceedings under the Rules
of the Council had to give a notice of the request for
arbitration to the Registrar of Indian Council of Arbitration
and to the opposite party and had to follow the procedure laid
down in those Rules. Learned counsel submits that the Rules
of the Indian Council of Arbitration had been incorporated in
the arbitration agreement by the parties and any mode of
exercise of right for invoking an arbitration clause other than
the one prescribed by the Rules of the Council would be futile.
Therefore, the notice issued on behalf of respondent No.1
intimating the appellant of the appointment of an arbitrator
and calling upon the appellant to appoint an arbitrator, would
not amount to a proper invocation of the arbitration agreement
and there is no failure on the part of the appellant to follow the
procedure agreed to between the parties for appointment of an
arbitrator resulting in conferment of jurisdiction on the Chief
Justice to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Section 11(6) of the
Act. In this context, we may specifically record that the
learned counsel for the appellant agreed that the arbitration
was governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Respondent No.1 had, of course, invoked that very Act.
7. Even going by the Rules of arbitration of the Indian
Council of Arbitration, it is seen that the parties are not
precluded from having a different procedure for appointment
of an arbitrator. The Rules, even at the inception, suggests
the incorporation by the parties of an arbitration clause in
writing in their contracts in the following terms:
"Any dispute or difference whatsoever arising
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5
between the parties out of or relating to the
construction, meaning, scope operation or
effect of this contract or the validity or the
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the
Indian Council of Arbitration and the award
made in pursuance thereof shall be binding on
the parties."
Rule 4(c) which is relevant reads:
"In case the parties have provided a different
procedure for appointment of arbitrator or
schedule of cost including the arbitrator’s fee,
the Council shall not be bound to process the
case unless both the parties agree to follow
entire procedure or arbitration under Rules of
Arbitration of the Council."
It is clear from the comparison of the arbitration agreement
suggested by the council and the arbitration agreement
between the parties, that the arbitration agreement between
the parties substantially differs from the one suggested by the
Indian Council of Arbitration. Secondly, Rule 4(c) is specific
that in case the parties had provided a different procedure for
appointment of an arbitrator, the Council was not bound to
process the case unless both the parties agreed to follow the
entire procedure or Arbitration Rules of the Council.
Obviously, a different procedure for appointment of an
arbitrator or arbitrators had been agreed to by the parties and
respondent No.1 had obviously not agreed to follow the entire
procedure or have an arbitration under the Rules of the
Council. Therefore, even if one were to apply the Rules, it is
difficult to accept the argument that respondent No.1 was
bound to invoke the Rules of the Council to put in motion an
effective machinery for arbitration.
8. Learned counsel has referred to the decisions in
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA vs. INDIAN COUNCIL OF
ARBITRATION & ORS. [(2003) 6 S.C.C 564] and in
GESELLSCHAFT FUR BIOTECHNOLOGISCHE FORSCHUN
GMBH Vs. KOPRAN LABORATORIES LTD. & ANR. [(2004
(13) S.C.C. 630] in support of his submission that respondent
No.1 was bound to proceed in terms of the Rules of the
Council. But on a scrutiny of those decisions, it is clear that
the arbitration clauses in those cases were substantially in
conformity with the model arbitration clause prescribed by the
Council as quoted earlier and it was in that context that this
Court observed that the Rules of the Council must be followed.
The very appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal was to be
according to those Rules. But in this case, it is clear that the
arbitration clause differs considerably from the agreements
involved in those cases and the parties retained in themselves
the right to appoint the arbitrators. Hence, those decisions
cannot be relied on for the purpose of non-suiting respondent
No.1.
9. The argument that there is an incorporation of the
Rules of the Council in the arbitration agreement and hence
those Rules must be given effect to fully, does not take the
appellant far in this case. On a true construction of the
arbitration agreement, what we find is that the parties
retained in themselves the right to name an arbitrator of their
own, who in turn had to name a Presiding Arbitrator so as to
constitute an Arbitral Tribunal. The power to appoint has not
been ceded to the Indian Council of Arbitration. Once the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5
appointments are made and the Arbitral Tribunals are
constituted, the parties have also agreed that the arbitration
proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules
prescribed by the Indian Council of Arbitration. The provision
that the proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with
the Rules prescribed by the Indian Council of Arbitration does
not in any manner militate against the retention of the power
by the parties of appointing an arbitrator or constituting an
Arbitral Tribunal. Only if there exists any inconsistency
between the two provisions we would be called upon to
undertake the existence of reading down one or ignoring one
as ineffective or inconsistent and giving effect to the other.
Here in this case, there is no difficulty in reconciling both the
clauses in the arbitration agreement. As we have noticed,
resolution of disputes by way of arbitration is a matter of
agreement between the parties. If while contemplating such a
resolution of disputes they also retain in themselves the power
to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal, it cannot be said that there
is anything wrong in such a provision or that the same cannot
be given effect to. Therefore, the power retained by the
parties to name an arbitrator each, does not militate either
against the provisions of the Act or against the Rules of the
Indian Council of Arbitration. That Arbitral Tribunal once
constituted in terms of the Act, may have to follow the Rules of
Indian Council of Arbitration in that behalf. But as rightly
pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General who
appeared on behalf of respondent No.1, when an Arbitral
Tribunal of persons well versed in law is constituted, surely, a
proper procedure will be followed by them and there is no
reason to insist on a particular procedure to be followed. But
obviously, it is not a matter on which we need pronounce now.
Suffice it to say, that we find no infirmity in the interpretation
of the arbitration agreement by the designated Judge and in
the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal as presently
constituted. We are also inclined to think that no prejudice is
caused to the appellant and no injustice is involved in the
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. We therefore affirm the
order of the designated Judge and dismiss this appeal. We
expect the Arbitral Tribunal to enter upon the reference
without any further delay and pronounce its award within
nine months of its entering upon the reference.
10. The appeal is thus dismissed with the above
expectation. The parties are directed to suffer their respective
costs.