Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JETHA BAI & SONS, JEW TOWN, COCHIN, ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SUNDERDAS RATHENAI, ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1988
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
BENCH:
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
RANGNATHAN, S.
CITATION:
1988 AIR 812 1988 SCR (2) 871
1988 SCC (1) 722 JT 1988 (1) 329
1988 SCALE (1)243
CITATOR INFO :
R 1989 SC 922 (10)
ACT:
Whether against an order of a District Court in
Revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease &
Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a further Revision lies to the
High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure-
Determination of-Landlord-Tenant dispute-In the matter of.
HEADNOTE:
%
These appeals together with a petition for special
leave raised a common question of law-whether against an
order of a District Court in revision under section 20 of
the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a
further revision would lie to the High Court under section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the question was
not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133-A.I.R.
1987 S.C. 203, the matters were listed for consideration, by
a Bench of three Judges, of the very same question in order
to see whether there was any conflict between the views
taken in Aundal Ammal’s case above-said and a later decision
of this Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt &
Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663, and whether the view taken in the
earlier case required reconsideration. Aundal Ammal’s case
arose under the Kerala Act afore-mentioned, and the
Shyamaraju Hegde’s case was under the karnataka Rent Control
Act, and there were essential differences between the two
Acts.
The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section
18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench
of the Kerala High Court in Vareed v. Mary, A.I.R. 1969
Kerala 103, which held that a decision of a District Court
under section 20 of the Kerala Act was undoubtedly amenable
to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under
section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question
decided by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above-
mentioned, came to be considered by this Court (a Bench of
two Hon. Judges) in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra), and the
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Court held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court
in Vareed’s case (supra) could not be approved because the
High Court had not properly construed the sections 18(5)
872
and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error.
So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned, this Court
held in Shyamaraju Hegde’s case (supra) that an order of a
District Judge under section 50(2), though it conferred
finality under the Act, was nevertheless open to challenge
before the High Court by revision under section 115 C.P.C.
by the aggrieved party.
What fell for consideration in the present cases was
whether there was any conflict between the decisions in
Aundal Ammal’s case (supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde’s case
(supra) and whether the ratio in the former case required
reconsideration.
Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special
Leave, the Court,
^
HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji & S. Natarajan, JJ.
After examining the differences between the two Acts in
detail, the Court concluded that there was really no
conflict between the two decisions of this Court in Aundal
Ammal’s case (supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde’s case (supra),
because the provisions in the two Acts were materially
different. As to the question whether a fresh thinking was
called for on the scope of section 20 read with section
18(5) of the Kerala Act, the Court did not find any grounds
for reconsidering the view taken in the Aundal Ammal’s case;
on the contrary, the renewed discussion by the Court of the
matter called for a reiteration of the view expressed in
Aundal Ammal’s case. [889C-D]
The Court was unable to conntenance in the
circumstances of the case, the argument advanced that since
the decision of the Kerala High Court in Vareed v. Mary
aforementioned had been a good law for a number of years in
the Kerala State and since the High Court had been
entertaining revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C.
against the revisional orders of the District Courts under
sections 20(1) of the Kerala Act, the decision should have
been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was
not commendable for acceptance by this Court, and the reason
therefore, the Court observed, could be set out by referring
to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted
therein, in West Ham Union v. Edmonten Union, 13 1908 AC 1
at 4; Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. v. Hongton V. Chester
i.e. Street Assessment Committee, 12 1937 2 All ER 298,
affirmed in 1938 (2) All E.R. 79. These decisions had been
followed in Brownsee Haven Proper
873
ties Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, [1958] 1 All ER, 205. On
similar lines, this Court deemed it necessary to overrule
the ratio in Vareed v. Mary (supra), as the decision
suffered from miscontruction of the relevant sections in the
Act, and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in
the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as
in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32 = 1980 2
SCC 378 = AIR 1980 SC 892.[889E-F; 890A-C]
In the light of the conclusion of the Court, all the
appeals succeeded in so far as the challenge to the right of
the High Court to entertain revision petitions under section
115, C.P.C., was concerned. In Civil Appeals Nos. 626 of
1981 and 624 of 1985, the High Court allowed the revision
petitions under section 115 C.P.C., and ordered the eviction
of the tenants. In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981, the
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District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High
Court restored the order of eviction. In the Civil Appeal
No. 1619 of 1986, the District Judge allowed the Revision
and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller and the High Court confirmed the said order in
revisions. In the Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983, the
District Judge reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller
and the Appellant Authority and ordered eviction and the
High Court confirmed the order of the District Judge. In the
petition for special leave listed with the appeals, the
Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for
eviction under section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the
case to the Rent Controller for deciding the question
whether the tenant was entitled to resist the claim for
eviction. The District Court and the High Court confirmed
the order of remand.[890D-G]
In accordance with the pronouncement of the Court, the
order of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., in each of
the appeals above-mentioned was set aside and the revisional
order of the District Judge in each case, restored to become
operative. The appeals were directed only against the orders
of the High Court passed in revision, and they were disposed
of with the pronouncement of the Court on the above lines.
[890G-H; 891A]
In the petition for special leave also, the order of
the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., was not
sustainable, but even so, the Court did not find any merit
in the petition, because the finding of the Appellate
Authority and the order of remand passed by it had been
confirmed by the District Court ’and as such, there were no
merits in the petition. [891B]
874
Per S. Ranganathan, J. (dissenting)
While a number of enactments of various States on rent
control confer specific jurisdiction on the State High
Courts, some others are broadly on the same pattern as the
Kerala and Karnataka enactments. Though the Court was
concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these
matters, a similar question might well arise under the
corresponding enactments of some other States as well.[891C-
D]
The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest power
of revision in the District Judge against certain orders.
The question in these matters was whether the jurisdiction
of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., could be invoked
to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by
the District Judge. This question was answered in the
negative in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 SCC
133 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative
in Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987] 3 J.T. 663 (a
decision under the Karnataka Act), and hence this reference
to a larger Bench.[891E-F]
Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under
section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District
Judge/Court. The fact that the order might have been passed
under a special statute or that the statute contained
expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of
the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or
Court, had been held insufficient to take away this
jurisdiction. This was the effect of the decisions in
Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977] 2
S.C.R. 871 and Krishandas Bhatija v. Venkatachala Shetty,
S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju’s
case (supra), which were direct decisions under the
Karnataka Act. In the opinion of his Lordship, there was no
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vital or material difference between the two enactments in
this respect and that the same result should follow under
the Kerala Act also. [891G-H; 892A-B]
Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendments in 1975,
the rent control matters are decided, in the first instance,
by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller.
There is no provision for an appeal from this order but
there is one for revision. This revisional power is
bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the
District Court. The High Court is empowered to revise the
order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District
Judge that of the District Munsiff. Section 50(2)
specifically declares that the order of the District Judge
under this provision is final. The Kerala pattern is the
same except that section 18 provides for an appeal from the
Rent Controller
875
to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate
Judge or of a superior rank. Section 20 provides for
revision. The revisional power is to be exercised by the
District Court where the appellate authority is the
subordinate Judge, and the High Court, in other cases.
Section 20 does not provide, as does section 50 of the
Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge would
be final. The much wider and more emphatic language of the
Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High
Court under s. 115 of the C.P.C., as had been held in the
two cases referred to above, and it was difficult to see the
justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala
Act. [892C-H]
This led to the question of a choice between the two
views of this Court-one in Shyamaraju and the other, in
Aundal Ammal. Shyamaraju followed the earlier decisions of
this Court in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation,
Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1955 and Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S.
Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on
February 13, 1978. The only other decision of this Court,
having relevance in the present context, was Vishesh Kumar
v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32, relied upon in Aundal
Ammal. His Lordship was in agreement with the view in
Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally
statutory context. That decision turned largely on
legislative history of s. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the
Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, in their application to
the State of Uttar Pradesh. His Lordship was, therefore,
inclined to lean in favour of the view that had commended
itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the
Karnataka Act, and to hold that the High Court had a power
of revision over the order of the District Judge under the
Kerala Act as well. The result of applying Aundal Ammal
would be to completely exclude the High Court in the Rent
Control matters, and, this, as the two Acts were in pari
materia according to his Lordship’s view, would leave the
litigant in Karnataka only a right of revision to the
District Court. It was doubtful whether, in the absence of
clear language, the Legislature could be held to have
intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High
Court in such an important Branch of law. The provisions did
not and could not, in his Lordship’s view, preclude the
applicability of s. 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by
the District Court, not as a persona designata, but as a
civil court of the land. Section 18 and 20 had a vital role
to pay but their effect was not to eliminate the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115. [893A-F;
894B-C]
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As a result of the various decisions of the Courts, the
position had been that right through in the State of
Karnataka and for at least a
876
period of 20 years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent
view had been in favour of the maintainability of a second
revision by the High Court. In a matter of procedure, such a
long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the
statutory indication was quite clear to the contrary. [894F]
The revision petitions before the High Court were
maintainable.[894G]
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133;
Shyamaraju Hegde v. G. Venkatesha Bhatt & Ors., [1987] 3
J.T. 663; Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984] K.L.T.
845; Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 103; Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti
Prasad, [1980] 2 SCR 32; Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v.
Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Ors., ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585;
Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC
1555; Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP
(Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978; M.M.
Yaragatti v. Vasant & Ors., AIR 1987 Karnataka 186; S.S.
Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1954 S.C. 497; West Ham Union v.
Domonton Union, 13 1908 A.C. 1 at 4; Robinson Brothers
(Brewers) Ltd. v. Honghton & Chester_ie_Street Assessment
Committee, 12 1937 2 All E.R. 298 and 1938 2 All E.R. 79 and
Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd. v. Poole Corporation, [1958]
1 All ER, 205 referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 626 of
1981 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1980 of the
Kerala High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2939 of
1978.
P.S. Poti, G. Viswanatha Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, T.S.
Krishnamoorthy Iyer, E.M.S. Anam. R. Sathish, M.A. Firoz, N.
Sudhakar, Miss Nalini Poduval and S. Balakrishnan for the
appearing parties.
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:
NATARAJAN, J. These appeals by special leave and the
special leave petition have been clubbed together and listed
for consideration of a common question of law involved in
them, viz. whether against an order of a District Court in
revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease &
Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965 (for short the Kerala Act), a
further revision would lie to the High Court under Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
877
Though the question is not res integra in view of the
decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai,
[1987] 1 SCC 133: AIR 1987 SC 203, the appeals have been
listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the
very same question in order to see whether there is any
conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal’s case
(supra) and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju
Hedge v. G. Venkatesha Bhat & Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663 and
whether the view taken in the earlier case requires
reconsideration.
Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be
mentioned that Aundal Ammal’s case arose under the Kerala
Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge’s case (supra) pertained to the
Karnataka Rent Control Act. Since there are essential
differences between the two Acts, it is necessary to set out
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the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the
circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act
came to be rendered by this Court.
As per section 20(5) of the Kerala Act "a Rent Control
Court" means a Court constituted under Section 3. Under
Section 3(1) "the Government may, by Notification in the
Gazette appoint a person who is or is qualified to be
appointed, a Munsif to be the Rent Control Court for such
local areas as may be specified therein." Section 11 of the
Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant
only by making an application to the Rent Control Court and
it also sets out the grounds on which a landlord can seek
eviction of his tenant. Section 18 of the Act provides for
an Appeal being preferred by an aggrieved person to the
Appellate Authority. The relevant portions of Section 18 are
as under:
"18. Appeal:(1)(a) The Government may, by general
or special order notified in the Gazette, confer
on such officers and authorities not below the
rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of
appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act
in such areas or in such classes of cases as may
be specified in the order.
(b) ........
(2) ........
(3) ........
Explanation .....
878
(4) The appellate authority shall have all
the powers of the Rent Control Court including the
fixing of arrears or rent.
(5) The decision of the appellate authority,
and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent
Control Court shall be final and shall not be
liable to be called in question in any Court of
law, except as provided in section 20." (Emphasis
supplied).
Then comes Section 20 which provides for Revisions and it
reads as follows:
"20. Revision:(1) In cases where the appellate
authority empowered under section 18 is a
subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in
other cases the High Court may, at any time, on
the application of any aggrieved party, call for
and examine the records relating to any order
passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such
authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as
to the legality, regularity or propriety of such
order or proceedings and may pass such order in
reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all
proceedings before the High Court or District
Court under sub-section (1) shall be in it
discretion.
20A. Power to remand: In disposing of an
appeal or application for revision under this Act,
the appellate authority, or the revising
authority, as the case may be, may remand the case
for fresh disposal according to such directions as
it may give."
The scope and effect of Section 20(1) read with Section
18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench
of the Kerala High Court in Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 Kerala
103. The Full Bench held that since the District Court
exercising revisional powers under Section 20(1) of the
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Kerala Act functions as a Court and not as a persona
designata, the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that
Court including any right of appeal or revision will be
inhered to the decision rendered by the District Court. In
that view of the matter the Full Bench held that a decision
of a District Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Act is
undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction
879
of the High Court especially when there is no provision in
the Act providing for an appeal against an order of the
District Court under Section 20 or in the alternative any
express provision declaring the finality of the said order.
The decision of the Full Bench held the field for a number
of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases
where the competence of the High Court to entertain a
revision under Section 115 C.P.C. against an order of a
District Court passed under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act
was challenged the contention was repelled by reference to
the judgment of the Full Bench. One such case in point is
Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984]KLT 845.
The question decided by the Full Bench, however, came
to be raised before this Court, in Aundal Ammal’s case
(supra). A Bench consisting of E.S. Venkataramiah, J. and
one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) held that the ratio laid
down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed’s case (supra)
cannot be approved because the High Court had not properly
construed Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act. The
relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms:
"In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the
provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the
Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states
that such decision of the appellate authority as
mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be
liable to be questioned except in the manner under
Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an
implied prohibition or exclusion of a second
revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to the High Court when a revision has
been provided under Section 20 of the Act in
question. When Section 18(5) of the Act
specifically states that "shall not be liable to
be called in question in any court of law" except
in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot
be said that the High Court which is a court of
law and which is a civil court under the Code of
Civil Procedure under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Produce could revise an order once again
after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That
would mean there would be a trial by four courts,
that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in
the different sections of the Act in question.
Public policy or public interest demands
curtailment of law’s delay and justice demands
finality with quick disposal of case. The language
of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with
Section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts
must so construe."
880
The Bench drew support for its conclusion from an
earlier decision of this Court in Veshesh Kumar v. Shanti
Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32: 1980(2) SCC 378: AIR 1980 SC 892.
In that case the two questions that case the two questions
that fell for consideration were:
"(1) Whether the High Court possesses revisional
jurisdiction under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure
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in respect of an order of the District Court under
s. 115 disposing of a revision petition?
(2) Whether the High Court possesses revisional
jurisdiction under s. 115 against an order of the
District Court under s. 25, Provisional Small
Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision
petition?"
Answering both the questions in the negative, it was held in
so far as question no. 1 is concerned, as follows:
"........ In determining whether the Legislature
intended a further revision petition to the High
Court, regard must be had to the principle that
the construction given to a statute should be such
as would advance the object of the legislation and
suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It
seems to us that to recognise a revisional power
in the High Court over a revisional order passed
by the District Judge would plainly defeat the
object of the legislative scheme. The intent
behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction- to reduce
the number of revision petitions filed in the High
Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in
large measure, lose its meaning. If a revision
petition is permitted to the High Court against
the revisional order of the District Court arising
out of a suit of a value less than Rs.20,000, a
fundamental contradiction would be allowed to
invade and destroy the division of revisional
power between the High Court and the District
Court, for the High Court would then enjoy
jurisdictional power in respect of an order
arising out of a suit of a valuation below
Rs.20,000. That was never intended at all."
The second question was answered as under:
"The question before us arises in those cases only
where the District Judge has exercised revisional
power under s.
881
25. Is an order so made open to revision by the
High Court under s. 115. Code of Civil Procedure?
An examination of the several provisions of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that
it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present
enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of
correcting decrees or orders made by a Court of
Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a
revision in cases falling under s. 24 and s. 25
respectively. Cases in which the District Judge
and High Court respectively exercise revisional
power, revisional powers are specifically
mentioned. A complete set of superior remedies has
been incorporated in the Act. Moreover, s. 27 of
the Act provides:
"27. Finality of decrees and orders. Save as
provided by this Act, a decree or order made under
the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of
Small Causes shall be final."
The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or
order made by a Court of Small Causes should be
final subject only to correction by the remedies
provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act. It is a point for consideration that had s.
25, in its application to the State of Uttar
Pradesh continued in its original form the High
Court would have exercised the revisional power
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under s. 25, and no question could have arisen of
invoking the revisional power of the High Court
under s. 115 of the Code. All the indications
point to the conclusion that a case falling within
the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never
intended to be subject to the remedies provided by
the Code of Civil Procedure. By way of abundant
caution s. 7 of the Code made express provision
barring the application of ss. 96 to 112 and 115
of the Code to courts constituted under the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Section 7 of
the Code merely embodies the general principle
against resort to remedies outside the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act. Although the court of the
District Judge is not a court constituted under
the Act the general principle continues to take
effect. No change in the principle was brought
about merely because revisional power under s. 25,
before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to
the District Judge. It must be remembered that the
legislative intention behind the amendment was to
relieve the High Court of the
882
burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in
respect of cases decided under the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act. We are of firm opinion
that the central principle continues to hold,
notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25,
that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the
Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a
complete and final order of remedies, and it is
not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail
of a superior remedy provided by another statute."
Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a
selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra)
that "the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error
and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction
to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC."
Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of
the High Court and of this Court pertaining to Section 50
read with Section 48(6) of the said Act, it is first
necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as
they stood before and after the amendments effected by the
Amendment Act 31 of 1975. The relevant portions of Section
48 and 50, as they stood before the amendment and after the
amendment are as under:
Before the Amendment After the Amendment
48. 48.
Appeals:-(1)Notwithstanding Appeals:-(1) omitted.
anything contained in any
law for the time being in
force, every person aggrieved
by an order under section 14,
Section 16, Section 17 or
section 21, passed by the
Controller or the Court may
within thirty days from the
date of the order, prefer
an appeal in writing to the
District Judge having jurisd-
iction over the area in which
the premises are situate.
2............ 2..............
3............ 3..............
4............ 4..............
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5. The appellate authority 5. The appllate authority
shall send for the records shall send for the records of
883
of the case from the Courtthe case from the Controller and
or the Controller, as the caseafter giving the parties an oppor-
may be, and after giving thetunity of being heard and if
parties an opportunity of beingnecessary after making such further
heard and if necessary afterenquiry as it thinks fit either itself
making such further enquiry asor through the Controller shall
it thinks fit, either itself ordecide the appeal.
through the Court or the Contro-
ller, as the case may be, shall
decide the appeal.
Explanation .............
6. Subject to any decision of the6. An order of the court or the
High Court under section 50 theController shall, subject to the
decision of the District Judge shalldecision of the District Judge or th
e
be final, and an order of the CourtHigh Court under section 50 or of
or the Controller shall, subject tothe relevant appellate authority
the decision of the relevant appel-under this Act be final and shall
late authority under this Act or ofnot be liable to be called in questio
n
the High Court under section 50,in any court of law whether in a
be final and shall not be liable tosuit or other proceeding or by way
be called in question in any courtof appeal or revision.
of law whether in a suit or other
proceedings or by way of appeal
or revision.
50. Revision by the High Court50. Revision.
1. The High Court may, at any(1).The High Court may,at any
time, call for and examine-time,call for examine any order
passed or proceeding taken by the
(i) the records relating to anycourt of Civil Judge under this Act
decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con-
taken by the District Judge.troller under sections 14,15 16,or
17 for the purpose of satisfying itself
(ii) any order passed or proceed-as to the legality or correctness of
ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may
Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference
Controller under section 14,thereto as it thinks fit.
section 15 or section 16.
for the purpose of satisfying itself as
to the legality or correctness of such
decision, order or proceeding and
may pass such order in reference
thereto as it think fit;
2. The costs of, and incidental2. The District Judge may, at any
all proceedings before the Hightime, call for and examine any order
Court shall be in its distretion.passed or proceeding taken by the
884
Court of Munsiff referred to in
sub-clause(iii)of clause (d) of
section(3)for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the legality
or correctness of such order in
reference thereto as he thinks fit.
the order of the District Judge shall
be final.
3. The costs of and incidental to all
proceedings before the High Court
or the District Judge shall be in the
discretion of the High Court or the
District Judge, as the case may be."
On a reading of the provisions it may be seen that under
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Section 48 as it stood prior to the amendment, an appeal lay
to the District Judge against an order passed under Sections
14, 16, 17 or 21 by the Rent Controller or the Court and
thereafter a revision lay to the High Court under Section 50
of the Act. Sub-section (6) of Section 48 further provided
that the decision of the District Judge shall, subject to
the decision of the High Court under Section 50, be final
and the order of the Court or the Controller shall subject
to the decision of the relevant Appellate Authoirty under
the Act or of the High Court under Section 50 be final and
shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of
law, whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of
appeal or revision. One of the changes effected by the
Amending Act was to confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in
the place of District Munsifs in respect of house rent
control cases arising in the city of Mangalore. Another
change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the
District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control Court by
deleting sub-section (1) of Section 48. The third change
effected is of a two-fold nature. The first is to restrict
the High Court’s powers of revision under Section 50 to only
those cases decided by the city Civil Judges and the second
is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect
of cases decided by the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in
areas outside the city of Bangalore. Thus what the
legislature had done was to do away with the remedy of an
appeal so as to save the litigants from "a large segment of
time and much expenses". The resultant position is that as
against the orders of District Munsifs acting as Rent
Controllers a right of appeal to the District Judge and a
further revision to the High Court has been taken away and
instead only a right of revision to the District Court is
provided. In so far as the cases disposed of by the Civil
Judges in the city of Bangalore are concerned, a right of
revision is provided to the High Court. Notwithstanding the
changes effected,
885
Section 48(6) inter alia provided that an order of the Court
or the Controller shall, subject to the decision of the
District Judge or the High Court under Section 50 be final
and shall not be liable to be called in question in any
court of law, whether in a suit or other proceeding or by
way of appeal or revision.
In the background of the changes made by the
legislature, a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court went
into the question in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v.
Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Others, ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585
whether by reason of Section 48(6) a further revision
against a revisional order passed by the District Judge
under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to
the High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. Venkataramiah, J.
(as he then was), who spoke for the Full Bench held that in
the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC
1555 and Krishnadass Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty,
SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th February 1978
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C.
to revise an order of the District Judge passed under
Section 50(2) will stand unaffected.
The correctness of this view was questioned before
another Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in M.M.
Yaragatti v. Vasant & Others, AIR 1987 Karnataka 186. The
Full Bench took the view that in the light of the decisions
of the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases, viz. Aundal
Ammal’s case (supra) and Vishesh Kumar’s case (supra), the
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law laid down in Krishnaji’s case (supra) cannot be
considered good law any longer and as such a further
revision to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. will not
lie against an order passed by a District Judge in exercise
of his revisional powers under Section 50(2) of the
Karnataka Act.
The correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench in
Yaragatti’s case (supra) fell for consideration by this
Court in Shyamaraju’s case (supra). A Bench of this Court
held that in so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned, the
relevant provisions warranted invoking the ratio in
Chhaganlal’s case (supra) and Krishna Das Bahtija (supra)
and therefore the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in
Krishnaji’s case (supra) is the correct one and not the view
taken in Yaragatti’s case (supra). The position, therefore,
is that so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned an order of
a District Judge under Section 50(2), though conferred
finality under the Act is nevertheless open to challenge
before the High Court by means of a further revision under
Section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
886
What now falls for consideration is whether there is
any conflict between the decision in Aundal Ammal’s case
(supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde’s case (supra) and whether the
ratio in the former case requires reconsideration.
Even without any discussion it may be seen from the
narrative given above that there is really no conflict
between the two decisions because the provisions in the two
Acts are materially different. However, to clarify matters
further we may point out the differences between the two
Acts in greater detail and clarity. Under the Kerala Act,
against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided
over by a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred
a right of appeal under Section 18. The Appellate Authority
has to be a judicial officer not below the rank of a
Subordinate Judge. The Appellate Authority has been
conferred powers co-extensive with those of the Rent Control
Court but having over-riding effect. Having these factors in
mind, the Legislature has declared that in so far as an
order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final
subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate
Authority; and in so far as an Appellate Authority is
concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be
liable to be called in question in any Court of law except
as provided in section 20. As regards Section 20, a division
of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been
made between the High Court and the District Court. In all
those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision
of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge
under Section 18, the District Judge has been constituted
the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e.
where the decision sought to be revised is that of a
judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge,
the High Court has been constituted the Revisional
authority. The revisional powers conferred under Section 20,
whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the
case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of
revision exercisable by a High Court under Section 115
C.P.C. Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled
to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or
propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that,
the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have
been expressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20A
of the Act. Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to
put forth his case before the Rent Control Court and then
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before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be
before the Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the
Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge.
The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of
the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case
before
887
three courts, viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and
the Revisional Court, there was no need to make the
revisional order of the District Court subject to further
scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision
either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code. It
has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra) that the
Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe
the terms of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) in their
proper perspective and this failing had affected its
conclusion. According to the Full Bench, a revisional order
of a District Court under Section 20 laid itself open for
further challenge to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C.
because of two factors viz. (1) there was no mention in the
Act that the order would be final and (2) there was no
provision in the Act for an appeal being filed against a
revisional order under Section 20. The Full Bench failed to
notice certain crucial factors. In the first place, Section
20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of
revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge
as well as by the High Court. Such being the case if it is
to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under
Section 20 will not have finality because the Section does
not specifically say so, then it will follow that a
revisional order passed by the High Court under Section
20(1) also will not have finality. Surely it cannot be
contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in
exercise of its powers of revision under Section 20(1) can
be subjected to further revision because Section 20(1) has
not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under
that Section. Secondly, the terms of Section 20(1) have to
be read in conjunction with Section 18(5). Section 18(5), as
already seen, declares that an order of a Rent Control Court
shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate
Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be
final and shall not be liable to be called in question in
any court of law except as provided for in Section 20. When
the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent
Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority
shall be final at their respective states unless the order
is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional
Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the
legislature to declare once over again that an order passed
in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or the
High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of
finality. The third aspect is that the Legislature has not
merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate
Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall
not be liable to be called in question in any court of law
except as provided for in Section 20. These additional words
clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second
revision under Section 115 C.P.C. to the High Court against
a revisional order passed by a District Court
888
under Section 20 of the Act. This position has been
succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal
Ammal’s case (supra). As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar’s
case, the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction
is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the
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High Court and for determining the legislative intent, the
Court must as far as possible construe a statute in such a
manner as would advance the object of the legislation and
suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.
A thought may occur to some whether by a rigid
construction of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5), the
High Court’s power of superintendence over the District
Court, even when it functions as a revisional court under
Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act, will not stand forfeited.
We may only state that legislative history would indicate
that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by
a High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. appear to have been
conferred and vested "because the supervisory jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition over
Subordinate Courts in the mofussil could not be exercised,
(and hence) it would be reasonable to hold that it was
intended ......... to be analogous with the jurisdiction to
issue the high prerogative writs and the power of
supervision under the Charter Act and its successor
provisions in the Constitution Acts." vide para 10 S.S.
Khanna v. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497.
Incidentally, we may also point out that the
Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take
away the power of superintendence of the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution over all courts and
tribunals which are within the territories in relation to
which the High Court exercise its jurisdiction.
Having said so much it is really not necessary for us
to dwell at length about the decision in Shyamaraju’s case
restoring the ratio in Krishnaji’s case and disapproving the
decision in Yaragatti’s case. Even so we cannot but refer to
the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has
been completely taken away and the entire proceedings are
sought to be limited to a two tier system viz. the Rent
Control Court and the Revisional Court, whereas under the
Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz. the Rent
Control Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court.
Though Section 48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also
speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control
Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under
Section 50 in more or less the same terms as in Section
18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words
"shall be final
889
and shall not be liable to be called in question" etc. has
to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the
Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts
under the relevant provisions present distinctly different
perspections. It is in that situation it was found in
Shyamaraju’s case that the relevant provisions of the
Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in
Chhaganlal’s case and Krishnadas Bhatija’s case rather than
the ratio in Vishesh Kumar’s case and Aundal Ammal’s case.
In fact, it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who
spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji’s case was a party to
the judgment in Aundal Ammal’s case and the learned judge,
while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who spoke for
the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference
to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji’s case.
There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision
rendered in Aundal Ammal’s case (supra) and Shyamaraju’s
case (supra). As to the question whether a fresh thinking is
called for on the scope of Section 20 read with Section
18(5) of the Kerala Act, we do not find any grounds for
reconsidering the view taken in Aundal Ammal’s case and on
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the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls
for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal’s
case.
An argument was advanced that since the decision in
Vareed v. Mary had been good law for a number of years in
Kerala State and since the High Court had been entertaining
revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. against the
revisional orders of District Courts under Section 20(1) of
the Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to
stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable
for acceptance by this Court. We are unable to countenance
this argument in the circumstances of the case and the
reason therefore can be set out by refering to certain
English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein. In West
Ham Union v. Edmonton Union, 13 1908 A.C. 1 at page 4 Lord
Loreburn, L.C. spoke as under:
"Great importance is to be attached to old
authorities, on the strength of which many
transactions may have been adjusted and rights
determined. But where they are plainly wrong, and
especially where the subsequent course of judicial
decisions has disclosed weakness in the reasoning
on which they were based, and practical injustice
in the consequences that must flow from them, I
consider it is the duty of this House to overrule
them, if it has not lost the right to do so by
itself expressly affirming them."
890
In Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. v. Houghton &
Chesteric Street Assessment Committee, 12 1937 2 All E.R.
298, affirmed in 1938 2 All E.R. 79, the members of the
Court, having concluded that a decision on a question of
rating pronounced some forty years previously by a
Divisional Court was plainly wrong, overruled it
accordingly, although the earlier decision had, without
doubt, been frequently acted on in rating matters in the
meantime, and although no judicial doubt had previously been
cast on its correctness. These decisions have been referred
to and followed in Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd. v. Poole
Corporation, All E.R. 1958 1205. On similar lines this Court
deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed v. Mary,
(supra) as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the
relevant Sections in the Act and the weakness in the
reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent
decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar (supra).
In the light of our conclusion all the appeals must
succeed in so far as the challenge to the right of the High
Court to entertain revision petitions under Section 115
C.P.C. is concerned. In Civil Appeal Nos. 626 of 1981 and
624 of 1985, the High Court allowed the revision petition
under Section 115 C.P.C. and ordered the eviction of the
tenant. In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981 the District Judge
set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored
the order of eviction. In Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986 the
District Court allowed the Revision and restored the order
of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court
has confirmed the said order in the revision preferred to
it. In Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983 the District Court
reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the
Appellate Authority and ordered eviction and order of the
District Court has been confirmed by the High Court. In
Special Leave Petition No. 4311 of 1985 the Appellate
Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction
under Section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the
Rent Control Court for deciding the question whether the
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tenant is entitled to resist the claim for eviction on the
basis of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The
order of remand was confirmed by the District Court and the
High Court.
In accordance with our pronouncement it follows that
the order of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. in each
of the appeals concerned, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 626 of
1981, 624 of 1985, 2079 of 1981, 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of
1983 will stand set aside and the revisional order of the
District Judge in each case will stand restored and become
operative. As the appeals are directed only against the
order
891
of the High Court passed in revision the appeals will stand
disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines.
In Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4311 of 1985 also
the order of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. is not
sustainable but even so we do not find any merit in the
petition because the finding of the Appellate Authority and
the order of remand passed by it have been confirmed by the
District Court and as such, there are no merits in the
petition, accordingly it is dismissed. Interim orders, if
any, passed in the appeals and the special leave petition
will stand vacated. The parties in all the cases are
directed to bear their respective costs.
S. RANGANATHAN, J. 1. I find on a cursory perusal of
various State enactments on rent control that, while a
number of them do confer s . cific jurisdiction on the State
High Court, some others are broadly on the same pattern as
the Kerala and Karnataka enactments. Thus, though we are
concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these
cases, a similar question might well arise under the
corresponding enactments of some other States as well. It is
in view of this importance of the question raised that I
have considered it necessary to state my views in a separate
order.
2. The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest a
power of revision in the District Judge against certain
orders. The question in these matters is whether the
jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) can be invoked to seek a further
revision of the revisional order passed by the District
Judge. This question has been answered in the negative in
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 3 SCC 83 (a
decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in
Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987] 3 J.T. 663 (a
decision under the Karnataka Act) and hence this reference
to a larger Bench. My learned brothers are of the view that
there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the
two enactments are not in pari materia and that, so far as
the Kerala Act is concerned, Aundal Ammal should be
followed. With respect, I am unable to agree.
3. Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under
section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District
Judge/Court. The fact that the order may have been passed
under a special statute or that the statute contains
expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of
the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court
have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction.
This is the effect
892
of the decisions in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation,
Indore, [1977] 2 SCR 871, a case under the Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act and in Krishandas Bhatija v.
Venkatachala Shetty, SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on
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13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju’s case (supra), which are direct
decisions under the Karnataka Act. In my opinion, there is
no vital or material difference between the two enactments
in this respect and that the same result should follow under
the Kerala Act also.
4. The relevant provisions of the two enactments have
been extracted in the order of Natarajan J. and need not be
set out again, Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendment
in 1975, rent control matters are decided, in the first
instance, by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent
Controller, according as the case arises outside or inside
the city of Bangalore. There is no provision for an appeal
from this order but there is one for revision. This
revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the
High Court and the District Judge. The High Court is
empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent
Controller and the District Judge that of the District
Munsiff. Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order
of the District Judge under this provision is final. The
Kerala pattern is the same except that an appeal intervenes
before the revision. Section 18 provides for an appeal from
the Rent Controller to an officer or an authority of the
rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank. Section
20 provides for revision. The revisional power is to be
exercised by the District Court where the appellate
authority is the Subordinate Judge and the High Court in
other cases. Section 20 does not provide, as does Section 50
of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District
Judge shall be final. It is true that section 18(5) of the
Kerala Act lays down that the order of the Rent Control
court or, where there is an appeal, the decision of the
appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called
into question in any court of law except as provided in
section 20 but the language of section 48(5) of the
Karnataka Act is even stronger. It provides that the order
of the Court or the Rent Controller shall (subject to the
decision in appeal or of the District Judge or the High
Court in revision under section 50) be final and "shall not
be liable to be called into question in any court of law
whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or
revision." If the much wider and more emphatic language of
the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the
High Court under S. 115, as has been held in the two cases
referred to above, it is difficult to see the justification
for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act.
893
5. This poses then the question of a choice between the
two views of this court: the one in Shyamaraju and the one
in Aundal Ammal. As has already been pointed out, Shyamaraju
follows the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal
and Krishnadas Bhatija. The only other decision of this
Court, which has relevance in the present context, is Vihesh
Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32 which has been
relied upon in Aundal Ammal. I am in agreement with the view
expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a
totally different statutory context. That decision turned
largely on the legislative history of S. 115 of the C.P.C.
and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their
application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. I am therefore
inclined to lean in favour of the view that has commended
itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the
Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of
revision over the order of the the District Judge under the
Kerala Act as well.
6. Aundal Ammal has pointed out that such an
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interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four
courts under the Kerala Rent Control Act viz: the court of
the first instance, the appellate court, the district court
and then the High Court whereas under the Karnataka Act
there are only three courts, viz: the court of the first
instance, the district court by way of revision and the High
Court by way of further revision. This is no doubt true but
can this alone be a reason why identical statutory language
should be given different interpretation under the two
enactments? I think not. That apart, the result of applying
Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court
in rent control matters and this, if I am right in thinking
that the two Acts are pari materia, will leave the litigant
in Karnataka with only a right of revision to the District
Court. I venture to doubt whether in the absence of clear
language the Legislature can be held to have intended to
completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in
such an important branch of the law. Moreover to exclude the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 would
only encourage the recourse, by aggrieved parties, to
articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the
conclusion may not even result in reducing the spate of
litigation under the Rent Control Acts in the High Courts
and Supreme Court. I am, therefore, not inclined to attach
muct importance to this circumstance as a guide to the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute.
7. The above interpretation will not render the
language and scheme of section 18(5) read with section 20
totally redundant as was suggested in arguments before us.
Section 20 is necessary because
894
though, at present, Subordinate Judges have been constituted
as the appellate authorities under the Act, the appellate
authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and,
but for such a specific statutory provision, there would be
no remedy to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate
authority. Section 18(5) is a provision of a general nature
intended to prevent the orders of the Rent Controller from
being challenged in the courts. These provisions, in my
opinion, do not and cannot preclude the applicability of s.
115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District Court,
not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the
land. In this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a
vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115.
8. One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on
the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem
is this. In the State of Kerala, as early as in Vareed v.
Mary, AIR 1969 Ker. 101, a view was taken that the High
Court can entertain a second revision and, though Shri Potti
suggested that this view has been often challenged, the
above Full Bench decision hold the field till Aundal Ammal
was decided. In Karnataka, the maintainability of a second
revision appears to have been taken for granted untill a
doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a
decision under the Cooperative Societies Act. This doubt was
dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji’s case (ILR 1978 Kar.
1585) that the High Court could maintain a second revision.
This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full
Bench in Yaragatti’s case, in the light of the decision in
Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju’s
case. In the result, the position has been that, right
through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a
period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala, the
prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of
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a second revision by the High Court. I think that in a
matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not
be disturbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear
to the contrary.
9. I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions
before the High Court were maintainable and that the matters
before us should be disposed of accordingly. However, the
petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance
with the majority view of my learned brothers.
S.L. Appeals and petitions disposed of.
895