M/S ACHAL INDUSTRIES vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 28-03-2019

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 4837 OF 2011 M/s. ACHAL INDUSTRIES .…..Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA ….Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 4838 OF 2011 J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. The   present   appeals   have   been   preferred   against   the th impugned judgment dated 17   April, 2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka disposing of the Sales Tax Revision Petition Signature Not Verified examining the applicability of the turnover tax as defined under Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2019.03.28 17:12:05 IST Reason: 1 Section 6­B(1) by the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957(hereinafter being referred to as “KST Act”). 2. The brief facts of the case which may be relevant for the present purpose are that the appellant is a manufacturer and registered   dealer   of   the   cashew   kernels   cashew   shell   oil,   etc. Assessments were made for the years 1990­91 to 1999­2000 by the respective assessing authorities under Section 12(3) of the Act.  Against the assessment orders of the assessing authorities, appeals/revision   petitions   were   preferred   before   the appellate/revisional authority and the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant was that levy of tax under Section 6­B of the Act, on the total turnover is a misconstruction of the provision and it has to be on the “taxable turnover” which may be in conformity with Article 286 of the Constitution of India but that was neither accepted by the assessing authority nor at the appellate/revisional stage against which the present appeals have been preferred impugning the assessments made for the years 1990­91 to 1999­2000 in the instant appeals. 2 3. The main thrust of the submission of Mr. Mohit Chaudhary, learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   is   that   Courts   below   have manifestly   erred   in   appreciating   that   the   ‘total   turnover’   as defined under Section 6­B(1) for the purpose of levy turnover tax can in no event include the ‘turnover’ with reference to which the State has no power to levy tax under the constitutional scheme and the submission proceeds that the levy of tax under Section 6­B can be on the ‘taxable turnover’ alone.   Though the first limb of the Section has adopted the word ‘total turnover’ but it is only for  the  limited   purpose   of   identifying   the   dealers   and   further submits that the ‘turnover’ which is not liable to tax under the provisions of the Act, cannot be included in the calculation of ‘total turnover’ for the purpose of assessment of turnover tax and that   is   according   to   him   the   basic   error   which   has   been committed in interpreting Section 6­B(1) of the KST Act.   4. Learned counsel submits that the interpretation which has been advanced by the respondent State if taken at its face value, would amount to permitting the State to indirectly levy turnover tax on part of a dealer’s total turnover which is non exigible to 3 intra   sales   tax   and   indeed   would   be   beyond   the   legislative competence of the State.   5. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   although   the constitutional validity of the provision has been upheld but still open to the Court to read down the provision in a manner that it do not offend the Constitutional scheme.   The concept of ‘total turnover’   has   been   incorporated   under   Section   6­B(1)   for   the purpose   of   identification   of   the   dealers   and   for   prescribing rate/slabs and the actual levy is intended only on intra­state turnover   by   reason   of   the   proviso,   it   may   be   within   the competence of the State Legislature.  In support of submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in   2011(3) SCC 380 and  Indra Das Vs. State of Assam Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam  2017(15) SCC 67. 6. Per contra, Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned AAG appearing for the   respondent   State   submits   that   the   issue   in   the   instant appeals   stands   conclusively   answered   by   this   Court   in   M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others  Vs.  State of Bihar 4 and   Others  1983(4) SCC 45 and further submits that once the constitutional validity of Section 6­B has been upheld by the jurisdictional High Court in the series of decisions, wherein the challenge to Section 6­B(1) offending Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India regarding the classification of dealers being repelled and it was held that the inclusion of inter­state export and import turnover is only for the purpose of identifying dealers and not for levying tax, that was within the competence of the State Legislature.   This Court has explained in   M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals   Ltd.   and  Others  Vs.  State  of   Bihar  and (supra) to reiterate the principle of economic superiority Others for the purpose of levying turnover tax.   7. Learned counsel for the respondent State further submits that   in   the   instant   case,   the   appellant   filed   returns   for   the assessment years in question claiming certain deductions.  When such returns were assessed by the assessing authorities, it was noticed that as far as the determination of the rate at which ‘turnover tax’ was to be levied, the dealer has made incorrect deductions and in turn has furnished returns at a lower rate. 5 Upon assessment, the assessing authority determined the actual slab applicable to the assessee for each assessment year and levied the turnover tax accordingly and it is in conformity with Section 6­B(1) of the KST Act.   8. Before   we   proceed   to   examine   the   question   raised   any st further, it will be relevant to note the pre­amendment (1  April, 2000) of the KST Act, as under:­ “2. Definitions. – (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, ­­ “(u)   "tax"  means a tax leviable under the provisions of this Act;   [(u­1) "taxable turnover" means the turnover on which a dealer shall be liable to pay tax as determined after making such deductions from his total turnover and in such   manner   as   may   be   prescribed,   but   shall   not include the turnover of purchase or sale in the course of inter­State trade or commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India; (u­2) "total turnover"  means the aggregate turnover in all goods of a dealer at all places of business in the State, whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover   is   liable   to   tax,   including   the   turnover   of purchase or sale in the course of inter­State trade or commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India;]  (v) "turnover"  means the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold, or supplied or distributed [or delivered or otherwise disposed of in any of the ways referred to in clause (t)] by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of 6 others, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration; …. [6­B.   Levy   of   Turnover   Tax.­   [(1)   [Every   registered dealer and every dealer who is liable to get himself registered under sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 10] whose total turnover in a year is not less than [ten lakh] rupees whether or not the whole or any portion of such   turnover   is   liable   to   tax   under   any   other provisions of this Act, shall be liable to pay tax,­ (i) at the rate of one and a quarter per cent of his total turnover, if his total turnover is not less than ten lakh rupees but is less than two hundred lakh rupees in a year; or   (ii) at the rate of one and three­fourths per cent of his total turnover,   if   his   total   turnover   is   not   less   than   two hundred lakh rupees [but is less than five hundred lakh rupees in a year; or] (iii) at the rate of [two and three fourth per cent] of his total turnover,   if   his   total   turnover   is   not   less   than   five hundred lakh rupees in a year]: Provided that no tax under this sub­section shall be payable on that part of such turnover which relates to,­ (i) sale   or   purchase   of   goods   specified   in   the   Fifth Schedule; (ii) sale   or   purchase   of   good   specified   in   the   Fourth Schedule; (iii) sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter­State trade or commerce; …. Provided further that save as otherwise provided in this sub­section, no other deduction shall be made 7 from the total turnover of a dealer for the purposes of this Section.” 9. The expression “total turnover” + “turnover” which has been used under Section 6­B has the same meaning as defined under Section 2(1)(u­2) and 2(v) of the Act.  It may be further noticed that under Section 6­B, reference is made on ‘total turnover’ and not the ‘turnover’ as defined under Section 2(v) of the KST Act and taking note of the exemption provided under first proviso clause(iii), exclusion has been made in reference to use of sale or purchase of goods in the course of inter­state trade or commerce. It clearly indicates that the expression ‘total turnover’ which has been incorporated as referred to under Section 6­B(1) is for the purpose   of   identification   of   the   dealers   and   for   prescribing different rates/slabs.  The first proviso to Section 6­B(1) provides an   exhaustive   list   of   deductions   which   are   to   be   made   in computation   of   such   turnover   with   a   further   stipulation   as referred to in second proviso that except for the manner provided for in Section 6­B(1), no other deduction shall be made from the total turnover of a dealer. 8 10. This Court, in   M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and (supra), while examining the  pari meteria  provision of Others case sub­Section   (1)   of   Section   5   of   the   Bihar   Finance   Act   which provides for levy of surcharge on gross turnover in relation to the tax payable in reference to Article 286 of the Constitution of India read   with   Entry   54   under   List   II   of   Seventh   Schedule   into consideration held as under:­
90.The decision inFernandez case[AIR 1957 SC 657]
is therefore clearly an authority for the proposition that
the State Legislature notwithstanding Article 286 of the
Constitution while making a law under Entry 54 of List
II of the Seventh Schedule can, for purposes of the
registration of a dealer and submission of returns of
sales tax, include the transactions covered by Article
286 of the Constitution. That being so, the
constitutional validity of sub­section (1) of Section 5 of
the Act which provides for the classification of dealers
whose gross turnover during a year exceeds Rs 5 lakhs
for the purpose of levy of surcharge, in addition to the
tax payable by him, is not assailable. So long as sales
in the course of inter­State trade and commerce or
sales outside the State and sales in the course of
import into, or export out of the territory of India are
not taxed, there is nothing to prevent the State
Legislature while making a law for the levy of a
surcharge under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to take into account the total turnover of the
dealer within the State and provide, as has been done
by sub­section (1) of Section 5 of the Act, that if the
gross turnover of such dealer exceeds Rs 5 lakhs in a
year, he shall, in addition to the tax, also pay a
surcharge at such rate not exceeding 10 per centum of
the tax as may be provided. The liability to pay a
surcharge is not on the gross turnover including the
transactions covered by Article 286 but is only on
inside sales and the surcharge is sought to be levied on
9
dealers who have a position of economic superiority.
The definition of gross turnover in Section 2(j) of the
Act is adopted not for the purpose of bringing to
surcharge inter­state sales or outside sales or sales in
the course of import into, or export of goods out of the
territory of India, but is only for the purpose of
classifying dealers within the State and to identify the
class of dealers liable to pay such surcharge. The
underlying object is to classify dealers into those who
are economically superior and those who are not. That
is to say, the imposition of surcharge is on those who
have the capacity to bear the burden of additional tax.
There is sufficient territorial nexus between the
persons sought to be charged and the State seeking to
tax them. Sufficiency of territorial nexus involves a
consideration of two elements viz.: (a) the connection
must be real and not illusory, and (b) the liability
sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that
territorial connection:State of Bombayv.R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwala[AIR 1957 SC 699],Tata Iron & Steel
Co. Ltd.v.State of Bihar[(1958) SCR 1355]
andInternational Tourist Corporationv.State of
Haryana[(1981) 2 SCC 318]. The gross turnover of a
dealer is taken into account in sub­section (1) of
Section 5 of the Act for the purpose of identifying the
class of dealers liable to pay a surcharge not on the
gross turnover but on the tax payable by them.
11. This Court also noticed the economic superiority principle for the purpose of levy of turnover tax while holding that the interpretation of statute would not depend upon contingency.  It is trite  law  which the   Court would  ordinary  take  recourse  to golden   rule   of   strict   interpretation   while   interpreting   taxing statutes.  In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply strict rule of interpretation and this is what 10 has   been   considered   by   this   Court   in   Commissioner   of Customs(Import), Mumbai Vs. Dilip Kumar and Company and Others  2018(9) SCC 1 in para 24 and 34 as under:­
“24.In construing penal statutes and taxation
statutes, the Court has to apply strict rule of
interpretation. The penal statute which tends to
deprive a person of right to life and liberty has to be
given strict interpretation or else many innocents
might become victims of discretionary decision­
making. Insofar as taxation statutes are concerned,
Article 265 of the Constitution prohibits the State from
extracting tax from the citizens without authority of
law. It is axiomatic that taxation statute has to be
interpreted strictly because the State cannot at their
whims and fancies burden the citizens without
authority of law. In other words, when the competent
Legislature mandates taxing certain persons/certain
objects in certain circumstances, it cannot be
expanded/interpreted to include those, which were not
intended by the legislature.
34.  The passages extracted above, were quoted with approval   by   this   Court   in   at   least   two   decisions being  CIT  v.  Kasturi and Sons Ltd.  (1999) 3 SCC 346 and  State of W.B.  v.  Kesoram Industries Ltd.  (2004) 10 SCC   201   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “ Kesoram Industries case ”, for brevity). In the later decision, a Bench of five Judges, after citing the above passage from   Justice   G.P.   Singh's   treatise,   summed   up   the following principles applicable to the interpretation of a taxing statute: “( )   In   interpreting   a   taxing   statute,   equitable i considerations   are   entirely   out   of   place.   A   taxing statute cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything   which   is   not   expressed;   it   cannot   import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; 11 ( ii ) Before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section; and ( iii ) If the words are ambiguous and open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject and there is nothing unjust in a taxpayer escaping if the letter of the   law   fails   to   catch   him   on   account   of   the legislature's failure to express itself clearly.” 12. In the instant scheme of the Act of which reference has been made in detail, the expression ‘total turnover’ has been referred to for the purpose of identification/classification of dealers for prescribing various rates/slabs of tax leviable to the dealer and read with first and second proviso to Section 6­B(1),  this makes the   intention   of   the   legislature   clear   and   unambiguous   that except the deductions provided under the first proviso to Section 6­B(1) nothing else can be deducted from the total turnover as defined under Section 2(u­2) for the purpose of levy of turnover tax under Section 6­B of the Act.  13. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the ‘total   turnover’   in   Section   6­B(1)   is   to   be   read   as   ‘taxable turnover’ and the determination of the rate of the turnover tax is to be ascertained on the ‘taxable turnover’ on the face of it is unsustainable and deserves outright rejection. 12 14. The   judgments   on   which   learned   counsel   has   placed reliance in  Indra Das Vs. State of Assam  (supra) is in context of the fundamental rights in reference to the provisions of Terrorists &   Disruptive   Activities   (Prevention)   Act,   1987,   and   it   was observed that the endeavour of the court should be to try to sustain the validity of the statute by reading it down as possible. 15. The judgment in   Subramanian Swamy and others  Vs. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and Another 2014(8) SCC 390 was in reference to a challenge to the validity of the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Though the validity was repelled by this Court, the doctrine of ‘reading down’ was discussed.  It was held to be inapplicable in the facts of the said case.  16. In   Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam (supra), this Court has examined the interpretation of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which has a reference to the liberty of a citizen.  Either of the cases referred to may not have any remote relevance to the question which has come up before us for consideration. 13 17. Consequently,   in   our   considered   view,   the   appeals   are without substance and the same are dismissed accordingly.  No costs. 18. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. …………………………J. (A.M. KHANWILKAR) ………………………….J. (AJAY RASTOGI) NEW DELHI March 28, 2019 14