Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NEW PRAKASH TRANSPORT CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NEW SUWARNA TRANSPORT CO. LTD.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/09/1956
BENCH:
ACT:
Road Transport-Application for stage carriage Permit-Police
report-Procedure-Appellate Authority, if bound to adjourn
proceeding suo mctu-Failure Of natural Justice--Motor
Vehicles Act (II, Of 1939), ss. 47, 48, 64, 68.
HEADNOTE:
Rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions
of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the
legislature under which they have to act, and the question
whether in a particular case they have been contravened must
be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be
but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act.
Case-law discussed.
The provisions of ss. 47, 48, 64 and the rules framed under
s. 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act make it abundantly clear
that a Regional Transport Authority and an Appellate
Authority in hearing an appeal, function in a quasi-judicial
capacity and not as courts of law and are not required to
record oral or documentary evidence and, in deciding as
between the rival claims of applicants for stage carriage
permits, what they are required to do is to deal with such
claims in a fair and just manner. The Act, however, amply
provides for the safeguarding of their interests.
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd, [1952] S.C.R. 583,
referred to,
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Consequently, in a case where the Regional Transport Autho-
rity refused to grant a permit to an applicant on account of
an adverse police report and the Appellate Authority granted
the same on the basis of a further report by the police,
whereby all material allegations against him were withdrawn
and nothing was said against his rival which would require
to be controverted by him, and the Chairman read out such
report at the hearing of the appeal without any objection by
any of the interested parties or any request for adjournment
and a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal, reversing
the decision of a single judge made under Arts. 226 and 227
Of the Constitution, held that the rules of natural justice
had been contravened by reason of the failure on the part of
the Appellate Authority to adjourn the proceeding suo motu
in order to afford the rival claimant an opportunity to meet
the revised police report, its decision was erroneous and
must be set aside.
Held, further, that the reading out of the contents of the
poiice report by the Chairman at the hearing of the appeal
was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice as
there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of it to be
furnished to any of the parties.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 74 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 22, 1955, of the Nagpur High Court in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 2 of 1955.
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, J. N. Bannerji
and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and Naunit Lal,
for respondent No. 1.
1956. September 30. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the
judgment and order, dated September 22, 1955, passed by the
Letters Patent Bench of the Nagpur High Court reversing
those of a single Judge of that Court, dated December 13,
1954, refusing to issue a writ in the nature of a
certiorari.
The facts of this case lie in a short compass and may be
stated as follows: The Suwarna Transport Company Limited,
which will be referred to as the first respondent in the
course of this judgment, held seven permits for running
buses on the Buldana-Malkapur route, as the
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sole operator on that route. It applied for another permit
for the same route. The appellant, The New Prakash
Transport Co. Ltd., as also another party, called the
Navjivan Transport Service (not cited in this Court) applied
for a similar permit on that route. On May 26, 1953, all
the three applicants aforesaid were heard by the Regional
Transport Authority of Amraoti, which is the third
respondent in this Court, in connection with the permit
applied for. Consideration of the several applications was
postponed, but a resolution was passed to the effect that
"No one service should have monopoly on Buldana-Malkapur
route." On March 30, 1954, another meeting of the Regional
Transport Authority took place and the first respondent was
granted the permit. The appellant’s application was
rejected on the ground that the police report was against
it. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate
Authority (constituted under R. 73 of the Motor -Vehicles
Act), Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, which is the second respondent
to this appeal. The appellant challenged the correctness of
the police report against it and applied to the District
Superintendent of Police personally to verify the facts
stated in the first report on the basis of which the
appellant’s application for permit had been rejected, as
aforesaid. The police made a further report, which was
placed before the second respondent. That further report by
the police was read out to the parties by the Chairman of
the Appellate Authority at the time of the hearing of the
appeal. At the hearing no objection appears to have been
raised by any of the parties to the course adopted by the
second respondent. By its order dated July 29, 1954, the
second respondent set aside the order of the third
respondent, allowed the appeal and ordered the permit to be
issued to the appellant. The first respondent moved the
High Court at Nagpur for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226
of the Constitution, substantially on two grounds, namely,
(1) that the order passed by the second respondent was
vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, and
(2) that it contravened the’ principles of natural justice.
The first ground was founded on the allegation that the
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second
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respondent had misread the police report, and the second on
the allegation that the revised report by the police had not
been shown to the petitioner who had been afforded no " real
and effective opportunity to deal with the report or to meet
any relevant allegations made therein, and to study that
report and make his submissions in regard thereto before the
appeal was decided." The appellant and the second respondent
showed cause against the rule issued by the court. The
appellant while showing cause, admitted that the third
respondent had rejected its application on the basis of the
police report dated March 27, 1954, which "was full of
mistakes and falsehoods," that it moved the District
Superintendent of Police personally to verify the contents
of the said report and that the fresh report submitted by
the police after due verification had absolved the appellant
from the allegations of misconduct contained in the first
report. It also controverted the ground that there was any
mistake apparent on the face of the record. The fresh
report submitted by the police after verification at the
appellant’s request was received by the second respondent
and the Chairman read the same during the hearing of the
appeal and that, therefore, it was wrong to suggest that
there had been a failure of justice,. The second respondent
also showed cause and corroborated the appellant’s statement
that the first police report had been subsequently modified
by the District Superintendent of Police by the report dated
May 13, 1954, which showed that the previous report was "
based on some misunderstanding." It was also stated that the
report was actually read out to the parties by the Chairman
while the appeal was being heard.
The petition under Arts. 226 and 227 made, as aforesaid, by
the first respondent was heard by a single Judge (Mr.
Justice V. R. Sen) who by his orders dated December 13,
1954, discharged the rule with costs. In the course of his
judgment the learned Judge after’ referring in detail to the
orders of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, that
is to say, the second and third respondents, observed that
there was no substance in the contention that the procedure
102
adopted by the Appellate Authority was opposed to the
principles of natural justice and had operated to the
prejudice of the first respondent; and that there was no
error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Judge
also pointed out that when -the report was brought to the
notice of the first respondent, it did not indicate that it
wished to controvert the report.
The first respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters
Patent and repeated its grounds of attack against the orders
of the Appellate Authority. The appeal was heard by a
Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Hidayatulla and
Mr. Justice S. P. Kotwal. The Letters Patent Bench seemed
to be inclined to negative the plea that there was a mistake
apparent on the face of the record and pointed out that
though the language used by the second respondent was ambi-
guous and not quite accurate, it was possible to take the
view that it had in fact considered the subsequent police
report when it observed that the police bad practically
absolved the appellant from all blame except on a minor
question, not necessary to be referred to in detail here.
On the second ground it differed from the learned single
Judge and came to the conclusion "that the Appellate
Authority erred in rushing through without giving a proper
and effective chance to the appellant to state its case." In
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the result it granted a writ quashing the order of the
Appellate Authority and directing it to rehear the appeal in
the light of the observations made in the course of the
judgment.
The appellant made an application to the High Court for a
certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. Having
been unsuccessful there, the appellant came up to this Court
and obtained special leave to appeal.
The only question which requires determination by this Court
is whether or not there has been a failure of natural
justice in this case as a result of the procedure adopted by
the Appellate Authority. On this question there has been a
marked difference of opinion in the two stages of the case
in the High Court. It has been
103
argued on behalf of the appellant that the Appeal Bench of
the Nagpur High Court has erred in coming to the conclusion
that in the circumstances of this case, there has been a
failure of justice, in disagreement with the learned single
Judge who was clearly of the opposite opinion. It has also
been argued that there are no well defined criteria by which
this question falls to be determined. It depends upon the
terms of the legislation creating the statutory body which
has to function according to its obligations laid down in
the statute. If it has done all that was required by the
law to do, it cannot be said that it has failed in the
discharge of its statutory duty. In this connection
reference was made to the provisions of ss. 47, 48 and 64 of
the Motor Vehicles Act read along with the relevant rules
framed under s. 68 of the Act. On behalf of the respondents
it was argued that it had no opportunity of studying the
subsequent police report and of making submissions thereon
with the result that there has been a failure of natural
justice in the sense that the respondent had been deprived
of a fair and full opportunity of being heard. Though the
High Court on appeal did not base its decision on the other
question, namely, whether there was any error apparent on
the face of the record, it was sought to be argued that
there was an error in the order of the second respondent in
so far as it made reference to only the first report and
read into it the maatter contained in the subsequent report.
At the outset we may observe that, in our opinion, there is
no substance in the second ground sought to be resuscitated
in this Court by the learned counsel on behalf of the res-.
pondent. Error apparent on the face of the record in the
context of this case must mean an assumption of facts which
are not borne out by the record. We are not concerned with
other grounds which may in the context of each particular
case support a contention of error apparent on the face of
the record. In this case if there was any such error, it
was with reference to the two police reports. As observed
by the Appellate Bench of the High Court, though the
language used by- the Appellate Authority with regard to
strict
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grammatical construction may refer to the first police
report, it was difficult to hold that the matters referred
to in the order challenged before the High Court were not
contained in the subsequent report submitted by the police
at the instance of the appellant. The judgment under appeal
did not take the view that there was any such mistake
apparent on the face of the record as was contended for on
behalf of the first respondent. We have been referred to
the orders of the Appellate Authority as read by the
Appellate Bench of the High Court and, in our opinion, no
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such mistake has been shown to have vitiated the orders
impugned before the High Court.
Coming back to the question whether or not there has been a
failure of natural justice, we may shortly review the
relevant provisions of the statute in order to find out the
obligations imposed upon the Appellate Authority while
disposing of an appeal from the orders of the Regional
Transport Authority. The matters to be considered by a
Regional Transport Authority at the time of disposing of an
application for a stage carriage permit are set out in s.
47. They include the interest of the public generally, the
adequacy of existing road transport service and the benefits
to any particular locality. The Authority is also enjoined
to take into consideration any representations made by
persons already providing road transport facilities along
the proposed route or by any local authority or police
authority within whose jurisdiction the proposed route lies.
Section 48 empowers a Regional Transport Authority, after
taking into consideration matters set forth in s. 47, to
restrict the number of stage carriages and to impose
conditions on stage carriage permits. Section 64 provides
for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed
by the Provincial or Regional Transport Authority to the
"prescribed authority". It also in terms provides that on
an appeal being filed to the prescribed authority, it shall
give the appellant and the original authority, that is to
say, the authority against whose orders the appeal had been
brought., "an opportunity of being heard." Section 64 which
creates the right of appeal does not in terms speak of a
like
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opportunity being given to the persons against whom the
appeal had been filed. But r. 73 framed by the Government
in pursuance of its rule-making power conferred by s. 68,
lays down that the authority to decide’ an appeal against
the orders of a Regional Transport Authority under s. 64 of
the Act shall be the Chairman and two members of the
Provincial Transport Authority. The rule further provides
that on receipt of an appeal, the Chairman shall appoint the
time and place for hearing the appeal and shall give not
less than thirty days notice to the appellant, the original
authority, and "any other person interested in the appeal"
and on such appointed or adjourned date the Appellate
Authority "shall hear such persons as may appear and, after
such further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary,
confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the
appeal is preferred and make any consequential or incidental
order that may be just or proper". It will. thus be seen
that though the substantive section creating the right of
appeal does not in terms create any right in a respondent to
be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure
before the Appellate Authority contemplate that sufficient
notice shall be given to " any other person interested in
the appeal" which expression must include persons other than
the appellant who may be interested in being heard against
the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the
sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate
anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the
usual way as in courts of law. Besides, the parties
interested in the grant of stage carriage permits or those
interested against it, the police authority of the locality
is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and
at the appellate stage.
Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder
with particular reference to the Regional Transport
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Authority and the Appellate Authority do not contemplate
anything like a regular hearing in a court of justice. No
elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the
parties interested have to be
14
106
heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted
a stage carriage permit. The judgment of the High Court
under appeal has made copious quotations from the decisions
of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in support of
its conclusion that the principles of natural justice had
not been sufficiently complied with in the present case by
simply reading out the subsequent police report at the time
the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal. The learned
Judges of the Appeal Court have observed that the contents
of a long report such as the second report was, could not be
carried in one’.-, head. They also observed that in order
to present its case effectively the first respondent was
entitled not only to have the report read out but also to
study it so that it could understand it and state its case
fully and effectively before the Appellate Authority. We
have to examine those several precedents relied upon by the
High Court to see how far its conclusions are supported by
authority. But before we do that, it has got to be observed
that the question whether the rules of natural justice have
been observed in a particular case must itself be judged in
the light of the constitution of the statutory body which
has to function in accordance with the rules laid down by
the legislature and in that sense the rules themselves must
vary. The Regional Transport Authority is charged with the
duty of granting or refusing a stage carriage permit, only
to mention the matter with which we are immediately
concerned. In that connection the statute requires that
authority to have regard to the matters set forth in s. 47
of the Act, as already indicated. The police authority
within whose local jurisdiction any part of the proposed
route lies, has also been given the right to make
representations. But the police report submitted to the
Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate Authority,
if it requires the police authority to do so, is not
intended to be anything more than an expression of opinion
by an authority interested in the maintenance of law and
order, with particular reference to the question as to
whether any of the applicants for a permit had anything to
its credit or discredit as
107
supplier of transport facilities. Such a report is meant
more for the use of the authority in making or refusing a
grant than for the use of the several applicants or any one
of them. In other words, it is in the nature of information
supplied by the police in order to assist the authority in
making up its mind. In the present case when the subsequent
police report was read out by the Chairman, neither the
appellant nor the first respondent, nor for the matter of
that any of the other parties, raised any objection to the
use of that document or asked for an adjournment on the
ground either that it had been taken by surprise or that it
had materials to offer in opposition to the report. The
learned Judges of the High Court have observed in the course
of their judgment under appeal that though it is the essence
of the business of tribunals like the one under the -Motor
Vehicles Act to transact business expeditiously, the
business of the authority would not have suffered much if a
copy of the report had been given to the parties concerned
and the case adjourned for a short time. It appears that
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-no such adjournment had been prayed for on behalf of any of
the parties who, it appears, had been represented by
counsel. But then the High Court has observed further that
"the duty is laid not upon counsel who appears but upon the
tribunal which administers justice. It is incumbent on
every tribunal which - acts judicially to see that justice
is not only done but is seen to be done, arid that the
elementary rule of natural justice of giving a fair and
proper hearing to every one concerned is followed. We think
that the Appellate Authority erred in rushing through
without giving a proper and effective chance to the
appellant to state its case." In our opinion, the High Court
has made a number of assumptions in making those
observations which do not appear to be justified by the
scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or by any a
priori considerations of what has been characterized as
"natural justice". The tribunal in question was not
administering justice as a court of law, though while
deciding as between the rival claims of the applicants for a
permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner.
108
But a tribunal even acting " judicially " is not obliged to
grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on
behalf of any of the parties interested. We do not find
that any of the parties made at that time any grievance
about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority. But
the question appears to have been raised for the first time
before the High Court after the Appellate Tribunal had
decided to grant the permit to the appellant. In this
connection it has also to be observed that the subsequent
police report had said nothing directly against the first
respondent which it would be interested in controverting.
The subsequent police report had only withdrawn some of the
adverse comments against the conduct of the appellant which
had been found to have been made under a misunderstanding.
But the subsequent report still contains some minor
complaints against the appellant. Those matters were
apparently considered by the Appellate Authority not to be
so serious as to stand in the way of the appellant getting
the permit, especially when that authority had previously
decided upon the policy that monopoly of supplying transport
facility should not be allowed to continue in favour of the
first respondent. Hence, in our opinion, there was nothing
in the rules requiring a copy of the police report to be
furnished to any of the parties, nor was there any
circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of
the appeal, particularly when no request for such an
adjournment had been made either by the first respondent or
by any other party. At that time none of the parties
appears to have made any grievance about the police report
only being read at by the Chairman or any request for an
adjournment in order to adduce evidence pro and con. The
rules framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and hearing
of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter (s.
68 (2) (b)) " do not contemplate any such facilities being
granted to the parties, though it is open to the Appellate
Authority to make any such " further enquiry, if any, as it
may deem necessary."
But the High Court Bench appears to have, taken the view
that, rule or no rule, request or no request for an
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adjournment,the rules of natural justice made it incumbent
upon the Appellate Authority to stay its hands in order that
" a proper and effective chance was given to the first
respondent to state its case." There was not much of a case
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to state because, each party applying for the permit must be
presumed to have pressed its claim upon the Appellate
Authority. We have therefore to examine the precedents
discussed in detail in the judgment under appeal to see how
far the Appellate Bench was justified in holding that the
rules of natural justice had been contravened by the Appel-
late Authority.
The earliest decision of the House of Lords brought to our
notice in this connection is the case of Spackman
v.Plumstead Board of Works (1). In that case the question
arose on a prosecution for infringement of an Act of
Parliament making provision for fixing the " general line of
buildings " in a road. The certificate of the
superintending architect as to the general line of buildings
came in for discussion as to whether the architect, before
deciding as to how the general line has to be fixed, had to
hear the parties concerned. In that connection the Earl of
Selborne, L.C., made the following observations :-
" No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how
the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will
imply no more than that the substantial requirements of
justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the
proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an
opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case
and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed
with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially
and not under the dictation of some other person or persons,
to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no
Malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within
the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that
sort done contrary to the essence of justice.
But it appears to me to be perfectly consistent with reason,
that the statute may have intentionally
(1) [1885] 10 A.C. 229, 240.
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omitted to provide for form, because this is a, matter not
of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litigation
at all, but requiring only that the parties should have an
opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision
they are to be bound such considerations as in their
judgment ought to be brought before him. When that is done,
from the nature of the case no further proceeding as to
summoning the parties, or as to doing anything of that kind
which a judge might have to do, is necessary."
Another leading case on the subject is the decision of the
House of Lords in the well-known case of Board of Education
v. Rice (1). Their Lordships in that case had to discuss
the duty of the Board of Education under s. 7 of the
Education Act, 1902. Lord Loreburn, L.C., in the course of
his speech referred to the provisions of the Act and made
the following observations as to the duty to decide certain
questions relating to nonprovided schools:-
" Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have
not originated, the practice of imposing upon department.,;
or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining
questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in
many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a
matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It
will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but
sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of
fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such
cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law
and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in
doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen
to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who
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decides anything, But I do not think they are bound to treat
such a question as though it were a trial. They have no
power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses.
They can obtain information in any way they think best,
always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in
the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant
statement prejudicial to their view."
(1) [1911] A.C. 179,182.
How far judicial opinion may vary as to the content of the
rule of natural justice is amply illustrated by the case of
Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte Arlidge (1), at
different stages. The rule nisi for a certiorari was first
heard by Ridley, Lord Coleridge and Bankes, JJ. The case
related to the powers of the, Local Government Board under
the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act, 1909 (9 Edw. 7, c.
44) refusing to terminate its orders closing a dwelling-
house as unfit for habitation and the procedure for hearing
an appeal against such an order. Section 29 of the Act
provided that such an appeal shall be heard and disposed of
according to the procedure laid down by the Local Government
Board, provided that the rules shall provide that the Board
shall not dismiss any, appeal without having first held a
public local inquiry.., It was unanimously held by the Court
discharging the rule that the Local Government Board was not
bound to hear the appellant or any one on his behalf after
the report of the inspector on the public local inquiry had
been received, before dismissing the appeal. At the public
local inquiry the owner of the house affected by the closing
order had been represented. But at the time the appeal was
finally disposed of, there was no hearing of the appellant
or his representative as in a court of law. The Court
repelled the argument that the appellant had a right to be
heard by the Local Government Board and to know the contents
of the report made by the inspector who had held the public
local inquiry. Rely Vingmainly upon the judgment of Lord
Loreburn, L.C, in the case of Board of Education v. Rice
(supra), the Court decided that the procedure indicated by
the rules framed under the statute in question had been
followed and that there was no other or further obligation
on the Board to hear the appellant either personally or
through his representative or counsel, because there was no
indication in the statute to that effect. The matter was
taken in appeal in Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte A
rlidge (2), and the Court of Appeal by a majority (Vaughan
Williams and Buckley, L.JJ., Hamilton, L.J. dissenting
(1) [1913] 1 K.B, 463.
(2) [1914] 1 K. B. 16o,
112
allowed the appeal holding that it was contrary to the
principles of natural justice that the Board should have
dismissed the appeal without disclosing to the appellant the
contents of their inspector’s report and without giving the
appellant an opportunity of being heard in support of the
appeal. They, therefore, quashed the order dismissing the
appeal. The majority judgment pointed out that the Act and
the rules framed thereunder except for certain matters were
silent as to the procedure and that in the absence of such
specific provisions the non-disclosure of the ‘nspector’s
report was contrary to principles of natural justice on
which English law is based. It further held that the
appellant before the Board was entitled to a hearing and
that as the appellant had not the opportunity of seeing and
considering the report and the documents which the deciding
authority had before it, the appellant had been denied full
opportunity of being heard. It went to the length of
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observing that the nondisclosure of the report and the
documents which were taken into consideration by the Board
when the disclosure had been asked for, was itself
inconsistent with natural justice. Hamilton, L.J., in his
dissenting judgment pointed out that the report of the
inspector in the case, as in other Government departments,
is only a statement of facts made for the information of the
officials of the department and that it could not be assumed
that the legislature meant all such reports to be
communicated to those interested where it does not say the
contrary. He further pointed out that the practice was the
other way, namely, to specify how and to whom such reports
were to be communicated, (when they are intended to be
communicated at all.) Dealing with the question how far the
requirements of natural justice had been fulfilled, the Lord
Justice observed at p. 199 that "It has often been pointed
out that the expression (natural justice) is sadly lacking
in precision." Then he referred to a number of precedents
dealing with the question of natural justice as to how the
connotation of the expression differed in different
contexts. He further observed at pp. 201 & 202: -
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" The Local Government Board here is a statutory tribunal,
anomalous as compared with common law Courts, created by the
Legislature for a special class of appeals and endowed by it
with the power of formulating its own procedure."
He also adopted the dictum of Loreburn, L.C., in Board of
Education v. Rice (supra) that the Board must " act in good
faith and fairly listen to both sides."
Against the judgment of the majority of the Court quashing
the determination of the appeal by the Board there was an
appeal to the House of Lords. The House of Lords
unanimously adopted the opinion of Hamilton, L.J. (later
Lord Sumner), allowed the appeal and set aside the majority
decision. [Vide Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1)]. In
the course of his speech Viscount Haldane, L.C., made the
following observations:-
" My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed,
those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. ,
They must deal with the question referred to them without
bias, and they must give to each of the parties the
opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The
decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of
responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out
justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every
such tribunal must be the same."
His Lordship adopted the dictum of Lord Loreburn, L.C., in
the leading case of Board of Education v. Rice (supra).
Lord Shaw in his speech made the following observations
which are very apposite to the facts and circumstances of
this case:-
" The judgments of the majority of the Court below appear to
me, if I may say so with respect, to be dominated by the
idea that the analogy of judicial methods or procedure
should apply to departmental action. Judicial methods may,
in many points of administration, be entirely unsuitable,
and produce delays, expense, and public and private injury.
The department must obey the statute."
(1) [1915] A.C. 120, 132.
15
114
He further observed at p. 138 as follows
" And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are
ex necessitate those of Courts of justice is wholly
unfounded. This is expressly applicable to steps of
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procedure or forms of pleading. In so far as the term
’natural justice’ means that a result or process should be
just, it is a harmless though it may be a high-sounding
expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus
naturale it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the
ethical sphere of a term employed for other distinctions;
and, in so far as it is resorted to for other purposes, it
is vacuous."
Lord Parmoor in his speech also reiterated the principle
governing the procedure of a quasi judicial tribunal in
these words:-
" Where, however, the question of the propriety of procedure
is raised in a hearing before some tribunal other than a
Court of law there is no obligation to adopt the regular
forms of legal procedure. It is sufficient that the case
has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with
the principles of substantial justice."
Another recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of
General Medical Council v. Spackman (1) was relied upon by
the High Court in the judgment under appeal. In that case
the General Medical Council, which had been constituted a
domestic forum to determine whether a case had been made out
for striking off the name of a medical practitioner from the
medical register " for infamous conduct in a professional
respect," was the appellant before their Lordships, and the
respondent had been found guilty by the Divorce Court of
having committed adultery. In the proceedings before the
Medical Council the medical practitioner proceeded against
desired to call fresh evidence on the issue of adultery and
requested the Council to rehear that issue. The Council
declined to reopen the issue and to hear fresh evidence and
directed his name to be erased from the register. The Court
of Appeal unanimously affirmed the view of the dissenting
Judge in the Court of first instance that there had been no
(1) [1943] A.C. 827.
115
" due inquiry " as required by s. 29 of the Medical Act,
1858. The Appeal Court set aside the majority decision of
Viscount Caldecote, C.J., and Humphreys, J., who had held
that the requirements of the law had been satisfied by
adopting the judgment and decree of the Divorce Court. On
appeal by the Medical Council to the House of Lords, the
House unanimously agreed with the unanimous decision of the
Appeal Court and held that the requirement of due inquiry
enjoined by the Act creating the Tribunal had not been
satisfied. Viscount Simon, L.C., examined the provisions of
the Act and the relevant rules and pointed out that they
require the practitioner proceeded against " to state his
case, and to produce the evidence in support of it." The
Lord Chancellor in the course of his speech observed that
the General Medical Council was not a judicial body in the
ordinary sense, was master of its own procedure and was not
bound by strict rules of evidence. It was bound to satisfy
the requirements of the law and the rules made thereunder.
The Council had to decide on sworn testimony after due
inquiry. He also adopted the language of Lord Loreburn,
L.C., in the aforesaid case of Board of Educatian v. Rice
(supra). Lord Atkin in the course of his speech pointed out
that the rules under the Act provided that the Council was
bound, if requested, to hear all the evidence that the
practitioner charged wished to bring before them. He also
pointed out the antithesis between convenience and justice
by saying " convenience and justice are often not on
speakin- terms." His Lordship further pointed out the
difference between the procedure which may be prescribed in
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respect of different tribunals which were creations of
statutes, in these words:-
" Some analogy exists, no doubt, between the various
procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies,
but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just
in deciding whether to close a ,school or an insanitary
house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous
conduct against a professional man. I would, therefore,
demur to any suggestion that the words of Lord Loreburn,
L.C., in -Board of Education v. Rice (supra) afford a
complete guide to
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the General Medical Council in the exercise of their duties.
As I have said, it is not correct that I they need not
examine witnesses.’ They must examine witnesses if tendered,
and their own rules rightly provide for this. Further it
appears to me very doubtful whether it is true that ’they
have no power to administer an oath’."
It may be noticed that the Lords who sat on that case
particularly emphasized the requirements of the law as laid
down in the statute and the rules framed thereunder. In
view of those statutory provisions they found it necessary
to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal which had set
aside the judgment and orders of the King’s Bench Division
which had taken the con tarry view, to the effect that the
decree in the Divorce Court was conclusive evidence on which
the Medical Council could act. The case is therefore
authority for the proposition that the rules of natural
justice have to be inferred from the nature of the tribunal,
the scope of its enquiry and the statutory rules of
procedure laid down by the law for carrying out the
objectives of the statute.
There is another class of cases which lay down that if a
person is to be deprived of his professional status, he must
be heard and be given effective opportunity of meeting any
allegation made against him on the question of his fitness
to pursue his profession. If the tribunal constituted by
the statute in question to decide about the fitness of an
individual to pursue that profession, decides against him
without giving him an opportunity of meeting any allegations
against him bearing on his capacity or qualification for the
profefession to which he claims admission, it has been held
that it was improper for the tribunal acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity to act to his prejudice upon evidence or
adverse report without his having an opportunity of meeting
such relevant allegations made against him. To that class
belongs the case of R. v. Architects Registration Tribunal
(1). In that case the King’s Bench Division issued an order
of certiorari to, quash
(1) [1945] 2 A.E.R. 131.
117 the tribunal’s decision refusing an application for
registration as an architect.
The cases of Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education
and Registration (1), and Allinson v. General Council of
Medical Education and Registration (2) also belong to that
category. They deal with the power of the General Council
of Medical Education under the Medical Act (21 & 22 Viet. c.
90) to strike off a medical practitioner for unprofessional
conduct. Those were cases in which the Medical Council had
to function as a quasi-judicial body and had to proceed
according to the procedure laid down in the rules framed
under the Act aforesaid. They had therefore to function,
not exactly as courts of law, but as domestic tribunals
created by the statute to function according to the
statutory rules in a fair and just manner, that is to say,
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that they should have no personal interest in the con;,
troversy and should have given a full and fair opportunity
to the person proceeded against to place his case before the
tribunal.
Another class of cases is illustrated by the decision of the
Court of Appeal in R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury(3). In
that case the Archbishop of Canterbury reviewing the order
of the Bishop refused to approve the clerk presented by the
patron to a benefice. Acting under s. 3 of the Benefices
(Exercise of the Rights of Presentation) Measure, 1931, the
Court repelled the argument on behalf of the disappointed
patron that as the decision involved a deprivation of
property rights there was an obligation upon the Archbishop
to act in a quasijudicial manner. Lord Greene, M.R., who
delivered the judgment of the Court, observed that there was
no " justification for regarding the matter when it comes
before the Archbishop as in any sense, or by any remote
analogy, a his inter parties". Hence the Court on a true
construction of a. 3 of the Measure came to the conclusion
that the Archbishop was not required to arrive at his
decision by conducting a quasi-judicial enquiry. This case,
therefore, is an authority for the
(1) [1890] 43 Ch. D. 366.
(2) [1894] 1 Q.B. 750.
(3) [1944] 1 A.E.R. 179.
118
proposition that simply because property rights are
involved, the authorities charged with the duty of deciding
claims to such rights are not necessarily, apart from the
provisions of the statute, required to function as quasi-
judicial tribunals.
As already pointed out, the Appellate Authority had to
function in a quasi-judicial capacity in accordance with the
rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act. That Act has made
ample provisions for safeguarding the interests of rival
claimants for permits. The provisions of the Act were
examined in detail by a Bench of five Judges of this Court
in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (1).
This Court examined elaborately the provisions of the Act
vis-a-vis the authorities created by the Act to administer
its provisions relating to the grant of stage carriage
permits. It also examined how far the High Court exercising
its special powers to issue writs under Art. 226 of the
Constitution could interfere with the orders made by those
authorities. In the course of its judgment this Court made
the following observations at page 596, which are very
relevant to the present purpose :-
" Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for
regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are
to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing
appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher
authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or
the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and
it is to these remedies that resort must Generally be bad."
Keeping in view the observations of this Court quoted above
and the principles of natural justice discussed in the
several authorities of the highest Courts in England, we
have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act
and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the
High Court that the Appellate Authority did not give full
and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present
his point of view before it. As already indicated, the
statutory
(1) [1952] S. C. R. 583.
119
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provisions do not contemplate that either the Regional
Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority had to record
evidence or to proceed as if they were functioning as a
court of law. They had to decide between a number of
applicants as to which of them was suitable for the grant of
the fresh permit applied for. They took into consideration
all the relevant matters and came to their decision which
has not been attacked as partial or perverse. The only
ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of the High
Court was that the requirements of natural justice had not
been satisfied. The only question that we have to determine
is whether the Appellate Authority was justified in using
the second report made by the police, though it had not been
placed into the hands of the parties. That report did not
directly contain any allegations against the first
respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it
could be called upon to meet. The only effect of the report
was that many of the objections raised against the
suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the
police on further consideration of their records. The
police report is more for the information of the authorities
concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of
the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion,
therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read
out the contents of the police report was enough compliance
with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out
that no grievance was made at the time the Appellate
Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties,
particularly by the first respondent, that the second report
should not have been considered or that they wished to have
a further opportunity of looking into that report and to
controvert any matter contained therein. They did not move
the Appellate Authority for an adjournment of the hearing in
order to enable it to meet any of the statements made in
that report. But the learned counsel for the respondent
suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not
be waived by any of the parties and that it was incumbent
upon the Appellate Authority to observe the so-called rules
of natural justice. In our
120
opinion, there is no warrant for such a proposition. Even
in a court of law a party is not entitled to raise the
question at the appellate stage that he should have been
granted an adjournment which he did not pray for in the
court of first instance. Far less, such a claim can be
entertained in an appeal from a tribunal which is not a
court of justice, but a statutory body functioning in a
quasi judicial way.
For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment
under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are
further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned
single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view
of the legal position. The appeal is accordingly allowed
with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
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