Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (C.B.I.)
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DEEPAK CHOWDHARY & ORS,
DATE OF JUDGMENT17/08/1995
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 186 1995 SCC (6) 225
JT 1995 (6) 532 1995 SCALE (5)226
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Delay of 232 days condoned.
The facts lie in a short compass. During the year 1982,
while the respondent no.1 was working as a Branch Manager in
Desh Priya branch of the United Bank of India at Calcutta it
was realised that certain officers working in that bank had
conspired with a creditor and the bank was defrauded for a
sum of Rs.45,000/-. On a complaint laid, a crime case was
registered and the appellant investigated the matter and
submitted the report to the competent authority for
sanction, who, by its order dated the 14th January, 1987
accorded sanction under 6(1-c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, ‘PC Act) to file the
charge-sheet against the respondent for the offences
punishable under Section 120B, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A, 201
and 109 IPC and also under Section 5(1) (d) read with
Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The respondent filed writ
petition in the High Court to quash the sanction. The High
Court by the impugned order dated the 2nd April, 1992 in
Matter No.498/87 quashed the sanction on two grounds,
namely, that the respondent was not given any opportunity of
hearing before granting sanction and in the departmental
enquiry conducted by the Bank, respondent was exonerated of
the charge. Therefore, it was not expedient to proceed with
the prosecution of the respondent. Hence, the above appeal
has been filed.
It is contended for the appellant that the question of
giving an opportunity to the charged officer before granting
sanction does not arise since it is not a quasi-judicial
function. Grant of sanction is an administrative function.
What is required is that the investigating officer should
place all the necessary material before the sanctioning
authority who should apply its mind to that material and
accord sanction. Therefore, the question of giving
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opportunity of hearing to the accused before granting
sanction does not arise.
We find force in the contention. The grant of sanction
is only an administrative function, though it is true that
the accused may be saddled with the liability to be
prosecuted in a court of law. What is material at that time
is that the necessary facts collected during investigation
constituting the offence have to be placed before the
sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material.
Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the
satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the
offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction.
The grant of sanction, therefore, being administrative act
the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused
before according sanction does not arise. The High Court,
therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the order of
sanction is vitiated by violation of the principles of
natural justice.
The second ground of departmental exoneration by the
disciplinary authority is also not relevant. What is
necessary and material is whether the facts collected during
investigation would constitute the offence for which the
sanction has been sought for.
It is not appropriate at this stage to go into the
merits of the culpability of the respondent though sought to
be contended for by Shri Thopas Roy, the learned counsel. In
fairness to the accused, we deem it inappropriate to go into
the merits to express any opinion.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the order of the
High Court is set aside and the trial court is directed to
proceed with the trial against the respondent as
expeditiously as possible and conduct joint trial, if trial
is not already concluded, along with other accused. If the
case has been separated and the trial of other accused has
been concluded, then the trial court is directed to
expeditiously conclude the trial of the respondent, not
exceeding one year.