Prabhu Kumar vs. The State Of Himachal Pradesh

2026 INSC 253
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 868 OF 2024

PRABHU KUMAR ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF HIMACHAL
PRADESH & OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
2. The appellant herein, a Law Graduate, is a
specially-abled person suffering from 90% permanent
locomotor disability due to left shoulder
disarticulation. He has been practicing as an
advocate since 2015.
3. He has preferred the instant appeal for assailing
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the judgment dated 29 September, 2020 passed by
1
the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in
C.W.P. No. 3634 of 2019, whereby the High Court
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.03.17
18:31:11 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter referred to as “High Court”.
1


dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant and
rejected his claim for appointment to the post of
2
Assistant District Attorney .
Brief Facts: -
4.
The facts relevant and essential for the disposal
of the appeal are noted hereinbelow.
nd
5. An advertisement dated 2 May, 2018 was
issued by respondent No. 3- Himachal Pradesh
3
Public Service Commission for 24 posts of ADA,
Class-I (Gazetted). Out of these 24 posts, 20 were
advertised in furtherance of a requisition and 4 were
backlog posts. 2 posts from the 24 advertised posts
were kept reserved for persons with disability. The
advertisement provided that the applicant under the
disabled category should not have less than 40%
disability and not more than 60% disability in one leg
or one arm.
6. The appellant submitted an online application
form annexing all his documents including the
disability certificate and the experience certificate
from the bar. After scrutinizing the application
submitted by the appellant, the Commission issued

2
For short “ADA”.
3
Hereinafter referred to as “Commission”.
2


a Roll number and the appellant was allowed to
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appear in the written test conducted on 30
September, 2018. The result of the written test was
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declared by the Commission on 4 July, 2019. The
appellant qualified the same under the Physically
Handicapped (General) category. A total of 5
candidates with disability were declared successful
against these two reserved posts. The appellant
having succeeded in the written/screening test was
called to appear before the interview board for
nd
personality assessment which was scheduled for 2
August, 2019. The result of interview was declared
rd
on 3 August, 2019 and the respondent-
rd
Commission, press note dated 3 August, 2019,
vide
recommended the name of the appellant for
appointment to the post of ADA under the physically
handicapped quota.
7. The select list was forwarded to the Government
of Himachal Pradesh in the form of a
recommendation and the Government, acting upon
the same, issued appointments to 16 out of the 17
recommended candidates. The name of the appellant
was, however, withheld and not included in the
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notification dated 19 September, 2019 offering
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appointment to only 16 candidates. The appellant
made inquiries and also sought information under
the Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking disclosure
of the reason for his exclusion in the final list of
appointments. In response, the appellant was
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provided copy of a communication dated 19
September, 2019 wherein it was stated that the
recommendation of the appellant’s name by
Commission was not accepted on the ground that the
appellant was having 90% disability (left shoulder
disarticulation) which was well above the threshold
limit of 60% fixed in the advertisement under the
handicapped quota.
8. Being aggrieved by the non-issuance of
appointment order despite succeeding in the
selection process, the appellant approached the High
Court by filing the captioned writ petition being
C.W.P. No. 3634 of 2019. Before the High Court, the
appellant contended that the respondents could not
have prescribed a maximum limit of 60% disability in
the subject recruitment process as the same ran in
direct conflict with the provisions of Rights of Persons
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4
with Disabilities Act, 2016 . The High Court,
however, proceeded to dismiss the appellant’s writ
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petition by judgment dated 29 September, 2020
which is the subject matter of challenge in this
appeal.
Submissions
9. Shri P.V. Dinesh, learned senior counsel
representing the appellant strenuously contended
that the denial of appointment to the appellant in
spite of him succeeding in the competitive selection
process was absolutely illegal, unjustified and
arbitrary. It was submitted that there existed no
intelligible or rational criterion in prescription of the
upper limit of 60% disability as a threshold beyond
which the candidates belonging to the physically
handicapped category would not be entitled for the
appointment to the post of ADA. The said restriction
has no rational nexus with the nature of duties
required to be performed for the post in question.
10. It was further submitted that the appellant has
been successfully practising law for nearly a decade,
without any impediment on account of the disability

4
Hereinafter, referred to as “RPwD Act, 2016”.
5


in his shoulder. It was pointed out that the appellant
topped amongst the 5 candidates who were
shortlisted under the physically handicapped
category, thereby demonstrating both merit and
competence to discharge the duties attached to the
post.
11. Learned senior counsel contended that the High
Court itself in the impugned judgement observed that
the respondents were not clear about the extent of
maximum disability which could have been
prescribed for physically handicapped reserved seats
in the selection process for the post of ADA. Despite
observing so, the High Court declined to grant relief
to the appellant and proceeded to dismiss the writ
petition.
12. He further contended that denial of
appointment to the appellant and the dismissal of the
writ petition are grossly illegal, arbitrary and violative
of the fundamental rights available to the appellant
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
13. Shri Dinesh urged that the High Court placed
reliance upon the judgment of this Court in V
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5
Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu to hold
that prescribing a maximum limit of disability for
candidates belonging to physically handicapped
category was in the domain of the employer. However,
the said judgment has been expressly overruled by a
three Judge bench of this Court in Vikash Kumar v.
6
U.P.S.C. and as such, the impugned judgment is
untenable in the eyes of law and liable to be set aside.
14. Per contra , learned counsel representing the
respondents vehemently and fervently opposed the
submissions advanced by the appellant’s counsel. It
was urged that the advertisement contained a
specific condition in unambiguous terms that
candidates seeking appointment under the physically
handicapped category must have a disability ranging
between 40% and 60% in one arm or one leg. Learned
counsel submitted that the disability certificate held
by the appellant reflects 90% permanent disability
(left should disarticulation) and therefore, the
appellant was not covered within the prescribed
range of disability contemplated under the
advertisement.

5
2019 4 SCC 237.
6
2021 5 SCC 370.
7


15. It was further urged that the appellant cannot
claim any relief as he had participated in the selection
process despite being fully aware of the condition
prescribing the upper limit of 60% disability. If the
appellant was aggrieved by the stipulation fixing the
upper disability limit at 60%, the appropriate course
would have been to challenge the said condition prior
to participating in the selection process. Having
taken part in the process without objection, the
appellant is now estopped from assailing the same
after being denied appointment.
16. On these grounds, learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that the appellant has failed
to demonstrate any enforceable right for claiming
appointment and, therefore, the present appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
Analysis
17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced at bar and have gone
through the impugned judgment and the material
placed on record.
18. There is no dispute that the appellant who
suffers from 90% permanent locomotor disability (left
shoulder disarticulation), is a practising advocate
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since the year 2015. The respondents, while
advertising the post of ADA, reserved two posts for
specially-abled persons. It was stipulated in the
advertisement that a candidate seeking benefit of
reservation under this category should have not less
than 40% and not more than 60% disability in one
leg or one arm.
19. In order to examine the validity of prescribing
such a stipulation, reference must be made to the
provisions of the governing statute i.e. RPwD Act,
2016.
20. Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act, 2016, defines a
“person with benchmark disability” as follows:-
“(r) “person with benchmark disability” means a
person with not less than forty per cent. of a
specified disability where specified disability has
not been defined in measurable terms and includes
a person with disability where specified disability
has been defined in measurable terms, as certified
by the certifying authority”

21. Complementing the aforesaid provision, Section
33 of the RPwD Act, 2016 mandates the identification
of posts for reservation. Section 33 is extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference:-
“33. Identification of posts for reservation.— The
appropriate Government shall—
(i) identify posts in the establishments which
can be held by respective category of persons with
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benchmark disabilities in respect of the vacancies
reserved in accordance with the provisions of
section 34;
(ii) constitute an expert committee with
representation of persons with benchmark
disabilities for identification of such posts; and
(iii) undertake periodic review of the identified
posts at an interval not exceeding three years.”
22. Conjoint reading of these provisions would
clearly indicate that the legislature intended to create
a threshold of inclusion, specifically designating 40%
as the minimum requirement to qualify for
“benchmark disability” status. Thus, none of these
provisions indicate that an upper limit can be
prescribed in the matter of adjudging the suitability
of a candidate for a particular post. The RPwD Act,
2016 defines the “floor” for reservation eligibility but
does not empower the State to create an arbitrary
“ceiling” that excludes those with higher degrees of
disability, provided they are otherwise capable of
performing the functional requirements of the role
through reasonable accommodation.
23. By fixing a 60% maximum limit, the
respondents have essentially rewritten the statutory
definition of “benchmark disability” to the detriment
of those very persons whom the Act aims to protect.
This restrictive interpretation finds no sanctuary
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within the four corners of the RPwD Act, 2016, and
fails to align with the objective of ensuring full and
effective participation of specially-abled persons in
the process of public employment.
24.
The High Court while denying relief to the
appellant placed reliance heavily upon the decision of
this Court in V. Surendra Mohan (supra) to justify
the imposition of an upper cap on disability. While V.
Surendra Mohan (supra) had previously suggested
that prescribing a maximum limit for disability
reservations was permissible to ensure functional
suitability, the ratio of the above judgment has been
expressly overruled by a three-judge bench of this
Court in Vikash Kumar (supra) wherein it was
observed that V. Surendra Mohan (supra) failed to
correctly consider the true purport and
transformative nature of the RPwD Act, 2016.
Specifically, it was noted that there was an absolute
lack of discussion on the principle of “reasonable
accommodation”, a cornerstone of the RPwD Act,
2016 which mandates that the State must make
necessary and appropriate modifications to ensure
that persons with disabilities can enjoy their rights
on an equal basis with others.
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25. The salutary observations made by this Court in
Vikash Kumar (supra) are extracted below:-
“ 68. A discordant note struck by this Court having
a direct bearing on the principle of reasonable
accommodation finds expression in a two-Judge
Bench decision of this Court in V. Surendra
Mohan v. State of T.N . The proceedings before this
Court arose from a judgment [ V. Surendra
Mohan v. State of T.N. , 2015 SCC OnLine Mad
2100] of the Madras High Court. At issue was the
decision of the Tamil Nadu Public Service
Commission (“TNPC”) to impose a ceiling of 40-
50% visual/hearing impairment to be eligible to
be appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division).
Differently stated, a person whose
visual/hearing impairment exceeded 50% was
disqualified from being eligible for the said post.
In the said case, the appellant's disability was
70%. The appellant's name was not included in
the list of registered numbers who were
provisionally admitted to the oral test . He
challenged this in the Madras High Court. By its
judgment dated 5-6-2015, the Madras High Court
held that as per the decision of the Government
dated 8-8-2014 and Notification issued by the
TNPC dated 26-8-2014, those partially blind with
40%-50% disability were only eligible and the
appellant having 70% disability was not eligible to
participate in the selection.
69. A two-Judge Bench of this Court held that a
judicial officer in a State has to possess reasonable
limit of the faculties of hearing, sight and speech in
order to hear cases and write judgments and,
therefore, stipulating a limit of 50% disability in
hearing impairment or visual impairment as a
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condition to be eligible for the post is a legitimate
restriction. This Court affirmed the submission
of the Madras High Court that seeking to
address the socially constructed barriers faced
by a visually or hearing impaired Judge, whose
disability exceeds 50%, would create “avoidable
complications”. As a result, the impugned
ceiling was found to be valid.
70. This judgment was delivered by this Court after
India became a party to the U NCRPD and the 2016
RPwD Act, came into force. The aforesaid view
espoused by this Court is innocent of the
principle of reasonable accommodation. This
Court did not consider whether the failure of
the TNPC to provide reasonable accommodation
to a Judge with a disability above the impugned
ceiling was statutorily or constitutionally
tenable. There is no reference in this Court's
judgment to whether the appellant would have
been able to discharge the duties of a Civil
Judge (Junior Division), after being provided
the reasonable accommodations necessitated
by his disability.
71. The analysis by this Court in the portion
excerpted above begs the question. Specifically, the
relevant question, under the reasonable
accommodation analysis, is not whether
complications will be caused by the grant of a
reasonable accommodation. By definition,
“reasonable accommodation” demands departure
from the status quo and hence “avoidable
complications” are inevitable. The relevant
question is whether such accommodations would
give rise to a disproportionate or undue burden.
The two tests are entirely different.
13

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26. Seen on the touchstone of the principles laid
down in Vikash Kumar (supra) to the present case,
the stipulation prescribing a maximum disability
limit of 60% for appointment to the post of ADA is
clearly arbitrary, having no nexus with the nature of
duties to be performed. This upper limit of disability
has clearly been prescribed in sheer ignorance of the
principle of reasonable accommodation and hence
the same cannot be sustained in law. The fact that
the appellant has been practicing law successfully for
nearly a decade despite suffering from 90% locomotor
disability in his left shoulder, clearly demonstrates
that a higher degree of locomotor disability does not
necessarily translate into compromising the
functionality of a law professional. The judgment of
the High Court would not pass muster as it is based
on a precedent which has since been overruled.
Furthermore, by failing to assess the appellant’s
claim in the light of the doctrine of reasonable
accommodation, the respondent authorities as well
as the High Court have adopted an approach that is
manifestly arbitrary and inconsistent with the
guarantees of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India.
15


27. The percentage of disability, by itself, cannot be
treated as determinative of a candidate’s capability or
suitability for public employment. The statutory
framework under the RPwD Act, 2016 enjoins upon
the State a positive obligation to ensure equal
opportunity and to provide reasonable
accommodation so that persons with disabilities are
not excluded merely on account of their physical
condition.
28. In the present case, the appellant has already
demonstrated his competence by successfully
clearing the selection process and securing the
highest position among the candidates in the
physically handicapped category. In such
circumstances, the fixation of an upper cap of
disability, resulting in the exclusion of the appellant,
is not only unjustified and arbitrary but also runs in
clear contravention of the constitutional and
statutory mandate.
29. The issue can also be examined from another
perspective.
30. If the appellant had applied under the general
category and had successfully cleared the written
examination as well as the interview and secured a
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position in the merit list, could the respondents have
denied him appointment solely on account of the
extent of his disability?
31. The answer, evidently, would be in the negative.
The advertisement does not contain any stipulation
which even remotely suggests that a candidate
belonging to the general category, who has otherwise
qualified in the selection process, may be denied
appointment merely because of a certain degree of
disability. The selection process includes the
component of interview where the suitability of a
candidate can be best adjudged. Evidently, the
appellant passed muster in the said test with flying
colors. Hence, there was no doubt about his
suitability for the post.
32. The principle that professional capability must
be assessed on actual functional competence rather
than a mere percentage of disability has been
examined extensively by this Court in the cases of
Om Rathod v. Director General of Health
7 8
Sciences , Anmol v. Union of India & Ors and
Kabir Pahariya v. National Medical Commission

7
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130.
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 387.
17


9
& Ors . Although those matters arose in the context
of medical education, the underlying legal principle
remains the same i.e., the State cannot rely on
arbitrary medical disability percentages to create an
insurmountable barrier to professional entry.
33. In the cases of Om Rathod (supra) and Anmol
(supra) , where candidates were denied admission in
MBBS courses despite standing in merit, this Court
intervened by directing their medical examinations to
objectively assess whether the candidates were
actually suitable for the rigors of the MBBS course,
rather than relying on abstract disability figures.
34. Similar exercise was conducted in the case of
Kabir Pahariya (supra), where the appellant was
having multiple deficiencies in both hands as well as
in left foot owing to birth complications. In spite
thereof, when the appellant was subjected to review
by a medical board, he was able to demonstrate
various skill techniques in simulation laboratory,
including chest compressions, intravenous
cannulation, assembly of a laryngoscope, intubation,
and suturing. Taking note of these crucial facets of

9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1025.
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disability issues, this Court directed the National
Medical Commission to revise its guidelines in light
of the law laid down in Om Rathod (supra) and
Anmol (supra) so as to ensure that systemic
discrimination of persons with benchmark disability,
whether direct or indirect, is eliminated and that
their capabilities are assessed through an
individualised and evidence-based process rather
than stereotypical assumptions. This Court in Kabir
Paharia (supra) observed as follows:-
“ 14. We further direct that the National Medical
Commission shall forthwith and not later than
within a period of two months from today and at
any cost before the counselling for the 2025-2026
session commence, complete the process of
revising the guidelines in light of judgments of this
Court in Om Rathod v. Director General of
Health Sciences and Anmol v. Union of India so
that no deserving candidate in the PwBD category
is denied admission into the MBBS course in spite
of his/her/their entitlement . It must be ensured
that systemic discrimination against persons
with benchmark disabilities, whether direct or
indirect, is eliminated and that the admission
process upholds their right to equal opportunity
and dignity.
15. The constitutional promise of equality is not
merely formal but substantive, requiring the State
to take affirmative measures to ensure that PwD
and PwBD can meaningfully participate in all
spheres of life, including professional education.
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We emphasize that reasonable accommodation
is not a matter of charity but a fundamental
right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our
Constitution. When administrative authorities
create arbitrary barriers that exclude qualified
PwBD candidates, they not only violate
statutory provisions but also perpetuate the
historical injustice and stigmatisation. The
fundamental rights and the dignity of PwD and
PwBD candidates must be protected by ensuring
that assessment of their capabilities is
individualised, evidence-based, and free from
stereotypical assumptions that have no
scientific foundation .”
(Emphasis supplied)

35. Tested on the touchstone of the above
principles, the action of the respondents in the
present case, clearly runs foul of the constitutional
and statutory mandate and thus cannot be upheld.
On going through the pleadings of the respondents,
we do not find that any such exercise or scientific
assessment was undertaken by the State before
fixing the upper limit of 60% disability for the
purpose of granting reservation to persons with
benchmark disabilities in the subject selection
process.
36. Manifestly, we are at a loss to comprehend as to
what could have been the rationale behind fixing this
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upper limit of disability in leg or arm for appointing a
person to perform the duties of an ADA. The job
description as portrayed in the advertisement
indicates that an ADA is supposed to conduct
litigation on behalf of the State Government in
various courts of law, teach law in the various
institutions of H.P. Government and also to advise
Government in legal matters. For performing the said
duties, the disability in arm, whatever the percentage
be, could never be an impediment, as the said job
would primarily require mental alacrity, legal
acumen and analytical ability.
37. In fact, even the High Court in the impugned
judgment expressed reservations regarding the
approach of respondents in fixing 60% ceiling for the
said post. The relevant findings are extracted below:-
“The only aspect which now remains to be
examined in the instant case is regarding the mode
and manner of determining the maximum limit of
disability. In (2009) 14 SCC 546 , titled Union of
India vs. Devender Kumar Pant, Hon'ble Apex
Court held that intention of the Disabilities Act is
not to accept reduced standards of efficiency in
performance of functions of a particular post
merely because the employee suffers from a
disability. In the instant case respondents No. 1
and 2 in their reply have simply submitted that
head of every establishment has the competency to
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prescribe conditions or restrictions for assessing
suitability of a person for a post, keeping in view
the nature of job, work, duties, functions to be
performed by the incumbent of a post. The action
of respondent No. 2 in placing a cap of 60% as
benchmark disability of one leg/one arm for the
post of ADA has been sought to be justified on
the ground that ADA is required to perform
multifarious duties and functions. The
respondents have not placed on record any
material to show as to how and by adopting
what process, under which of the provisions of
the Act/instructions etc., the ceiling limit of
60% disability was fixed by them for
determining the eligibility of a candidate
belonging to physically handicapped (locomotor
impaired) category for the post of Assistant
District Attorney. How the issue was
deliberated, who deliberated the issue, whether
any Committee of experts in the concerned field
of medicine (locomotor disability) was
constituted to determine the maximum
eligibility limit of disability for the post of ADA,
whether any decision in that regard was taken,
is not forthcoming from the reply . In fact,
following para of the reply reflects the confusion
writ large in respondent No. 2-department about
fixation of 60% disability as maximum eligibility
limit for the post of ADAs: -
“........it is submitted that the upper limit of
disability of 60% has been incorporated
keeping in view the legitimate aim on
suitability of a candidate to a particular
post. However, the matter is being taken
up with the Department of Social justice &
Empowerment i.e. Administrative
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Department to provide the detail of
identification of posts and extent of
disability and the replying respondent,
reserves its right to file supplementary
reply at any stage hereinafter, as and
when the outcome of the deliberations is
received.…”
Respondents, it appears are themselves not
clear about the extent of maximum disability
which should have been prescribed for
physically handicapped category candidates for
the post of ADA. The Act is a beneficial legislation
enacted for the welfare of persons with disabilities.
It was incumbent upon the respondents to
deliberate over the issue with experts for
determining the maximum extent of disability vis-
a-vis the eligibility of disabled persons for the posts
in question. Such determination should not be
solely left to the discretion of the employer. We
have the example of this case where even after
the completion of selection process,
respondents are themselves not certain about
soundness of prescribing 60% as the maximum
eligible limit of disability. We, therefore, direct
the respondent-State through respondent No. 1
personnel department to issue necessary directions
to all concerned departments etc. for henceforth
fixing maximum eligibility limit of disability for
persons belonging to physically handicapped
category, for the posts reserved for them under
2016 Act, only after due deliberation over the issue
with Department of Social Justice & Empowerment
in consultation with committee of experts in the
concerned field of medicine to be constituted by the
State for the said purpose.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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38. A perusal of the above observations makes it
evident that even the High Court noted the absence
of any tangible material to demonstrate the
foundational basis on which the 60% disability
ceiling had been fixed. The respondents were unable
to indicate whether the issue had been deliberated
upon with the Department of Social Justice and
Empowerment or whether any expert committee in
the field of locomotor disability had been consulted
prior to prescribing the said limit. The pleadings filed
on behalf of the respondents, as noticed by the High
Court, in fact reveal a certain degree of uncertainty
regarding the justification behind prescribing such a
ceiling.
39. Thus, it becomes evident that the fixation of the
60% upper limit of disability for selection against the
posts reserved for persons with disability in the
subject advertisement was not preceded by any
objective evaluation of the functional requirements of
the post or by any expert consultation as
contemplated under the statutory scheme of the
RPwD Act, 2016. In the absence of any rational basis
or intelligible criterion for prescribing such a
24


restriction, the said upper limit of disability was
clearly unjust and invalid.
40. In view of the above discussion, we are of the
considered view that denial of appointment to the
appellant for the post of ADA, in spite of having
succeeded in the competitive examination and the
interview and having been recommended for
appointment, was arbitrary, unjustified and in gross
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and so
also the mandate of the RPwD Act, 2016.
th
41. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 29
September, 2020 does not stand to scrutiny and is
hereby set aside.
42. The respondent No.1-State of Himachal Pradesh
shall forthwith, and not later than within a period of
two weeks from today, issue the appointment letter
to the appellant for the post of ADA in the subject
recruitment process.
th
43. order dated 8 November, 2021 passed by
Vide
this Court, the vacancy stated to be existing was
directed not to be filled up and to be kept reserved for
the appellant, who shall be appointed against the
said post. In the event that the designated vacant
25


post is unavailable for any technical reason,
respondent No.1-State shall create a supernumerary
post to accommodate the appellant.
44. The appointment of the appellant shall relate
th
back to 19 September, 2019, and the appellant shall
be entitled to all notional benefits from the said date.
45. Considering the fact that the appellant, despite
standing in merit was unjustly denied appointment
and compelled to pursue prolonged litigation, we
deem it appropriate to impose costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on
respondent No.1-State of Himachal Pradesh, which
shall be paid to the appellant within a period of four
weeks from today.
46. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
47. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.

….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)


...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 11, 2026.


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