Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6888 of 1999
PETITIONER:
A.V.G.P. CHETTIAR & SONS & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
T. PALANISAMY GOUNDER
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/05/2002
BENCH:
R.C. Lahoti & Ruma Pal
JUDGMENT:
RUMA PAL, J.
This is an appeal filed by tenants against an order
passed by the High Court at Madras upholding the decision
of the Rent Controller ordering the eviction of the appellants
under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Control Act) Act,
1960 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).
The appellants have assailed the decision of the High
Court primarily on three grounds:
i) that the suit premises belongs to a religious
charitable Trust and, therefore, the
provisions of the Act were not applicable to
the suit premises, and
ii) that there was no relationship of tenants and
landlord between the appellants and the
respondent and
iii) the denial of the respondent’s title by the
appellants was bona fide and as such the
Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try or
determine the suit.
Before considering the submissions of the parties,
the background in which the issues before us arise needs to
be stated.
In 1900, one Mandi Venkata Naicker endowed his
property in Trust for religious and charitable purposes by a
registered deed dated 7th September 1900. A
supplementary deed was executed by the said Venkata
Naicker on 12th April 1911 transferring further properties to
the Trust from the income of which various rituals were to
be carried on. According to the appellants the suit property
was one of such Trust properties. The second appellant was
inducted as a tenant in the suit premises by the Trust in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 12
1942. Subsequently, the second appellant formed a
partnership firm together with his sons. The firm is the first
appellant before us and the remaining appellants are its
partners. The appellants’ case is that they have continued
as tenants under the Trust and the suit premises still
belongs to the Trust.
According to the respondent, the said premises
belonged to S. Gowthaman, an heir of the said Venkata
Naicker. The respondent claims that the appellants had
acknowledged Gowthaman as their landlord and paid rent to
him without protest. Gowthaman sold and conveyed the
suit property to the respondent by a registered deed dated
15th July 1988. This fact was intimated to the appellants by
Gowthaman who attorned the tenancy in favour of the
respondent by letter dated 19th July, 1998. On 5th
December, 1998 the respondent sent a registered notice to
the appellants demanding payment of rent. The appellants
refused to pay rent to the respondent on the ground that
the property belonged to the Trust and that no right, title or
interest could pass under the alleged sale by Gowthaman to
the respondent.
The appellants then filed an application before the
Subordinate Judge at Erode under Section 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for leave to institute a suit to obtain a
declaration that the alienation of the suit property by
Gowthaman to the respondent was null and void and not
binding on the trust and for framing of a proper scheme for
the enforcement of the trust. Both Gowthaman and the
respondent were made parties to this application.
While this application was pending the respondent
filed a petition in the Court of the Rent Controller for
eviction of the appellants from the suit premises on four
separate grounds under Sections 10 (2)(i), 10 (2) (vii), 10
(3)(iii), and 14 (1)(b) (2)(b) of the Act. Section 10(2)(i)
provides for eviction on the ground of default in payment of
rent. The proviso to Section 10(2) allows the Controller, if
he is satisfied that the tenant’s default is not wilful, to give
the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to
pay or tender the up to date rent due by him to the
landlord. If the tenant avails of this opportunity the
application of the landlord "shall be rejected". The
Explanation to the sub section defines wilful default as
default which continues after the issue of two months’
notice by the landlord claiming rent.
Section 10(2) (vii) allows the landlord to ask for
eviction of the tenant on the ground:
"that the tenant has denied the title
of the landlord or claimed a right of
permanent tenancy and that such denial
or claim was not bona fide."
Under the second proviso to Section 10(1) if the
Controller decides that the tenant’s denial of the title of the
landlord or the claim to permanent tenancy is bona fide,
then the landlord is entitled to sue for eviction of the
tenant in a Civil Court which would have the jurisdiction to
pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned
in Section 10,14,15 and 16 of the Act, "notwithstanding
that the Court finds that such denial does not involve
forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded". It is
clear from the language of this proviso, that the Rent
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 12
Controller has only to decide whether there is a bona fide
dispute as to the landlord’s title and has no jurisdiction to
decide the issue of title himself. That would be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
This was also held in J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v.
M.R. Murali and Anr where this Court having examined
the relevant scheme of the Act construed the second
proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 10 and clause (vii) of
sub-Section (2) of Section 10, in the following words:
"The legislative intent appears to
be that denial of title can be decided by
the Controller for the limited purpose of
finding out whether a ground of eviction
is made out but the questions of title
should be left to be determined by the
Civil Court. Once a question of title has
arisen between a landlord and a tenant
and such dispute is bona fide, the doors
of Civil Court are let open to the
landlord and therein adjudication, on
grounds of eviction otherwise within the
domain of the Controller, is also
permitted so as to avoid multiplicity of
suits and proceedings. All the disputes
between the landlord and tenant would
be settled in one forum and the need for
prosecuting two separate proceedings
before two fora would be eliminated".
The third ground for eviction was under Section 10
(3) (iii) which allows the landlord to sue for eviction:
"in case it is any other non-residential
building, if the landlord or (any member
of his family) is not occupying for
purposes of a business which he or
(any member of his family) is carrying
on, a non-residential building in the
city, town or village concerned which is
his own".
The fourth ground on which the respondent sought
the appellants’ eviction was under Section 14 (1) (b)
which reads:
14 (1) (b) "that the building is bona
fide required by the landlord for the
immediate purpose of demolishing it
and such demolition is to be made for
the purpose of erecting a new building
on the site of the building sought to be
demolished".
According to the appellants none of these provisions
are applicable to the suit property because it was a
religious endowment and religious endowments have been
exempted from the Act. If this question is decided against
the appellants and we hold that the Act is applicable to the
suit property, even so it is not necessary for the purpose of
this judgment to refer to the pleading or the evidence of
the respondent in support of the first, third and fourth
grounds for eviction because the High Court confined its
decision to the second ground namely whether the
appellants could be said to have denied the landlord’s title
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 12
and if so was the denial bona fide. Therefore we limit the
narration of facts to those which are relevant to these
issues.
In the eviction petition the respondent claimed that
the suit premises belonged to S.Gowthaman and that the
respondent had purchased the suit premises on 15th July,
1988 from the said S. Gowthaman since which date the
respondent "has become the absolute owner of the said
building". The appellants filed a counter in which, apart
from denying the grounds urged for eviction, it was claimed
that the property belonged to the said Trust and not to the
respondent as Gowthaman could not have sold the
property to the respondent and that in accordance with
G.O.No.2000 dated 16th August, 1976, religious
endowments like the suit property were exempted wholly
from the operation of the Rent Control Act. It was also
stated that an application under Section 92 CPC had been
filed by the appellants for leave to file a suit in respect of
the Trust properties including the suit premises.
By an order dated 21st September, 1990, the
appellants’ application under Section 92 CPC was granted
and the appellants’ suit was numbered as O.S. No.539 of
1990 before the Subordinate Judge, Erode. The appellants
brought this fact to the notice of the Rent Controller by
filing an additional counter on 17th January, 1991.
The respondent impugned the order granting leave
under Section 92 before the High Court under Section 115
CPC. The High Court allowed the Revisional Application by
an order dated 23rd August, 1991 and held that the trust
was a religious endowment and religious charity within the
meaning of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment Act, 1959 and that Section 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure had ceased to apply to Hindu Religious
Institutions and Endowments by virtue of Section 5 of that
Act. The order granting leave under Section 92 was
accordingly set aside and the application of the appellants
under Section 92 CPC was dismissed as not maintainable.
On 4th November 1991 the Rent Controller allowed
the petition of the respondent and directed the eviction of
the appellants from the suit premises. He upheld each of
the grounds of eviction urged by the respondent. The
specific issue viz., "whether the respondents (the
appellants before us) are justified in denying the title of the
petitioner (the respondent before us) to the petition
building" was decided against the appellants on four
grounds:
1) The appellants recognised the
said Gowthaman as the owner
of the building and remitted
rents to him.
2) From the decree passed in
O.S.No.311/85 Sub Court,
Erode, it could be understood
that the petition-building had
belonged to the said S.
Gowthaman.
3) The said S. Gowthaman had
written a letter dated 18.7.1988
to the appellants intimating to
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 12
them that he had sold the
building to the respondent and
that future rents might be paid
by the appellants to the
respondent.
4) The said S. Gowthaman had
sold the petition-building on
15.7.1988 to the respondent.
The Rent Controller refused to go into the question
whether Gowthaman had the right to transfer the suit
property to the respondent because:
"This is Rent Controller (sic)
proceeding. In this summary
proceedings it is not necessary to
find whether S. Gowthaman was
previously entitled to the petition-
building".
The appellants preferred an appeal from the Rent
Controller’s decision before the Appellate Authority. The
Appellate Authority allowed the appeal. It found prima facie
that the suit property was covered by the trust which was a
religious public trust and that in terms of G.O. No. 2000
dated 16th August 1976 the Rent Controller had no
jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s application under
the Act. It was also held that the Rent Controller erred in
deciding that the property belonged to S. Gowthaman both
as a matter of fact and of jurisdiction. The Appellate
Authority held that the denial of title of the respondent by
the appellant was bona-fide and that the respondent
should have been directed to establish his claim for eviction
before the Civil Court.
The respondent challenged the decision of the
Appellate Authority before the High Court by way of a
revisional application under Section 115 CPC. By its
judgment dated 17th November, 1998 the High Court
reversed the decision of the Appellate Authority and
restored the decision of the Rent Controller solely on the
issues relating to the Rent Controller’s jurisdiction. The
judgment then records:
"Learned counsel for the
respondents request time so as to
enable the tenants to vacate the
premises. Accepting the same, six
months’ time is granted to the
respondents from this date on condition
that the respondents should file an
affidavit of undertaking stating that they
would vacate and hand over the vacant
possession of the premises to the
landlord on or before the said period,
without making the landlord to go to the
court for taking possession. Such an
affidavit should be filed on or before
30.11.1998. If such an affidavit is not
filed within the said period, the order of
eviction will come into operation with
immediate effect".
The appellants did not file any undertaking. Instead
they impugned the decision of the High Court by filing a
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 12
special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
on 8th December, 1998. By an order dated 18th January
1999, this Court issued notice to the respondent and
passed an interim order protecting the possession of the
appellants. After hearing the parties, leave was granted
on 29th November, 1999 and interim relief granted earlier
was directed to continue pending the disposal of the
appeal.
Before considering the correctness of the decision
of the High Court, we take up for consideration a
preliminary objection raised by the appellants that the
appellants were estopped from impugning the High Court’s
decision because they had requested for time to vacate the
suit premises and such request had been granted by the
High Court. The objection is unsustainable. First, an
objection to the maintainability of the appeal, like other
points of demurrer, may be relevant at the time of the
admission of the appeal. Once the appeal is admitted
without reserving the issue of maintainability and the
matter is heard on merits, such a preliminary objection
does not survive. Second, the appellants had no doubt
requested for a stay of the execution of the decree. That
had been granted by the High Court subject to furnishing of
an undertaking by the appellants to vacate the premises
within a period of six months. The appellants did not in
fact give any such undertaking. Even if they had, they
could not be denied the right to appeal to this Court on any
principle of estoppel unless the respondent could show that
the appellants had thereby gained an advantage which was
otherwise not available to them; for example, if the
appellants had given an undertaking and obtained a stay of
the order of eviction beyond the period allowed for
preferring the appeal or if the landlord had consented not
to execute the decree of eviction in consideration of the
appellants’ undertaking to vacate . If such or other like
circumstances exist, this Court may have refused to
exercise discretion in favour of the tenant under Article 136
of the Constitution. Otherwise merely giving an
undertaking does not foreclose a tenant from availing of
any statutory remedies available to him by way of appeal
or revision or under the Constitution.
In this case, no undertaking was in fact given by the
appellants. The question of deriving any advantage by the
appellants on the basis of such undertaking therefore did
not arise at all. In fact the application under Article 136
was filed well within the period of limitation. The
preliminary objection raised by the respondent is
misconceived and is accordingly rejected.
On the merits, we are of the view that the decision
of the High Court cannot be sustained. The basic question
to be decided ( and which should have been decided by the
High Court) was whether the Rent Controller could have
determined his own jurisdiction finally not only with regard
to the applicability of the Act to the suit premises but also
with regard to title of the respondent to the premises.
As we have already noted it was and is the
appellants’ case that the suit property belonged to and still
belongs to a religious trust. This assertion forms the basis
not only of their contention that the Act does not apply to
the suit property but also of their denial of the respondent’s
title to it. In the case before us, the Rent Controller did
not address himself at all to this basic fact. Consequently,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 12
he did not express any view on the question of the
applicability of the Act to the suit premises. The Appellate
Authority no doubt filled in the lacuna by holding, albeit
prima facie, that the suit property belonged to the Trust
and that the Act did not apply to the suit premises. The
High Court erred in reversing this prima facie view.
The High Court in the impugned judgment has
found that the suit property was covered by the Trust
deeds in the following words: (wherein the appellants are
referred to as the respondents and the respondent as the
petitioner)
"Though the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner has initially raised
a dispute that the property in
question is not the subject matter
of the trust deed, after the
clarification by the learned senior
counsel for the respondents that
the property has been included in
the trust deed, the learned senior
counsel for the petitioner is not in a
position to substantiate his stand
with respect to the same."
The Trust deeds in question had been construed by
the Madras High Court itself while allowing the revision
application filed by the respondent against the order
granting leave to the appellants to sue under Section 92 in
respect of the suit property. It had been held that the Trust
deeds showed that "the endowment is a religious
endowment or religious charity within the meaning of the
Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments
Act, 1959".
Under the Endowments Act, the supervision and
administration of "religious endowments" are vested in a
hierarchy of officials consisting of the Commissioner, Joint
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant
Commissioner. The Endowments Act contains elaborate
provisions inter-alia for the maintenance and alienation of
immovable property of a religious endowment. Section 5 of
the Endowments Act provides for certain Acts not to apply
to Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments. The
excepted enactments include Section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. Section 108 of the Endowments Act
provides:
"Bar of suits in respect of
administration of management, or
religious institutions, etc. No suit or
other legal proceedings in respect of the
administration or management of a
religious institution or any other matter
or dispute for determining or deciding
which provision is made in this Act shall
be instituted in any Court of Law, except
under, and in conformity with, the
provisions of this Act".
In other words, by Section 5 and 108 of the
Endowments Act, the jurisdiction which would otherwise
have vested in the Civil Courts to grant relief under
Section 92 CPC in respect of public, religious or charitable
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 12
trusts has been taken away and vested in authorities
constituted under the Endowments Act.
Perhaps because of the special procedure to be
followed in respect of religious endowments, a notification
was issued by the State Government in exercise of powers
under Section 29 of the Act to exempt any building or
class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the
Act. The notification was issued on 16th August, 1976 and
reads as follows:
"(G.O. Ms No.2000, Home, August 16,
1976) No. II(2)/HO/4520/76.- In
exercise of the powers conferred by
Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
(Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960), and in
suppression of the Home Department
Notification No. II(2)/HO/3811/74,
dated August 12, 1974, published at
page 444 of Part II Section 2 of the
Tamil Nadu Government Gazette,
dated August 12, 1974, the
Government of Tamil Nadu hereby
exempts all the buildings owned by the
Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious
public trusts and public charitable
trusts from all the provisions of the
said Act."
The constitutional validity of this notification has
been upheld by this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar V.
State of Tamil Nadu and Another 1985 (1) SCC 290.
But, say the respondents, this did not mean that the suit
property was exempt from the provisions of the Act,
because there was nothing on record to show that the
Trust created by Venkata Naicker was a Public Trust within
the meaning of the exemption notification. The submission
is unacceptable. There was on record the two Trust deeds
as also the earlier decision intra-partes on the effect and
scope of the deeds. Since the High Court had, on a
construction of the Trust deeds, held that the Trust was a
"religious endowment" or "religious charity", within the
meaning of the Endowments Act, it cannot be said without
more having regard to the definition of those words in the
Endowments Act, that the claim of the appellants to be
covered by the said exemption, notification was patently
wrong or unfounded.
’Religious endowment’ has been defined in Section
6(17) of the Endowments Act, as follows:
"’Religious endowment’ or ’endowment’
means all property belonging to or
given or endowed for the support of
maths or temples, or given or endowed
for the performance of any service or
charity of a public nature connected
therewith or of any other religious
charity; and includes the institution
concerned and also the premises
thereof; but does not include gifts of
property made as personal gifts to the
archakas, service-holders or other
employees of a religious institution."
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 12
"Religious charity" has been defined in Section
6(16) as:
"religious charity" means a public
charity associated with a Hindu
festival or observance of a religious
character, whether it be connected
with a math or temple or not"
In the judgment impugned before us, the High
Court relying upon three decisions came to the conclusion
that in the earlier decision, no issue had been raised and
therefore no decision had been taken with regard to the
nature of the Trust so as to operate as res judicata
between the parties. According to the High Court:
"The issue raised in the decision in
1992-I-MLJ-109 (supra) is only as to
whether the respondents are entitled
for leave to file the suit, and that was
rejected, and the apex court also
confirmed the said order and so it
cannot be said that the learned Judge
has decided as to whether the trust in
question is a public trust or not".
This conclusion proceeds on a misreading of the
earlier decision. In the revision application, it was the
respondent who had specifically raised the issue that the
Trust was covered by the Endowments Act and, therefore,
Section 92 CPC did not apply. The High Court accepted this
submission. The High Court was of the view that there was
no necessity for any other evidence to be led for the
purpose of deciding the character of the Trust as it was a
pure question of law which depended on the terms of the
Trust deed. It was because the High Court came to the
conclusion that the Trust was a religious endowment or
religious charity within the meaning of the Endowments Act
that it dismissed the application filed by the appellants for
leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
fact, the only basis for rejecting leave under Section 92 CPC
was that the Trust documents created a ’religious
endowment’ or ’religious charity’ within the meaning of
Endowments Act and, therefore, the provisions of the
Endowments Act and not Section 92 of the CPC would
apply. The decision on the construction of the deeds of
Trust is res adjudicata and binds the parties. The three
decisions referred to by the High Court for arriving at a
contrary conclusion are inapposite and do not support the
conclusion reached by the High Court. The first was a
decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court on Article 141 of the Constitution . The second was
the minority view expressed at paragraph 55 of the Report
and the third was not a decision on the principles of res
judicata at all.
In any event and at the very least, the earlier
decision of the High Court on the construction of the Trust
deeds could be said to have established a real possibility of
the suit property being covered by the exemption
notification and, therefore, outside the ken of the Rent
Controller. However, it is also not for us in this appeal to
decide the issue as to the applicability of the Act to the suit
property finally. It is sufficient for the purposes of allowing
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 12
the appeal on this issue to hold that there was prima facie
support for the stand taken by the appellants in the form of
the unimpeached documents relating to creation of a Trust,
the admitted inclusion of the suit property in those
documents and the unchallenged decision intra-partes that
the suit property was part of a religious endowment or
religious charity within the meaning of the Endowments Act.
Our decision on the second and third questions
raised by the appellants relating to the denial of the
respondent’s title to the suit property under Section 10
(2)(vii) of the Act follows to a large extent from the
discussion in the previous paragraphs. If the suit property
was covered by the Trust deeds, as the High Court itself has
held, the next step would necessarily be to find out how
the suit property came to be in the hands of Gowthaman.
What the appellants were challenging was not only the
immediate title of the respondent but also the title of his
predecessor-in-interest, Gowthaman, to the suit property.
This they were entitled to do without offending Section
10(2)vii).
This Court has recently held that Section 10(2)(vii)
is based on "the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116
of the Evidence Act which estops the tenant from denying
the title of the landlord at the commencement of the
tenancy and the estoppel continues to operate so long as
the tenant does not surrender possession over the tenancy
premises to the landlord who inducted him in possession.
The tenant is not estopped from denying the title of the
landlord if it comes to an end subsequent to the creation of
the tenancy nor is he estopped from questioning the
derivative title of a transferee of his landlord" .
(Emphasis added)
It is nobody’s case that the appellants were
inducted by Gowthaman from whom the respondent
derived his interest in the property. The High Court noted
that "the rent receipts were given originally in the name of
E. Venkata Naicker Trust, Erode/E.V. Krishasami Sons
(management)". Therefore, the appellants were inducted
as tenants by the Trust. If the suit property was part of the
Trust, the appellants could validly raise the questions viz.
how did the property come to be transferred by the Trust
to Gowthaman? What was the validity of the transfer, if
any? What was the nature of the interest which
Gowthaman had in the suit property? Was it qua trustee or
qua owner? If it was that of a trustee, could he have,
legally and in terms of the Trust deed, transferred the suit
property to the respondent? Yet the Rent Controller
refused to go into any of these questions although they
were squarely raised by the appellants before him. Instead
he decided the title of Gowthaman on the basis of a
partition deed between the heirs of Venkata Naicker and
rent receipts granted to the appellants by Gowthaman as
proprietor. The Rent Controller could have only decided (i)
whether there was a dispute regarding the landlord’s title
raised by the tenant and (ii) whether the dispute was bona-
fide the bona fides being established prima facie, by
evidence in support of the tenant’s stand. The Rent
Controller could not have ignored the questions relating to
the derivative title of the respondent. He could not have
finally decided the issue of title of the respondent to the
suit property, nor could he have, on that basis, find that
the appellants’ denial of the respondents title not bonafide.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 12
"To operate against the tenant as proving a ground for
eviction under Section 10 of the Act, a mere denial of the
title of the landlord is not enough; such denial has to be
"not bona fide". "Not bona fide" would mean absence of
good faith or non-genuineness of the tenant’s plea".
The High Court upheld the title of the respondent on
the basis of the definition of "landlord" in the Act which
reads:
" ’landlord’ includes the person who is
receiving or is entitled to receive the
rent of a building, whether on his own
account or on behalf of another or on
behalf of himself and others or as
agent, trustee, executor, administrator,
receiver or guardian or who would so
receive the rent or be entitled to
receive the rent if the building were let
to a tenant.’
The impugned judgment is erroneous. It failed to
consider that the appellants had denied the derivative
title of the respondent and that this would not afford a
ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vii) of the Act.
The High Court also failed to examine the issue from the
perspective and from within the confines of the Rent
Controller’s limited jurisdiction.
The High Court found that:
"admittedly, from 1984, accepting the
said Gowthaman as the proprietor of
the property the rent has been paid"
and therefore came to the conclusion that:
"In view of the abovesaid specific
definition under the said act, the said
Gowthaman either as a person who is
entitled to receive the rent or as the
trustee, should be construed as the
landlord, and he issued the notice to
the tenants to pay the rent to the
petitioner, and so notwithstanding the
sale in favour of the petitioner in
respect of the property in question,
the petitioner should be construed as
the landlord as he has been
authorised to receive the rent by a
notice dated 18.7.1988 issued to the
tenants by the said Gowthaman, and
thereby he is entitled to maintain the
eviction petition in the capacity as
landlord".
The High Court’s reasoning was far removed from
the pleadings of the respondent. The respondent had
claimed that Gowthaman was the absolute owner of the
suit property and that such absolute interest had been
purchased by the respondent. Given this pleading the
respondent could not be allowed to set up a different case
and take shelter behind the definition of ’landlord’ in the
Act. The definition of ’landlord’ is an enabling provision in
the sense that it enables persons who are not the owners
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 12
to ask for eviction under the Act. But it does not mean
that a person who has claimed to be the landlord qua
owner can jettison his case as pleaded in his eviction
petition and establish his claim on the basis that he was
otherwise entitled to claim as landlord of the suit
premises. As held in M/s Trojan & Co. V. RM
N.N.Nagappa Chettiar. "It is well settled that the
decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the
pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has
to be found".
To sum up: we hold that there was a bona fide
dispute as to title raised by the appellants and, therefore,
the Rent Controller did not have jurisdiction to hear and
finally adjudicate upon the application filed by the
respondent before it. However we clarify that this finding
is limited to the issue of the Rent Controller’s jurisdiction
and shall not preclude the respondent from approaching
a competent Civil Court for determination of the issue
finally and no observations made in this judgment will
prejudice the trial of this or any other issue that the
respondent may raise on merits. Subject to this
observation, for all the reasons stated earlier, we set aside
the impugned decision of the High Court and allow the
appeal. There will be no order as to costs.
J.
(R.C. Lahoti)
..J.
(Ruma Pal)
May 8, 2002