Dhananjay Rathi vs. Ruchika Rathi

2026 INSC 360
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1924 OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO(S). 1878 OF 2026)

J U D G M E N T
VIJAY BISHNOI, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant-
Husband challenging the order dated 07.01.2026 (hereinafter
referred to as “ Impugned Order ”) passed in Crl. M.C. No.
116 of 2026 by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Signature Not Verified
(hereinafter referred to as “ the High Court ”) wherein the High
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2026.04.13
17:37:48 IST
Reason:
Court issued notice and granted an interim order directing
1

that the proceedings initiated in DV Complaint No. 3186 of
2025 (hereinafter referred to as “ DV Proceedings ”) under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(hereinafter referred to as “ the DV Act ”) by the Respondent-
Wife against the Appellant-Husband and his mother (mother-
in-law of the Respondent-Wife) shall proceed, subject to
deposit of ₹ 89,00,000/- by the Respondent-Wife before the
Registrar General of the High Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. The marriage between the Appellant-Husband and the
Respondent-Wife was solemnized on 19.02.2000 in
accordance with the Hindu rites and ceremonies and from the
wedlock, a daughter was born on 06.06.2003 and a son was
born on 01.01.2006. Thereafter, due to temperamental
differences, matrimonial disputes arose between the parties
and they started living separately from the year 2022-23.
Consequently, the Appellant-Husband filed Divorce Petition
bearing H.M.A. No. 275/2023 under Sections 13(1)(i-a) &
13(1)(i)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter
2

referred to as “the Act” ) before the Court of Principal Judge,
Family Court, Saket Court House, Delhi.
4. The Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Saket Court
House, Delhi vide order dated 13.07.2023 referred the matter
to mediation. Pursuant to mediation, a settlement was
entered into between the parties on 16.05.2024, settling all
the disputes between them (hereinafter referred to as
“ Settlement Agreement ”). It is not the case of either of the
party that the said Settlement Agreement is not accepted by
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Saket Court House. The
terms of the Settlement Agreement are summarised as
follows:
4.1
Both agreed to dissolve their marriage by a Decree of
Divorce by Mutual Consent as per Sections 13B(1) and
13B(2) of the Act.
4.2 The Appellant-Husband agreed to withdraw the Divorce
Petition bearing H.M.A. No. 275/2023 filed under
Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)(ia) of the Act.
4.3 The Appellant-Husband agreed to pay and the
Respondent-Wife agreed to accept ₹ 1,50,00,000/-
3

(including ₹ 4,77,129/- invested in the PPF Account)
towards full and final settlement of all the claims arising
out of the matrimonial discord, in two installments:
4.3.1 A sum of ₹ 75,00,000/- at the time of recording
of statement under First Motion.
4.3.2 A sum of ₹ 70,22,871/- at the time of recording
of statement under Second Motion.
4.4 A Gift Deed would be executed by the Respondent-Wife
for an amount of ₹ 2,52,38,794/- in favour of the
Appellant-husband to validate the accounts which stand
reflected in the business account of Appellant-Husband
on account of their relations as husband and wife.
4.5 The Appellant-Husband agreed to pay 14,00,000/- for ₹
purchase of a car.
4.6 The Appellant-Husband agreed to hand over jewellery
items as per APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife.
4.7 Pursuant to the grant of the First Motion, the
Respondent-Wife agreed to present herself for executing
Gift Deeds and such other documents required for
4

transfer of properties, shares and policies bought in her
name by the Appellant-Husband, which are as follows:
4.7.1 Project Manorath: Flat No. E-2002, Mascot GH-
04B/1, Sector 16, Greater Noida.
4.7.2 Project Neo Town: Flat No. 02/1704 Patel GH-03
Tech zone, Greater Noida.
4.7.3 Project Neo Town: Flat No. D2/1705 Patel GH-03
Tech zone, Greater Noida.
4.7.4 LIC Policy No. 117410693 and Bajaj Allianz Policy
No. 0506426223
4.7.5 Shares held in Globe Capital, K.L. Rathi Steels and
Rathi Steels Ltd.
4.7.6 Jewellery account as maintained by the Appellant-
Husband in favor of their daughter.
4.8 Both the parties further agreed to put an end to all the
disputes between them and their family members, and
additionally both the parties also agreed to refrain from
instituting any case (civil or criminal) against each other
or their family members.
5

5 Thereafter, on 04.07.2024, the Divorce petition bearing
H.M.A. No. 235/2023 filed under Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)
(ia) of the Act was withdrawn by the Appellant-Husband and
furthermore, a petition for Divorce under Section 13-B(1) of
the Act was jointly filed by the Appellant-Husband and the
Respondent-Wife, which was registered as H.M.A. No.
1185/2024, in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court,
Saket Court House, Delhi. Both the parties therein signed an
Affidavit of Undertaking dated 03.07.2024, agreeing to
comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
6 Thereafter, the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court,
Saket Court House, Delhi, vide order dated 14.08.2024,
allowed the First Motion of the petition filed under Section
13B(1) of the Act, in view of the settlement arrived at between
the parties. In compliance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, the Appellant-Husband paid 75,00,000/- as first ₹
installment of the final settlement amount along with a sum
of ₹ 14,00,000/- for purchase of the car. The Appellant-
Husband has also returned the Jewellery Items as described
in APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife. At the same
6

time, the Respondent-Wife, in compliance with her
obligations under the Settlement Agreement, transferred a
sum of 2,52,38,794/- to the Appellant-Husband. ₹
7 Subsequently, the Respondent-Wife withdrew her
consent for the mutual divorce and in response, the
Appellant-Husband filed a Contempt Petition No. 07/2025
before the Principal Judge, Family Court, South District,
Saket District Court, New Delhi. Later, a complaint bearing
DV Complaint No. 3186 of 2025, was filed, before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Courts, Delhi, by the
Respondent-Wife under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, against
the Appellant-Husband and his mother on 16.10.2025
wherein, vide order dated 13.11.2025, summons were issued
against them.
8 Thereafter, the Appellant-Husband withdrew the
Contempt Petition No. 07/2025 filed before the Principal
Judge, Family Court, South District, Saket District Court,
New Delhi and proceeded to file a Quashing Petition bearing
Crl. M.C. No. 116 of 2026 before the High Court. The
Appellant-Husband also filed a Contempt Petition bearing
7

Contempt Case (C) No. 19 of 2026 before the High Court
seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the
Respondent-Wife for alleged breach of the Settlement
Agreement, which is still pending.
9 The High Court in the Quashing Petition, vide Impugned
Order passed an interim order issuing notice, and agreeing to
continue the D.V. proceedings while directing the
Respondent-Wife to deposit ₹ 89,00,000/- and retain the
jewellery received by her in terms of the Settlement
Agreement. The relevant portions from the judgment are
reproduced hereinunder:
“ CRL.M.A. 392/2026 (exemption)
Exemption granted, subject to just exceptions.
Let requisite compliances be made within 01 week.
The application stands disposed-of.
CRL.M.C. 116/2026 & CRL.M.A. 391/2026 (stay)
By way of the present petition filed under
section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita 2023, the petitioner seeks quashing of
domestic violence complaint bearing CT Case
No.3186/2025 pending before the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class-02/Mahila Court, South
District, Saket Courts, New Delhi.
2. Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner submits, that the parties had
resolved their disputes vide a Settlement Agreement
dated 16.05.2024 signed under the aegis of the
8

Delhi Mediation Centre, Saket Courts, New Delhi, as
per which the parties were to seek divorce by
mutual consent. It is submitted that under the said
settlement, the petitioner has paid to the
respondent Rs. 89 lacs and has also handed-over
to her jewellery as referred to in clause ‘B’ of the
settlement.
3. Mr. Jauhar submits, that pursuant to the
settlement, parties filed the first motion seeking
divorce by mutual consent under 13B(1) of the
Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (‘HMA’), wherein the
respondent also filed an affidavit of undertaking as
required by law, agreeing to abide by the terms of
the settlement; and the first motion was passed by
the learned Family Court vide order dated
14.08.2024.
4. Mr. Jauhar submits, that one of the terms of the
settlement was that the parties will put to an end
all disputes between them and with their respective
family members; and further the respondent had
also agreed as follows:
“12. The Parties agree and acknowledge
that by signing of the present Settlement
Agreement shall put an end to all disputes
between the Parties and their family
members and relatives. The Second Party
undertakes and acknowledges that neither
she nor her parents or any of her family
members, relatives, friends shall institute
any case or proceedings (civil or criminal) in
future against the First Party, his family
members, relatives and friends with respect
to the present matrimonial discord between
the Parties. Similarly, the First Party
undertakes and acknowledges that neither
he nor his parents or any of his family
members, relatives, friends shall institute
any case or proceedings (civil or criminal) in
future against the Second Party, her family
9

members, relatives and friends with respect
to the present matrimonial discord between
the Parties.”
5. Counsel submits however, that despite the
aforesaid position, the respondent has now reneged
on the terms of settlement and has filed a complaint
under section 12 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘DV Act’) alleging acts
of domestic violence and seeking various reliefs
against the petitioner.
6. It is argued, that having signed the mediated
settlement agreement and having received benefits
thereunder, the respondent cannot now be
permitted to file the complaint under section 12 of
the DV Act, since that would amount to abuse of the
process of law.
7. Mr. Jauhar further submits, that as part of the
terms of settlement, the petitioner has in fact
withdrawn a petition that he had filed under
section 13 of the HMA vide order dated 04.07.2024,
whereby the petitioner had sought dissolution of his
marriage with the respondent on the ground of
adultery; and that the petitioner is accordingly now
put to serious disadvantage.
8. Issue notice.
9. Mr. Prashant Mendiratta learned counsel
appears for the respondent on advance copy;
accepts notice; and opposes the grant of any interim
relief.
10. Mr. Mendiratta submits, that in addition to the
terms contained in the settlement agreement, there
were certain other terms that were also agreed
upon between the parties by exchange of e-mails,
which the petitioner is now dithering on; and by
reason of the petitioner’s conduct, the respondent is
no longer willing to abide by the mediated
settlement and will not concede to a divorce by
mutual consent.
10

11. In support of their respective submissions,
learned counsel for the parties have cited certain
judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of
Coordinate Benches of this court.
12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, on
a prima-facie view of the matter, and in the
interests of justice, this court is of opinion that the
following directions are required to be passed at
this stage:
12.1. The respondent shall, by way of
disgorgement, deposit the sum of Rs. 89 lacs
that have admittedly beenreceived by her from
the petitioner under the terms of Settlement
Agreement dated 16.05.2024, with the
Registrar General of this court within 04 weeks
from today;
12.2. The Registrar General is directed to retain
the amount so deposited in a fixed deposit
account in a nationalised bank, initially for a
period of 01 year; to be renewed for the same
period from time-to-time, without awaiting any
further directions from this court in that behalf,
unless otherwise directed by the court;
12.3. Though the respondent shall continue to
hold the jewellery, which also she admits to
having received from the petitioner in terms of
clause ‘B’ of the settlement agreement, she is
restrained from selling, transferring or parting
with possession of any part of that jewellery
during the pendency of the present
proceedings, without prior permission of this
court;
12.4. Since this court considers it inadvisable to
restrain a party from exercising their legal
rights by prosecuting legal proceedings, subject
to compliance of the above, the respondent
shall be entitled to proceed with the complaint
filed by her under section 12 of the DV Act.
11

13. Let reply to the petition as well as CRL.M.A. No.
391/2026 be filed within 04 weeks; rejoinder
thereto, if any, be filed within 03 weeks thereafter;
with copy to the opposing counsel.
14. Whether or not the petition filed by the
petitioner under section 13 of the HMA (which was
subsequently withdrawn by him) should be
restored, will be considered subsequently. For the
record, Mr. Mendiratta submits, that they have no
objection to the petitioner reviving the said divorce
case.
15. Re-notify on 05th May 2026. JANUARY 7,2026
CRL.M.C. 116/2026”
10. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellant-
Husband approached this Court by filing the present SLP. In
addition to this, the Appellant-Husband also preferred an
application bearing I.A. No. 35342 of 2026 in the present SLP
seeking Decree of Divorce under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India. This Court vide order dated
06.02.2026, issued notice and stayed the DV proceedings
pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket
Courts, Delhi. Subsequently, a Counter-Affidavit and
Rejoinder Affidavit have been filed by the respective parties.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
12

A. On behalf of the Appellant-Husband
11. The learned counsel for the Appellant-Husband
vehemently submitted that the Impugned Order suffers from
an error of law as it failed to appreciate that the parties have
been living separately since 21.12.2022, with no intention
whatsoever to resume cohabitation. It was submitted that the
Respondent-Wife indulged in an extramarital relationship,
leading to the filing of a divorce petition dated 30.01.2023 on
the grounds of adultery and cruelty. The matter was
thereafter referred to mediation, culminating in a Settlement
Agreement dated 16.05.2024, whereby, under Clause 11, the
Respondent-Wife agreed to accept a lump sum amount of
₹ 1,50,00,000/- towards full and final settlement of all claims,
along with jewellery and 14,00,000/- for the purchase of a ₹
new car, as provided under Clause 7 of the Settlement
Agreement.
12. It was further submitted that Clause 12 of the
Settlement Agreement clearly stipulated that neither the
Respondent-Wife nor her family members would initiate any
13

civil or criminal proceedings against the husband or his
family members. It has been submitted that the Respondent-
Wife admittedly received 75,00,000/- as first installment of ₹
the lump sum amount, 4,00,000/- for the car, and her ₹
entire jewellery at the time of the First Motion, which was
duly allowed by the Family Court, Saket. It was argued that,
despite having accepted 89,00,000/- and all her jewellery, ₹
the Respondent-Wife, with malafide intentions, refused to
proceed with the Second Motion Petition and instead filed a
vexatious complaint under the DV Act, solely to extract a
more financially lucrative settlement. The learned counsel
contended that such conduct amounts to a clear abuse of the
process of law and is contumacious in nature, and thus,
liable to be nipped in the bud, as held by this Court in Ruchi
Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal and others , reported as
(2005) 3 SCC 299, and Mohd. Shamim and others v.
Nhahid Begum and another , reported as (2005) 3 SCC 302.
13. The allegations made by the Respondent-Wife is that she
provided her consent to the Settlement Agreement and the
consequent divorce only on the basis of assurances given by
14

the Appellant-Husband that he would return her jewellery
worth 120 crores and gold biscuits worth 50 crores, were ₹ ₹
vehemently denied. Per contra, it was argued that no such
agreement ever existed, nor was there any evidence to
suggest that jewellery of such value was ever given, and that
these claims were merely tactics to extort additional money
from the Appellant-Husband. It was further contended that
the Respondent-Wife listed all her items to be returned by the
Appellant-Husband, which were not specified under the
Settlement Agreement, by way of WhatsApp messages dated
17.02.2025, wherein there is not even a whisper of the
jewellery worth 120 crores and the gold biscuits worth 50 ₹ ₹
crores.
14. The learned counsel further submitted that the marriage
between the parties has irretrievably broken down, with both
parties having made serious allegations of cruelty,
incompatibility, and irreconcilable differences, and neither
party having expressed any willingness to resume marital
obligations at any stage. Reliance was placed upon the
judgment of this Court in Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar ,
15

reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191, wherein this Court
exercised powers under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage
when there existed no scope of reconciliation between the
parties and directed compliance with the terms of a
concluded settlement. It was further submitted that the
Appellant-Husband herein is ready and willing to comply with
the Settlement Agreement by paying the balance amount of
₹ 75,00,000/-.
15. It was argued that the High Court erred in permitting
the Respondent-Wife to continue with the DV proceedings
subject to deposit of 89,00,000/-, instead of quashing the ₹
same in exercise of powers under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter
referred to as “ BNSS ”), despite the proceedings being ex facie
an abuse of process in light of the binding Settlement
Agreement as well as the Affidavit of Undertaking dated
03.07.2024. The Appellant-Husband has also initiated
contempt proceedings for breach of the Settlement Agreement
and the Undertaking. The learned counsel finally argued that
loss of finality in litigation would ensue if parties are
16

permitted to renege from mediated settlements. As a result, it
was prayed that this Court should exercise its extraordinary
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to
dissolve the marriage and quash the DV proceedings to
secure the ends of justice.
B. On behalf of the Respondent-Wife
16. It is submitted by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Respondent-Wife that the Appellant-Husband had assured
the Respondent-Wife that he will return the jewellery gifted to
the Respondent-Wife by his parents, relatives and family
members and by her parents worth ₹ 120 crores at the time of
signing of the Settlement Agreement and gold biscuits worth
₹ 50 crores before signing of the Second Motion Petition.
However, the same was not included in the Settlement
Agreement and the Respondent-Wife was told by the
Appellant-Husband that including the same would alert the
Income Tax Department and he may have to give a wealth tax
on the same. It was also made clear that in case the
Appellant-Husband fails to return the said jewellery, the
17

Respondent-Wife need not sign the Second Motion Petition.
Accordingly, it was contended that believing the said
assurances being made by the Appellant-Husband, the
Respondent-Wife signed the Settlement Agreement and the
First Motion Petition.
17. The learned counsel further submitted that after the
recording of the statements for the First Motion, the
Respondent-Wife asked the Appellant-Husband to hand over
the jewellery and the gold biscuits as promised by him.
However, the Appellant-Husband completely refused and said
that he would hand over the jewellery and gold biscuits only
after the grant of decree of divorce by mutual consent.
Therefore, the Respondent-Wife refused to sign the Second
Motion Petition and withdrew her consent to the mutual
divorce because of the conduct and ill-intention of the
Appellant-Husband and reliance was placed on the email
dated 21.02.2025 sent by the counsel for the Appellant-
Husband, wherein it was expressly stated that all payments,
terms or personal items agreed upon and not specifically
18

mentioned in the Settlement Agreement shall be made good
in toto by 02.03.2025.
18. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that the
Respondent-Wife, that in compliance with the direction given
by the High Court and within the stipulated time period, she
has deposited the amount of 89,00,000/- by way of two ₹
Demand Drafts ( 75,00,000/- and ₹ ₹ 14,00,000/-,
respectively) before the Registrar General of the High Court.
19. Furthermore, it is submitted that in terms of settled
principles governing divorce by mutual consent, the consent
of the parties must subsist not only at the stage of filing of
the petition but also, is required to continue to exist till the
passing of the final decree. Reference in this regard was made
to the judgment of this Court in Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om
Prakash, reported as (1991) 2 SCC 25 , wherein it was held
as follows:

19

20. It is also submitted that the Settlement Agreement is
entirely one-sided, whereby the Respondent-Wife alone was
required to relinquish her rights, share in properties and
financial interests in favour of the Appellant-Husband,
including transfer of a sum of 2,52,38,794/- by diluting and ₹
liquidating her mutual funds and shares, despite having no
independent source of income, and without receiving any
commensurate or reciprocal consideration in return and
thus, withdrawal of consent by the Respondent-Wife was a
legally justified and inevitable consequence of the conduct of
the Appellant-Husband.
21. Moreover, it is submitted that the unlawful retention of
the Respondent-Wife’s stridhan, jewellery, gold biscuits, and
monies, coupled with her continued deprivation thereof,
amounts to continuing economic abuse as recognised under
Section 3 of the DV Act and the cause of action continues to
20

subsist and the rights of the Respondent-Wife to seek
redressal under the DV Act remain unaffected by the
cessation of cohabitation or the alleged severance of
matrimonial ties.
ANALYSIS
22. We have heard the parties and perused the materials
available on record and the issues arising for consideration
before this Court are as follows:
I. Whether the proceedings initiated by the Respondent-
Wife under the DV Act should be quashed?
II. Whether any party can back out from the Settlement
Agreement arrived at in the mediation proceedings? If
yes, in what situation?
III. Whether this Court, in the case in hand, can exercise
its powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India to grant a decree of divorce to the parties herein
on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage,
upon an application filed by the Appellant-Husband? If
yes, then on what terms and conditions?
21

23. In the present case, the marriage between the parties
was solemnized on 19.02.2000 and they have two issues, a
daughter aged 23 years and a son aged 20 years. On
30.01.2023, the Appellant-Husband filed a Divorce Petition
on grounds of cruelty and adultery. In the said case, the
concerned trial Court referred the parties for mediation at the
mediation centre. During mediation, both the parties agreed
to settle all their disputes and accordingly, a Settlement
Agreement was entered between the parties, wherein, subject
to the compliance with the terms thereof, the parties were to
apply for divorce by mutual consent.
24. The First Motion Petition in the petition for divorce by
mutual consent was allowed on 14.08.2024 after fulfilling the
terms as per the Settlement Agreement to that effect and the
Second Motion Petition was to be filed on or before
20.02.2025. However, the Respondent-Wife refused to sign
the Second Motion Petition within the stipulated time period
and withdrew her consent to the mutual divorce.
25. Subsequently, the Appellant-Husband filed a contempt
petition being Contempt Petition No. 7/2025, which was later
22

withdrawn by the Appellant-Husband to pursue his remedy
before the High Court. Soon after filing the contempt petition,
the Respondent-Wife initiated proceedings under Section 12
of the DV Act and filed a case bearing D.V. Complaint No.
3186/2025 on 16.10.2025.
26. This Court in the case of Ruchi Agarwal (supra) was
caught up with a similar situation wherein the husband
performed his part of the compromise agreed for mutual
consent divorce, however, the wife partly performed her
obligations and did not withdraw certain cases. It was argued
by the wife that the said compromise was obtained by the
husband and his family through threat and coercion. This
Court therein held that it was difficult to accept the argument
that the compromise was signed under coercion since the
wife partly performed the obligations mentioned thereunder.
The relevant portions from the judgment are reproduced
hereinunder:
“7. It is based on the said compromise the appellant obtained a
divorce as desired by her under Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act and in partial compliance with the terms of the
compromise she withdrew the criminal case filed under Section
125 of the Criminal Procedure Code but for reasons better
known to her she did not withdraw that complaint from which
23

24

also based on an almost identical set of facts. In that case,
the first motion for divorce by mutual consent was moved by
both the parties along with the Settlement Agreement and the
same was allowed by the Family Court. Before moving the
Second Motion Petition, the wife resiled from the settlement
agreement. A three-judge Bench of this Court therein noting
down that the marriage has irretrievably broken, granted
divorce and quashed all the proceedings between the parties
arising out of the matrimonial relationship. The relevant
portion from the judgment is reproduced hereinunder:

25

26

27

28. Again coming to the facts of the case, even at the cost of
repetition, we would like to mention that as per the
Settlement Agreement, the Appellant-Husband was to pay
₹ 75,00,000/- as first installment of the final settlement
amount along with a sum of 14,00,000/- for purchase of the ₹
car, both of which had been complied with. The Appellant-
28

Husband has also returned the jewellery items as per
APPENDIX A to P to the Respondent-Wife. The Respondent-
Wife, as part of her obligations under the Settlement
Agreement, transferred ₹ 2,52,38,794/- to the Appellant-
Husband at the time of filing the First Motion Petition.
29. However, the Respondent-Wife refused to honour the
terms of the Settlement Agreement and refused to sign the
Second Motion Petition stating that she had withdrawn her
consent from the divorce. Though it is well within the law, for
any party, to withdraw consent at any stage before grant of
divorce by mutual agreement, however, in case a compromise
deed or a settlement agreement has been entered in between
the parties regarding the full and final settlement of their
disputes, then in that case it is not open for the party to step
back from the terms and conditions so arrived between them.
30. It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a
settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the
mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as
agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be
encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms
29

of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by
the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation
harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire
process of mediation. This Court in the case of Gimpex
Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, reported as (2022) 11 SCC
705, while dealing with a compromise entered between the
parties in case of cheque dishonour, held that the parties
cannot be allowed to reverse the effect of a settlement
agreement by pursuing either original or subsequent
complaints. A three-Judge Bench of this Court therein
emphasized that a settlement once entered and authenticated
by a mediator subsumed the original complaint. The relevant
portion of the said judgment is reproduced herein under:

30

dishonour of cheques issued subsequent to it, would then give
rise to a fresh cause of action attracting liability under Section
138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and
criminal law.

31. The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile
from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation
proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said
Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue
influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement
Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the
conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement
Agreement.
32. The Respondent-Wife alleged that the Appellant-
Husband assured the Respondent-Wife that apart from the
considerations specified in the Settlement Agreement, the
Appellant-Husband would give 120 Crores worth of jewellery ₹
along with gold biscuits worth ₹ 50 Crores in lieu of the
stridhan (apart from those mentioned in the Settlement
31

Agreement) to her before signing of the Second Motion
Petition. However, since the Appellant-Husband did not
adhere to his promise, the Respondent-Wife did not sign the
Second Motion Petition.
33. Another argument raised by the Respondent-Wife, that
she only agreed to exclude these terms from the Settlement
Agreement upon being asked so by the Appellant-Husband in
order to avoid alerting the Income Tax Department and to
evade any liability towards wealth tax, is highly egregious. We
are appalled at the sheer audacity of such a submission being
advanced before a court of law and deplore the evident
disregard exhibited towards the legal system.
34. We are not impressed by the reasons given by the
learned counsel of the Respondent-Wife for resiling out of the
Settlement Agreement. It is difficult to comprehend as to why
in the Settlement Agreement the condition for return of
jewelleries and gold biscuits have not been mentioned. It is
an admitted position that the Respondent-Wife had signed
the Settlement Agreement and we are not sure as to why she,
being a mature and educated woman assisted by her
32

advocate, did not press for the inclusion of these conditions
in the Settlement Agreement.
35. In addition, we find no plausible explanation as to why
the Respondent-Wife waited for eight long months from the
date of the Second Motion Petition before initiating the DV
proceedings. It is evident from the WhatsApp chats dated
17.02.2025 between them, wherein the Respondent-Wife
listed all articles she sought to be returned, that were not a
part of the Settlement Agreement, that the said list did not
make any mention whatsoever of any jewellery worth 120 ₹
crores or gold biscuits worth 50 crores, which she claims ₹
were assured to her by the Appellant-Husband. Notably,
these allegations were raised for the first time only in the DV
complaint. This prolonged delay in raising such a substantial
ground raises serious suspicion as to the credibility and
authenticity of the allegations made therein in blatant
disregard of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In
addition to this, with regard to the email sent by the counsel
for the Appellant-Husband dated 21.02.2025, wherein it was
mentioned that the Appellant-Husband would make good all
33

other obligations, apart from those mentioned in the
Settlement Agreement, it must have been in pursuance of the
list of items sent by the Respondent-Wife through the
WhatsApp chat dated 17.02.2025 and it cannot be construed
in such a manner that it would have included the demands
for jewellery worth ₹ 120 Crores or gold biscuits worth ₹ 50
Crores.
36. Reliance was placed upon by the learned counsel for the
Respondent-Wife on certain judgments, however, all the said
cases would not apply in the present case for the following
reasons:
A. Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, reported as (1991)
2 SCC 25: The Respondent-Wife relied on the said judgment
to the effect that the consent of the parties must subsist not
only at the stage of filing of the petition but also, is required
to continue to exist till the passing of the final decree.
However, in the present case, regarding the withdrawal of
consent before the Second Motion, the Respondent-Wife could
not prove any fraud, force, or undue influence and her
withdrawal of consent is merely on the ground of non-
34

adherence to the promise made by the Appellant-Husband
which was not even the part of the Settlement Agreement and
thus, cannot benefit her to initiate another proceeding.
B. Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, reported as
(2011) 5 SCC 234: The Respondent relied on the said
judgment to the effect that one of the parties could withdraw
his/her consent at any time before passing of the decree. In
the said case, the agreement was entered into between the
parties independently, however, in the present case the
settlement was arrived upon mediation between the parties
on specific order of the Court and which was also later
ratified by the Court.
C. Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya, reported as
(2009) 12 SCC 338: The said judgment of the Court was given
after following the reasoning given in the case of Surestha
Devi (supra ) which has been already distinguished above.
Proceedings under the DV Act
37. A careful perusal of the complaint filed by the
Respondent-Wife under the DV Act depicts that there are no
specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence
35

that could emanate from the pleadings. The Respondent-Wife
has failed to mention any event describing any sort of
violence carried out either by the Appellant-Husband or his
mother. A criminal complaint regarding domestic violence,
with mere reference to the names of the family members or
the husband without any specific allegation that points
towards their active involvement in commission of such an
act of violence, shall be nipped in the bud.
38. While we are conscious of the fact that the parties to a
long standing marital dispute are often fuelled by emotions,
we cannot allow such emotions to take a drastic turn in as
much as allowing the bursts of emotions to form the basis of
criminal prosecution. Such criminal prosecution, if allowed,
would lead to an abuse of law and cause harassment.
39. It is evident from the petition filed by the Respondent-
Wife that apart from the Appellant-Husband’s non-
compliance with the condition of giving 120 Crores and gold ₹
biscuits worth 50 Crores, all the other allegations seems to ₹
be trivial disagreements exaggerated, solely to justify the
institution of the complaint under the DV Act.
36

40. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that,
admittedly, since the last couple of years (from 2022-23), the
Respondent-Wife is living separately from the Appellant-
Husband. The proceedings under the DV Act appear to be
premeditated, one filed in order to sustain some sort of
litigation between the parties after she had resiled from the
Settlement Agreement, as it was evidently for the first time in
a long span of about 23 years of their sustained marriage,
that such a petition alleging domestic violence has been filed
by the Respondent-Wife. The proceedings initiated under the
DV Act were merely an afterthought, as they were filed after
notice was issued in the contempt petition filed by the
Appellant-Husband.
41. Therefore, we are of the view that the proceedings under
the DV Act as initiated by the Respondent-Wife are liable to
be quashed, the continuance of which would be an abuse of
the process of law.
ARTICLE 142(1) AND IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF
MARRIAGE
37

42. Now we shall proceed on to adjudicate upon the
application filed by the Appellant-Husband under Article
142(1) to examine if in the instant case, exercise of powers
under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India for
dissolution of marriage would be justified.
43. Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India grants powers
to the Supreme Court to pass any orders or decree in order to
achieve complete justice. Article 142(1) has been reproduced
hereinbelow for easy reference:
“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme
Court and orders as to discovery, etc. —(1) The Supreme
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or
make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in
any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so
passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the
territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or
under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that
behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by
order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by
Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of
the territory of India, have all and every power to make any
order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person,
the discovery or production of any documents, or the
investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”
This vast power vested in the highest court of the country by
the insertion of the phrase “ such order as is necessary for
doing complete justice ” has been done with the intent to
38

protect the interests of the persons (and not merely “the
litigants”) approaching the institution of judiciary with the
hopes of seeking justice. Having been empowered with these
extraordinary powers, it is the quintessential duty of this
Court to ensure that the parties who are present before it are
not left remediless merely because certain statutory gaps
exist and their rights are adequately safeguarded.
44. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a valid
ground under the Act for the ground of divorce. The Act
permits a decree of divorce to be passed either when certain
matrimonial offences have been committed by either party or
through mutual consent. The jurisprudence pertaining to the
grant of divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been developed with
caution through various judgments.
45. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the judgment of
Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, reported as (2023)
14 SCC 231 held that the power to grant divorce under the
aegis of Article 142(1) is exercisable by this Court only in
those cases where in the opinion of the Court, there has been
39

a “ complete and irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage.
This Court therein however specified that irretrievable
breakdown of marriage has to be ascertained factually while
weighing all the underlying circumstances. This relevant
paragraphs from Shilpa Sailesh to this effect are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“62. Having said so, we wish to clearly state that grant of
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage
by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is
to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind
several factors ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both
parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced
and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable,
emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore,
dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way
forward.
63. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be
factually determined and firmly established. For this, several
factors are to be considered such as the period of time the
parties had cohabited after marriage; when the parties had last
cohabited; the nature of allegations made by the parties
against each other and their family members; the orders
passed in the legal proceedings from time to time, cumulative
impact on the personal relationship; whether, and how many
attempts were made to settle the disputes by intervention of the
court or through mediation, and when the last attempt was
made, etc. The period of separation should be sufficiently long,
and anything above six years or more will be a relevant factor.
But these facts have to be evaluated keeping in view the
economic and social status of the parties, including their
educational qualifications, whether the parties have any
children, their age, educational qualification, and whether the
other spouse and children are dependent, in which event how
40

and in what manner the party seeking divorce intends to take
care and provide for the spouse or the children. Question of
custody and welfare of minor children, provision for fair and
adequate alimony for the wife, and economic rights of the
children and other pending matters, if any, are relevant
considerations. We would not like to codify the factors so as to
curtail exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution of India, which is situation specific. Some of the
factors mentioned can be taken as illustrative, and worthy of
consideration.”
( Emphasis Supplied )
46. In Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, reported in
(2025) 3 SCC 686, it was held that the Court is required to
take a holistic view on the relationship between the parties
and then conclude whether there is an irretrievable
breakdown of marriage. The relevant portion from the
judgment is reproduced herein below:

41

marriage between the parties and as a result, it is in their
interest that they should part ways by passing a decree of
divorce by exercising jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the
Constitution and thereby doing complete justice between the
parties.”

Court was faced with a similar situation wherein the wife
resiled from the terms of settlement as agreed before the

marriage has been irretrievably broken down and therefore
granted divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of
India. The relevant portions from the judgment are
reproduced hereinunder:

42

XXXX

43

48. The aforesaid line of reasoning has been continuously
adopted by this Court in a catena of judgments including but
not limited to Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 383; Vineet Taneja v. Ritu Johari
reported in (2025) 3 SCC 732; Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar
reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 95.
49. A perusal of the dicta laid down by this Court in the
above mentioned judgments and several others holding
authority on the said law point makes it crystal clear that the
Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) for grant
of divorce has to first conclude that there has been an
irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
50. In the case at hand, the Appellant-Husband had first
filed a divorce petition being H.M.A. No. 275/2023 under
Sections 13(1)(i-a) & 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act, which was later
withdrawn as per the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
Further, in the petition for divorce by mutual consent filed on
44

joint petition by both the parties, First Motion Petition has
been allowed vide order dated 14.08.2024 and the Second
Motion Petition has not been filed as yet.
51. Apart from the above, the parties have been admittedly
living separately from around 2022-23. Both the children of
the parties have attained majority and are now living their
respective lives. Moreover, even after the Settlement
Agreement, the Respondent-Wife proceeded to file a case of
domestic violence against the Appellant-Husband and his
mother. Thus, we are convinced that the sacrosanct thread
tying the parties in this martial relationship has been
snapped for long now and we perceive no possibility that they
could be united (for good) in a matrimonial relationship.

that there has been a complete and irretrievable breakdown
of the matrimonial relationship between the parties. In such a
case, when there is no scope of parties peacefully co-existing
together, we see no point in continuation of any sorts of
litigation in between the parties arising solely out of the
matrimonial discord.
45

53. Thus, in the light of the abovestated facts, we conclude
that the present is a fit case for exercise of powers under
Article 142(1) to grant a divorce as there had been an
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
Prevailing Position of the Settlement between the Parties
54. We notice that various terms and conditions have been
set out in the Settlement Agreement and out of all such
conditions, some have been already performed by the parties
and the rest are yet to be completed. The following table
indicates the terms of the Settlement Agreement between the
parties and their status:

46

47

DIRECTIONS
55. In the above situation, we pass the following directions:
i. The criminal appeal stands allowed and the
proceedings initiated by the Respondent-Wife
pursuant to DV Complaint No. 3186/2025 are
quashed hereby and the Impugned Order is set aside.
ii. The application filed by the Appellant-Husband under
Article 142(1) for grant of divorce stands allowed and
48

the marriage between the party is dissolved subject to
the terms specified hereunder.
iii. Contempt Case (C) No. 19 of 2026 pending before the
High Court of Delhi filed by the Appellant-Husband
and all consequential proceedings thereto stands
closed.
iv. The Appellant-Husband shall pay the remaining
amount of 70,22,871/- (after deduction of a sum of ₹
₹ 4,77,129/- towards PPF Account) and he shall also
handover the passbook of the said PPF Account in the
bank account of the Respondent-Wife within two (2)
weeks from the date of the judgment. In case the
Appellant-Husband fails to comply with the same, the
divorce shall not come into effect.
v. Immediately after the transfer of the amount
mentioned in the preceding clause, on the next
working day, the parties shall appear before the
jurisdictional Registrar to execute all the
relinquishment deeds as agreed between the parties
as per Clause 8(E) of the Settlement Agreement within
49

four (4) weeks from the date of the judgment. If the
Respondent-Wife fails to appear on the said date, the
jurisdictional Registrar shall acknowledge and record
the presence of the parties and the Registrar shall
register such deed in the favour of the Appellant-
Husband on the said date itself and the rights of the
Respondent-Wife would be relinquished.
vi. The amount of ₹ 89,00,000 as deposited by the
Respondent-Wife before the High Court of Delhi shall
be returned back to her along with the interest
accrued on the said amount within two (2) weeks
from the date of receipt of the bank details submitted
by the Respondent-Wife to the Registrar General of
the High Court.
vii. All proceedings, civil and criminal, initiated by the
Appellant-Husband or the Respondent-Wife, their
family members, relatives, friends, in relation to or
arising out of such marriage between the parties,
shall stand closed and quashed. In addition to this,
there shall be a complete bar on all future
50

proceedings, either civil or criminal, by the Appellant-
Husband or the Respondent-Wife, their family
members, relatives, friends, on any aspect arising out
of or in relation to the marriage.
viii. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Courts
concerned for taking action as per the directions in
this judgment. However, if there is any other case
arising out of the matrimonial dispute, though not
mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall
also stand disposed of on production of a copy of this
judgment by the parties.
56. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
……………………………J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
…………………………. J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
NEW DELHI,
DATED: 13 APRIL, 2026
51