Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1849 OF 2002
V. Laxminarasamma … Appellant
Versus
A. Yadaiah (Dead) & Ors. … Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1850 OF 2002
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Sinha, J.
Determination of a question of adverse possession whether would
come within the purview of the jurisdiction of Special Tribunal and/or
Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of
2
brevity as ‘the Act’) has been referred to this Bench, noticing purported
conflict in the decisions of two Division Benches of this Court in Konda
Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC
258] and N. Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act & Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 214].
Before, however, adverting to the said question, we may notice some
salient features of the said Act.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh noticed organized attempts on
the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups, to
grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to
the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or
endowment, including a wakf, or any other private persons) as also the fact
that the land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or
setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented
and fraudulent sales of lands through unscrupulous real estate dealers or
otherwise in favour of certain sections of the people resulting in large
accumulation of unaccounted wealth and as thereby public order was also
3
adversely affected now and then by such unlawful activities of land
grabbers in the State in respect of urban and urbanisable land. The said Act
was enacted with a view to prohibiting the activities of land grabbing in the
State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith.
The Act is a special Act. It is a self contained code.
‘Land grabber’ is defined in section 2(d) of the Act to mean a person
or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person
who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands
or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or
attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands, rent, compensation and
other charges by criminal intimidation; or who abets the doing of any of the
above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest.
‘Land grabbing’ has been defined in Section 2(e) to mean :
“every activity of grabbing of any land (whether
belonging to the Government, a local authority, a
religious or charitable institution or endowment,
including a wakf, or any other private person) by a
person or group of persons, without any lawful
entitlement and with a view to illegally taking
possession of such lands or enter into or create
illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements
4
or any other illegal agreements in respect of such
lands, or to construct unauthorized structures
thereon for sale or hire, or give such land to any
person on rental or lease and licence basis for
construction, or use and occupation of
unauthorized structures; and the term ‘to grab
land’ shall be construed accordingly.”
Section 3 declares ‘land grabbing’ in any form to be unlawful and any
activity connected therewith to be an offence punishable under the Act.
Section 4 imposes prohibition on land grabbing, violation whereof results in
penal action (s) as specified therein. Section 7 provides for constitution of
Special Courts. The Chairman of the Special Court is a sitting or retired
Judge of the High Court and out of other four members thereof two ought to
be sitting or retired District Judges (Judicial members) and the other two
who hold or have held a post not below the rank of a District Collector. The
process for appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Judicial
Members of the Special Court has been laid down therein.
The Special Court has been empowered to make regulations relating
to the procedure to be followed for the conduct of cases as also the manner
of taking decisions. Sub-section (5D) of Section 7 of the Act reads as
under:
5
“5(D)(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Special
Court may follow its own procedure which shall
not be inconsistent with the principles of natural
justice and fair play and subject to the other
provisions of this Act and of any rules made
thereunder while deciding the Civil liability.
(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in
Section 260 or Section 262 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, every offence
punishable under this Act shall be tried in a
summary way and the provisions of Sections 263
to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as
far as may be apply to such trial.
(iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of
land grabbing attended by criminal force or show
of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears
to the Special Court that, by such force or show of
force or intimidation the land of any person has
been grabbed, the Special Court may if it thinks
fit, order that possession of the same be restored to
that person after evicting by force, if necessary,
any other person who may be in possession of the
property.”
Section 7A provides for the powers of the Special Tribunal, sub-
section (1) whereof reads as under :
“B7-A. “Special Tribunals and its powers etc:—
(1) Every Special Tribunal shall have power to try
all cases not taken cognizance of by the Special
court relating to any alleged act of land grabbing
or with respect to the ownership and title to, or
lawful possession of the land grabbed whether
before or after the commencement of the Andhra
6
Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
(Amendment) Act, 1987 and brought before it and
pass such orders (including orders by way of
interim directions) as it deems fit.
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special
Tribunal, any case brought before it is prima facie
frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same
without any further enquiry;
Provided further that if in the opinion of the
Special Tribunal any case brought before it is a fit
case to be tried by the Special court it may for
reasons to be recorded by it transfer the case to the
Special Court for its decision in the matter.”
The first proviso appended thereto empowers the Special Court to
reject a case brought before it without any further enquiry, if prima facie it
appears to be frivolous or vexatious. Special tribunal may also for reasons
to be recorded by it transfer a case to the special court for its decision in the
matter. A special tribunal ordinarily is required to follow the procedures
prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.
An appeal is maintainable from a judgment or order to the special
court. Sub-section (4) of Section 7A makes a finding of the Special
Tribunal with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing to be conclusive of
the said fact as also the persons who committed the act of land grabbing
conclusive.
7
Section 8 provides for the procedure and power of the Special Courts,
the relevant parts whereof read as under:
“ 8. Procedure and Powers of the Special Court:
— (1) The Special Court may, either suo motu, or
on application made by any person, officer or
authority, take cognizance of and try every case
arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing, or
with respect to the ownership and title to, or
lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether
before or after the commencement of this Act, and
pass such orders (including orders by way of
interim directions) as it deems fit.
XXX XXX XXX
(2B) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for the
Special Court to try all offences punishable under
this Act. (Central Act 2 of 1974).
(6) Every finding of the Special Court with
regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be
conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and
of the persons who committed such land grabbing,
and every judgment of the Special Court with
regard to the determination of title and ownership
to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall
be binding on all persons having interest in such
land.
Provided that the Special Court shall by
notification specify the fact of taking cognizance
of the case under this Act. Such notification shall
state that any objection which may be received by
the Special Court from any person including the
custodian of evacuee property within the period
specified therein will be considered by it.
8
Provided further that where the custodian of
evacuee property objects to the Special court
taking cognizance of the case, the Special Court
shall not proceed further with the case in regard to
such property;
Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a
notice of taking cognizance of the case under the
Act, served on any person known or believed to be
interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to
satisfy itself about the persons likely to be
interested in the land.
(7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to
pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the
cause of justice. It may award compensation in
terms of money for wrongful possession of the
land grabbed which shall not be less than an
amount equivalent to the market value of the land
grabbed as on the date of the order and profits
accrued from the land, payable by the land grabber
to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct
re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful
owner. The amount of compensation and profits,
so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall
be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case
the Government is the owner, or as a decree of a
Civil Court, in any other case to be executed by
the Special Court.
Provided that the Special Court shall, before
passing an order under this sub-section, give to the
land grabber an opportunity of making his
representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in
this regard and consider such representation and
evidence.
(8) Any case, pending before any court or other
authority immediately before the constitution of a
Special Court, as would have been within the
jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand
9
transferred to the Special court as if the cause of
action on which such suit or proceeding is based
had arisen after the constitution of the special
court.”
Section 9, inter alia, provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the
proceedings before the Special Court insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act and for the purposes thereof the Special Court
shall be deemed to be a ‘Civil Court’ or as the case may be a ‘Court of
Sessions’ and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court or the Court of
Sessions.
Section 10 provides for the burden of proof. Section 15 of the Act
contains a non-obstante clause stating that the provisions thereof shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or agreement or
decree or order of a court of any other tribunal or authority.
Rule making power is vested in the State in Section 16 of the Act.
Section 17A provides for review of the judgment and order passed by the
10
special court under Section 8. Section 17B provides for guidelines for
interpretation of the Act as contained in Schedule appended thereto.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh made rules in exercise of its
power conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act known as the
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (for short “the
Rules”). Rule 5 lays down the procedure for suo motu action. Rule 6
provides for verification of application. Rule 7 mandates that the Special
Court before taking cognizance of the case is to give notice in form 2A by
publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Sub-section (2) thereof makes
a similar provision in relation to the Special Tribunal. Rules furthermore
provide for notice to the person interested as also notice to the land
grabbers. It provides for filing of a counter affidavit. Rule 10 provides for
the application of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matters as provided for
therein. Rule 15 lays down the procedure for taking possession.
The Special Court has also framed regulations in exercise of its power
conferred upon it under sub-section (5A) of Section of the Act, inter alia,
providing for :
1. Place of sitting of the Special Courts (Regulation 4)
2. Sitting hours of the Special Court (Regulation 5)
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3. Working hours of the office of the Special Court (Regulation 6)
4. Scrutiny of the application (Regulation 8)
5. Weekly and daily cause list (Regulation (11)
6. Documents to accompany summons to the respondent (Regulation
12)
Chapter III of the Regulations provide for the powers and functions
of the officers of the Court. The Regulations furthermore provide for the
matters relating to proceedings before the Special Court, inspection of
documents by strangers, inspection of the records, production of records in
the custody of a court, production of records in the custody of public officer
other than a court, etc.
The Act indisputably confers a wide jurisdiction upon the Special
Court and the Special Tribunal. The Tribunal or the Special Courts are high
powered ones. For all intent and purport, the Tribuanl and Special Courts
are substitutes for the civil court and the appellate authority.
Statements of objects and reasons for enacting the said Act clearly
establish that the said Act was enacted to achieve a special purpose; the
12
‘object’ being to prohibit land grabbing resulting in breakage of public law
and order.
The Act brings within it umbrage not only ‘grabbing of lands’ of
Government or local authorities but also statutory authorities and private
persons. It aims at those persons who form a distinct class. The Special
Courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. The provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal are ordinarily applicable subject, of
course, to the provisions to the contrary. It also safeguards the interest of
the noticees from vexatious or frivolous litigations. Before taking
cognizance of a case, a report of the revenue authorities are required to be
obtained. In the event a suo motu action is to be taken, the proceeds are
required to be heard.
A legal fiction is created that it would be civil court and/or court of
sessions and would otherwise have the same power as civil court or the
court of sessions as provided for in the Code of Civil procedure and Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Act provides for transfer of cases to the Tribunals
in relation to the matters pending before any court of law relating to land
grabbing. The Act also contains a non-obstante clause.
13
The Special Courts and Tribunals, indisputably are entitled to
determine any question or issue including the question of title or possession
in the proceedings initiated before it. Special Courts and the Tribunal not
only have trappings of a court but also of a civil court and, thus, are entitled
to determine complicated questions of title.
Would the question of adverse possession be beyond the purview of
its jurisdiction is the question. There appears to be an apparent conflict in
the decision in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) and N. Srinivasa Rao
(supra). Whereas in the former, the defence of adverse possession had
specifically been gone into holding that the appellant therein had acquired
indefeasible title by adverse possession, opining:
“ 17. It is pertinent to note that mere allegation of
an act of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Special Court. In both Section 7
(1) and Section 8(1) of the Act the phrase “any
alleged act of land grabbing” is employed and not
“act of land grabbing”. It appears to us that it is
designedly done by the legislature to obviate the
difficulty of duplication of trial once in the courts
under the Act and over again in the ordinary civil
court. The purpose of the Act is to identify cases
involving allegation of land grabbing for speedy
enquiry and trial. The courts under the Act are
nonetheless civil courts which follow the Code of
Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the
same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary
civil courts.”
14
It was furthermore observed:
“A combined reading of these provisions leads to
the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil
court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and under the Civil Courts Act is ousted
and the Act which is special law will prevail and
as such the Special Court will have jurisdiction in
respect of the matters dealt with thereunder. (See:
Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Coop.
Housing Society Ltd. )”
In N. Srinivas Rao (supra), another Division Bench, however,
unfortunately, without noticing Konda Lakshamana Bapuji (supra), despite
holding that there was no actual dispossession, opined :
“…In our view, in a proceeding before the
Special Court the only issue which fell for
decision is whether there has been an act of land
grabbing as alleged and who is the guilty party.
The Special Court has no jurisdiction to decide
questions relating to acquisition of title by adverse
possession in a proceeding under the Act as the
same would fall within the domain of the civil
courts. The learned Special Judge apparently
travelled beyond the jurisdiction vested in him
under the 1982 Act in deciding that even if the
provisions of Section 47 of the Act were a bar to
transfer without the sanction of the Tahsildar, the
occupants of the land had perfected their title
thereto by way of adverse possession.”
15
We may, however, notice that another Bench of this Court in A.P.
Housing Board v. Mohd. Sadatullah & Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 566] despite
noticing both the decisions did not enter into the larger question and in the
peculiar facts and attending circumstances thought it appropriate that the
finding as to adverse possession be set aside by granting liberty to all or any
of the respondents to take appropriate proceedings by approaching a
competent civil court, if they claim title on the basis of adverse possession.
Mr. M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that the Tribunal being not a Court and as the
protections afforded to a defendant in a civil suit have been taken away by
reason of the provisions of the said Act, they require strict construction.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Court having been expressly ousted and in any
event, the Tribunal and/or special court being not an alternative efficacious
complicated question in regard to adverse possession, it was urged, must be
held to be beyond the purview of the Tribunal.
Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that the said Act being
a special law having been enacted to deal with special circumstances and
providing for a high powered tribunal, it must be held to have the
jurisdiction to deal with a question of adverse possession. Acquisition of an
16
indefeasible title by adverse possession, the learned counsel would submit,
also being a question of title, there is absolutely no reason as to why special
court and/or tribunal can be said to be having no jurisdiction in relation
thereto.
The validity of the Act is not in question. We have, therefore, no
other option but to proceed on the basis that the same is constitutional. In
view of the question referred to before us, we are also not called upon to
decide the larger question as to whether by reason of the provisions of the
Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted.
We have noticed the provisions of the Act. The Act provides for
inbuilt safeguards for the defendants. The Special Court or the Tribunal
derives jurisdiction of a case only in the event it is satisfied with regard to
the existence of the jurisdictional facts viz. activities of land grabbing.
Notices are issued by the Tribunal only on arriving at a prima facie
satisfiaction. Hearing of the noticee is mandatory in the event a suo motu
action under the Act is to be taken. A report of the revenue officer who is
man on the spot is required to be obtained.
Rules and Regulations framed under the Act provide for a detailed
procedure. The Tribunal or the Special Court, thus, cannot act in an
17
arbitrary or capricious fashion. The provisions of the Act provide for
adequate remedy in case an application is found to be vexatious or frivolous
although it exercises a very wide jurisdiction both under Civil as also
Criminal law. The Tribunal is a high powered one. It can execute its own
decrees. The provisions of the Act, as noticed hereinbefore, contain non-
obstante clause in terms whereof the provisions thereof prevail over not
only Code of Civil Procedure but also A.P. Civil Court’s Act.
‘Civil Court’ is defined under the A.P. Civil Courts Act. Tribunals
and/or Special Courts by reason of a legal fiction created are both Civil
Court as also the Court of Sessions. Legal fiction created under the Act is
of wide amplitude. [See Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of
the City of Bombay [AIR 1951 SC 469]; and Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt.
Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 620].
The Tribunal and/or Special Court are ordinarily required to follow
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal
Procedure. Being a ‘court’, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act
would also be applicable. It is true that burden of proof is on the noticee
being an alleged land grabber, but the same by itself would not mean that it
is an interim Tribunal vis-à-vis the civil court. Enactment of such a
provision, moreover, was within the competence of the Legislature. Only
18
because burden of proof is on the noticee, the same would not mean that he
has been deprived of his right to defend himself in the proceedings. Burden
of proof is in the realm of procedural law. By reason of such a provision,
substantive right of the parties on an immovable property is not taken away.
Jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal and/or Special Court upon arriving
at a satisfaction in regard to existence of jurisdictional fact. Even in terms
of Article 65 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 in the
event, the plaintiff proves his title, the burden of proof would be on the
defendant to show that he has acquired title by adverse possession. {See
Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam and Ors. [(2007) 14 SCC 308].
The defendant in all circumstances, therefore, would be entitled to
prove that he is lawfully entitled to possess the land. No law says that if a
new forum is created by a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of
the civil court becomes barred, the Tribunal constituted thereunder must be
a substitute for a civil court, not only with regard to all its powers but also
with all its deficiencies. If the Special Act satisfies substantive due process,
in our opinion, the same would satisfy the legal requirements.
Acquisition of an indefeasible title by prescription is a creation of
statute. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides for extinction of a title of
the owner of the land and vesting thereof in a person who has acquired the
19
same by adverse possession. The plea of adverse possession, however, must
expressly be raised and established.
The question referred to before us has been gone into by a Bench of
this Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer and Ors.
[(2007) 11 SCC 714], wherein this Court took into consideration the earlier
decisions of this Court including Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) and N.
Srinivasa Rao (supra) and Mohd. Sadatullah (supra) as also State of A.P. v.
Prameela Modi [(2006) 13 SCC 147].
In Mahalaxmi Motors (supra), it was held:
“36. We are bound by the decision of the larger
Bench in this case (sic for coordinate bench). The
Special Court exercises a jurisdiction of the civil
court, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
being applicable. If it is a civil court, all questions
relating to title and possession can be gone into.
The proceeding can be initiated in terms of
Section 4 of the said Act against a person who
continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a
lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the
Government, local authority, religious or
charitable institution or endowment including a
wakf, or any private person. If and when a
proceeding is initiated under the said Act, the
proceedee not only can raise jurisdictional
questions but can also raise questions relating to
his title and possession. It is, therefore, difficult to
comprehend as to how the Special Court would be
debarred from determining the questions raised by
the parties thereto .”
20
It was opined :
“40. The Tribunal being possessed of extensive
jurisdiction, subject of course to fulfilment of the
conditions precedent, for initiation of the
proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues. We
have furthermore to bear in mind that the
definition of “land grabber” is not only restricted
to the party to the proceeding, but also includes his
predecessor-in-interest. Once the land is held to be
a government land, the logical corollary thereto
would be that subject to the law of limitation and
prescription, the State would not lose the said right
to the opposite party.
41. It may be true that absence of lawful
entitlement by itself may not be sufficient to pass a
judgment and decree in favour of the State and
against the land grabber, but also it must be shown
that he had taken illegal possession thereof.
42. The Bench in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji has
applied both the broader and narrow meanings of
the said expression. It would not, however, mean
that all the tests laid down therein are required to
be satisfied in their letter and spirit. What is
necessary to be proved is the substance of the
allegation. The proof of intention on the part of a
person being his state of mind, the ingredients of
the provisions must be considered keeping in view
the materials on records as also circumstances
attending thereto. What would be germane for
lawful entitlement to remain in possession would
be that if the proceedee proves that he had bona
fide claim over the land, in which event, it would
be for him to establish the same.
43. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji this Court has
categorically held that the requisite intention can
be inferred by necessary implication from the
averments made in the petition, the written
statement and the depositions of witnesses, like
any other fact. The question which must, therefore,
have to be posed and answered having regard to
the claim of the land grabber would be that, if on
the face of his claim it would appear that he not
only had no title, but claimed his possession only
on the basis thereof, the same must be held to be
21
illegal. The question in regard to lawful
entitlement of the proceedee, therefore, for
invoking the charging section plays an important
and significant role.
44. We would like to add that the person’s
purported belief that he is legally entitled to hold
the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal
must also be judged not only from the point of
time when he entered into the possession or when
he had acquired the purported title but also from
the point of view as to whether by reason of
determination of such a question by a competent
court of law, he has been found to have no title
and consequently continuance of his possession
becomes illegal. If the proceedee against whom a
proceeding has been initiated under the provisions
of the said Act is entitled to raise the question of
adverse possession, which being based on
knowledge of a lawful title and declaration of the
hostile title on the part of the person in possession,
there does not appear to be any reason as to why
knowledge of defect in his title and consequently
his possession becoming unlawful to his own
knowledge would not come within the purview of
the term “land grabbing” as contained in Section 2
( e ) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must be
construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect
thereto. It cannot be construed in a pedantic
manner which if taken to its logical corollary
would make the provisions wholly unworkable.
Only because a person has entered into possession
of a land on the basis of a purported registered sale
deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion,
would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion
that he had not entered over the land
unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily.
45. For determination of such an issue, the Special
Court will be entitled to take into consideration
not only the rival claims of the parties, but also the
earlier round of litigation, if any, and subsequent
conduct of the proceedee himself.”
22
We agree with the legal principles laid down in the said decision and
are of the considered view that the Tribunal/Special Court constituted under
the Act has the requisite jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse
possession.
We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of
Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 SCC 134]
wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in
a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land
Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose
for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in
possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the
same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition
proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In
that case, Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was
dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse
possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of
Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are
not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made
therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual
matrix.
23
It is one thing to say that a summary proceeding cannot be resorted to
when a noticee resists a bona fide dispute involving complicated questions
of title and his right to remain in possession of the land but it is another
thing to say that although a Special Court and/or a Tribunal which has all
the powers of a civil court would not be entitled to enter into such a
contention. Krishna Rao (supra), therefore, in our opinion has no
application to the facts of the present case.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that Konda Lakshmana Bapuji
(supra) lays down the correct law and N. Srinivasa Rao (supra) does not.
The reference is answered accordingly. The merit of the matter may now be
determined by an appropriate Bench.
………………………………J.
[S.B. Sinha]
………………………………J.
[Asok Kumar Ganguly]
………………………………J.
[R.M. Lodha]
New Delhi;
March 3, 2009