Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 838-841 of 1999
PETITIONER:
AMRITLAL AND ORS.
RESPONDENT:
UNION GOVERNMENT THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2000
BENCH:
UMESH C. BANERJEE & K.G. BALAKRISHNAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2000 Supp(4) SCR 450
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
In these appeals the validity of the order of detention passed by the Joint
Secretary to the Government of India stands challenged.
The contextual facts depict that the appellants were arrested pursuant to
the raid conducted by the officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics
leading to the seizure of 132 Kgs. of opium and crime No. 22/96 was
registered against them under sections 8/18 of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ’the Act’). The appellants
prayed for being released on bail, but the Addl. District Judge, Neemuch,
rejected the application. Subsequently however they were detained under
section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short ’the PITNDPS Act’) by order
dated 5.6.1997. The record depicts that the grounds of detention were
communicated to the appellants within the stipulated time and subsequently
by order dated 17.8.1997 their detention has been confirmed. The appellants
moved the High Court on the ground that it was illegal and invalid as the
detaining authority passed the order mechanically and without application
of mind and that facts do not justify their detention. In any event the
detention was further challenged on the ground of the same being punitive
in nature. The Division Bench of the High Court however dismissed the
petitions on the ground that the detaining authority had shown awareness of
the petitioners being in the custody and had also communicated the
compelling reasons ’by hinting at the likelihood of their enlarging on
bail’. The Division Bench of the High Court while dealing with the matter
did take into consideration the factum of the two other persons connected
with the occurrence being released on bail and, as such, the detaining
authority was not oblivious of the petitioners’ custody and had also
provided compelling reasons under section 3(1) of the Act.
Learned advocate appearing in support of the appeals during the course of
hearing informed this Court that while it is true that by reason of efflux
of time the period of detention has otherwise expired but continued to
press the appeal with some emphasis by reason of the consequences as
provided in the statute to wit: the forfeiture of the property of the
detenue and it is in this context strong reliance has been placed on the
decision of this Court in Rivadeneyta Ricardo Augustin v. Govt. of the
National Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors., [1994] Supp. 1 SCC 597. This
Court while dealing with the matter and relying upon the decision of this
Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, [1991] I SCC 128 came to the
conclusion that the order of detention cannot but be quashed. In
Kamarunnissa’s case (supra) this Court was pleased to observe thus :-
"The decisions of this Court to which our attention was drawn by the
learned counsel for the petitioners lay down in no uncertain terms that
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detention orders can validly be passed against detenus who are in jail,
provided the officer passing the order is alive to the fact of the detenus
being in custody and there is material on record to justify his conclusion
that they would indulge in similar activity if set at liberty."
In Augustin’s decision (supra) this Court also placed strong reliance on an
earlier but oft-cited decision of this Court in Binod Singh v. District
Magistrate, Dhanbad, [1986] 4 SCC 416 wherein it was held that if a person
is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released
therefrom, the power of detention should not ordinarily be exercised. This
Court held that there must be cogent materials before the officer passing
the detention order that the detenue is likely to be released on bail. The
inference must be drawn from the available material on record and must not
be the ipsi dixit of the officer passing the order of detention. It is in
this perspective as above, that the recording of the concerned officer in
the matter under reference ought to be noticed and the same reads as below
:-
"Even though prosecution proceedings under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 have been initiated against Shri Amritlal I am
satisfied that there is compelling necessity in view of the likelihood of
his moving an application for bail and in the event of his being granted
bail, the likelihood of his indulging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
as is evident from the trend of his activities, to detain him under the
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1988."
It is this reasoning which the learned advocate contended that the High
Court should have held to be completely erroneous in the matter of being
the basis of an order of detention.
The requirement as noticed above in Binod Singh’s case, (supra) that there
is ’likelihood of the petitioners being released on bail’ that however is
not available in the reasonings as provided by the concerned officer. The
reasoning available is the ’likelihood of his moving an application for
bail’ which is different from ’likelihood to be released on bail’. This
reasoning, in our view, is not sufficient compliance with the requirements
as laid down.
The emphasis however, in Binod Singh’s case (supra) that before passing the
detention order the concerned authority must satisfy himself of the
likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and that satisfaction
ought to be reached on cogent material. Available cogent material is the
likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not
obtaining a bail order.
On the wake of the aforesaid, we do not feel inclined to record our
concurrence with the order of detention passed in the matter. As such the
same is quashed. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.