Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
D.P. MAHESHWARI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DELHI ADMN. & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/09/1983
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
BENCH:
REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
DESAI, D.A.
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
CITATION:
1984 AIR 153 1983 SCR (3) 949
1983 SCC (4) 293 1983 SCALE (2)313
CITATOR INFO :
R 1984 SC1164 (20)
R 1984 SC1683 (1)
D 1988 SC 329 (7,15)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act-Adjudication of disputes-Duty
of Tribunals and Courts while deciding Preliminary
Questions.
Constitution of India-Arts. 226 and 136-Nature of
jurisdiction-Courts not to be too astute to interfere with
exercise of jurisdiction by Special tribunals at
interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.
HEADNOTE:
An industrial dispute concerning the termination of
services of the appellant in 1969 was referred for
adjudication by the Labour Court under ss. 10 (1) (c) and 12
(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act in the year 1970. The
Management of the company in which he was employed
questioned the reference itself by filing a petition under
Art. 226 and when it was rejected, the Management raised a
preliminary contention before the Labour Court that the
appellant was not a ’workman’ and therefore the reference
was incompetent. The Labour Court, after a detailed and
careful examination of the oral and documentary evidence
produced by both the appellant and the Management came to
the conclusion that the appellant was a ’workman’ under s. 2
(s) of the Act as he was employed mainly for clerical
duties. This finding was challenged by the Management once
again by filing a petition under Art. 226 and a Single Judge
of the High Court allowed the same and quashed the order of
the Labour Court as well as the reference made by the
Government. On his appeal having been rejected by a Division
Bench of the High Court, the appellant approached this Court
under Art. 136.
Allowing the appeal,
^
HELD: The nature of jurisdiction under Art. 226 is
supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is
primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all
necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the
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exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor
this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with
the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunals at
interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. [951 G-H]
Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to
decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their
jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner
of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down.
Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary
questions must
950
ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is
really necessary and whether it will not lead to other
woeful consequences. There was a time when it was thought
prudent and wise to decide preliminary issues first. But the
time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy.
It is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted
with the task of adjudicating Labour disputes where delay
may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should
decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying
some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts
in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 stop
proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issues
may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Art. 226 nor the jurisdiction of this Court
under Art 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who
can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can
ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to
Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding
decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136
are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen
in this fashion. [951 F, C-D]
The instant case relates to a dispute originating in
1969 and referred for adjudication in 1970 which is still at
the stage of decision of a preliminary objection. The Labour
Court considered the entire evidence and recorded a positive
finding that appellant who was discharging duties of a
clerical nature was a ’workman’. The Single Judge of the
High Court did not refer to a single item of evidence while
reversing the finding of the Labour Court. He appeared to
differ from the Labour Court on a question of fact on the
basis of a generalisation without reference to specific
evidence. The Division Bench which affirmed the judgment of
the Single Judge also read the judgment of the Labour Court
in a similar unfair fashion and did not consider any of the
evidence considered by the Labour Court and yet
characterised the conclusion of the Labour Court as
perverse. No appellate Court is entitled to do that less so,
a Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
[951 C, 953 B, 954 C-D, 955 C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3844 of
1983.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order
dated the 25th July, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A.
No. 89 of 1976.
A.K. Gupta for the Appellant.
G.B. Pai, S.N. Bhandari and Ashok Grover for
Respondent. No. 3.
R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
951
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CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. It was just the other day that we
were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain
employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on
merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary
objections, invite decision on those objections in the first
instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Art. 226
of the Constitution and to this Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for
years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one
presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now
before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and
referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour
Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a
preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought
prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first.
But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that
policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly
those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour
disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise
industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the
same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues.
Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction
under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a
Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them.
Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can
well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill
afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court
for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on
issues more vital to them. Art. 226 and Art. 136 are not
meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this
fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide
preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether
such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and
whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After
all tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to
decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their
jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner
of preliminary objections journeyings up and down. It is
also worth while remembering that the nature of the
jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate
while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the
Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do
substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction
neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too
astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by
special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary
issues.
952
Having sermonised this much, we may now proceed to
state the facts which provoked the sermon. The appellant
D.P. Maheshwari was an employee of Toshniwal Brothers Pvt.
Ltd., when his services were terminated with effect from
28th July 1969. He raised an industrial dispute and on 3rd
July 1970 the Lt. Governor of Delhi referred the dispute for
adjudication to the Additional Labour Court Delhi under
sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The dispute referred for adjudication to the Labour Court
was, "Whether the termination of services of Shri D.P.
Maheshwari is illegal and/or unjustified and if so to what
relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in
this respect ?" The Management straightaway questioned the
reference by filing Writ petition No. 159 of 1972 in the
Delhi High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on 22nd
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May 1972. Thereafter the management raised a preliminary
contention before the Labour Court that D.P. Maheshwari was
not a ’workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was therefore
incompetent. The Labour Court tried the question whether
D.P. Maheshwari was a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act as a preliminary issue. Both
parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. After
referring to the evidence of the employee’s witnesses the
Labour Court said, "Thus according to the evidence of the
claimant’s witnesses the claimant was employed mainly for
clerical duties and he did discharge the same." The Labour
Court then referred to the evidence of the witnesses
examined by the management and said, "Thus the said evidence
falls far short of proving that the claimant was in fact
discharging mainly Administrative of supervisory duties."
The Labour Court then proceeded to refer to the documents
produced by the management and observed, "Thus the documents
filed by the respondent do not go to show that the real
nature of the duties discharged by the claimant was
supervisory or administrative in nature." The Labour Court
next referred to what it considered to be an admission on
the part of the management who had classified all their
employees into three separate classes A, B and C, Class-A
described as ’Managerial’ Class-B described as ’Supervisory’
and Class-C described as ’Other Staff’. The name of D.P.
Maheshwari was shown in Class-C. After reviewing the entire
evidence the Labour Court finally recorded the following
finding:
"From the above discussion, it is clear that the
claimant’s evidence shows that he was doing mainly
953
clerical work of maintaining certain registers
preparing drafts and seeking instructions from the
superiors and respondents’ lawyers during the period of
his services though designated Accounts Officer or
officer in special duty or store purchase officer
.......................................................
.......................................................
As a result, in my opinion it has to be held that the
nature of the main duties being discharged by the
claimant was clerical and not supervisory or
administrative despite his designation as officer.
Accordingly, he has to be held to be a workman under
section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act."
The management was dissatisfied with the decision of
the Labour Court on the preliminary issue. So, they invoked
the High Court’s extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226
of the Constitution. A learned single judge of the High
Court, by his judgment dated 12th July 1976 allowed the Writ
Petition and quashed the order of the Labour Court and the
reference made by the Government. A Division Bench of the
High Court affirmed the decision of the Single Judge on 25th
July 1980. The matter is now before us at the instance of
the workman who obtained special leave to appeal under Art.
136 on 4th April 1983. The services of the workman were
terminated on 28th July 1969. A year later the dispute was
referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. Thirteen
years thereafter the matter is still at the stage of
decision on a preliminary question. In our view, further
comment is needless.
Shri A.K. Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the High Court literally exercised appellate
powers and recorded findings of fact differing from those
recorded by the Labour Court and this, he complained, had
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been done by an unfair reading of the order of the Labour
Court and without the High Court itself considering a single
item of evidence or document. We are afraid there is
considerable force in Shri Gupta’s criticism.
Curiously enough, the Learned Single Judge of the High
Court affirmed the finding of the Labour Court that D.P.
Maheshwari was not employed in a supervisory capacity. He
said,
"In the face of this material and the admitted
hypothesis the conclusion that the respondent was not
954
mainly employed in a supervisory capacity is certainly
a possible conclusion that may be arrived at by any
Tribunal duly instructed in the law as to the manner in
which the status of an employee may be determined. It
is, therefore, not possible for this Court to disturb
such a conclusion having regard to the limited admit of
review of the impugned order."
Having so held, the Learned Single Judge went on to consider
whether the workman was discharging duties of a clerical
nature. He found that it would be difficult to say that D.P.
Maheswari was discharging ’routine duties of a clerical
nature which did not involve initiative, imagination,
creativity and a limited power of self direction.’ The
Learned Single Judge did not refer to a single item of
evidence in support of the conclusions thus recorded by him.
He appeared to differ from the Labour Court on a question of
fact on the basis of a generalisation without reference to
specific evidence. No appellate court is entitled to do
that, less so, a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
Referring to the finding of the Labour Court that the
workman was discharging mainly clerical duties the Learned
Single Judge observed, "It is erroneous to presume, as was
apparently done by the Additional Labour Court, that merely
because the respondent did not perform substantially
supervisory functions, he must belong to the clerical
category." This was an unfair reading of the Labour Court’s
judgment. We have earlier extracted the relevant findings of
the Labour Court. The Labour Court not only found that the
workman was not performing supervisory functions but also
expressly found that the workman was discharging duties of a
clerical nature. The Division Bench which affirmed the
judgment of the Learned Single Judge also read the judgment
of the Labour Court in a similar unfair fashion and
observed." It is no doubt true that the Labour Court held
that the appellant’s evidence showed that he was doing
mainly clerical work. As we read the order as a whole it
appears that in arriving at this conclusion the Labour Court
was greatly influenced by the fact that the appellant was
not employed in a supervisory capacity." We have already
pointed out that the Labour Court did not infer that the
appellant was discharging duties of a clerical nature from
the mere circumstance that he was not discharging
supervisory functions. The Labour Court considered the
entire evidence and recorded a positive finding that the
appellant was
955
discharging duties of a clerical nature. The finding was
distinct from the finding that the appellant was not
discharging supervisory function as claimed by the company.
We would further like to add that the circumstance that the
appellant was not discharging supervisory functions was
itself a very strong circumstance from which it could be
legitimately inferred that he was discharging duties of a
clerical nature. If the Labour Court had drawn such an
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inference it would have been well justified in doing so.
But, as we said, the Labour Court considered the entire
evidence and recorded a positive finding that the workman
was discharging duties of a clerical nature. The Division
Bench, we are sorry to say, did not consider any of the
evidence considered by the Labour Court and yet
characterised the conclusion of the Labour Court as
perverse. The only evidence which the Division Bench
considered was that of M.W.I.Shri K.K. Sabharwal and under
the impression that the Labour Court had not considered the
evidence of K.K. Sabharwal, the Division Bench observed.
"The non-reference to the said evidence while discussing the
point in issue, would clearly vitiate the order to the
Labour Court." This was again incorrect since we find that
the Labour Court did consider the evidence of M.W.I fully.
Shri G.B. Pai, Learned Counsel for the company, drew
our attention to the qualifications of the appellant and
certain letters written by him to the Managing Director and
argued that the qualifications and the letters indicated
that the appellant was discharging duties, not of a clerical
nature but those of a senior executive closely in the
confidence of the Managing Director. We are enable to agree
with Mr. Pai. First, we are not prepared to go behind the
finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court which
certainly was based on relevant evidence and next, all that
we can say from the qualifications and the letters is that
the appellant was occasionally deputed by the Managing
Director to undertake some important missions. The question
is what were his main duties and not whether he was
occasionally entrusted with other work. On that question,
the clear finding of the Labour Court is that he was mainly
discharging duties of a clerical nature.
We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was
totally unjustified in interfering with the order of the
Labour Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We set
aside the judgments of the Learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the Delhi High
956
Court, restore the order of the Additional Labour Court and
direct the Additional Labour Court to dispose of the
reference within a period of three months from the date of
communication of this order to that Court. That appellant is
entitled to his costs which we stipulate at Rupees five
thousand.
H.L.C. Appeal allowed.
957