K. LAKSHIMINARAYANAN vs. UNION OF INDIA

1 REPORTABLE    THE IN     SUPREME     COURT     OF    INDIA   CIVIL   APPELLATE     JURISDICTION   CIVIL   APPEAL     NO.11887      Of    2018  (arising out of SLP (C) No. 8249 of 2018) K. LAKSHMINARAYANAN           ...APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR.    ...RESPONDENT(S)  WITH   CIVIL   APPEAL     NO.11888       Of    2018  (arising out of SLP (C) No. 8224 of 2018) S. DHANALAKSHMI    ...APPELLANT(S)   VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.    ...RESPONDENT(S)  J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T   ASHOK   BHUSHAN,J. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date: 2019.03.07 15:33:26 IST Reason: Leave granted.  These   two   appeals   have   been   filed   against   the   common 2 judgment of Madras High Court dated 22.03.2018 by which the writ   petitions   filed   by   the   appellants   questioning   the nominations   made   by   the   Central   Government   in   exercise   of power   under   Section   3(3)   of   the   Government   of   Union Territories   Act,   1963   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “Act, 1963”),   to   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   Union   Territory   of Puducherry has been dismissed.  2. The   background   facts   leading   to   filing   of   the   writ petitions giving rise to these appeals are as follows:­ 2.1 Part VIII of the Constitution of India dealing with the   Union   Territories   was   amended   by   Constitution (Fourteenth   Amendment)   Act,   1962   by   inserting Article 239A, which provides for “creation of local Legislatures   or   Council   of   Ministers   or   both   for certain Union  Territories.”    Article  239A  provided that  Parliament,  may  by law,  create for the Union Territory of Pondicherry, a body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory, or a Council of Ministers, or both with such constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law.   After the above Constitutional amendment 3 inserting   Article   239A,   the   Parliament   enacted Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 to provide for   Legislative   Assembly   and   Council   of   Ministers for certain Union Territories and for certain other matters.  2.2 At the time of commencement of Act, 1963, there were large number of Union Territories, which were to be governed by the Act, 1963.  Gradually, several Union Territories were upgraded to the status of a State and as on date, the definition of Union Territories under Section 2(h) defines “Union Territory” as the Union   Territory   of   Puducherry.     Section   3   of   the Act,   1963   provides   for   Legislative   Assemblies   for Union territories and their composition.   According to Section 3(2), the total number of seats in the Legislative   Assembly   of   the   Union   territory   to   be filled by persons chosen by direct election shall be thirty   and   as   per   Section   3(3),   the   Central Government may nominate not more than three persons, not being persons in the service of Government, to be members of the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory.  2.3 Election for filling thirty seats in the Legislative 4 Assembly  of Puducherry   was  held  in  the  year  2016. Indian National Congress, who bagged fifteen out of thirty seats with support of DMK and one independent candidate  has  formed  the  Government in  Puducherry. Writ   Petition   (C)   No.   16275   of   2017   as   K. Lakshminarayanan Vs. Union of India & Anr. was filed in   the   Madras   High   Court   praying   for   a   writ   of mandamus   forbearing   the   respondents   from   in   any manner nominating or filling up the nominated seats of  Members  for  the  Puducherry  Legislative  Assembly except   with   the   consultation   and   choice   of   the elected Council of Ministers.  The writ petition was filed   on   27.06.2017.     The   Government   of   India, Ministry of Home Affairs had issued a notification on   23.06.2017   nominating   Shri   V.   Saminathan,   Shri K.G. Shankar and Shri S. Selvaganabathy as members of the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory of   Puducherry.   An   application   for   amendment   was filed in the writ petition praying for quashing the notification   dated   23.06.2017.     Another   Writ Petition (C) No. 18788 of 2017 – S. Dhanalakshmi Vs. Union of India & Ors. was filed in the Madras High Court praying for following reliefs:­ 5 “Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the   records   on   the   file   of   the   third respondent   relating   to   the   impugned Notification   bearing   Ref.   No. F.No.U­11012/1/2014­UTL dated 23­06­2017 and quash   the   same   and   consequently   direct   the respondents 1 to 3 to nominate the members to the Puducherry Legislative Assembly only with the   consultation   and   choice   of   the   elected Council of Ministers and pass such further or other orders and thus render justice”. 2.4 On   13.11.2017,   the   Secretary   of   Puducherry Legislative   Assembly   communicated   the   decision   of the   Speaker   of   the   Legislative   Assembly   that   the nominated members could not be recognised as members of   the   Assembly,   having   been   appointed   in contravention of the Constitution and the Act, 1963. The communication dated 13.11.2017 was challenged by three   nominated   members   by   filing   three   separate writ petitions being Writ Petition Nos. 29591, 29592 and   29593   of   2017.     All   the   writ   petitions,   i.e. Writ Petition No. 16275 of 2017, Writ Petition No. 18788  of  2017  and  Writ  Petitions  No.  29591, 29592 and 29593 of 2017 were heard and decided by Division Bench of Madras High Court vide its judgment dated 22.03.2018.    The  Writ  Petition  Nos. 16275  of  2017 and 18788 of 2017 challenging the notification dated 6 23.06.2017   has   been   dismissed,   whereas   the   Writ Petition   Nos.   29591,   29592   and   29593   have   been allowed.  Two separate but concurring judgments have been   delivered   by   Division   Bench   of   Madras   High Court.   Operative portion of the judgment delivered by   Justice   M.   Sundar,   with   which   judgment,   Chief Justice   expressed   absolute   agreement,   was   to   the following effect:­ “W.P. No. 16275 of 2017 filed by the Whip and W.P.   No.   18788   of   2017   filed   by   PIL petitioner   are   dismissed.     Writ   petitions, being W.P. Nos. 29591 to 29593 of 2017 filed by nominated MLAs are allowed.   Considering the nature of the matter and in the light of the   trajectory   this   litigation   has   taken, there   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs. Consequently,   connected   miscellaneous petitions are closed.” 2.5 Against   the   aforesaid   Division   Bench   judgment   of Madras High Court dated 22.03.2018, only two appeals have   been   filed,   one   by   K.   Lakshminarayanan   and other by S. Dhanalakshmi challenging the judgment of Division Bench by which Writ Petition No. 16275 of 2017 has been dismissed and another appeal has been filed against the judgment of Division Bench in Writ Petition  No.  18788  of  2017  by  which writ  petition was dismissed.   In so far as judgment of Division 7 Bench in Writ Petitions Nos. 29591, 29592 and 29593 of   2017   filed   by   three   nominated   MLAs,   by   which their   writ   petitions   were   allowed   quashing   the decision of the Speaker dated 23.11.2017, no appeals have been filed.                3. We have heard Shri Kapil Sibal and Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants.  We have heard Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for the Union of India.  Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel has been heard for the respondents. 4. Shri Kapil Sibal challenging the nominations made by the Central Government has raised various submissions.  Shri Sibal submits that the Government of Puducherry has vital interest in   the   constitution   of   the   Assembly,   since   it   enjoys   the confidence   of   Legislative   Assembly   and   accountable   to   the people.  The Government of Puducherry cannot be a stranger in the   nominations   made   to   the   Assembly.     He   submits   that nominations of the members of the Assembly must emanate from the Government of Puducherry and should have concurrence of the Government.   It was open for the Central Government to adopt   any   fair   procedure   for   nominating   the   members.     The nominees   could   have   been   originated   from   Government   of 8 Puducherry.  The President could have asked the names from the Government   of   Puducherry.     He   submits   that   let   this   Court decide   on   a   valid   procedure,   which   is   to   be   adopted   while making nominations by Central Government in the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry.   He further submits that there has been   at   least   six   occasions   when   elected   Government   of Puducherry was consulted before nominating the members in the Legislative Assembly by the Central Government.  In the year 2001,   when   Lieutenant   Governor   without   consulting   the Government of Puducherry forwarded the names for nomination to the   Assembly,   objection   was   raised   by   the   Government   of Puducherry   and   the   proposed   list   of   nominated   members   was referred   back   to   the   Lieutenant   Governor   for   lack   of consultation   with   the   elected   Government.     He   submits   that earlier   incidents   when   the   Government   of   Puducherry   was consulted   before   nomination   has   taken   shape   of   a constitutional   convention,   which   is   nothing   but   a constitutional   law   to   be   followed   by   all   concerned.     He submits that while making nominations vide notification dated 23.06.2017, the above constitutional convention has not been followed,   which   renders   the   nomination   illegal   and unsustainable.     He   further   submits   that   in   the   counter affidavit filed by the Union of India before the High Court, 9 it   was   stated   that   Lieutenant   Governor   has   not   sent   any nominations to the Central Government and Central Government on its own has made nominations under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963.  Shri Kapil Sibal submits that the expression “Central Government” as occurring in Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963 has not been correctly understood by the High Court.  He submits that according to the definition given under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Central Government means the President and include in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administrator thereof.  It is submitted that   the   President   has   framed   Rules   of   Business   of   the Government   of   Puducherry,   1963,   Rule   4   of   which   Rules   is relevant for the present case.   It is submitted that as per the Business Rules, it is the administrator, who was required to make nominations that too after consultation of Council of Ministers.  Shri Sibal refers to Rule 4(2) and Rule 48 of the Business Rules to buttress his submission.   It is submitted that the nomination to Legislative Assembly is fully covered by   expression   “remaining   business   of   the   Government”   as occurring   in   Rule   4(2).     Therefore,   Rule   4(2)   read   with Chapter IV of the Rules of Business, cover the entire gamut of executive power exercisable by the President under Article 239 of   the   Constitution.     Since   Section   3(3)   of   the   Act,   1963 10 refers to “Central Government”, thereby indicating exercise of power in terms of Article 239 of the Constitution, Rule 4(2) read   with   Chapter   IV   of   the   Rules   of   Business   of   the Government of Puducherry would apply.  Therefore, the power to nominate members under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963 has to necessarily   involve   the   administrator   acting   in   accordance with Chapter IV. 5. Shri Sibal further submits that in event interpretation is accepted that the Government of Puducherry has no role to play in the nominations of members to Legislative Assembly, it is de­establishing cooperative federalism.   It is submitted that federalism has been recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution   and   it   is   Government,   which   is   democratically formed and reflect the will of the people and responsible to the Legislature, who has to initiate and concur in the members to   be   nominated   in   the   Legislative   Assembly.     In   the representative democracy, the Government is not a stranger to the process of nomination. One more submission which has been pressed by Shri Sibal is that even though nominated members may have right to vote in the proceedings of Assembly there are two exceptions to such right of vote, i.e., (i) voting on budget, and (ii) voting on no­confidence motion against the Government. He submits that nominated members shall have no 11 right   to   vote   in   above   two   subjects.   Shri   Kapil   Sibal   has further very candidly in his submission, stated that he is not pursuing the challenge to Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963 nor he is carrying further the submission made before the High Court on   the   ground   of   eligibility   of   members,   who   have   been nominated in the Legislative Assembly.  Shri Sibal has placed reliance on various judgments of this Court, which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail.   6. Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General replying the submissions of Shri Sibal submits that the Union Territory is   a   Territory   of   a   Union   in   which   Central   Government   can nominate   unless   the   Constitution   or   law   provides   for   any consultation   of   Government   of   Puducherry.     According   to Article 239, it is the President, who has to administer Union Territory.     Lieutenant   Governor,   who   is   an   administrator appointed by the President to administer the Union Territory of Puducherry, govern the Union Territory as per instructions and directions of the President.  Neither Lieutenant Governor nor Legislative Assembly can assert themselves in governing the   Union   Territory.     The   Act,   1963   is   a   law   framed   by Parliament   in   exercise   of   power   under   Article   239A   of   the constitution.   The   powers   and   functions   of   the   Legislative Assembly   are   such   as   specified   in   the   Act,   1963.     The 12 provision empowering nominations in the Legislative Assembly by the Central Government in no manner affect the principle of federalism or cooperative federalism.   The Act, 1963 or any Constitutional provision does not provide for any consultation of   Government   of   Puducherry   for   making   nomination   in   the Legislative   Assembly   by   the   Central   Government.     There   are large number of Constitutional provisions, which provide for consultation, whereas no Constitutional provision provide for consultation of Government of Puducherry in making nomination by Central Government nor any such right of consultation, is decipherable   from   the   Act,   1963.     Reading   consultation   in nomination shall upset the Constitutional balance.  Appellants want to read the word “consultation” in Section 3(3) of Act, 1963,   which   has   been   consciously   withheld.     When   the provisions   of   Act,   1963   indicate   a   primacy   of   Central Government, the submission that nomination should be made with the   concurrence   of   Government   of   Puducherry   is   wholly unfounded.     The   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry   is   wholly subservient to the President. 7. Shri K.K.  Venugopal   further   submits   that   Council   of Ministers of Government of Puducherry is a Agency devised by President of India. Section 50 of Act, 1963 gives absolute power   to   the   President   to   issue   any   direction   to   the 13 Administrator and his Council of Ministers. It is submitted that there is no kind of any limit in the extent of power as envisaged under Section 50. Shri Venugopal referred to various other   statutes   where   provisions   envisaged   for   issuing directions   by   Central   Government   or   other   authorities.   He submits that in various statutory provisions, directions are hedged   by   several   conditions   and   in   some   of   the   statutes consultation is also envisaged. 8. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for nominated MLAs submits that the Constitution itself provides that   Legislative   Assembly   of   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry shall be partly elected and partly nominated and Parliament enacted   Act,   1963,   for   both   the   elected   and   non­elected members. He further submits that Section 14 of the Act, 1963 which   deals   with   disqualification   of   members,   does   not contemplate that if nomination is made without consultation of Legislative Assembly, the members will be disqualified. Hence, non­consultation   with   Council   of   Ministers   of   Legislative Assembly cannot be treated to be as any disqualification. 9. Shri   Ranjit   Kumar   further   submits   that   Section   33 provides that the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory may   make   rules   for   regulating   and   conducting   its   business. 14 Similarly, Section 46 provides that the President shall make the rules for allocation of business to the Ministers and for the more convenient transaction of business. He submits that in both the rules framed under Act, 1963 as well as Section 36, there is  no rule providing consultation of the Council of Ministers or Chief Minister before making any nomination  in the Legislative Assembly by the Central Government. 10. He further submits that Legislative Assembly has no power to   make   any   law   to   regulate   nomination   to   be   made   in   the Assembly. It is only the Parliament who is empowered to make law   under   Article   239A   regulating   constitution   of   the Legislative Assembly. When the legislative power is not there with the Union Territory of Puducherry, no executive power can be exercised by the Legislative Assembly of the Puducherry. He further submits that power of nomination which shall flow from law   making   power   unless   Article   239A   and   legislative   power will be co­extensive with the executive power. 11. Shri Kapil Sibal in his rejoinder submission replying the submissions of learned Attorney General as well as Shri Ranjit Kumar,   submits   that   the   appellants   are   questioning   the procedure   adopted   by   Central   Government   for   nomination.   He further reiterates that Central Government under Section 3(3) 15 of Act, 1963 is  to mean the President who in turn delegated his   power   to   its   Administrator,   thus,   nomination   has   to emanate from Administrator who is to Act on the advise of the Council of Ministers. He submits that the Rules of Business framed   by   the   President   are   Rules   of   Business   both   under Article 239 as well as under Section 44 and under Section 46 of   the   Act,   1963,   hence,   the   Rules   of   Business   relate   to entire executive functions of the Government of Puducherry. 12. Learned   counsel   for   the   parties   in   support   of   their respective   submissions   have   relied   on   various   judgments   of this Court which shall be referred to while considering the submission in detail. 13. From   the   submissions   raised   by   the   learned   for   the parties and the materials on record following are the main issues which arise for consideration in these appeals: (1) Whether   the   expression   “Central   Government”   as occurring   in   Section   3(3)   of   the   1963   Act   means   the Administrator, hence, it is the Administrator who has to exercise the power of nomination that too on the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers of the Union Territory of Puducherry? (2) Whether the nomination in the Legislative Assembly of the Puducherry is the business of the Government which has 16 to be transacted in accordance with Rule 4 sub­Rule (2) read   with   Rule   48   of   the   Rules   of   Business   of   the Government   of   Puducherry,   1963.   As   per   which   Rule   the Administrator  was  required   to  consult  either   Council   of Ministers   or   Chief   Minister   before   discharging   his functions under Rule 4(2)? (3) Whether   nomination   by   Central   Government   in   the Legislative Assembly without concurrence of Government of Union   Territory   of   Puducherry   violates   principles   of Federalism and co­operative Federalism? (4) Whether   there   is   a   constitutional   convention   to consult   the   Government   of   Puducherry   before   making   any nomination by the Central Government on the strength of the   fact   that   on   six   earlier   occasions   when   the nominations   were   made,   the   Central   Government   has consulted   the   Government   of   Puducherry   before   making nominations? (5) Whether the Central Government while exercising its power   of   nomination   under   Section   3(3)   of   1963   Act   is obliged to consult the Council of Ministers/Chief Minister of   Government   of   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry   and   the nomination by Central Government can only be made with the concurrence of the Government of Puducherry? 17 (6) Whether recommendations made by the Madras High Court in so far as recommendations made in paragraph 5(iv) of the impugned judgment is concerned, are unsustainable and not in accordance with law? (7) Whether   the   nominated   members   in   the   Legislative Assembly shall have no voting right in two matters, i.e., (i)   budget   and   (ii)   no­   confidence   motion   against   the Government? Issue No.1 14. The submission made by Shri Sibal is that the expression “Central Government” used under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963 means the administrator.  In consequence, he contends that the power of nomination in the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry is to be exercised by the administrator on the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers of Union Territory of Puducherry. The   Act,   1963   does   not   define   the   expression   “Central Government”.  The provision of General Clauses Act, 1897 had to be looked into to find out the definition of the expression “Central   Government”.     Section   3(8)   of   the   General   Clauses Act, 1897 defines the expression “Central Government”.   The 18 relevant portion of Section 3(8) is as follows:­ “3(8) “Central Government” shall,­­ (a) ………… (b) in   relation   to   anything   done   or   to   be   done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,­­ (i)  …………… (ii) …………… (iii) in relation to the administration of a Union   territory,   the   administrator   thereof acting within scope of the authority given to him under article 239 of the Constitution; 15. In Section 3(8)(b) Central Government has been defined as to   “mean   the   President”.     The   next   phrase   used   after   the semi­colon is “and shall include”. The definition of Central Government   given   in   Section   3(8)   is   a   restrictive   and exhaustive   definition.     When   the   definition   uses   the   word “mean   the   President”,   the   clear   intention   is   that   Central Government   is   the   President,   the   next   phrase   “and   shall include   in   relation   to   the   administration   of   a   Union territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of   the   authority   given   to   him   under   article   239   of   the Constitution”   has   been   added   with   a   purpose   and   object. Article 239 of the Constitution provide that save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be 19 administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify.  As per definition of Section   3(8)(b)(iii)   administrator   shall   include   in   the definition   of   Central   Government   when   in   relation   to   the administration of a Union territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under article 239 of the Constitution.  Thus, the administrator will be Central Government when he acts within the scope of the authority given to him under article 239.  Under Article 239, Rules of Business have been framed as noticed above, which has been brought on record as Annexure P1 to Civil Appeal of K. Lakshminarayanan.  Executive functions of the administrator as contemplated by Rule 4(2) read with Rule 48 shall include a variety of the executive functions, which he is authorised to discharge.     The   executive   functions   may   include:   (i)   the business of executive functions in relation to the subjects on which   Legislative   Assembly   of   the   Union   Territory   of Puducherry   is   entitled   to   make   law;   (ii)   the   executive functions   entrusted   to   the   Government   of   Puducherry,   to   be exercised   in   the   name   of   the   administrator, entrusted/delegated   under   any   Parliamentary   law;   (iii) functions to be discharged by administrator under any special 20 or   general   order   issued   by   the   President   of   India;   (iv) functions   to   be   discharged   by   administrator   under   the instructions   issued   by   the   Central   Government   from   time   to time.   A perusal of the Rules of Business, which have been framed under Article 239 as well as Section 46 of the Act, 1963 does not expressly indicate that in so far as power of nomination   to   be   exercised   by   the   Central   government   under Section 3(3), the administrator or Government of Puducherry has been authorised or delegated any function in the above regard.  No order of the President or Central Government has been brought on the record on the basis of which it can be concluded   that   with   regard   to   right   of   a   nomination   to   be exercised by the Central Government under Section 3(3) of Act, 1963,   any   function   has   been   delegated,   authorised   or instructed to the administrator.   The definition of Central Government given under Section 3(8)(b)(iii), which means the President   cannot   be   given   a   go   bye   to   rely   on   the   next expression “shall include” the administrator.  The context of subject has to be looked into while finding out as to whether in context of Section 3(3), the Central government shall mean the President or the administrator. 16. This   Court   had   occasion   to   interpret   the   definition clause   in   Jagir   Singh   and   Others   Vs.   State   of   Bihar   and 21 Others, (1976) 2 SCC 942 .     In the above case, the Court was considering the definition of expression   “owner” as defined in Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service   Motor   Vehicles)   Act,   1961.     In   para   11   of   the judgment, the definition has been extracted, which is to the following effect:­ “ 11.   The expression “owner” is defined in the Bihar Act in Section 2(d) thereof as follows: “   ‘Owner’   means   the   owner   of   a   public service motor vehicle in respect of which a permit has been granted by a Regional or State Transport   Authority   under   the   provisions   of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and includes the holder   of   a   permit   under   the   said   Act   in respect of a public service motor vehicle or any   person   for   the   time   being   in   charge   of such vehicle or responsible for the management of the place of business of such owner.” 17. The definition of owner in the Bihar Act also used two expression, first ‘Owner’ means the owner of a public service motor vehicle and second it includes the holder of a permit under   the   said   Act   in   respect   of   a   public   service   motor vehicle or any person for the time being in charge of such vehicle   or   responsible   for   the   management   of   the   place   of business of such owner.  The provisions of Maharashtra Tax on Goods (Carried by Road) Act, 1962 and other Acts were also under consideration.  In Maharashtra Act, the “operator” means 22 any person whose name is entered in the permit as the permit holder or any person having the possession or control of such vehicle.  It was contended before the Court that words “or any person for the time being in charge of such vehicle” in the definition of “owner” indicate that the transport or booking agencies which would take the public service motor vehicle on hire would be owners within the definition of the word without being permit holders in respect of these public service motor vehicles.   The   contention   to   read   definition   in   particular manner was rejected by this Court.  In paragraph Nos. 19 and 21, following has been held:­ “19.   The   definition   of   “owner”   repels   the interpretation submitted by the petitioners that the definition means not only the owner who is the permit holder   but   also   a   booking   agency   which   may   be   in charge of the vehicle without being a permit holder. The entire accent in the definition of owner is on the   holder   of   a   permit   in   respect   of   the   public service   motor   vehicle.   It   is   the   permit   which entitles the holder to ply the vehicle. It is because the vehicle is being plied that the passengers and consignors of goods carried by that vehicle become liable to pay not only fare and freight to the owner but also tax thereon to the owner. The words “or any person for the time being in charge of such vehicle or   responsible   for   the   management   of   the   place   of business   of   such   owner”   indicate   that   the   permit holder will include any person who is in charge of such vehicle of the permit holder or any person who is   responsible   for   the   management   of   the   place   of business of such owner. The owner cannot escape the liability by stating that any person is for the time being   in   charge   of   such   vehicles,   and,   therefore, such person is the owner and not the permit holder. 23 21.  The definition of the term “owner” is exhaustive and  intended  to  extend  the  meaning  of the term  by including within its sweep bailee of a public carrier vehicle or any manager acting on behalf of the owner. The   intention   of   the   legislature   to   extend   the meaning  of  the  term  by  the  definition given  by  it will   be   frustrated   if   what   is   intended   to   be inclusive   is   interpreted   to   exclude   the   actual owner.” 18. It is further relevant to notice that definition clause in Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 begins with the expression   “In   this   Act,   and   in   all   Central   Acts   and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. Thus, all   definitions   given   under   Section   3   are   subject   “unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”.  Thus, the subject or context has to be looked into to apply the definition   given   in   Section   3(8)(b).     This   Court   in   Jagir Singh   (supra)   has   also   held   that   while   interpreting   the definition clause, the context, the collocation and the object of words relating to such matter has to be kept in mind while interpreting the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the word under a circumstance.  In paragraph No. 20 following has been laid down:­ “20.  The general rule of construction is not only to look at the words but to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such  matter and interpret the meaning according to 24 what would appear to be the meaning intended to be conveyed   by   the   use   of   the   words   under   the circumstances.   Sometimes   definition   clauses   create qualification by expressions like “unless the context otherwise   requires”;   or   “unless   the   contrary intention appears”; or “if not inconsistent with the context   or   subject­matter”.   “Parliament   would legislate to little purpose,” said Lord Macnaghten in Netherseal Co.   v.   Bourne (1889) 14 AC 228 , “if the objects of its care might supplement or undo the work of legislation by making a definition clause of their own. People cannot escape from the obligation of a statute by  putting a private  interpretation on its language.” The  courts will  always examine the real nature of the transaction by which it is sought to evade the tax.” 19. Another judgment of this Court in  Black Diamond Beverages and   Another   Vs.   Commercial   Tax   Officer,   Central   Section, Assessment Wing, Calcutta and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 458  is also relevant   in   the   present   context.     In   the   above   case,   this Court had occasion to consider the definition of “Sale price” as occurring in Section 2(d) of West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954.  The definition has been quoted in paragraph No.5 of the judgment, which is to the following effect:­ “5.   The  1954 Act generally  provides  for  levy of  a single­point  tax at the first stage on commodities notified under Section 25 of that Act. On the other hand, the 1941 Act is a general statute providing for multipoint   levy   of   sales   tax   on   commodities   not covered by the 1954 Act. Sub­clause ( d ) of Section 2 of the 1954 Act reads as follows: “2.   ( d )   ‘sale­price’   used   in   relation   to   a dealer   means   the   amount   of   the   money consideration   for   the   sale   of   notified commodities manufactured, made or processed by 25 him   in   West   Bengal,   or   brought   by   him   into West   Bengal   from   any   place   outside   West Bengal,   for   the   purpose   of   sale   in   West Bengal, less any sum allowed as cash discount according to trade practice, but  includes  any sum charged for containers or other materials for the packaging of notified commodities;” 20. The   above   definition   also   contain   two   expression   means and includes.   The first part of the definition defines the meaning of the word ‘sale­price’ as the amount of the   money consideration   for   the   sale.     This   Court   held   that interpretation of the first part of the definition in no way control or affect the other part of the definition and include other part.   In paragraph Nos. 7 and 8, following has been laid down:­   “7.   It is clear that the definition of “sale price” in   Section   2( d )   uses   the   words   “means”   and “includes”. The first part of the definition defines the  meaning  of the word “sale price” and must, in our view,   be   given   its   ordinary,   popular   or   natural meaning.   The   interpretation   thereof   is   in   no   way controlled   or   affected   by   the   second   part   which “includes”   certain   other   things   in   the   definition. This   is   a   well­settled   principle   of   construction. Craies on Statute Law  (7th Edn., 1.214) says: “An   interpretation   clause   which   extends   the meaning   of   a   word   does   not   take   away   its ordinary   meaning….   Lord   Selborne   said   in Robinson  v.  Barton­Eccles Local Board  AC at p. 801: ‘An interpretation clause of this kind is   not   meant   to   prevent   the   word 26 receiving   its   ordinary,   popular,   and natural   sense   whenever   that   would   be properly applicable, but to enable the word   as   used   in   the   Act   …   to   be applied to something to which it would not ordinarily be applicable.’ ” (emphasis supplied) Therefore,   the   inclusive   part   of   the   definition cannot prevent the main provision from receiving its natural meaning. 8.   In view of the above principle of construction, the  first part  of the definition  of  sale  price  in Section 2( d ) of the 1954 Act must be given its own meaning   and   the   respondent’s   counsel   is   therefore right in urging that the first part of Section 2( d ) which is similar to the first part of Section 2( p ) in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, must be given the same   meaning   given   to   similar   words   in   Hindustan Sugar Mills  v.  State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 271 . What   the   said   meaning   is   we   shall   consider separately.   If,   therefore,   by   virtue   of   Hindustan Sugar Mills case  the first part is to be interpreted as bringing within its natural meaning the “freight charges” then the contention for the appellants that like “packaging charges” these “freight charges” must have also been specifically included in Section 2( d ) cannot be accepted.” 21. Thus,   it   is   clear   that   the   definition   of   Central Government, which means the President is not controlled by the second expression “and shall include the administrator”.  The ordinary   or   popular   meaning   of   the   word   “the   President” occurring in Section 3(8)(b) has to be given and the second part of the definition shall not in any way control or affect the first part of the definition as observed above.   In the 27 definition of Central Government, an administrator shall be read when he has been authorised or delegated a particular function   under   the   circumstances   as   indicated   above.   No statutory   rules   or   any   delegation   has   been   referred   to   or brought on record under which the administrator is entitled or authorised to make nomination in the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory of Puducherry.  Thus, in the present case, the definition of Central Government, as occurring in Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963 has to be read as to mean the President and not the administrator.  The issue is answered accordingly. Issue No.2 22. Relying   on   Rule   4(2)   of   the   Rules   of   Business   of   the Government   of   Puducherry,   1963   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “Rules of Business”) read with Rule 48 it is contended that business of Government in the nominations in the Legislative Assembly   is   covered   by   Rule   4(2),   hence,   Administrator   is required to consult Council of Ministers or the Chief Minister before taking any decision. The Rules of Business have been framed by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by Article   239   and   the   proviso   to   Article   309   of   the Constitution, Section 46 of the Act, 1963 and all other powers 28 enabling   the   President   in   this   regard.   In   the   Rules   of Business,   Rule   2(f)   means:   “the   Government   of   Puducherry”. Rule 3 provides that the business of the Government shall be transacted in accordance with these Rules. Rule 4 on which reliance has been placed by  Kapil Sibal is to the following effect: “4. (1) The business of the Government in relation to matters with respect to which the Council is required under section 44 of the Act to aid and advise the Administrator in the exercise of his functions shall be   transacted   and   disposed   in   accordance   with   the provisions of Chapter III. (2) The remaining business of the Government shall be transacted   and   disposed   of   in   accordance   with   the provisions of Chapter IV. (3)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­rule (1) and sub­rule (2), prior reference in respect of the matters specified in chapter V shall be made to the   Central   Government   in   accordance   with   the provisions of that Chapter.” 23. Rule   4(1)   refers   to   the   business   of   the   Government   in relation   to   matters   with   respect   to   which   the   Council   is required under Section 44 of the Act to aid and advise the Administrator in exercise of his functions. Section 44(1) of the Act, 1963 is as follows: ― “44.   Council   of   Ministers . (1)   There   shall   be   a Council of Ministers in each Union territory with the Chief   Minister   at   the   head   to   aid   and   advise   the Administrator   in   the   exercise   of   his   functions   in relation   to   matters   with   respect   to   which   the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by or 29 under   this   Act   to   act   in   his   discretion   or   by   or under   any   law   to   exercise   any   judicial   or quasi­judicial functions:   Provided that, in case of difference of opinion between the Administrator and his Ministers on any matter,   the   Administrator   shall   refer   it   to   the President   for   decision   and   act   according   to   the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such   decision   it   shall   be   competent   for   the Administrator in any case where the matter is in his opinion so  urgent that  it is necessary for  him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary. a[ x x x x] b[ x x x x]” 24. Section   44(1)   relates   to   functions   “in   relation   to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory has power to make laws. There may be other functions of the Government of Puducherry which do not pertain to   functions   in   relation   to   matters   with   respect   to   which Legislative Assembly of Puducherry has power to make laws. For example,   under   any   Parliamentary   law   with   respect   to   which Legislative Assembly of Union Territory has no power to make laws,   any   power   delegated   to   the   State   Government   is authorised   or   delegated   under   the   Parliamentary   laws   to exercise any function. 25. Rule 4(2) obviously refers to “the remaining business of the Government”, which is not covered by Rule 4(1). Rule 48 of the Rules of Business refers to sub­(2) of Rule 4. Rule 48 is as follows: 30 “48. In regard to any matter referred to in sub­rule (2) of rule 4 and in respect of which no specific provisions has been made in the foregoing rules in this Chapter, the Administrator may, if he deems fit either   consult   his   Council   or   the   Chief   Minister, before   exercising   his   powers   or   discharging   his functions in respect of that matter.” 26. As   per   Rule   48   with   regard   to   matters   referred   to   in sub­rule (2) of Rule 4, the Administrator may, if he deems fit, either consult his Council or the Chief Minister, before exercising   of   his   powers   or   discharging   his   functions   in respect of that matter. But the question which needs to be answered for the present case is as to whether the nomination of   a   member   in   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   Puducherry   is covered by expression “remaining business of the Government”. The   Government   has   been   defined   in   Rule   2(f)   as   “the Government of Puducherry”. The Government occurring in Rule 4(2)   cannot   be   stretched   to   be   Central   Government.   When Section 3(3) of Act, 1963 empowers the Central Government to nominate   not   more   than   three   persons   to   the   Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory, it is the business of the Central Government to make nominations as per Parliamentary law. 27. The business of the Government as occurring in Rule 4 has to be business which under any law is to be performed by the 31 Government   of   Puducherry.   Article   239A   of   the   Constitution provides that Parliament may by law create a body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory or Council of Ministers or both with such Constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law. 28. The   expression   'law'   used   in   Article   239A(1)   is   a Parliamentary   law.   When   the   Constitution   expressly   provides that   it   is   the   Parliament   which   may   provide   by   law, constitution of Legislature for the Union Territory, it is the Parliament   alone   which   can   provide   for   constitution   of Legislative Assembly for Union Territory under the Act, 1963. Section   3   does   provide   for   constitution   of   Legislative Assembly for Union Territory with thirty members to be elected members   and   three   members   to   be   nominated   by   the   Central Government.   When   the   Parliamentary   law       as   envisaged   by Article   239A   provides   for   the   constitution   of   Legislative Assembly   of   the   Union   Territory   which   also   includes nomination,   the   said   constitution   which   also   includes nomination   can   not   be   the   business   of   the   Government   of Puducherry. The nominations of the members to the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry thus can never be covered by expression 'remaining business of the Government' as occurring in Rule 32 4(2). When Rule 4(2) itself is not attracted in reference to the   nomination   in   the   Legislative   Assembly,   there   is   no occasion of applicability of Rule 48 that is consultation with the   Council   of   Ministers   or   the   Chief   Minister   by   the Administrator.   We,   thus,   do   not   find   any   substance   in   the submission   of   Shri   Kapil   Sibal   that   nomination   in   the Legislative Assembly in the Puducherry is the business of the Government of Puducherry and is to be exercised in accordance with   Rule   4(2)   read   with   Rule   48.   The   nomination   in   the Legislative Assembly in the Puducherry is to be made by the Central Government by virtue of Article 239A read with Section 3(3) of the Act, 1963. 29. Article   77   of   the   Constitution   deals   with   “conduct   of business of the Government of India”. Article 77 sub­clause (3) provides that “The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India,   and   for   the   allocation   among   Ministers   of   the   said business”. In exercise of the power under Article 77(3) the President   has   made   Government   of   India   (Allocation   of Business) Rules, 1961 and the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961. Rule 2 and Rule 3 sub­rule (1) of Allocation of Business Rules which are relevant for this case are to the following effect: 33 "2. Allocation   of   Business   –   The   business   of   the Government   of   India   shall   be   transacted   in   the Ministries,   Departments,   Secretaries   and   Officers specified in the First Schedule to these rules (all of   which   are   hereinafter   referred   to   as “departments”). 3. Distribution of Subjects ­ (1)The   distribution   of   subjects   among   the departments shall be as specified in the Second Schedule to these Rules  and   shall   include   all attached  and  subordinate   offices   or   other organisations   including   Public   Sector Undertakings concerned with their  subjects and Sub­rules (2), (3) and (4) of this Rule. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx.” 30. The   Second   Schedule   includes   “Ministry   of   Home   Affairs (Grih Mantralaya), which has several departments from A to E. B is “Department of States (Rajya Vibhag). Under heading (III) Union Territories have been mentioned. Under Para 7 sub­clause (b) Union of Territory of Pondicherry is mentioned. Relevant extract of Second Schedule under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of States is as follows: "(III) Union Territories 7. Union of Territories with legislature: (a) xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) Union Territory of Pondicherry: All matters falling within the purview of the 34 Central Government in terms of provisions contained in Part VIII of the Constitution in so far as these relate to the Union Territory of Pondicherry and the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 except all such   matters   as   have   been   under   these   rules specifically been assigned to any other Ministry or Department of the Government of India.” 31. Para   7(b)   expressly   provides   that   all   matters   falling within   the   purview   of   the   Central   Government   in   terms   of provisions contained in Part VIII of the Constitution in so far as these relate to the Union Territory of Puducherry and the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 are assigned to the   Department   of   States.     Thus,   under   the   Act,   1963   all matters falling within the purview of the Central Government including power of nomination given to the Central Government under   Section   3(3)   are   assigned   under   the   Allocation   of Business Rules by the President of India to Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of States. Thus, power under Section 3(3) of Act, 1963 has to be transacted in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of States. For Transaction of Business, the President has framed Government of India (Transaction of Business)   Rules,   1961.   Rule   3   of   (Transaction   of   Business) Rules, 1961 which is relevant is as follows: "3. Disposal of Business by Ministries. ­ Subject to   the   provisions   of   these   Rules   in   regard   to consultation with other departments and submission of cases   to   the   Prime   Minister,   the   Cabinet   and   its Committees and the President, all business allotted to   a   department   under   the   Government   of   India 35 (Allocation   of   Business)   Rules,   1961,   shall   be disposed   of   by,   or   under   the   general   or   special directions of, the Minister­in­charge.” 32. Thus, as per Transaction of Business Rules, the matter of nomination in the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry not being a matter in regard to consultation with other departments and submission of the cases to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and its Committees and the President, the above business is to be disposed of by or under the general or special orders or the directions of the Minister­in­charge that is Home Minister. 33. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion   that   nomination   in   the   Legislative   Assembly   of Puducherry   is   not   the   Business   of   the   Government   of Puducherry.   It   is   a   business   of   Central   Government   as   per Section   3(3)   of   Act,   1963   which   is   to   be   carried   out   in accordance   with   the   Government   of   India   (Allocation   of Business) Rules, 1961 and Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961. The issue is answered accordingly. Issue No. 3 Whether Principles of Federalism or Cooperative Federalism has been violated in the present case?  34. The   Constitution   of   India   is   a   written   Constitution, which came into being after long deliberations by the men of eminence   representing   the   aspirations   and   culture   of   our 36 ancient   nation.     Before   Constitution   makers,   various Constitutions   of   the   world   were   there   to   be   looked   into, incorporated   and   relied   on.     Our   Constitution   makers   have taken   best   part   of   the   Constitution   of   different   countries including USA, Australia, Germany, Canada and Others.   When the draft Constitution was being debated in the Constituent Assembly,   one   of   the   relevant   issue   to   be   deliberated, pondered   upon   and   decided   was   the   nature   of   Indian Constitution.   Whether Constitution should be one, which is being followed in Federal countries like USA or it should be a Unitary Constitution, was deliberated and pondered.   Dr. B.R. Ambedkar , Chairman of the Drafting Committee after noticing the   characteristics   of   Unitary   Constitution   and   Federal Constitution categorically stated that draft Constitution is a Federal Constitution.  In the deliberation of 04.11.1948, Vol. VII Page 33, following was said by  Dr. B.R. Ambedkar ;­ “Two principal forms of the Constitution are known to history   ­   one   is   called   Unitary   and   the   other Federal.   The   two   essential   characteristics   of   a Unitary   Constitution   are:(1)   the   supremacy   of   the Central   Polity   and   (2)   the   absence   of   subsidiary Sovereign   polities.   Contrariwise,   a   Federal Constitution   is   marked:   (1)   by   the   existence   of   a Central polity and subsidiary polities side by side, and (2) by each being sovereign in the field assigned to   it.   In   other   words.   Federation   means   the establishment   of   a   Dual   Polity.   The   Draft Constitution is, Federal Constitution inasmuch as it establishes what may be called a Dual Polity. This Dual   Polity   under   the   proposed   Constitution   will consist of the Union at the Centre and the States at 37 the periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to be   exercised   in   the   field   assigned   to   them respectively by the Constitution………..” 35. Dr.   Ambedkar   further   said   that   there   are   marked differences   with   the   American   Federation.   He   said   that   all federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of federalism.  It cannot change its form and shape no matter what are the circumstances.  Our draft Constitution can be   both   Unitary   as   well   as   Federal   according   to   time   and circumstances.  Dealing with the essential characteristics of the Federal Constitution,  Dr. Ambedkar  Said:­ “………………….   A   Federal   Constitution   cannot   but   be   a written Constitution and a written Constitution must necessarily   be   a   rigid   Constitution.   A   Federal Constitution means division of Sovereignty by no less a sanction than that of the law of the Constitution between the Federal Government and the States, with two necessary consequences (1) that any invasion by the Federal Government in the field assigned to the States and vice versa is a breach of the Constitution and  (2)  such  breach  is  a justiciable  matter  to  be determined by the Judiciary only………………….” 36. It is also relevant to notice that before the Constituent Assembly, complaint was raised by the members that there is too much of centralisation in the Union.  Replying the above complaint,   Dr.   Ambedkar   clarified   that   legislative   and executive authority, is partitioned between the Centre and the States.   37. Dr. Ambedkar   in deliberations dated 25.11.1949, Vol. XI 38 Page 976 said:­

  38. The   nature   and   character   of   the   Constitution   came   for consideration   before   this   Court   in   several   Constitution Benches, where this Court noted the fundamental feature of the Constitution of India.   A seven­Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in  Special Reference No.1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745 held   that   essential   characteristics   of   federalism   is   the 39 distribution   of   executive,   legislative   and   judicial authorities among bodies, which are independent of each other. In paragraph 39, following has been laid down:­ “ 39.   Our   legislatures   have   undoubtedly   plenary powers, but these powers are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh   Schedule;   but   beyond   the   Lists,   the legislatures   cannot   travel.   They   can   no   doubt exercise   their   plenary   legislative   authority   and discharge   their   legislative   functions   by   virtue   of the   powers   conferred   on   them   by   the   relevant provisions of the Constitution; but the basis of the power   is   the   Constitution   itself.   Besides,   the legislative supremacy of our legislatures including the   Parliament   is   normally   controlled   by   the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. If   the   legislatures   step   beyond   the   legislative fields   assigned   to   them,   or   acting   within   their respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not justified by the   relevant   articles   dealing   with   the   said fundamental   rights,   their   legislative   actions   are liable   to   be   struck   down   by   courts   in   India. Therefore, it is  necessary  to remember  that though our legislatures have plenary powers, they function within   the   limits   prescribed   by   the   material   and relevant provisions of the Constitution.” 39.   In   the   landmark   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225  a new dimension was   given   to   the   constitutional   principles.   This   Court   by majority   judgment   declared   that   the   basic   feature   of   the Constitution   could   not   be   amended   by   a   constitutional amendment. Sikri, C.J. while delivering the majority judgment had held that federal character of the Constitution is one of 40 the basic structures of the Constitution. 40. Shelat   and   Grover,   JJ.   while   delivering   concurring opinion   had   also   stated   that   our   Constitution   has   all essential elements of federal structure. In para 486 following was stated: (Kesavananda Bharati case, SCC pp. 408­09) “486. The Constitution has all the essential elements of   a   federal   structure   as   was   the   case   in   the Government   of   India   Act,   1935,   the   essence   of federalism being the distribution of powers between the  federation  or the Union  and  the  States  or the provinces. All the legislatures have plenary powers but these are controlled by the basic concepts of the Constitution   itself   and   they   function   within   the limits laid down in it (Per Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Special   Reference   No.   1   of   196435).   All   the functionaries,   be   they   legislators,   members   of   the executive or the judiciary take oath of allegiance to the   Constitution   and   derive   their   authority   and jurisdiction   from   its   provisions.   The   Constitution has entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights (SCR at p. 446). It is a written and controlled Constitution.” 41. Again a seven­Judge Bench in  State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592   had an occasion to consider the nature   of   the   Indian   Constitution.   M.H.   Beg,   C.J.,   while delivering majority decision, in para 57  states: (SCC p. 622) “57.   The   two   conditions   Dicey   postulated   for   the existence   of   federalism   were:   firstly,   ‘a   body   of countries   such   as   the   Cantons   of   Switzerland,   the Colonies of America, or the Provinces of Canada, so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing, in the eyes of   their   inhabitants,   an   impress   of   common nationality’; and, secondly, absolutely essential to the founding of a federal system is the ‘existence of a   very   peculiar   state   of   sentiment   among   the 41 inhabitants of the countries’. He pointed out that, without the desire to unite there could be no basis for federalism. But, if the desire to unite goes to the   extent   of   forming   an   integrated   whole   in   all substantial   matters   of   Government,   it   produces   a unitary rather than a federal Constitution. Hence, he said,   a   federal   State   “is   a   political   contrivance intended   to   reconcile   national   unity   with   the maintenance of State rights”. The degree to which the State rights are separately preserved and safeguarded gives the extent to which expression is given to one of  the  two  contradictory  urges  so that  there  is  a union without a unity in matters of Government. In a sense, therefore, the Indian union is federal. But, the   extent   of   federalism   in   it   is   largely   watered down by the needs of progress and development of a country   which   has   to   be   nationally   integrated, politically   and   economically   coordinated,   and socially, intellectually and spiritually uplifted. In such a system, the States cannot stand in the way of legitimate and comprehensively planned development of the   country   in   the   manner   directed   by   the   Central Government.” 42. Further in para 60 referring to Dr Ambedkar following was stated: ( State of Rajasthan case , SCC p. 623) “60.   Although   Dr   Ambedkar   thought   that   our Constitution is federal “inasmuch as it establishes what may be called a Dual Polity”, he also said, in the   Constituent   Assembly,   that   our Constitution­makers had avoided the “tight mould of federalism”   in   which   the   American   Constitution   was forged. Dr Ambedkar, one of the principal architects of our Constitution, considered our Constitution to be ‘both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances’.” 43. A nine­Judge Bench had occasion to elaborately consider the   nature   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in   S.R.   Bommai   v. Union   of   India ,   (1994)   3   SCC   1 ,   Ahmadi,   J.   referring   to 42 federal character of the Constitution in para 14 following was stated: (SCC pp. 68­69) “14. In order to understand whether our Constitution is truly federal, it is essential to know the true concept   of   federalism.   Dicey   calls   it   a   political contrivance for a body of States which desire Union but not unity. Federalism is, therefore, a concept which   unites   separate   States   into   a   Union   without sacrificing   their   own   fundamental   political integrity.   Separate   States,   therefore,   desire   to unite   so   that   all   the   member   States   may   share   in formulation of the basic policies applicable to all and participate in the execution of decisions made in pursuance of such basic policies. Thus the essence of a federation is the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution of powers between them. Federalism,   therefore,   essentially   implies demarcation of powers in a federal compact.” Ahmadi, J. further stated that the Constitution of India is   differently   described,   more   appropriately   as “quasi­federal” because it is a mixture of the federal and unitary elements, leaning more towards the latter. 44. B.P.   Jeevan   Reddy,   J.   held   that   the   Founding   Fathers wished to establish a strong Centre. In the light of the past history of this Sub­Continent, this was probably a natural and necessary decision. In paras 275 and 276 following was stated: ( S.R. Bommai case , SCC pp. 215­17) “275. A review of the provisions of the Constitution shows unmistakably that while creating a federation, the   Founding   Fathers   wished   to   establish   a   strong Centre.   In   the   light   of   the   past   history   of   this sub­continent,   this   was   probably   a   natural   and necessary decision. In a land as varied as India is, a   strong   Centre   is   perhaps   a   necessity.   This   bias towards Centre  is reflected in the  distribution of legislative heads between the Centre and States. All 43 the more important heads of legislation are placed in List I. Even among the legislative heads mentioned in List II, several of them, e.g., Entries 2, 13, 17, 23,  24,  26,  27,  32,  33,  50,  57  and  63 are either limited by or made subject to certain entries in List I to some or the other extent. Even in the Concurrent List (List III), the parliamentary enactment is given the primacy, irrespective of the  fact whether such enactment is earlier or later in point of time to a State enactment on the same subject­matter. Residuary powers are with the Centre. By the 42nd Amendment, quite a few of the entries in List II were omitted and/or transferred to other lists. Above all, Article 3   empowers   Parliament   to   form   new   States   out   of existing States either by merger or division as also to increase, diminish or alter the boundaries of the States. … 276.   The   fact   that   under   the   scheme   of   our Constitution,   greater   power   is   conferred   upon   the Centre vis­à­vis the States does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted   to   them,   States   are   supreme.   The   Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the   courts   should   not   adopt   an   approach,   an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to  the  States.  It is  a  matter of  common  knowledge that   over   the   last   several   decades,   the   trend   the world   over   is   towards   strengthening   of   Central Governments   —   be   it   the   result   of   advances   in technological/scientific   fields   or   otherwise,   and that   even   in   USA   the   Centre   has   become   far   more powerful   notwithstanding   the   obvious   bias   in   that Constitution in favour of the States. All this must put   the   court   on   guard   against   any   conscious whittling down of the powers of the States. Let it be said that the federalism in the Indian Constitution is not  a  matter of administrative convenience, but one of principle — the outcome of our own historical process and a recognition of  the ground realities. This aspect has been dealt with elaborately by Shri M.C. Setalvad in his Tagore Law Lectures “Union and State   Relations   under   the   Indian   Constitution” (Eastern  Law House, Calcutta, 1974).  The nature of the   Indian   federation   with   reference   to   its 44 historical   background,   the   distribution   of legislative   powers,   financial   and   administrative relations, powers of taxation, provisions relating to trade,   commerce   and   industry,   have   all   been   dealt with  analytically.  It is  not  possible —  nor  is  it necessary   —   for   the   present   purposes   to   refer   to them. It is enough to note that our Constitution has certainly a bias towards Centre vis­à­vis the States [Automobile   Transport   (Rajasthan)   Ltd.   v.   State   of Rajasthan3, SCR p. 540]. It is equally necessary to emphasise that courts should be careful not to upset the   delicately­crafted   constitutional   scheme   by   a process of interpretation.” 45. A Constitution Bench in   Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1 , held that India is not a federal State in the traditional sense of the term and it is not a true federation formed by agreement between various States and it has been described as quasi­federation and similar other concepts. 46. A   nine­Judge   Constitution   Bench   in   Jindal   Stainless Limited and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2017) 12 SCC 1  had occasion to consider the nature of federalism in the Indian   Constitution   while   considering   the   relations   between Union   and   States   in   reference   to   part   XIII   of   the Constitution.  Dr. T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice of India, as he then   was,   speaking   for   the   Court   noticed   the   nature   of federalism   as   ingrained   in   the   Constitution.     Constitution Bench   held   that   even   though   our   Constitution   may   not   be strictly federal in its character but the significant features of federal Constitution are found in the Indian Constitution. 45 In Paragraph 32, Constitution Bench laid down as follows:­ “ 32.   Whether   or   not   the   Constitution   provides   a federal structure for the governance of the country has   been   the   subject­matter   of   a   long   line   of decisions of this Court, reference to all of which may be unnecessary but the legal position appears to be fairly well settled that the Constitution provides for   a   quasi­federal   character   with   a   strong   bias towards the Centre. The pronouncements recognised the proposition that even when the Constitution may not be strictly federal in its character as the United States   of   America,   where   sovereign   States   came together  to constitute a federal  Union, where each State enjoins a privilege of having a Constitution of its   own,   the   significant   features   of   a   federal Constitution   are   found   in   the   Indian   Constitution which makes it a quasi­federal Constitution, if not truly   federal   in   character   and   in   stricto   sensu federal.   The   two   decisions   which   stand   out   in   the long   line   of   pronouncements   of   this   Court   on   the subject may, at this stage, be briefly mentioned. The first of these cases is the celebrated decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati case15, wherein a thirteen­Judge Bench of this Court, Sikri, C.J. (as his Lordship then was), being one of them talks about whether   the   Constitution   of   India   was   federal   in character and if so whether federal character of the Constitution   formed   the   basic   feature   of   the Constitution. Sikri, C.J. summed up the basic feature of the Constitution in the following words: (SCC p. 366, paras 292­94) “292.   …   The   true   position   is   that   every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided   in   the   result   the   basic   foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same.   The   basic   structure   may   be   said   to consist of the following features: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution; (2)   Republican   and   Democratic   form   of Government; (3) Secular character of the Constitution; 46 (4)   Separation   of   powers   between   the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; (5) Federal character of the Constitution. 293. The above structure is built on the basic foundation i.e. the dignity and freedom of the individual.   This   is   of   supreme   importance. This   cannot   by   any   form   of   amendment   be destroyed. 294. The above foundation and the above basic features are easily discernible not only from the   Preamble   but   the   whole   scheme   of   the Constitution, which I have already discussed.” To   the   same   effect   are   the   views   expressed   by Shelat and Grover, JJ. who declared that the federal character of the Constitution is a part of its basic structure.” 47. In   Jindal   Stainless   Ltd.   (supra) ,   one   of   us   (Ashok Bhushan,J) has also expressed views on the form of the Indian Constitution,   which   was   the   same   as   expressed   by   majority opinion.  In Paragraph 944, following was held:­ “ 944.   The law declared by this Court as noted above clearly   indicates   that   the   Indian   Constitution   is basically federal in form and has marked traditional characteristics   of   a   federal   system,   namely, supremacy   of   the   Constitution,   division   of   power between the Union and the States and existence of an independent judiciary. Federalism is one of the basic features   of   the   Indian   Constitution.   However,   the history of Constitution including the debates in the Constituent Assembly indicate that the distribution of   powers   was   given   shape   with   creating   a   strong Centre   with   the   object   of   unity   and   integrity   of India.   The   States   are   sovereign   in   the   allotted fields.   The   Indian   Constitution   cannot   be   put   in traditional   mould   of   federalism.   The   traditional concept of federalism has been adopted with necessary modification in the framework of the Constitution to suit the country’s necessity and requirement. The sum 47 total of above discussion is that federalism in the Constitution   is   limited   and   controlled   by   the Constitution and the exercise of powers of both the States   and   the   Centre   are   controlled   by   express provisions of the Constitution.” 48. A recent Constitution Bench judgment, which needs to be noticed is a judgment of this Court in   State (NCT of Delhi) .  Chief Justice Vs. Union of India & Another, (2018) 8 SCC 501 Dipak Misra, as he then was, speaking for the Constitution Bench   elaborately   considered   the   concept   of   federal Constitution and laid down following in Paragraph Nos. 95, 96 and 108:­ “ 95.   In   common   parlance,   federalism   is   a   type   of governance in which the political power is divided into various units. These units are the Centre/Union, States and Municipalities. Traditional jurists like Prof.   K.C.   Wheare   lay   emphasis   on   the   independent functioning of different governing units and, thus, define “federalism” as a method of dividing powers so that the general/Central and regional governments are each within a sphere coordinate and independent. As per Prof. Wheare: “the   systems   of   Government   embody predominantly   on   division   of   powers   between Centre and regional authority each of which in its own sphere is coordinating with the other independent   as   of   them,   and   if   so,   is   that Government federal?” 96.  However, modern jurists lay emphasis on the idea of interdependence and define federalism as a form of Government   in   which   there   is   division   of   powers between   one   general/central   and   several   regional authorities,   each   within   its   sphere   interdependent and coordinate with each other. 108.   From the foregoing discussion, it is clear as day that both the concepts, namely, democracy i.e. 48 rule by the people and federalism are firmly imbibed in our constitutional ethos. Whatever be the nature of   federalism   present   in   the   Indian   Constitution, whether absolutely federal or quasi­federal, the fact of the matter is that federalism is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution as every State is a constituent unit which has an exclusive Legislature and   Executive   elected   and   constituted   by   the   same process as in the case of the Union Government. The resultant   effect   is   that   one   can   perceive   the distinct aim to preserve and protect the unity and the territorial integrity of India. This is a special feature of our constitutional federalism.” 49. Constitution   Bench   also   noticed   the   concept   of cooperative federalism and referring to an earlier judgment of this Court in  State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India, (1977) 3 laid down following in paragraph No. 121 and 122:­ SCC 592  “ 121.   In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, the Court took cognizance of the concept of cooperative federalism as perceived by G. Austin and A.H. Birch when it observed: (SCC p. 622, para 58) “58. Mr Austin thought that our system, if it could be called federal, could be described as “cooperative federalism”. This term was used by   another   author,   Mr   A.H.   Birch   (see Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada,   Australia   and   the   United   States,   p. 305), to describe a system in which: ‘…   the   practice   of   administrative cooperation   between   general   and regional   Governments,   the   partial dependence of the regional Governments upon   payments   from   the   general Governments   and   the   fact   that   the general   governments,   by   the   use   of conditional grants, frequently promote developments   in   matters   which   are constitutionally   assigned   to   the regions.’” 49 122.   We have dealt with the conceptual essentiality of   federal   cooperation   as   that   has   an   affirmative role on the sustenance of constitutional philosophy. We   may   further   add   that   though   the   authorities referred to hereinabove pertain to the Union of India and the State Governments in the constitutional sense of   the   term   “State”,   yet   the   concept   has applicability to the NCT of Delhi regard being had to its special status and language employed in Article 239­AA and other articles.” 50. The concept of Collaborative federalism was also noticed in paragraph Nos. 110 and 111 in the following words:­ “ 110.   The   Constituent   Assembly,   while   devising   the federal   character   of   our   Constitution,   could   have never   envisaged   that   the   Union   Government   and   the State   Governments   would   work   in   tangent.   It   could never have been the Constituent Assembly’s intention that   under   the   garb   of   quasi­federal   tone   of   our Constitution, the Union Government would affect the interest of the States. Similarly, the States under our constitutional scheme were not carved as separate islands   each   having   a   distinct   vision   which   would unnecessarily   open   the   doors   for   a   contrarian principle   or   gradually   put   a   step   to   invite anarchism.   Rather,   the   vision   enshrined   in   the Preamble   to   our   Constitution   i.e.   to   achieve   the golden   goals   of   justice,   liberty,   equality   and fraternity, beckons both the Union Government and the State Governments, alike. The ultimate aim is to have a holistic structure. 111.   The   aforesaid   idea,   in   turn,   calls   for coordination   amongst   the   Union   and   the   State Governments. The Union and the States need to embrace a collaborative/cooperative federal architecture for achieving this coordination.” 51. Another concept which was noticed and elaborated was the concept of Pragmatic federalism.  Following was laid down in Paragraph 123:­ “ 123.   In   this   context,   we   may   also   deal   with   an ancillary   issue,   namely,   pragmatic   federalism.   To 50 appreciate   the   said   concept,   we   are   required   to analyse the nature of federalism  that is  conceived under the Constitution. Be  it noted, the  essential characteristics   of   federalism   like   duality   of governments, distribution of powers between the Union and   the   State   Governments,   supremacy   of   the Constitution, existence of a written Constitution and most importantly,  authority of the courts as final interpreters   of   the   Constitution   are   all   present under   our   constitutional   scheme.   But   at   the   same time, the Constitution has certain features which can very well be perceived as deviations from the federal character. We may, in brief, indicate some of these features   to   underscore   the   fact   that   though   our Constitution broadly has a federal character, yet it still   has   certain   striking   unitary   features   too. Under Article 3 of the Constitution, Parliament can alter or change the areas, boundaries or names of the States.   During   emergency,   the   Union   Parliament   is empowered to make laws in relation to matters under the   State   List,   give   directions   to   the   States   and empower   Union   officers   to   execute   matters   in   the State   List.   That   apart,   in   case   of   inconsistency between the Union and the State laws, the Union Law shall prevail. Additionally, a Governor of a State is empowered   to   reserve   the   Bill   passed   by   the   State Legislature   for   consideration   of   the   President   and the President is not bound to give his assent to such a Bill. Further, a State Legislature can be dissolved and President’s rule can be imposed in a State either on the report of the Governor or otherwise when there is   failure   of   the   constitutional   machinery   in   the State.” 52. It has been laid down by this Court in the above cases, which is clear from above precedents that Indian Constitution has adopted federal structure.   Although, it is not in the strict mould of federalism as understood in theory.  That is why, different Constitution Benches of this Court have termed the Indian Constitution as a quasi­federal but the essential 51 characteristics   of   the   federal   system   are   ingrained   in   the Constitution   and   reflect   in   different   Constitutional provisions which are (i) the distribution of legislative and executive power between the Union and the States, (ii) the distribution of such legislative and executive power is by the Constitution   itself,   and   (iii)   an   independent   judiciary   to interpret the Constitutional provisions and lay down validly in case of any dispute or doubt.          53. The   concepts   of   cooperative   federalism,   collaborative federalism and pragmatic federalism as has been noticed by the Constitution Bench in  State (NCT Of Delhi) (supra)  essentially engraft   the   same   concept,   i.e.   faithful   discharge   of   the functions, both Union and States have to follow Constitutional principles and not to encroach in the field reserved to other by the Constitution.    54. The   principle   of   federalism   as   adopted   in   the constitution of India are well settled as noticed above.  The submission, which needs to be answered in the present case is as   to   whether   the   federal   principles   as   ingrained   in   the Constitution are in any manner sacrificed in the present case, i.e.,   by   nominations   made   by   Central   Government   without concurrence   of   the   Government   of   Union   Territory   of Puducherry.     Article   239A   by   which   creation   of   local 52 Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union Territories   was   provided   by   the   Constitution   (Fourteenth Amendment)   Act,   1962   empowering   the   Parliament   by   law,   to create for the Union Territory of Puducherry, a body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a   Legislature   for   the   Union   Territory,   or   a   Council   of Ministers,   or   both  with   such   constitution,   powers   and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law.  The Constitution,   thus,   by   Article   239A   has   empowered   the Parliament to create Legislature for the Union Territory by law with such  constitution, powers and functions  as may be specified in the law.   Thus, it is the Constitution itself, which   is   empowering   Parliament   to   provide   by   law   for Constitution of Union Territory.  Further, the Legislature as a body contemplated by Article 239A is a body, whether elected or   partly   nominated   and   partly   elected.    Thus,   the Constitution   provision   itself   contemplate   creation   of Legislature   whether   elected   or   partly   nominated   and   partly elected.  When the Constitution itself empowers the Parliament to frame law to create a body, which may be partly nominated and   partly   elected   and   Section   3   of   the   Act,   1963,   which provide for thirty seats to be filled up by persons chosen by direct election and three seats by nominations made by the 53 Central Government, we fail to see that how the law made by Parliament or nominations made by Central Government breaches the principles of federalism.  The Constitution of Legislative body for Union Territory being entrusted to the Parliament by Constitution   and   there   being   no   indication   in   the Constitutional provision or provisions of the Act, 1963 that said nomination has to be made with concurrence of Government of Union Territory of Puducherry, we fail to see any substance in the argument of Shri Kapil Sibal that by nominations made by   Central   Government,   federal   principles   or   principle   of cooperative   federalism   has   been   violated.     The   concept   of federalism   itself   envisages   distribution   of   power   between Union and States.   It is further to be noticed that Union Territories   are   not   States.   These   Union   Territories, ordinarily, belong to the Union (i.e. the Central Government) and therefore they are called 'Union Territories'. That is why they   are   governed   under   the   administrative   control   of   the President of India.  That is the clear purport behind Article 239. However,   to a limited extent, the power of the Union is diluted with respect to Puducherry vide Article 239A. At the same time, this constitutional provision, i.e. Article 239A. With   regard   to   the   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry   itself envisages the constitution of Legislative Council partly by 54 nomination and partly by election. Further, specific authority to nominate in the Legislative Council has been conferred by law i.e. under Section 3 to the Central Government. Thus no breach of federal principles are made out and the submission on the basis of breach of federal principles in nomination by the Central Government is unfounded.    Issue No.4 and 5 55. Both   the   issues   being   interdependent   are   being   taken together.  The expression “Constitutional convention” has been coined by  Professor A.V. Dicey .  In 1885, in his introduction to   the   study   of   the   “Law   of   the   Constitution”,   in   Chapter dealing with nature of conventions of Constitution, Professor Dicey States:­  “………… The   conventions   of   the   constitution   are   in short rules intended to regulate the exercise of the whole of the  remaining  discretionary  powers of the Crown, whether these powers are exercised by the King himself or by the Ministry…………………..” 56. Elaborating further Prof. Dicey States:­ “……………………The result follows, that the conventions of the constitution, looked at as a whole, are customs, or   understandings,   as   to   the   mode   in   which   the several   members   of   the   sovereign   legislative   body, which,  as it  will be  remembered,  is  the  "Queen  in Parliament,” should   each   exercise   their   discretionary   authority,   whether   it   be   termed   the prerogative   of   the   Crown   or   the   privileges   of Parliament. Since, however, by far the most numerous and   important   of   our   constitutional   understandings refer at bottom to the exercise of the prerogative, it will conduce to brevity and clearness if we treat the   conventions   of   the   constitution,   as   rules   or customs   determining   the   mode   in   which   the discretionary power of the executive, or in technical 55 language the prerogative, ought (i.e. is expected by the nation) to be employed.” 57. Professor Dicey in his treatment of conventions of the Constitution   has   held   that   conventions   of   the   Constitution constitutes customs, practices, maxims, and precepts which are not enforced or recognised by the Courts, make up a body not of   laws,   but   of   constitutional   or   political   ethics.     The Dicey’s statement that Constitutional conventions are not a body   of   laws   but   constitutional   or   political   ethics   was subject to debate and discussion.    Sir Ivor Jennings   in his treatise   “The   Law   and   the   Constitution”   noticed   the distinction between laws and conventions as made by Professor Dicey, but opined that distinction appears to be plain and unambiguous, it is by no means free from difficulty.   58. Professor Dicey’s statement that the convention is not a binding   rule   was   departed   with   by     in Sir   Kenneth   Wheare “ Modern Constitutions” , who wrote:­ “By  convention  is meant  a binding rule,  a rule  of behaviour accepted as obligatory by those concerned in the working of the constitution.”  59. Sir Ivor Jennings in his treatise has elaborately dealt the   conventions   of   the   Constitution   while   explaining   the purpose of the convention, he states:­ “The   short   explanation   of   the   constitutional conventions   is   that   they   provide   the   flesh   which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make the legal 56 constitution   work;   they   keep   it   in   touch   with   the growth of ideas. A constitution does not work itself; it has to be worked by men…………………..”  60. How   the   conventions   are   to   be   established   was   also explained by Sir Ivor Jennings in following words:­ “It is clear, in the first place, that mere practice is   insufficient.     The   fact   that   an   authority   has always  behaved  in a  certain  way  is  no warrant for saying that it ought to behave in that way.  But if the   authority   itself   and   those   connected   with   it believe that they ought to do so, then the convention does  exist.    This is  the  ordinary rule  applied  to customary law.   Practice  alone  is not enough.    It must be normative………………….”   61. Further, he states that:­ “………………………….For   neither   precedents   nor   dicta   are conclusive.  Something more must be added.  As in the creation of law, the creation of a convention must be due  to  the  reason of  the  thing  because  it accords with the prevailing political philosophy.   It helps to make the democratic system operate; it enables the machinery of State to run more smoothly; and if it were  not  there  friction  would result.    Thus,  if  a convention continues because it is desirable in the circumstances of the constitution, it must be created for the same reason…………………….” 62. The   test   to   find   out   as   to   whether   a   practice   or precedent has become convention, Sir Ivor Jennings lays down following tests:­ “……………..We   have   to   ask   ourselves   three   questions: first,   what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?  A single precedent with a good reason may be enough   to   establish   the   rule.     A   whole   string   of precedents without such a reason will be of no avail, unless   it   is   perfectly   certain   that   the   persons concerned regarded them as bound by it.  And then, as 57 we   have   seen,   the   convention   may   be   broken   with impunity.” 63. The above three tests laid down by Sir Ivor Jennings has been approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in  Supreme Court Advocates­On­Record Association and Others Vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 (Para 346).  The Constituent Assembly while drafting the Constitution of India was well aware of the British   convention.   Initially   on   17.07.1947   Hon'ble   Sardar Vallabhbhai   Patel   while   moving   Clause   14   stated   that   the Governor   shall   be   generally   guided   by   the   conventions   of responsible, Government as set out in Schedule. A Schedule was contemplated   to   be   framed   according   to   the   traditions   of responsible Government. It is useful to notice what was said by Hon'ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: " The Hon'ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel :  Sir, I move that: “In the appointment of his ministers; and his relations with them, the Governor shall be generally guided by the conventions of responsible, Government as   set   out   in   Schedule.....;   but   the   validity   of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that it was done otherwise than in accordance with these conventions.” Now a Schedule according to the traditions of responsible Government will be framed and put in. This also is a non­controversial thing and I move the proposition for the acceptance of the House.” 64. Although Schedule IIIA   was   contemplated   codifying 58 convention   but   at   the   later   stage   it   was   decided   to   drop codifying the convenient. The reasons for not codifying the convention   was   elaborated   by   Shri.   T.T.   Krishnamachari   in Constituent Assembly debate on 11.10.1949. Schedule IIIA which was contemplated to be inserted by way of amendment was not moved. Similarly, Schedule IV which was to describe relations of the President and the Governor  viz­a­viz  the Ministers was also moved to be deleted. On the questioning of deletion of the Schedule, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar asked Shri Krishnamachari to explain.   Shri   T.T.   Krishnamachari   while   explaining   stated following: " Shri   T.T.   Krishnamachari:   ....Therefore,   we   have decided to drop Schedule IIIB which we proposed as an   amendment   and   also   Schedule   IV   which   finds   a place in the Draft Constitution,  because it is felt to be entirely unnecessary and superfluous, to give such   direction   in   the   Constitution   which   really should arise out of conventions that grow up from time to time, and the President and the Governors in their   respective   spheres   will   be   guided   by   those conventions....” 65. The   above   debates   in   the   Constituent   Assembly   clearly indicate that Constitutional conventions were very much in the contemplation during the debates in the Constituent Assembly. Conventions were expected to grow from time to time and the President and Governors in their respective spheres were to be guided by those conventions. 59 66. The   American   jurisprudence   also   recognises   convention including   the   constitutional   conventions.   John   Alexander Jameson in   'A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions'   while explaining the constitutional convention states: "as its name implies, constitutional; not simply as having for its object the framing or amending of Constitutions,   but   as   being   within,   rather   than without,   the   pale   of   the   fundamental   law;   as ancillary   and   subservient   and   not   hostile   and paramount to it. The species of Convention sustains an official relation to the state, considered as a political   organization.   It   is   charged   with   a definite,   and   not   a   discretionary   and indeterminate, function.” 67. Leonid Sirota in his Article  'Towards a Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conventions'  defines constitutional convention, as: “those primary constitutional rules, limiting the powers   of   the   several   organs   of   government   in   a polity   and   governing   the   relations   among   them, which are not found in constitutional or ordinary statutes or the common law, and which reflect the 'constitutional theory' or political values of the day.” 68. The constitutional conventions are born and recognised in working   of   the   Constitution.   The   purpose   and   object   of constitutional   convention   is   to   ensure   that   the   legal framework of the Constitution is operated in accordance with constitutional   values   and   constitutional   morality.   The 60 constitutional   conventions   always   aims   to   achieve   higher values   and   objectives   enshrined   in   the   Constitution.   The conventions are not static but can change with the change in constitutional values and constitutional interpretations. No constitutional   convention   can   be   recognised   or   implemented which runs contrary to the expressed constitutional provisions or contrary to the underlined constitutional objectives and aims which Constitution sought to achieve.    69. There   have   been   several   pronouncements   by   this   Court where   the   Constitutional   conventions   were   referred   to   and relied. In  U.N.R. Rao vs. Smt. Indira Gandhi, (1971) 2 SCC 63, this Court while interpreting Article 75(3) held that while interpreting the Constitution the conventions prevalent at the time when Constitution was formed, have to be kept in mind. In interpreting Article 75(3), this Court took support from the conventions followed in United Kingdom and other countries. In paragraphs 3 and 11 following was held: “ 3 ………It   seems   to   us   that   a   very   narrow   point arises on the facts of the present case. The House of   the   People   was   dissolved   by   the   President   on December   27,   1970.   The   respondent   was   the   Prime Minister  before the dissolution. Is there anything in   the   Constitution,   and   in   particular   in   Article 75(3),   which   renders   her   carrying   on   as   Prime Minister contrary to the Constitution? It was said that   we   must   interpret   Article   75(3)   according   to its   own   terms   regardless   of   the   conventions   that prevail in the United Kingdom. If the words of an Article   are   clear,   notwithstanding   any   relevant 61 convention,   effect   will   no   doubt   be   given   to   the words.   But   it   must   be   remembered   that   we   are interpreting   a   Constitution   and   not   an   Act   of Parliament,   a   Constitution   which   establishes   a Parliamentary system of Government  with a Cabinet. In trying to understand one may well keep in mind the   conventions   prevalent   at   the   time   the Constitution was framed.” “11.   We   are   grateful   to   the   learned Attorney­General   and   the   appellant   for   having supplied to us compilations containing extracts from various   books   on   Constitutional   Law   and   extracts from   the   debates   in   the   Constituent   Assembly.   We need not burden this judgment with them. But on the whole we receive assurance from the learned authors and the speeches that the view we have taken is the right   one,   and   is   in   accordance   with   conventions followed not only in the United Kingdom but in other countries following a similar system of responsible Government.” 70. The   most   elaborate   consideration   of   Constitutional convention was undertaken by the Constitution Bench of this Court   in   Supreme   Court   Advocates­on­record   Association   and others vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441,   Justice Kuldip Singh   in   his   judgment   has   elaborately   considered   the Constitutional   convention.   This   Court   held   that   conventions are found in all established Constitutions and soon develop even in the newest. In paragraphs 340 and 341 following was laid down: “340.  The written Constitutions cannot provide for every eventuality. Constitutional institutions are   often   created   by   the   provisions   which   are generally   worded.   Such   provisions   are   interpreted 62 with the help of conventions which grow with the passage of time. Conventions are vital insofar as they fill up the gaps in the Constitution itself, help   solve   problems   of   interpretation,   and   allow for   the   future   development   of   the   constitutional framework. Whatever the nature of the Constitution, a   great   deal   may   be   left   unsaid   in   legal   rules allowing enormous discretion to the constitutional functionaries. Conventions regulate the exercise of that   discretion.   A   power   which,   juridically,   is conferred upon a person or body of persons may be transferred, guided, or canalised by the operation of the conventional rule. K.C. Wheare in his book Modern Constitutions  (1967 Edn.) elaborates such a rule as under: “What often happens is that powers granted in a   Constitution   are   indeed   exercised   but   that, while they are in law exercised by those to whom they are granted, they are in practice exercised by   some   other   person   or   body   of   persons. Convention, in short, transfers powers granted in a Constitution from one person to another.” 341.   The   primary   role   of   conventions   is   to regulate the exercise of discretion — presumably to guard   against   the   irresponsible   abuse   of   powers. Colin   R.   Munro   in   his   book  Studies   in Constitutional   Law  (1987   Edn.)   has   summed   up   the field   of   operation   of   the   conventions   in   the following words: “Some   of   the   most   important   conventions, therefore,   are,   as   Dicey   said,   concerned   with ‘the discretionary powers of the Crown’ and how they should be exercised. But it is not only in connection   with   executive   government   and legislature­executive   relations   that   we   find such rules and practices in operation. They may be   found   in   other   spheres   of   constitutional activity too; for example, in relations between the Houses of Parliament and in the workings of each   House,   in   the   legislative   process,   in judicial administration and judicial behaviour, in the civil service, in local government, and in   the   relations   with   other   members   of   the Commonwealth.”” 63 71. This   Court   held   that   every   act   by   a   constitutional authority is a 'precedent' in the sense of an example which may or may not be followed in subsequent similar cases, but a long series of precedents all pointing in the same direction is very good evidence of a convention. On the requirements for establishing the existence of a convention, this Court quoted with approval the test laid down by Sir W. Ivor Jennings in 'The   Law   and   the   Constitution'.   In   paragraphs   345   and   346 following was laid down: “345.   Every act by a constitutional authority is a ‘precedent’ in the sense of an example which may or may not be followed in subsequent similar cases, but a long series of precedents all pointing in the same direction is very good evidence of a convention. 346.   The   requirements   for   establishing   the existence of a convention have been succinctly laid down by Sir W. Ivor Jennings in  The Law and the Constitution, Fifth Edn., (1959) as under: “We   have   to   ask   ourselves   three   questions: first, what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good   reason   may   be   enough   to   establish   the rule. A whole string of precedents without such a   reason   will   be   of   no   avail,   unless   it   is perfectly   certain   that   the   persons   concerned regarded them as bound by it.”” 72. This Court after referring to several treatises on the 64 constitutional law held that the constitutional functionaries have to follow the same as a binding precedent. In paragraphs 351 and 353 following was held: “351.  It is not necessary for us to delve into this subject any more. We agree that a convention while   it   is   a   convention   is   to   be   distinguished from the law. But this does not mean that what was formerly a convention cannot later become law. When customary   rules   are   recognised   and   enforced   by courts as law, there is no reason why a convention cannot   be   crystallized   into   a   law   and   become enforceable.   “Conventions   can   become   law   also   by judicial recognition” stated K.C. Wheare in Modern Constitution  (1966 Edn.). It is no doubt correct that the existence of a particular convention is to be   established   by   evidence   on   the   basis   of historical events and expert factual submissions. But once it is established in the court of law that a   particular   convention   exists   and   the constitutional functionaries are following the same as   a   binding   precedent   then   there   is   no justification to deny such a convention the status of law. 353.   We   are   of   the   view   that   there   is   no distinction between the “constitutional law” and an established   “constitutional   convention”   and   both are binding in the field of their operation. Once it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that   a   particular   convention   exists   and   is operating then the convention becomes a part of the “constitutional   law”   of   the   land   and   can   be enforced in the like manner.” 73. This   Court   in   the   above   case   has   clearly   held   that existence of a particular convention is to be established by historical   and   factual   evidence   and   for   establishing   the existence   of   convention   the   test   laid   down   by   Sir   Ivor 65 Jennings was also approved and applied in the following words in paragraph 357: “357.   We   now   proceed   to   consider   whether   an established constitutional convention can be read in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution of   India   to   the   effect   that   in   the   matter   of appointment of the Judges of the High Courts and Supreme   Court,   the   opinion   of   the   judiciary expressed   through   the   Chief   Justice   of   India   is primal and binding. For that purpose we adopt the test for the existence of a convention, laid down by Sir Ivor Jennings, based on three questions: (a) What are the precedents? (b) Did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule?, and (c) Is there a reason for the rule?” 74. We   now   proceed   to   apply   the   tests   for   establishing   a convention in the facts of the present case. The submission of Shri   Kapil   Sibal,   as   noted   above,   is   that   on   six   prior occasions members were nominated to the Puducherry Legislative Assembly   after   consultation   with   elected   Government   of Puducherry. He has referred to nominations made in the year 1985, 1990, 1996, 2006 and 2011. With regard to year 2001, it has   been   submitted   that   when   Lt.   Governor   unilaterally forwarded the names   of the members, upon objection from the then Chief Minister, the proceedings were dropped and proposed list   was   referred   back   to   the   Administrator   for   lack   of consultation. 75. Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   Union   of   India   has 66 replied the aforesaid submission. In the short note submitted on behalf of the Union of India, details regarding nominations made   on   the   earlier   occasions   have   been   explained.   Learned counsel for the Union of India has also produced the original files   of   the   Central   Government   relating   to   the   aforesaid nominations as was orally directed on 20.11.2018. It relates to the nominations made on earlier occasions, original records duly flagged has been submitted by the Union of India. The details submitted by the Union of India are in the following tabular form: DETAILS REGARDING NOMINATIONS MADE ON EARLIER OCCASIONS

67

76. The above details indicate that in the year 1990, 1997, 2005,   2007   and   2014   nominations   were   made   on   the recommendations of Chief Minister/LG. Original records fully support the statement made in the above Chart. The position of nomination is different in the year 1995, 2001 and 2011 which needs to be specifically noted.  77. In   the   year   1995,   Chief   Minister   of   the   Pondicherry suggested   three   names   for   nominations   whereas   President, Puducherry   Pradesh   Congress   Committee   also   suggested   three different names. The Prime Minister had approved three names which consists one name suggested by Chief Minister, one name suggested by  President, Puducherry Pradesh Congress Committee 68 and   one   name   of   its   own.   Notification   was   issued   on 26.07.1995. A decision was subsequently taken to cancel the notification by the Home Minister on 12.08.1995. No further nominations were made in the said year. 78. Now we come to year 2001. In the year 2001, Lieutenant Governor   had   forwarded   names   of   10   persons   who   had   sought nominations as members of the Legislative Assembly. The Chief Minister,   Pondicherry   had   sent   representation   that   the   Lt. Governor   did   not   consult   him   in   the   matter   of   proposing nominations. The issue surfaced in the said year as to whether the   consultation   of   Chief   Minister   is   necessary   before nomination by the Central Government. The Home Minister by his order dated 08.08.2001 directed for obtaining legal advise. The Joint Secretary and Legal Adviser submitted a note dated 21.09.2001 in which in paragraph 9 he opined: "9. In the light of the above, we are of the view that   consultation   with   the   Chief   Minister   of Pondicherry   is   not   necessary   before   the   Central Government nominates a person to be a member of its Legislative   Assembly   under   sub­section   (3)   of section 3 of the Act.” No final nominations could be made in the year 2001, 2002 and 2003. 69 79. In the year 2011, although recommendations were sent by the Lt. Governor and Chief Minister but no nominations were made.   After   the   nominations   made   in   the   year   2014,   the nominations   have   been   made   in   the   year   2017.   A   note   dated 16.08.2016 was put up by Deputy Secretary that last nomination was made vide notification dated 02.09.2014 with the approval of Home Minister. The tenure of the Assembly got over and new Assembly has been constituted, hence, new persons are to be appointed   as   Nominated   Members.   A   perusal   of   the   original records indicates that following four issues were outlined to be referred to the Attorney General for his advice: " Issue   No.1: Whether   the   Central   Govt.   has   got absolute   powers   to   appoint   nominated Members to the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry? Issue No.2: Whether recommendation of LG, Puducherry is mandatory for consideration of names for appointment of nominated Members to Puducherry   Legislative   Assembly   by   the Central Government ? Issue No.3: If   the   reply   to   Issue   1   is   in affirmative,   is   there   any   role   of   the Chief   Minister/Council   of   Ministers   to aid/advise   the   L.G.   in   the   matter   of making such recommendation, and if so, whether such aid and advice is binding upon the LG? Issue No.4: Keeping in view that there is no laid down   procedure   for   such   nomination, whether   any   prescribed   procedure   is 70 required to be followed or any specific condition   to   he   imposed   for   making nominations?” 80. The Attorney General on 15.11.2016 ordered the file “Be put   up   before   the   S.G.”.   In   the   records   there   is   detailed opinion   given   by   the   Solicitor   General   on   29.11.2016.   The Solicitor General with regard to Queries Nos.1,2,3 and 4  has opined: "5. In   light   of   the   aforementioned   observations, the Queries raised are answered accordingly: i. Re:Query (I): Section 3(3) of the Government of Union   Territories   Act,   1963   empowers   Central Government   to   nominate   members   of   the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry. Due to the operation   of   the   word   “may”   in   the   said sub­section   (3),   the   said   power   is   to   be exercised   at   the   discretion   of   the   Central Government. Hence, the Central Government may, or   may   not   nominate   three   members   to   the Legislative Assembly of Puducherry. However, it is   relevant   to   note   the   members   nominated   in the manner envisaged   in   sub­section (3) of Section   3,   must   comply   with   the   criteria   of qualification   of   members   to   the   Legislative Assembly   enumerated   in   Section   4   of   the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 and will be disqualified from being members of the Legislative Assembly if found within Section 14 of   the   Government   of   Union   Territories   Act, 1963. ii. Re: Query (iii): The Central Government may in 71 its   wisdom   consult   the   Administrator   of Puducherry   for   consideration   of   names   for appointment   of   nominated   members   to   the Puducherry Legislative Assembly especially when the   Administrator   is   the   nominee   of   the President. iii. Re: Query (iii):  As stated in response to Query (ii),   the   recommendation   of   Administrator   is not   mandatory   for   consideration   of   names   for appointment   of   nominated   members   to   the Puducherry Legislative Assembly but he/she may be   consulted.   Therefore,   the   role   of   Chief Minister/Council of Minister to aid/advice the L.G.   in   the   matter   of   making   such recommendation does not arise. iv. Re:   Query   (iv):   There   is   no   prescribed procedure   for   the   Central   Government   to nominate   three   members   to   the   Legislative Assembly.   In   the   absence   of   such   procedure, only the criteria for eligibility of a member laid down in Section 4   supra   and the criteria for disqualification in Section 14   supra   must be followed. I have nothing further to add.” 81. The file processed thereafter and Home Minister approved nominations   of   three   persons   to   the   Legislative   Assembly, Puducherry on 20.06.2017. Draft notification was put up for approval on 23.06.2016. 82. After having noticed the details of earlier nominations from 1985 till 2017, now the question has to be answered as to 72 whether from the sequence of the events as noticed above a Constitutional   convention   can   be   found   established   that nominations to the Legislative Assembly has to emanate from Chief Minister and can be made only with the concurrence of Chief Minister. We have noticed the test formulated by  Sir W. Ivor Jennings, as approved by this Court in    Supreme Court Advocates­on­record   Association   case   for   establishing   the existence   of   a   convention.   The   relevant   test,   as   noticed above, is again reproduced for ready reference: “We   have   to   ask   ourselves   three   questions: first, what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors   in   the   precedents   believe   that   they   were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents   without   such   a   reason   will   be   of   no avail,   unless   it   is   perfectly   certain   that   the persons concerned regarded them as bound by it.” 83. We will take up the three questions which are to be posed for deciding the question. First is “what are the precedents”. From the facts noticed above, although it is indicated that on several   occasions   on   the   recommendations   of   the   Chief Minister/LG nominations were made by the Central Government, one relevant fact cannot be lost sight that recommendations made by CM/LG were readily accepted by the Central Government when the Government of Puducherry and the Central Government 73 were of the same political party or were of allies. But the instance of year 1995  indicates that the recommendations made by Chief Minister were not followed and the nominations were made taking one name from Chief Minister's recommendation, one name from Puducherry Pradesh Congress Committee  and one name at   the   instance   of   the   Central   Government   itself   which nominations, however, subsequently were cancelled. In the year 2001 recommendations made by Chief Minister and LG were not accepted and no nominations were made. Similarly, in the year 2011 recommendations were made by Chief Minister and LG but no nominations   were   made.   The   above   facts   does   not   indicate uniform   precedent   in   making   nominations     by   the   Central Government. 84. Now, we come to the second test that is “did the actors in the precedents believed that they were bound by the rules”. The said test is not satisfied in the present case since more than   one   occasion   there   is   material   on   records   that   the Central Government concluded that it is not bound by any rule that recommendations made by Chief Minister is to be accepted by the Central Government or recommendations of Chief Minister is   a   condition   precedent   for   exercising   power   under sub­section   (3)   of   Section   (3).   No   uniform   procedure   was followed nor the Central Government was under the belief that 74 it is bound under the Rule to accept the recommendations made by the Chief Minister. It is true that there is no inhibition in the Central Government considering the recommendations sent by Chief Minister or LG or ask for suitable names from Chief Minister/LG   or   even   suggests   suitable   names   to   the   Chief Minister/LG   but   the   fact   that   the   Central   Government   can consider the recommendations or call for names is not akin to saying that there was any precedent or rule that unless the names   are   recommended   by   Chief   Minister   the     Central Government   is   incapacitated   in   exercising   its   powers   under sub­section (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 1963. The instance where the Central Government readily accepted recommendations made   by   LG   or   Chief   Minister   which   emanated   from   the Government   belonging   to   the   same   political   party   cannot   be said to be action of then Central Government by virtue of any rule   or   convention   rather   the   acts   have   to   be   treated   as convenient   exercise   of   power.   The   Central   Government     can receive input from any quarter including the Chief Minister or LG for nomination. 85. We may also refer to a judgment of this Court in  Consumer Education and Research Society vs. Union of India and others, (2009)   9   SCC   648.   One   of   the   questions   which   came   for 75 consideration   before   this   Court   in   the   above   case   was violation   of   constitutional   convention.   In   paragraph   37(ii) following question was noticed: "37(ii)   Whether   of   as   many   as   fifty­five   offices relating   to   statutory   bodies/non­statutory   bodies, without   referring   the   proposal   to   the   Joint Committee   would   render   the   amendment   a   colourable legislation   which   violated   any   “constitutional convention” or Article 14 of the Constitution.” 86. One   of   the   contentions   raised   in   the   above   case   for assailing the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959   as   amended   by   Act   31   of   2006   on   the   ground   that   for exempting   particular   office   from   a   list   of   the   office   of profit, opinion of Joint Committee was not obtained on Act 31 of   2006.   Repealing   the   contention   following   was   held   in paragraph 79: “79.  This brings us to the last question. It is not   in   serious   dispute   that   ever   since   Bhargava Committee   submitted   its   report   in   November   1955, whenever an office of profit had to be exempted the matter used to be referred to a Joint Committee and its opinion whether the office should be exempted or not, was being taken and only when there was a recommendation that a particular office should be exempted,   the   Act   was   being   amended   to   add   that office to the list of exemptions. However, this was merely   a   parliamentary   procedure   and   not   a constitutional   convention.   Once   Parliament   is recognised   as   having   the   power   to   exempt   from disqualification   and   to   do   so   with   retrospective effect,   any   alleged   violation   of   any   norm   or traditional   procedure   cannot   denude   the   power   of Parliament to make a law. Nor can such law which is 76 otherwise   valid   be   described   as   unconstitutional merely because a procedure which was followed on a few occasions was not followed for the particular amendment.” 87. The above judgment although was considering law made by the Parliament where in the present case we are concerned with the   exercise   of   statutory   power   of   the   Central   Government under   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   3   of   the   Act,   1963.   In exercising   the   power   under   Section   3(3)   no   particular statutory procedure having been prescribed except the exercise of power as per Allocation of Business Rules and Transaction of Business Rules, 1961 nominations made cannot be held to be vitiated on the submission that a particular procedure which was followed in some earlier cases was not followed. 88. We do not find any established practice or convention to the   fact   that   names   for   nominations   to   members   of   the Legislative Assembly has to emanate from Chief Minister and can be made by the Central Government only after concurrence by Chief Minister. Both the issues are answered accordingly. Issue No. 6      89. Shri Kapil Sibal submits that High Court in Paragraph No. 5 has made certain recommendations.  He has taken exception to 77 the recommendation (iv), which is to the following effect:­ “(iv)   If   the   nominated   MLA   belongs   to   a   political party on the date of nomination, it should be made clear that he shall become part of the legislature party   of   that   political   party.   If   there   is   no legislature   party   in   the   house   on   the   date   of nomination, the nominated MLA/s shall constitute the legislature party of  that political party.  This is inter­alia owing to Explanation (b) to paragraph 2(1) (b)   of   Tenth   Schedule   to   COI   using   the   term 'political party' and not 'legislature party'.” 90. We have perused the recommendations made in Paragraph No. 5 of   the   judgment   of   Justice   M.   Sundar.     The   recommendations contained in paragraph No. 5 are nothing but recommendations to the   Parliament   to   frame   legislation   on   various   aspects   as enumerated   in  the  recommendation.    We  have,  in  the   foregoing discussions, concluded that it is the Central Government, which is   under   Section   3(3)   empowered   to   nominate   members   in   the Legislative   Assembly   of   Union   Territory.     The   procedure   and manner of taking decision by Central Government has already been regulated by Rules of Business framed by President in exercise of power under Article 77 of the Constitution of India.   The Rules   framed   by   President   of   India   under   Article   77(3)   are applicable to all executive actions of the Central Government including   Constitutional   and   Statutory   functions.     In   a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in   Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (1974) 2 SCC 831  following was laid 78 down in Paragraph No. 29:­ “29.   The executive power is generally described as the   residue   which   does   not   fall   within   the legislative   or   judicial   power.   But   executive   power may also partake of legislative or judicial actions. All powers and functions of the President except his legislative powers as for example in Article 123 viz. ordinance making power and all powers and functions of the Governor except his legislative power as for example in Article 213 being ordinance making powers are   executive   powers   of   the   Union   vested   in   the President   under   Article   53(1)   in   one   case   and   are executive powers of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) in the other case. Clause (2) or clause   (3)   of   Article   77   is   not   limited   in   its operation to the executive action of the Government of India under clause (1) of Article 77. Similarly, clause   (2)   or   clause   (3)   of   Article   166   is   not limited in its operation to the executive action of the   Government   of   the   State   under   clause   (1)   of Article   166.   The   expression   “Business   of   the Government of India” in clause (3) of Article 77, and the   expression   “Business   of   the   Government   of   the State”   in   clause   (3)   of   Article   166   includes   all executive business.” 91. There being already Rules of Business for carrying out the functions by the Central Government as per Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India, we fail to see any justification for making recommendation in paragraph No. 5 of the impugned judgment. Furthermore, the power is to be exercised by Central Government and it is to be presumed that Central Government, in exercise of its power, shall be guided by objective and rational considerations. We, however, hasten to add that there is no inhibition in Central government or the Legislature to 79 make Rules or a Statute for more convenient transaction of business   regarding   nominations.     Recommendations   to   the Legislature and the high Constitution authorities are not made in a routine manner and we are of the view that High Court ought   to   have   desisted   for   making   any   recommendations   as contained   in   paragraph   No.   5.     The   qualifications   and disqualifications   to   become   a   member   or   continue   to   be   a member of a Legislative Assembly have already been provided in the Act, 1963.   The qualifications and disqualifications for members of Legislative Assembly are provided in the Act, 1963 and other relevant Statutes, which are always to be kept in mind, while exercising any Statutory functions by the Central Government.     We,   thus,   are   of   the   view   that   not   only recommendation   made   in   paragraph   No.   5(iv)   but   all   the recommendations made in Paragraph No. 5 deserves to be set aside.   In result, all recommendations as made in Paragraph No. 5 of the impugned judgment are set aside. Issue No.7 92. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by Shri Kapil Sibal is that even if the nominated members have right to vote in the proceeding of Assembly, they have no right to vote   in   two   circumstances,   i.e.   budget   and   no   confidence 80 motion against the Government.   Article 239A which provides for   composition   of   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry   itself contemplated that the Parliament, may by law, create a body, (i)   whether   elected   or;   (ii)   partly   nominated   and   partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union Territory of Puducherry.  Under Article 239, the Parliament has enacted the law, i.e., the Government of Union Territory Act, 1963, Section 3 of which provides that there shall be a Legislative Assembly for each Union territory.  The total number of seats in   the   Legislative   Assembly   of the   Union   territory   to   be filled by persons chosen by direct election shall be thirty and the Central Government may nominate not more than three persons,   to   be   members   of   the   Legislative   Assembly   of the Union   territory.     Thus,   the   composition   of   Legislative Assembly   itself   consists   of   both   persons   chosen   by   direct election   and   persons   nominated   by   the   Central   Government. Both   elected   and   nominated   persons   are   part   of   Legislative Assembly.   The provisions of Act, 1963 refers to members of the   Legislative   Assembly.     Section   11   provides   that   every member   of   the   Legislative   Assembly   of the   Union   territory shall, before taking his seat, make and subscribe before the Administrator, or some person appointed in that behalf by him, an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the 81 purpose in the First Schedule.  The expression “every member of   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   the   Union   territory”   shall include both elected and nominated members.   It is further clarified by First Schedule of the Act, 1963, which contains the forms of oaths and affirmations, which expressly refers both elected and nominated members. 93. Section 12 deals with the voting in the Assembly, which is as follows:­ 12.  Voting   in   Assembly,   power   of   Assembly   to   act notwithstanding vacancies and quorum. (1)  Save   as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Act,   all questions at any sitting of the Legislative Assembly of the   Union   territory   shall   be   determined   by   a majority of votes of the members present and voting other than the Speaker or person acting as such. (2)  The Speaker or person acting as such shall not vote   in   the   first   instance   but   shall   have   and exercise a casting vote in the case of an equality of votes. (3)  The Legislative Assembly of the Union territory shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof, and any proceedings in the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory shall be valid   notwithstanding   that   it   is   discovered subsequently that some person who was not entitled so to do, sat or voted or otherwise took part in the proceedings. (4)  The   quorum   to   constitute   a   meeting   of   the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory shall be 82 one­third   of   the   total   number   of   members   of   the Assembly. (5)  If   at   any   time   during   a   meeting   of   the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory there is no quorum, it shall be the duty of the Speaker, or person acting as such, either to adjourn the Assembly or to suspend the meeting until there is a quorum . 94. Section 12(1) provides that all questions at any sitting of the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and voting other than the Speaker or person acting as such.  When the expression used is votes of members present, obviously the members of the Assembly both elected and nominated person has to   be   counted,   we   cannot   while   interpreting   Section   12(1) exclude the nominated members.  Further Section 12(1) uses the expression “all questions at any sitting of the Legislative Assembly”, the expression “all questions” shall  include  all matters,   which   are   to   be   decided   in   any   sitting   of   the Legislative Assembly.   The Statutory provision does not give indication that nominated members have no right to vote on budget and no confidence motion against the Government.   To accept the submission of Shri Sibal shall be adding words to provision of Section 12, which are clear and express. Further, sub­section(1)   provides   that   in   the   voting   majority   of   the 83 votes of the members present and voting, the speaker shall not be a person, who shall vote.  When provision of sub­section(1) clearly provides no voting   by Speaker,     if intention of Legislature was to exclude the votes of nominated members, the said   expression   was   bound   to   find   included   in   the sub­section(1).     The   conclusion   is   inescapable   that   all members including the nominated members are entitled to vote in the sitting of the Legislative Assembly and the submission of Shri Sibal that nominated members cannot exercise vote in budget and no confidence motion has to be rejected.   Other provisions like sub­section (4) of Section 12, which provides for quorum to constitute a meeting of the Legislative Assembly used the word “one­third of the total number of members of the Assembly”, members of the Assembly obviously will include both elected and nominated members.   Thus, there is no basis for submission raised by Shri Sibal that nominated members cannot exercise their vote in budget and no confidence motion against the Government.  The issue is answered accordingly. 95. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussions,   we   uphold   the impugned   judgment   of   the   Madras   High   Court   for   the   above reasons   except   directions   in   paragraph   5   which   are   hereby deleted. In the result, the appeals are dismissed subject to the deletion of recommendations made in paragraph 5 of the 84 judgment. Parties shall bear their own costs. ..........................J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) ..........................J.     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) ..........................J. ( S. ABDUL NAZEER ) NEW DELHI, December 06 , 2018.