POONAM DEVI vs. ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 06-03-2020

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).1836 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP (C) No(s).33445 of 2014) POONAM DEVI AND OTHERS            ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The appellants are the legal heirs of the deceased. They were granted compensation of Rs.4,45,420/­ with interest at the rate of 12 per cent by the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation Act from the date of accident up to the date of deposit in addition to a penalty   imposed   on   the   employer   under   Section   4A(3)(b)   of   the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter called “the Act”). The   High   Court   on   09.05.2014   has   allowed   the   appeal   of   the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date: 2020.03.07 12:15:25 IST Reason: 1 respondent holding that the death occurred during the course of employment but did not arise out of the employment.  2.  The   deceased   was   aged   21   years,   in   the   employment   of respondent   no.2   (since   deleted),   and   was   driving   her   TATA   407 vehicle bearing registration No.UP 15P 1689 on 11.06.2003 from Ambala to Meerut, a distance of approximately 200 Kms.  At about 12.30 PM, when he approached the bridge near village Fatehpur, the deceased went to the Yamuna canal to fetch water and also to have a bath.  Unfortunately, he slipped into the canal and died. The vehicle   was   insured   with   the   respondent   Insurance   Company. P.W.2, who was standing near the bridge, deposed that the deceased had gone to fetch water in a can along with the cleaner who tried to save   him,   but   both   slipped   into   the   canal.     The   Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner by order dated 12.12.2005 allowed the claim as aforesaid. 3. The High Court in appeal by the Insurance Company held that the deceased may have died during the course of the employment but death did not arise out of the employment, as bathing in the 2 canal was not incidental to the employment but was at the peril of the workman.  There was no casual connection between the death of the workman and his employment. He had gone to fetch water for personal consumption and it was not his case that the truck was over heated. 4. Mr.   Vikas   Bhadana,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants, submitted that there was a causal connection of the death with the employment.  In the extreme heat of the month of June at noon, a presumption would arise that the deceased  had gone to the canal to fetch water not only to cool the truck but also himself to ensure a proper and safe journey of the vehicle belonging to the employer and his own safety.   Reliance was placed on   Leela Bai and anr. vs. Seema Chouhan and anr.,  (2019) 4 SCC 325. 5.  Mr. Ajay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent opposing the appeal, submitted that the High Court has rightly held that there was no casual connection between the death of the deceased with the employment.  Merely because death may have occurred in 3 the course of the employment will not suffice unless it is established that it was incidental and arose out of the employment.   Reliance was placed on   Malikarjuna G. Hiremath vs. Branch Manager, , (2009) 13 Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another SCC 405. 6. We have considered the submission on behalf of the parties and have also perused the impugned orders as also the case law cited before us. 7. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (now christened as “Employee’s   Compensation   Act,   1923”)   is   a   piece   of   socially beneficial   legislation.     The   provisions   will   therefore   have   to   be interpreted in a manner to advance the purpose of the legislation, rather than to stultify it.   In case of a direct conflict, when no reconciliation is possible, the statutory provision will prevail only then. 4 8. Relevant to the discussion is Section 3 of the Act. The relevant extract reads as follows: “3. Employer' s liability for compensation.­ (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:                                  XXXX” 9. In  , (2014) 14 Manju Sarkar & Ors. vs. Mabish Miah & Ors. SCC   21,   the   deceased   was   driving   the   employer’s   truck   from Agartala to Churaibari FCI godown.  When he reached near Dharam Nagar,   he   got   down   to   make   arrangements   for   repairing   some mechanical problems in the truck when he was hit on the road by another vehicle and died in the hospital.  Applying the principle of notional extension, it was held that death occurred in the course of employment relying upon   B.E.S.T. Undertaking vs. Agnes,   AIR 1964 SC 193, at paragraph 12
“UnderSection 3(1)of the Act the injury must be
caused to the workman by an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment. The
question, when does an employment begin and
when does it cease, depends upon the facts of
each case. But the Courts have agreed that the
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employment does not necessarily end when the
“down tool” signal is given or when the workman
leaves the actual workshop where he is working.
There is a notional extension at both the entry
and exit by time and space. The scope of such
extension must necessarily depend on the
circumstances of a given case. As employment
may end or may begin not only when the
employee begins to work or leaves his tools but
also when he used the means of access and,
egress to and from the place of employment.”
10. More recently in  Daya Kishan Joshi & Anr. vs. Dynemech , (2018) 11 SCC 642, the deceased was employed Systems Pvt. Ltd. as   an   engineer   for   promoting   sales   and   installation   of   products which required him to move around in the field.   While returning from field work, he met with an accident resulting in death.  Holding that his being on the road related to the nature of his duties, not only the injury was caused during the currency of the employment but also arose out of the employment. 11. Coming to the facts of the present case, the deceased was driving   the   truck   of   respondent   no.2   from   Ambala   to   Meerut. Indisputably he was in the course of his employment.  We can take judicial   notice   of   the   fact   that   considering   the   manufacturer’s 6 specification, the cabin of the truck was not air conditioned and would have been a baking oven in the middle of the afternoon in the sultry   monsoon   heat   of   June   2003,   when   the   temperature   was 0 touching 42.6 C in Yamunagar (Haryana) (source: weatheronline.in). It was a compulsion for the deceased to stay fresh and alert not only to protect the truck of respondent no.2 from damage but also to ensure a smooth journey and protect his own life by safe driving. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the possibility of the truck   also   requiring   water   to   prevent   overheating   cannot   be completely ruled out.   In these circumstances, can it be said that the act of the deceased in going to the canal to fetch water in a can for the truck and to refresh himself by a bath before continuing the journey was not incidental to the employment?  Every action of the driver of a truck to ensure the safety of the truck belonging to the employer and to ensure his own safety by a safe journey for himself has to be considered as incidental to the employment by extension of the notional employment theory.  A truck driver who would not keep himself fresh to drive in such heat would be a potential danger to others on the road by reason of any bonafide errors of judgement 7 by reason of the heat. The theory of notional extension noticed in the   Agnes   (supra) and followed in   Leela Bai   (supra) is extracted hereunder:
“9. In the facts of the present case and the nature
of evidence, there was a clear nexus between the
accident and the employment to apply the doctrine
of “notional extension” of the employment
considered in Agnes (supra) as follows:
“…It is now well­settled, however, that this is
subject to the theory of notional extension of the
employer’s premises so as to include an area
which the workman passes and repasses in
going to and in leaving the actual place of work.
There may be some reasonable extension in both
time and place and a workman may be regarded
as in the course of his employment even though
he had not reached or had left his employer’s
premises. The facts and circumstances of each
case will have to be examined very carefully in
order to determine whether the accident arose
out of and in the course of the employment of a
workman, keeping in view at all time this theory
of notional extension.”
12. In     (supra),   the   deceased   having   completed   his Leela   Bai journey as a driver stayed back on the roof of the bus to ensure early scheduled departure the next morning by not going home. While he was coming down the roof of the bus he slipped and died. It was held at paragraph 7 as follows: 8 “7.   In  the   facts  of   the  case,  and   the   evidence available,   it   is   evident   that   the   deceased   was present at the bus terminal and remained with the   bus   even   after   arrival   from   Indore   not   by choice,   but   by   compulsion   and   necessity, because of the nature of his duties. The route timings of the bus required the deceased to be readily   available   with   the   bus   so   that   the passenger service being provided by Respondent 1 remained efficient and was not affected. If the deceased would have gone home every day after parking the bus and returned the next morning, the   efficiency   of   the   timing   of   the   bus   service facility to the travelling public would definitely have been affected, dependent on the arrival of the deceased at the bus­stand from his house. Naturally   that   would   bring   an   element   of uncertainty in the departure schedule of the bus and   efficiency   of   the   service   to   the   travelling public   could   be   compromised.   Adherence   to schedule by the deceased would naturally enure to the benefit of Respondent 1 by enhancement of   income   because   of   timely   service.   It   is   not without reason that the deceased would not go home   for   weeks   as   deposed   by   the   appellant. Merely because the deceased was coming down the roof of the bus after having his meal, cannot be   considered   in   isolation   and   interpreted   so myopically   to   hold   that   he   was   off   duty   and therefore would not be entitled to compensation.” 13. We see no reason why the application of the theory of notional extension will therefore not apply in the facts of the present case also. 9 14. Malikarjuna  (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts as the deceased   had   completed   his   journey   from   Siraguppa   to   the Gurugunta Angreshwar temple, after which he went to the pond and while taking a bath slipped and drowned. The case is completely distinguishable on its own facts. 15. We,   therefore,   find   the   order   of   the   High   Court   to   be unsustainable.     It   is   set   aside.     The   order   of   the   Workmen’s Compensation  Commissioner dated 12.12.2005 is restored.   The payments in terms of the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner   be   made  to  the   appellants   within  a  period  of six weeks   from   today.     Since   respondent   no.2   stands   deleted,   the question of payment of penalty by her does not arise. 16.   The appeal is allowed. .……………………….J.   (Ashok Bhushan)   ………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   New Delhi, March 06, 2020. 10