Israr Ahmad Khan vs. Amarnath Prasad

CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
2026 INSC 209
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
[EXTRAORDINARY AND INHERENT CONTEMPT JURISDICTION]
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 IN C.A. NO.7023/2025
ISRAR AHMAD KHAN …PETITIONER
VERSUS
AMARNATH PRASAD & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
AND
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.6/2026 IN C.A. NO.7024/2025
MD. HANIF …PETITIONER
VERSUS
AMARNATH PRASAD & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH & R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.
PRELIMINARY:
After some arguments, at the outset, Mr. Shoeb Alam,
learned senior counsel, sought permission to be discharged from
the matter. Permission granted; the learned senior counsel is
Signature Not Verified
discharged from representing the alleged contemnors.
Digitally signed by
POOJA SHARMA
Date: 2026.02.28
10:18:18 IST
Reason:
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and the alleged
contemnors, who are present-in-person before the Court, pursuant
to our Order dated 16.01.2026, which reads as under:
‘ Issue notice.
2. List on 24.02.2026.
3. If by that date the order of which non-compliance
has been alleged is not fully complied and affidavit of
compliance filed, the alleged contemnors no. 1 to 4
shall remain physically present in Court. ’
(emphasis supplied)
THE CONTEMPT:
3. Though an Affidavit-in-Reply stands filed on behalf of the
alleged contemnor No.4, but on a perusal therefrom, we find that
only excuses seem to have been offered. The said Affidavit, inter
alia , contends ‘ …the answering respondent has taken several steps
and efforts to try and comply with the order of this Hon’ble Court.
However, due to exigent circumstances, compliance of the same
has not taken place due to administrative hurdles and issues in
implementation that have arisen. ’ It goes on to state the background
which led to the passing of the Order dated 20.05.2025, of which
contempt is alleged herein, in Civil Appeals No.7023/2025 and
7024/2025. Further, it is averred that the Managing Director,
Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce Federation (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘MD’) wrote a Letter dated 22.07.2025 to the
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
concerned Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh

Letter dated 22.07.2025 was written after over 2 months of the 3
months’ time given had elapsed. The concerned Under Secretary to

information/documents from the MD. It is urged that the MD
provided information as sought to the Government. The MD later, on
26.09.2025, sent a Letter to the Government as a reminder on the
issue. On 03.10.2025, the Government wrote back to the MD asking
if all legal options had been exhausted against the Order dated

out on 20.08.2025 itself, the MD’s reminder Letter dated 26.09.2025
as also the Government’s Letter dated 03.10.2025 came much after.
Indubitably, and prima facie , a clear case of contempt stands made
out, including against individuals not party to the Order dated
20.05.2025. We shall deal with the legal implication of our finding so
a little later.
5. Blissfully, the Affidavit makes no reference as to why no
Miscellaneous Application was preferred in the main Civil Appeals
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
seeking appropriate directions. Surely, if the difficulty was in
implementing the Order dated 20.05.2025, instead of seeking a
review, directions could have been sought for? Instead, a Review
Petition [Diary No.57124/2025] was filed in October, 2025, as
informed by learned counsel for the alleged contemnors. Defects
therein, notified in November, 2025 are yet to be cured. As such, it is
clear that there was no real intent on the part of the alleged
contemnors and others in default of the Order dated 20.05.2025 to
have the same either modified, clarified or reviewed. These facts
speak for themselves. But then again, perhaps it is only us who are
to be blamed. Giving parties an unduly long rope in the past has led
us to this. Alas!
6. If only the story were to end there. The MD, by another Letter
dated 06.10.2025, informed the Additional Chief Secretary to the
Government that a Review Petition had been filed against the Order
dated 20.05.2025, but ‘ a proposal for approval of the creation of
supernumerary post of Godown Keeper, in accordance with the
Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment dated 20.05.2025, is being
prepared and submitted separately so that in the event of a final
decision on the petition not being in favor of the Federation, prompt
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026

Order dated 20.05.2025 was sought to be and made conditional on
the outcome of a Review Petition. We must unequivocally state
herein that while no fetter could be placed on preferring a Review
Petition, it was the duty of the alleged contemnors to first comply
with the Order. Depending on the outcome of the Review Petition,
further steps/adjustment could have possibly taken place. But, it
was not open to the alleged contemnors to not comply with an Order
of this Court on the mere filing of a Review Petition, which, at the
deliberate cost of repetition, remains defective due to want of
rectification by the concerned Review Petitioner.

7. Incredibly, the Affidavit also states that if the Court ‘ does not
find merit in the review petition ’, immediate steps to comply will be
taken ‘ as the logistical hurdles have been figured out ’! Therefore, it
is quite clear that, at least as on date, the alleged contemnors could
very well have purged the contempt but chosen not to do so.
8. In the above circumstances, we were of the view that
Charge(s) ought to be framed against the alleged contemnors as
they have all but admitted to being in contempt while offering
inexcusable justifications for non-compliance.
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
9. While we have no doubt, been proponents of justice being
tempered with mercy, incidents like this seriously make us question
whether the ‘liberal’ jurisprudence on contempt requires a serious
re-look. Such issue, having come to our attention, will definitely be
gone into, in detail, in a more appropriate case.
10. Drastic measures, hence, are called for. This Court will not
permit, much less tolerate, any alleged contemnors to, at this stage,
raise any question on their respective capacity(ies) to comply with
the Order dated 20.05.2025. The Order, of which contempt is
alleged, was passed on 20.05.2025 and was to be complied with in
three months, i.e., on/or before 20.08.2025. The Review Petition
(noted supra ) has been filed against the said Order, inter alia , on the
ground that it was beyond the competence of the officers to comply
with the order and that is why a request was made to the
Government to do the needful.
11. Any apparent defence of a pending Review Petition also
vanishes. We may state, and authoritatively so, that if any of the
alleged contemnors actually believed that due compliance of the
Order dated 20.05.2025 was beyond their respective competence
and/or required the authority of the Government, it was their duty to
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
approach this Court well in time by way of an appropriate
application. Moreover, it was incumbent on such alleged
contemnors to bring to the notice of this Court any real difficulties
faced by them, while also identifying the concerned individuals, who
in their view, would need to be made parties and/or directions
against whom would be necessitated. Nothing of the sort has been
done. The pending Review Petition could not have been used for
the purpose as aforesaid.
12. We have, once again, heard the alleged contemnors as also
their learned counsel. We have no shadow of doubt in our mind that
a clear-cut case of contempt is made out. Thus, the Court proposed
to take the next logical step i.e., frame Charge(s).
LAST CHANCE:
13. At this juncture, the alleged contemnors and their learned
counsel requested, in unison, that the cases be adjourned for 15
days so as to provide them a last and final opportunity to ensure
that the Order dated 20.05.2025 is complied with fully, without any
ifs and buts.
14. Having regard to the afore-submission, purely by way of
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
extraordinary indulgence, basis the afore-undertaking given to this
Court by the alleged contemnors-in-person of their own accord, the
present Contempt Petitions (Civil) be listed on 24.03.2026 at the Top
of the Board as part-heard.
15. If by that date, affidavit(s) showing full compliance of the
Order dated 20.05.2025 passed in Civil Appeals No.7023/2025 and
7024/2025 is/are filed, the alleged contemnors (as substituted infra )
shall not be required to appear in person. Upon failure so to do, they
shall be present in Court on 24.03.2026, whereupon this Court
would proceed to frame Charge(s) against them.
16. It is made clear, for the avoidance of any doubt, that any
person/authority which is part of the chain, directly or indirectly, and
required to cooperate in the compliance of the Order dated
20.05.2025 is duty-bound to act accordingly. Any such
person/authority cannot raise a plea on the ground that it was not a
party in the original proceedings. We may record, ex abundanti
cautela , that no such person/authority has moved this Court raising
any such grievance till date.
17. We are informed that the person arrayed as Respondent
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
No.1-Mr. Amarnath Prasad, is the Secretary (Technical) in the
Department of Forest and Climate Change, Government of
Chhattisgarh, but the final decision has to be taken by the Additional
Chief Secretary concerned, namely, Ms. Richa Sharma, the
Additional Chief Secretary, Forest and Climate Change,
Chhattisgarh. Hence, let the name of Mr. Amarnath Prasad be
substituted by Ms. Richa Sharma.
18. It is further submitted that in place of Respondent No.2-Mr. V.
Sreenivasa Rao, Principal Chief Conservator of Forest and Head of
Forest Force, Government of Chhattisgarh, the name of Mr. Anil
Kumar Sahu, Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and Managing
Director, Chhattisgarh State Minor Forest Produce Cooperative
Federation be substituted. Hence, let the name of Mr. V. Sreenivasa
Rao be substituted by Mr. Anil Kumar Sahu.
19. The reason for the aforesaid substitutions lies at the door of
the learned counsel for the Petitioners. We excuse the said mistake,
albeit only this time. Notices were issued to the initially impleaded
respondents no.1 to 4, as they were holding the posts as indicated
in the pleadings. After the above dictation, this Court was informed
that respondents no.1 and 2 are not the persons who at present are
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
holding the concerned posts. However, apart from respondent no.1
(as substituted) and respondent no.2 (as substituted), other
respondents 3 and 4 have appeared, no separate notice is required
to be issued to the respondents no.3 and 4.
20. Let the newly-impleaded/substituted respondents no.1 and 2
be served with Court Notice alongwith the Order dated 16.01.2026
and this Judgment through the learned Standing Counsel, State of
Chhattisgarh, as well as directly by the Registry forthwith.
LIABILITY OF THIRD/NON-PARTIES FOR CONTEMPT:
1
21. Before resting the pen , we are duty-bound to indicate as to
how third-parties/non-parties to the original proceedings can also be
proceeded against for contempt. This question has cropped up
before this Court in the past. We need only cite the leading
judgment on the point.
22. Without verbiage, we straightaway refer to the dicta
enunciated by a learned 3-Judge Bench in Sita Ram v Balbir @
Bali , (2017) 2 SCC 463 :
‘ 40. Wilful disobedience to a direction issued by this
1
Rather, the keyboard.
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
Court on 24-10-2013 [Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13
SCC 489: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 722] on the part of the
respondent is quite evident. He was party to the
proceedings and bound by the order and as such his
liability on that court stands established. Further, by his
defiance of the direction so issued, he also obstructed
administration of justice. He is thus liable for
committing civil contempt as well as criminal contempt.
But the medical professionals, namely, Dr Munish
Prabhakar and Dr K.S. Sachdev were not parties to
the matter where the direction in question was passed.
41. As regards the liability of the aforesaid medical
professionals, questions that arise are : (1) whether a
person, who is not bound by a direction issued by the
court could be held guilty for committing contempt of
court for his conduct in either directly aiding and
abetting violation on the part of the person who is
bound by such direction; and (2) what is the extent of
liability of such person.
42. In Seaward v. Paterson [Seaward v. Paterson,
(1895-99) All ER Rep 1127: (1897) 1 Ch 545 (CA)] the
landlord of the premises concerned had obtained an
injunction against Paterson i.e. his tenant restraining
him from doing or allowing to be done anything on the
premises which would be a nuisance to the landlord
and from using the premises otherwise than for the
purposes of a private club. Alleging that the tenant had
committed contempt of the court by allowing the
premises to be used for boxing matches, the landlord
applied for committal of two other persons, namely,
Sheppard and Murray on the ground that they had
aided and assisted the tenant in his disobedience to
the injunction. The following passages from the
judgment of Lindley, L.J. are quite instructive: (All ER
pp. 1130 F-G & 1131 B-D)
Now, Let us consider what jurisdiction the court has to
make an order against Murray. There is no injunction
against him—he is no more bound by the injunction
granted against Paterson than any other member of
the public. He is bound, like other members of the
public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
course of justice; and the case, if any, made against
him must be this, not that he has technically infringed
the injunction, which was not granted against him in
any sense of the word, but that he has been aiding
and abetting others in setting the court at defiance,
and deliberately treating the order of the court as
unworthy of notice. If he has so conducted himself, it is
perfectly idle to say that there is no jurisdiction to
commit him for contempt as distinguished from a
breach of the injunction, which has a technical
meaning.
*
A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction,
which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the
injunction, is one thing; and a motion to commit a man
for contempt of court, not because he is bound by the
injunction by being party to the cause, but because he
is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of
justice, is another and a totally different thing. The
difference is very marked. In the one case the party
who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against
for the purpose of enforcing the order of the court for
the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case,
the court will not allow its process to be set at naught
and treated with contempt.
43. In Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL [Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-
LL, (1982) 1 All ER 556: 1982 QB 558: (1982) 2 WLR
288 (CA)] the plaintiff had obtained injunction against
certain defendants and the assets of one such
defendant against whom the injunction was granted,
were held by a bank. The bank was served with a copy
of the injunction but the defendant concerned had not
yet been served. While considering the question
whether any disposal of assets belonging to the
defendant by the bank would make it liable for
committing contempt of court, it was stated as under :
(All ER pp. 566g-j & 567a-b)
“I think that the following propositions may be stated
as to the consequences which ensue when there are
acts or omissions which are contrary to the terms of
injunction : (1) The person against whom the order is
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CONTEMPT PETITIONS (CIVIL) NO.5/2026 AND 6/2026
made will be liable for contempt of court if he acts in
breach of the order after having notice of it. (2) A third
party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the
breach, that is to say if knowing the terms of the
injunction he wilfully assists the person to whom it was
directed to disobey it. This will be so whether or not
the person enjoined has had notice of the injunction.
*
I will give my reasons for the second proposition and
take first the question of prior notice to the defendant.
It was argued that the liability of the third person arose
because he was treated as aiding and abetting the
defendant (i.e. was an accessory) and as the
defendant could himself not be in breach unless he
had notice it followed that there was no offence to
which the third party could be an accessory. In my
opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature
of the liability of the third party. He is liable for
contempt of court committed by himself. It is true that
his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a
dual character of contempt of court by himself and
aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the
conduct will always amount to contempt by himself. It
will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the
administration of justice by causing the order of the
court to be thwarted.”
44. The extent of liability of third party in such actions
was considered by the House of Lords in Attorney
General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [Attorney
General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (1991) 2 All ER
398: (1992) 1 AC 191: (1991) 2 WLR 994 (HL)] In that
case the Attorney General had brought action against
two newspapers seeking permanent injunction
restraining them from publishing material from a book
written by a person who was formerly a member of the
security service and by terms of his employment was
bound by confidentiality which would stand breached if
his memoirs were published. While the interlocutory
injunctions restraining publication of the material
pending trial of such action were granted against those
two newspapers, three other newspapers published
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extensive extracts and summaries of the book
following which proceedings for criminal contempt
against them were brought by the Attorney General. At
the trial of those proceedings those three other
newspapers were held to be guilty of criminal
contempt. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook concluded as
under : (All ER pp. 405j & 406a-c)
“… The claims of the Attorney General in the
confidentiality actions were for permanent injunctions
restraining the defendants from publishing what may
conveniently be called Spycatcher material. The
purpose of the Millett injunctions was to prevent the
publication of any such material pending the trial of
the confidentiality actions. The consequence of the
publication of Spycatcher material by the publishers
and editor of The Sunday Times before the trial of the
confidentiality actions was to nullify, in part at least,
the purpose of such trial, because it put into the public
domain, part of the material which it was claimed by
the Attorney General in the confidentiality actions
ought to remain confidential. It follows that the
conduct of the publishers and editor of The Sunday
Times constituted the actus reus of impeding or
interfering with the administration of justice by the
court in the confidentiality actions.”
45. In a separate concurring opinion Lord Jauncey of
Tullichettle stated as under : (Attorney General
case [Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,
(1991) 2 All ER 398: (1992) 1 AC 191: (1991) 2 WLR
994 (HL)] , All ER p. 426j)
“I turn to consider whether there is any
reason why established principle should not
be applied to the situation in this case. I do
not accept the proposition that to apply
established principles in the foregoing
circumstances would effectively be to convert
every injunction from an order in personam to
an order contra mundum. That proposition
ignores the distinction between the breach of
an order by the person named therein and
interference with the course of justice
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resulting from a frustration of the order by the
third party.”
47. We thus hold that the respondent is guilty of
having violated the order dated 24-10-2013 [Sita
Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13 SCC 489: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri)
722] passed by this Court and for having obstructed
administration of justice. We also hold Dr Munish
Prabhakar and Dr K.S. Sachdev guilty for having
helped the respondent in his attempts and thereby
obstructing administration of justice. Having held so,
we could straightaway have imposed appropriate
punishment under the Act. However, we deem it
appropriate to grant one more opportunity to these
contemnors. The respondent has not filed any affidavit
nor tendered an apology. At the same time for Dr K.S.
Sachdev, Managing Director of the company that
owns the hospital is said to be 76 years of age.
Considering the fact that these are medical
professionals with sufficient standing, in our view ends
of justice would be met if one more opportunity is
granted to them to present their view on the issue of
punishment. In the circumstances, we direct presence
of these three contemnors on 2-1-2017. The
respondent is in custody and therefore appropriate
production warrant shall be issued under the signature
of the Registrar of this Court ensuring presence of the
respondent before this Court. The police concerned is
directed to facilitate such production of the
respondent. The contemnors can also present their
views and make appropriate submission in writing on
or before 23-12-2016. ’
(emphasis supplied)
23. Simply put, thus, it is no longer res integra that a party, once
becomes or is made aware of an Order of this Court, if yet acts in
wilful default or deliberate non-compliance or any such like conduct
against/in breach of the Order concerned, makes itself liable to face
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the full wrath of Contempt Jurisdiction. In the cases at hand, the
Government and the Additional Chief Secretary have been aware of
the Order dated 20.05.2025, at the very least from 22.07.2025 and
onwards, as clear from the correspondence placed on record in the
Affidavit adverted to hereinbefore. Nothing more requires to be
stated on the factual matrix. In any event, we are bound by Sita
Ram ( supra ), which squarely applies herein.
QUESTION BEFORE THE CONTEMPT COURT:
24. It is beyond the pale of any doubt that when in seisin of a
contempt application, the question before the Court is only whether
or not the decision, of which contempt is alleged, has been complied
with. In Union of India v Subedar Devassy PV , (2006) 1 SCC 613 ,
after adverting to a similar view in K G Derasari v Union of India ,
(2001) 10 SCC 496 , a 2-Judge Bench held:

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(emphasis supplied)
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25. J S Parihar v Ganpat Duggar , (1996) 6 SCC 291 was a
case where this Court considered the limited scope of contempt
proceedings. In Snehasis Giri v Subhasis Mitra , (2023) 18 SCC
529 , after taking note of J S Parihar ( supra ), a Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court opined:

(emphasis supplied)
26. As pointed put in Subedar Devassy PV ( supra ), if an alleged
contemnor is of the view that the Order apropos which contempt is
alleged is, inter alia , impracticable or impossible, it will have to take
recourse to appropriate proceedings. We may add that a defence of
administrative hurdles or even impossibility to perform what has
been ordered, may not be open to an alleged contemnor, if he/she
has not moved the appropriate Court by recourse to appropriate
proceedings in time, promptly and within the prescribed period of
limitation, subject to condonation, if and as applicable, on sufficient
cause being shown. As narrated above, even the defective Review
Petition in the present case was filed after lapse of time granted for
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implementation/obedience of the Order dated 20.05.2025. We say
no more on this count.
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT
IMPLEMENTATION:
{{

27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the exception, but in
recent times, the exception has practically evolved to become the
rule. Orders passed by the Courts are not complied with for a long
time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed, belated appeals, with
tremendous delay, are preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious conduct of the
defaulting party is sought to be justified on the mere production of a
Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing that an appeal has
been preferred, so as to obtain multiple adjournments in contempt
matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate these practices. It is felt
that by such modus operandi , disobedient litigants act brazenly
which has the further effect of bringing down the authority and
majesty of the Courts and the rule of law, interfering in the
administration of justice. The same may well, in certain situations,
border on criminal contempt.
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30. The High Courts should deal with such unscrupulous litigants,
moreso when they happen to be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand. Unless the
High Courts, so also this Court deal with these aspects firmly, we run
the clear risk of erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary
litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at all levels. It is the
solemn duty of all of us manning the Courts across the hierarchy to
ensure that the public faith never wavers.
PROCEDURAL DIRECTIONS:
31. Registry to forthwith place Review Petition bearing Diary
2
No.57124/2025 before the appropriate Bench, after obtaining due
permission from Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. A copy of this
Judgement shall be placed with that Review Petition.
32. Copies of this Judgment be also circulated to the Union
Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training; the Chief
Secretaries to all State Governments, Union Territory
Administrations and the Government of the National Capital Territory
of Delhi, with a direction to take note of what we have stated above,
2
It is evincible that the same was filed on 04.10.2025 at 16:56 hours and defects therein notified on
21.11.2025. As at the time this Judgment is passed, the said review petition remains in defects.
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in respect of Contempt Petitions, whether pending before this Court
or the High Courts, where officers stand arrayed as individuals.
They are at liberty to transmit this Judgment onward as deemed fit
to other officers and concerned persons.
..………………………………………
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]
..………………………………………
[R. MAHADEVAN, J.]
NEW DELHI
th
24 FEBRUARY, 2026
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