Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
P. MALAICHAMI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M. ANDI AMBALAM & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT18/04/1973
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 2077 1973 SCR (3)1016
1973 SCC (2) 170
CITATOR INFO :
R 1974 SC1032 (25)
ACT:
Representation of People’s Act, Sec. 97 Recrimination
petition--Necessity of--Respondent challenging election of
appellant and seeking declaration of election
himself--Appellant not filing Recrimination petition u/s
97--In general recount valid votes cast in favour of
appellant cannot be taken account for non-compliance of sec.
97--High Court would have no jurisdiction.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent filed an election petition, not only
questioning the election of the appellant but also claiming
the seat for himself, alleging infraction of the Conduct of
Election Rules. Accordingly, he prayed for recounting of
the votes and for declarations that he was duly elected and
that the election of the appellant was void. The appellant
in his counter affidavit denied all the allegations in the
petition. However, the appellant did pot file any
Recrimination application u/s 97 of the Act. The respondent
filed an interlocutory application for directing a scrutiny
and recounting of all the votes. The evidence was duly re-
corded and the learned Judge of the High Court eventually
passed an order on various grounds for recount of the votes.
As a result of the recount, ’it was finally found that the
majority of 127 votes by which the appellant had been
declared elected was reduced to 75 votes.
The respondent urged before the High Court that in a case
where the election petitioner had applied not merely for
setting aside the election of the successful candidate but
also for declaring himself (the defeated candidate) as
elected, it was the duty of the successful candidate to have
filed a Recrimination application u/s 97 of the Act. The
High Court took the view that in the absence of the
Recrimination petition u/s 97 the appellant was not entitled
to question any votes which might have been improperly
received on behalf of the respondent. Consequently, the
High Court found that leaving out of account votes
improperly received on behalf of the respondent and taking
into account only the votes which ought to have gone to the
respondent which had been improperly rejected, the
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respondent had secured 96 votes more than the appellant and
declared him elected.
On appeal to this Court the appellant made the following
submissions : (i) Sec. 97 has no application to a case where
a prayer is for total count and. re-scrutiny; (ii) Sec. 97
has no application to the present case where the returned
candidate let in or did not have to let in any evidence on
any single vote all of which were produced and tendered in
evidence by the election petitioner notwithstanding the
respondent’s protest; iii) Since no case has been made out
in respect of individual votes and no finding given for
inspecting individual votes, the petitioner would not be
entitled to the benefit of the decision in Jabar Singh’s
case [(1964) 6 S.C.R. 54] and his right is only to a general
recount or none at all; (iv) The respondent is estopped from
questioning the result of the recount because of mutual
concessions; (v) The present case is wholly different from
the one in jabar Singh v. Genda Lal and the whole question
should be reconsidered by a larger
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bench in view’ of Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar’s dissenting
judgment; and (vi) The democratic process should be allowed
to have full sway and no more technicality should be allowed
to come in the way of. justice being done.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (1) The appellant did not comply with the
requirements of Sec. 97 of the Act. The appellant bad not
given notice u/s 97 within 14 days of his appearance to give
evidence to prove that the election ,of the respondent would
have been void if the respondent bad been the returned
candidate nor had he given the security and further security
referred to in sections 117 and 118 respectively nor was
there any statement and particulars as required u/s 83 in
case of an election petition. Even when an attempt was made
to file a recrimination petition with a petition to excuse
the delay, the other requisites of See. 97 were not complied
with. [1032-G-1033B]
(2)The respondent’s prayer for recount was not a request for
mere mechanical process of counting but for counting
contemplated u/r. 56 with all its implications. The very
grounds on the basis of which the recount was ordered by the
learned Judge show that there was a possibility of mistakes
having arisen under any one of the grounds set out in R. 56
(2) clauses (a) to (h) and it is to have them taken into
account and tested correctly that the respondent wanted
recount. When the respondent wants recount for the purpose
of setting aside the appellant’s election, he necessarily
has got to have not merely the benefit of votes which. would
have originally gone to him but which bad been wrongly given
to the appellant but also all votes which bad been cast in
his favour but had been rejected wrongly on one or the other
grounds mentioned in R, 56(2) clauses (a) to (b). it was
necessary for the purpose of respondent’s case not merely
that votes Which were held invalid should be re-scrutinised
but also votes which had been held to have been cast in
favour of the appellant. The improper reception or
rejection, therefore, would include not merely cases where a
voter appears before the Presiding Officer at the time of
the polling and his vote is received where it should not
have been received and his vote rejected where it should not
have been rejected. The improper rejection or reception
contemplated u/s lOO (i)(d)(iii) would include mistakes or
wrong judgments made by the Returning Officer while counting
and exercising his powers under R. 56(2) clauses (a) to (h).
[1035D-H]
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The appellant knew not only that the respondent wanted his
election to be set aside but also that he wanted himself
declared elected. He should have, therefore, filed a
recrimination petition in proper compliance with Sec. 97.
The election petition is not an action in law or a suit in
equity but one under the provisions of the. statute which
has specifically created that right. If a relief provided
under the statute can be obtained only by following a
certain procedure laid down therein for that purpose, that
procedure must be followed if the relief is to be obtained.
It is not a question of mere pleading. it is a question of
jurisdiction. The Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to
go into the question whether. any wrong votes had been
counted ’in favour of the election petitioner, who had
claimed the seat for himself. unless the appellant had filed
a recrimination petition u/s 97. [1037D]
797Sup.Cl/73
1018
(3) It was not necessary to lead evidence in respect of any
individual vote about the improper reception or improper
rejection as the decision on that question had been given
mostly on concessions by both the parties and in disputed
cases by the Judge himself scrutinising the votes. There is
no such thing, as a general recount and there is no
authority in law for suggesting that all that the respondent
could have asked for was either a general recount or none at
all. [1037F]
(4) No question of estoppel arises, where the law provides
that no evidence can be given about the improper reception
of votes in favour of the defeated candidate who had claimed
a seat for himself unless the successful candidate had
complied with Sec. 97. Concession is akin to admission and
the use of such an admission would be evidence. What is
barred under the proviso to Sec. 97 is the giving of
evidence by the appellant. The evidence furnished by the
valid as well as invalid votes in favour of both the
petitioner and the respondent was not admissible because of
the appellant’s failure to comply with the provisions of
Sec. 97. [1038B]
(5) There is no justification for ordering that the case
should be heard by a larger bench for reconsideration of the
decision in Jabar Singh’s case.
(6)Courts in general are averse to allow justice to be
defeated by a mere technicality. But in deciding an
election petition, the High Court is merely a Tribunal
deciding the election dispute. Its powers are wholly the
creature of the statute under which it is conferred the
power to hear the election petition. The election petition
’is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely
statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court
possess no common law power. Though the election of a
successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with
one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the
purity of the election process and also to see that people
do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by
corrupt practice. [1029C]
Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, [1959] S.C.R. 583 at 596,
Venkateswar v. Narasimha, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 679 at 685, Ch.
Subborao Member, Election Tribunal, 1964 D.E.C. 270,
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 649 of 1972.
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Appeal under S. 116A of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated March 13, 1972
of the Madras High Court in Application No. 648 of 1972, and
E.P. No. 2 of 1971.
K. K. Venugopal and A. Subhashini, for the appellant.
T. N. Srinivasa Varadacharya, G. Viswanathan, K. Jayaram and
R. Chandrasekhara, for respondent No. 1.
M. C. Chagla and A. V. Rangam, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
1019
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J. This appeal arises out of the election held
in March 1971 to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly to fill
a seat from the Melur (North) constituency in Madurai
district in which the appellant was declared elected by a
majority of 127 votes receiving 37,337 votes as against
37,210 received by the respondent 3,381 votes were held
invalid. The respondent filed an election petition on 23-4-
1971 not only questioning the election of the appellant but
also. claiming the seat for himself. He made various
allegations in his petition which related to infraction of
many of the rules regarding the conduct of election. But we
may refer to four important matters, which he had referred
to in his petition, the importance of which would become
clear in due course. In paragraph (g) of his petition he
has stated :
"The mixing of the papers, with rapid
counting, has resulted in large number of
votes polled in favour of the petitioner
erroneously added and bundled in the votes
polled by the respondent. This has also
resulted in wrong counting."
In paragraph (1) he has stated
"Therefore the petitioner submits that the
ballot papers may be directed to be arranged
according to the serial number and then
counted.. The petitioner submits that this
will reveal the introduction of unauthorised
ballot papers, if any, and use of different
inks for marking."
Paragraph (n) runs as follows
"The petitioner states that a number of votes
have been declared invalid without any
justification whatsoever. Many of the votes
declared invalid were cast in favour of the
petitioner. In the counting, some of the
invalid votes were taken in favour of the
first respondent. In view of the mixing of
the ballot papers counting was done hastily
and rapidly without any opportunity to
candidate or his agent to supervise the
counting. In fact, some of the numbers of
counting were wrongly mentioned and went to
the respondent instead of counting in the name
of the petitioner. If recount has been taken
the petitioner would have been declared
elected."
In paragraph (s) it is stated :
"The petitioner also states that at the time
of counting, the votes in favour of the
petitioner were bundled in the bundles
containing the votes in favour of the respon-
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dent and they were counted for the first
respondent. Number of ballot papers were
found outside the counting place."
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Finally, he prayed to the Court to:
(a) direct recounting of the votes;
(b) declare the petitioner duly elected;
(c) declare the election of the 1st respondent
to Melur North Constituency void, and
(d).................................
The appellant in his counter affidavit denied all the
allegations in the petition. The respondent filed an
interlocutory application for directing a scrutiny and
recounting of all the votes. To this application no counter
affidavit was at all filed by the appellant. Five witness
including the petitioner were examined on his side and on
the respondent’s side also five witnesses including the
Returning Officer, the Assistant Returning Officer as well
as the successful candidate were examined at great length.
The learned Judge after an elaborate, careful, thorough and
meticulous examination, which are almost a model of judicial
balance and propriety, passed an order for recount of the
votes. We consider it unnecessary to set them out at
length. It may be useful to set out the main grounds on
which he ordered recount, These are found in paragraph 22 of
his order.
"22. From the foregoing discussion, the
following facts emerge :
(i) Over worked and tried personnel were
employed for the counting. There are
reasonable grounds to think that the counting
was not done properly.
(ii) When the counting was in progress, the
petitioner admittedly complained about the
hasty counting, and there are reasonable
grounds to think that on account of the hurry
and haste, in which counting was done, the
counting was not likely to be correct or
proper.
(iii) The unlawful entry of Mr. O.P. Raman
into the counting hall, when the counting was
going on, caused dislocation and disturbance
to the counting, which was likely to have
affected the accuracy in the counting.
(iv) The Assistant Returning Officer could
not have checked each of the ballot papers
brought to him in the doubtful bundles in the
way in which such papers should have been
checked by him, having regard to the time
within which he claims to have completed the
checking and counting, whereas much longer
time would be required to check up these
bundles in the
1021
proper and prescribed way. This leads to the
reasonable inference that each of the ballot
papers contained in the, doubtful bundles was
not checked.
(v) The order of the Returning Officer
directing recounting of the ballot papers
treated as invalid lends support to the
contention of the petitioner that the votes
were not properly scrutinised.
(vi) The failure of the Returning Officer to
implement his order to recount has vitiated
the declaration of the result.
(vii) The Returning Officer and the Assistant
Returning Officer totally failed to check up
the valid votes and this is clearly a breach
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of the instructions issued by the Election
Commission and also by the State Government.
There is no assurance that the votes were
properly sorted and counted. There is
reasonable possibility to hold that the
counting was not proper; and
(viii) The test check conducted by me of some
of the ballot papers treated as invalid
clearly shows that some valid votes secured by
the petitioner and some secured by the
respondent have’ been treated as invalid and
rejected. This clearly shows that the
counting was wrong."
It would be noticed that the main attack was in respect of
tie counting and the findings of the learned Judge also.
related to the same question. The appellant had very hotly
contested the propriety of the request for recount. The
learned Judge considered the decisions in Ram Sewak v. H. K.
Kidwai(1), Jagjit Singh v. Kartar Singh(2), Jitendra Bahadur
v. Krishna Behari(3), Swami Rameshwara Nand v. Madho Ram
(4), Nathu Ram Mirdha v. Gordhaba Soni(5) and after a very
elaborate consideration of the facts as well as the
principles involved in those decisions had held that recount
should be ordered. We are, satisfied that the High ’Court
has taken into consideration all the material circumstances
and has appreciated the evidence from the correct
perspective in coming to the conclusion that the
circumstances under which the counting was carried out
necessitated a recount.
The recount was ordered to be done by four advocates acting
as tellers, two from each side out of a list of four
furnished by each side. Both the parties and their
respective counsel were permitted to be present alongwith
four counting agents for petitioner as well as the
respondent and an Assistant Registrar of the High Court was
appointed to preside over the recount of the
(1) A.I.R. 1964 S C. 1249 (2) A I.R. 1966 S.C. 773
(3) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 276 (4) 1968 (8) D.E.C. 163
(5) 1968 (8) D.E.C. 286,
1022
ballot papers and-to be assisted by the members of staff
dealing with election cases.. He, was ordered to submit his
report within two days after the completion of the
recounting. It was ordered that on receipt of that report
an opportunity will be given to both parties to be heard on
that report and necessary orders will be passed thereon.
The Assistant Registrar submitted his reports on 19-2-1972,
and on 23-2-1972, 24-2-1972, 25-2-1972 and 28-21972, the
Judge himself took up for decision the validity or otherwise
of the various votes which were disputed and dictated orders
then and there. Even before him some, concessions were made
in respect of certain votes by both the, parties and some
the Judge decided by himself. The Assistant Registrar
himself dealt merely with votes which were conceded by one
side or the other as having been validly cast in favour of
the opposite side. Before him out of the votes which were
held invalid by the Returning Officer, 2583 were agreed as
rightly held invalid but there was dispute about 804 votes
(it thus appears that there was a mistake even in the
counting of the invalid votes). From out of the votes
counted in rounds 8 to 11, 11,301 votes in favour of the
respondent were conceded as valid and 395 were disputed;
11,951 were conceded as valid in favour of the appellant and
567 were disputed. Thus the total of these disputed votes
amounting to over 1700 were decided by the Judge himself in
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the presence of the parties and their advocates, some on the
basis of concessions, some as decided by the Judge himself,
as already mentioned. It is necessary to mention also that
as in the recount from among the votes held invalid by the
Returning officer-petitioner conceded 65 were valid votes
cast for the respondent. He also conceded that 11 votes
counted by the Returning Officer in his favour were valid
votes cast for the respondent. 19 votes held by the
Returning Officer as validly cast for the petitioner were
conceded by him to be invalid. The total came to 95.
Similarly 126 votes cast for the petitioner but rejected by
the Returning Officer were found valid and 14 votes counted
by the Returning Officer as cast for the respondent were
found to have been really cast for the petitioner. These
facts clearly establish large scale mistakes in counting.
As a result of all this it was finally found that the
appellant had got 37,372 votes and the respondent 37,297
votes. Thus the majority obtained by the appellant was
reduced from 127 to 75.
It may be remembered that one of the grounds on which the
learned Judge had come to the conclusion that recount should
be ordered was that the unlawful entry of a Minister, Mr. O.
P. Raman into the counting hall when the counting was going
on, had caused dislocation and disturbance to the counting
which was likely to affect the accuracy of the counting.
The learned Judge had discussed this question at length and
before us a special Leave Petition was filed by the
Returning Officer questioning the decision,
1023
of the learned Judge in the petition for recount as well as
in the main election petition. We had rejected that
petition. But we should make it clear that the learned
Judge has been very fair in his discussion of this matter.
It seems to have been contended before him that Mr. Raman
had a right to enter the place where the counting was going
on, under Rule 66 of the Conduct of Elections Rules in order
to get the certificate. The Minister concerned was the
successful candidate for the Melur (south) Constituency, the
counting for which was over at 5 a.m. on 11-3-71- in the
same building. At 8 a.m. began the counting of the votes
for the Melur (North) Constituency, i.e. the election in
dispute. Mr. Raman was not a candidate in that election who
was entitled going on.We cannot understand the anxiety of
the Returning Officer in questioning the orders of the
learned Judge in the petition for recount as well as the
main election petition. After all the concerned parties
were fighting it out under the ostensible excuse of
questioning the decision of the learned Judge regarding his
interpretation of rules 53 and 66, it has been filed really
due to the hypersensitiveness on the part of the Minister.
Indeed the learned Judge has made fairly strong remarks
against the Returning Officer in other respects. He has
stated at one place that the Returning Officer had failed in
his duty, and at another place, that the Returning Officer
and the Assistant Returning Officer came forward with a
story totally devoid of truth. Nothing is said in the
petition about all this which shows that our inference on
this point is correct. The petition on behalf of the
Returning Officer was wholly uncalled for. It would appear
that he is not a free agent.
After the counting was over, as already shown the majority
in favour of the appellant was reduced from 127 to 75. Even
so his election would have had to be sustained. But on
behalf of the respondent it was urged before the learned
Judge that in a case where an election petitioner had
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applied not merely for setting aside the election of the
successful candidate but also for declaring himself (the
defeated candidate) as elected, it was the duty of the
successful candidate to have filed a Recrimination
application under s. 97 of the Representation of the People
Act.This argument was based on the decision of this Court in
Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal(1). This Court there referred to
the earlier decisions on the subject and by a majority cf 4
to 1 held that in such a case it was the successful
candidate’s duty to have filed a recrimination petition.
under s. 97 which would be like a counter petition. It is
unnecessary to set out the very instructive discussion in
that case at length. It would be enough if the headnote
alone is set out
(1) [1964] (6) S.C.R. 54.
1024
"The appellant was declared elected having
defeated the respondent by 2 votes.
Thereafter the respondent filed an election
petition. The respondent challenged the
validity of the appellant’s election on the
ground of improper reception of votes in
favour of the appellant and improper rejection
votes in regard to himself. His prayer was
that the appellant’s election should be.
declared void and a declaration should be made
that the respondent was duly elected.
The appellant urged before the Tribunal that
there had been improper rejection of the
votes, and improper acceptance of the votes of
the respondent, and his case was that if
recounting and re-scrutiny was made, it would
be found that he had secured a majority of
votes. The respondent objected to this
course; his case was that since the appellant
had not recriminated nor furnished security
under s. 97 of the Act, it was not open to him
to make this plea. The Tribunal rejected the
objection of the respondent and accepted the
plea of the appellant. The Tribunal re-
examined the ballot papers of the respondent
as well as the appellant and came to the
conclusion that 22 ballot papers cast in
favour of the respondent had been wrongly
accepted. The result was, that the respondent
had not secured a majority of votes. The
Tribunal declared that the election of the
appellant was void and refused to grant a
declaration to the respondent that he had been
duly elected. Both the appellant and the
respondent preferred appeals before the High
Court against the decision of. the Tribunal.
The High Court dismissed both the appeals and
the decision of Tribunal was confirmed. Hence
the appeal.
Held : (1) The scope of the enquiry in a case
falling under s. 100 (1) (d) (iii) is to
determine whether any votes have been
improperly cast in favour of the returned
candidate or any votes have been improperly
refused or rejected in regard to any other
candidate. These are the only two matters
which would be relevant in deciding whether
the election of the returned candidate has
been materially affected or not. At this
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enquiry the onus is on the petitioner to prove
his allegation. Therefore, in the case of a
petition where the only claim made is that the
election of the returned candidate is void,
the scope of the enquiry is clearly limited by
the requirement of s. 100 (1) (d) itself. In
fact s. 97 (1) has no application to the case
falling under S. 100(1)(d)(iii); the scope of
the enquiry is limited for the simple reason
that what
1025
the clause requires to be considered is
whether the election of the returned candidate
has been materially affected and nothing else.
(ii) There are cases in which the election
petition makes a double claim; it claims that
the election of a returned candidate is void
and also asks for a declaration that the
petitioner himself or some other person has
been duly elected. It is in regard to such a
composite case that s. 100 as well as s. 101
would apply, and it is in respect of the
additional claim for a declaration that some
other ,candidate has been duly elected that s.
97 comes into play. Section 97(1) thus allows
the returned candidate to recriminate and
raise pleas in support of his case. The
result of s. 97(1) therefore, is that in
dealing with a composite election petition the
Tribunal enquires into not only the case made
out by the petitioner, but also the counter-
claim made by the returned candidate. In this
connection the returned candidate is required
to comply with the provisions of s. 97(1) and
s. 97(2) of the Act. If the returned
candidate does not recriminate as required by
s. 97, then he cannot make any attack against
the alternative claim made by the petitioner.
In other words the returned candidate will not
be allowed to lead any evidence because he is
precluded from raising any pleas against the
validity of the claim of the alternative
candidate.
(iii) The pleas of the returned candidate
under s. 97 of the Act, have to be tried after
a declaration has been made under s. 100 of
the Act. The first part of the enquiry in
regard to the validity of the election of the
returned candidate must be tried within the
narrow limits prescribed by s. 100 (1) (d)
(iii) and the latter part of the enquiry which
is governed by s. 101 (a) will have to be
tried, on a broader basis permitting the
returned candidate to lead evidence in support
of the pleas which he may have taken by way of
recrimination under s. 97 (1) But even in
cases to which s. 97 applies, the enquiry
necessary while dealing with the dispute under
s. 101 (a) will not be wider if the returned
candidate has failed to recriminate and in a
case of this type the, duty of the Election
Tribunal will not be to count and scrutinise
all the votes cast at the election. As a
result of r. 57, the Election Tribunal wall
have to assume that every ballot paper which
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had not been rejected under r. 56 constituted
one valid vote and it is on that basis the
finding will have to be made under s. 101 (a).
Therefore, it is clear
1026
that in holding an enquiry either under s. 100 (1) (d) (iii)
or under s. 101 where s. 97 has not been
complied with it is not competent to the
Tribunal to order a general recount of the
votes preceded by a scrutiny about their
validity."
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. was the solitary Judge who dissented
from the majority judgment and we have gone through his
judgment with all the care and the respect that it deserves
and we do not see that it throws much light on the subject.
It seems to ignore. 97.We may also point out that in Bhim
Sen v.Gopali,(1) which was considered in the above decision
it was observed :
"As we have already pointed out, in his first
written statement respondent I made a positive
averment that no void votes had been allowed
to be used by the returning officer and that
the returning officer had fully discharged his
duties under section 63. It is true that
after it was discovered that he had received
37 void votes respondent I attempted to make
an allegation that the appellant may likewise
have received similar void votes, but it was
too late then, because the time for making
such an allegation by way of a recriminatory
proceeding had. elapsed and respondent I had
failed to furnish the security of Rs. 1,000 as
required by section 97(2) of the Act. If
under these circumstances respondent I was not
allowed to pursue his allegation against the
appellant, he is to blame himself."
It was urged before this Court that in a subsequent decision
in Shankar v. Sakharam (2) this Court itself had differed
from the earlier decision. The relevant sentence reads like
this
"We also think that the enquiry under s.
100(1)(d) (iii) is outside the purview of s.
97. On an enquiry under s.100(1) (d) (iii)
with regard to improper refusal of votes, the
respondent to the election petition is en-
titled to dispute the identity of the voters
without filing any recrimination under s. 97".
This argument is clearly based on a misapprehension. The
question that arises in this case did not arise there nor
was the earlier decision in Jabar Singh’s case referred to
or distinguished. Indeed it was not necessary because they
were dealing only with a case falling under’s. 100, i.e. a
case where the election of the successful candidate was
sought to be set aside and not one also falling under s. 101
where the defeated candidate also wants that he should be
declared to have been elected.
(1) 1960 (22) E.L.R. 288.
(2) [1965] (2) S.C.R, 403.
1027
In the present case apparently neither party was aware of
the decision in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal (supra) till after
the counting was over. The learned Judge took the view that
in the absence of a recrimination petition under s. 97 the
appellant was not entitled to question any votes which might
have been improperly received on behalf of the respondent.
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If that had been done the appellant, as indicated earlier,
would still have won by a majority of 75 votes but as he was
not entitled to do so the result of leaving out of account
votes improperly received on behalf of the respondent and
taking into. account only the votes which ought to have gone
to the respondent, which had been improperly rejected it was
found that the respondent had 96 votes more than the appel-
lant and he was declared elected.
The decision in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal (supra) has
received reconsideration at the hands of this Court with
approval again in, Ravindra Nath v. Raghbir Singh(1) where
it was observed :
"The object of s. 97 is to enable
recrimination when a seat is claimed for the
petitioner filing the election petition or any
other candidate. In his election petition the
petitioner may claim a declaration that the
election of all or any of the returned
candidates is void on one or more of the
grounds specified in sub-s. (1) of s. 100 and
may additionally claim a further declaration
that he himself or any other candidate has
been duly elected on the grounds specified in
s. 101 (see ss. 81, 84, 98, 100 and 101). It
is only when the election petition claims a
declaration that any candidate other than the
returned candidate has been duly elected that
s. 97 comes into play. If the respondent
desires to contest this claim by, leading
evidence to prove that the election of the
other candidate would have been void if he had
been the returned candidate and an election
petition had been presented calling in-
question his election, the respondent must
give a formal notice of recrimination and
satisfy the other conditions specified in the
proviso to s. petition calling in question the
claim that the other candidate has been duly
elected. In this background, it is not
surprising that the legislature provided that
notice of recrimination must be accompanied by
the statement and particulars required by s.
83 in the case of an election petition and
signed and verified in like manner and the
recriminator must give the security and the
further security for costs required under ss.
117 and 118 in the case of an election
petition.
(1) [1968] (1) S.C R. 104.
1028
Looking at the object and scheme of S. 97 it
is manifest that the. provisions of ss. 1 17
and 1 1 8 must be applied mutatis mutandis to
a proceeding under s. 97. The recriminator
must produce a government treasury receipt
showing that a deposit of Rs. 2,000 has been
made by him either in a Government Treasury or
in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the
Election Commissioner as costs of the
recrimination. As the notice of recrimination
cannot be sent by post, it must be filed
before the Tribunal, and reading S. 117 with
consequential adaptations for the purposes of
the proviso to s. 97(1), it will appear that
the treasury receipt showing the deposit of
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the security must be produced before .the
Tribunal along with the notice of
recrimination. It follows that the
recriminator must give the security referred
to in S. 1 17 by producing the treasury
receipt showing the deposit of the security at
the time of the giving of the notice under the
proviso to S. 97(1).
If the recriminator fails to give the
requisite security under s. 117 at the time of
giving the notice of recrimination, he loses
the right to lead evidence under S. 97 and the
notice of recrimination stands Virtually
rejected.
Mr. K. K. Venugopal, appearing on behalf of the appellant
made four submissions :
1. Section 97 has no application to a case
where a prayer is for total count and
re-scrutiny.
2. Section 97 has no application to the
present case where the returned candidate let
in or did not have to let in any evidence on
any single vote all of which were produced and
tendered in evidence by the election
petitioner notwithstanding the respondent’s
protest.
3. Since no case has been made out in respect
of individual votes and no finding given for
inspecting individual votes the petitioner
would not be entitled to the benefit of the
decision in Jabar Singh’s case and his right
is only to a general recount or none at all.
4. The respondent is estopped from questioning
the result of the recount because of mutual
concessions.
Though stated in a different form the sum and substance of
the ,very vigorous attempt on behalf of the appellant is to
question in
1029
effect the validity of the decision in so far as it is held
that s. 97 is applicable to the facts of this case. He even
went so far as to suggest that this case is totally
different from the one in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal (supra)
and the whole question, if necessary should be reconsidered
by a much larger Bench in view of Justice Rajagopala
Ayyangar’s dissenting judgment. He finally urged that the
democratic process should be allowed to have full sway and
no mere technicality should be allowed to come in the way
of’ justice being done.
The last appeal is particularly interesting. Courts in
general,, are averse to allow justice to be defeated on a
mere technicality. But in deciding an election petition the
High Court is merely a tribunal deciding an election
dispute. Its powers are wholly, the creature of the Statute
under which it is conferred the power to, hear election
petitions. An election petition, as has been pointed out
again and again, is not an action at law or a suit in equity
but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common
law and the Court possesses no common law power. It is
always to, be borne in mind that though the election of a
successful candidate is not to be lightly interfered with,
one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the
purity of the election process and also to see that the
people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law
or by corrupt practices (see the decisions in Kamaraja Nadar
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v. Kunju Thevar,(1) Venkateswara v. Narasimha(2) and Ch.
Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal (3). We may, there-
fore, look into the law regarding this matter. Under s. 81
of the Representation of the People Act 1951 "an election
petition calling in question any election may be presented
on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1)
of section 100 and section 101 to the High Court by any
candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five
days from, but not earlier than, the date of election of the
returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned
candidate at the election and the dates of their election
are different, the later of those two dates." Section 83
reads :
"(1) An election petition-
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the
material facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b).............................
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and
verified in the manner laid down in the Code
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 583 at 596.
(2) [1969] (1) S.C.R. 679 at 685
(3) 1964 D.E.C. 270.
1030
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the
verification of pleadings.
(2).........................."
Section 84 reads
"A petitioner may, in addition to claiming a
declaration that the election of all or any of
the returned candidates is void , claim a
further declaration that he himself or any
other candidate has been duly elected."
Section 97 reads
"(1) When in an election petition a
declaration ,that any candidate other than the
returned candidate has ,been duly elected is
claimed, the returned candidate or :any other
party may give evidence to prove that the
election of such candidate would have been
void if he :had been the returned candidate
and a petition had .been presented calling in
question his election.
Provided.that the returned candidate or such
other party as aforesaid shall not be entitled
to give such ,evidence unless he has, within
fourteen days from the ,date of commencement
of the trial, given notice to the High Court
of his intention to do so and has also given
the security and the further security referred
to in sections 117 and 118 respectively.
(2) Every notice referred to in sub-section
(1) shall be accompanied by the statement and
particulars required by section 83 in the case
of an election petition and shall be signed
and verified in like manner."
’Section 100 reads
"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) if .the High Court is of opinion-
(a) that on the date of his election a
returned candidate was not qualified, or was
disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat
under the Constitution or this Act or the
Government of Union Territories Act, 1963; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been
committed by a returned candidate or his
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election agent or by any other person with the
consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been improperly
rejected; or
1031
(d) that the result of the election, in so far
as it concerns a returned candidate, has been
materially affected-
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomi-
nation, or
(ii) by Any corrupt practice committed in the
interests of the returned candidate by an
agent other than his election agent, or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or
rejection of any vote or the reception of any
vote which is void, or
(vi) by any non-compliance with the provisions
of the Constitution or of this Act or of any
rules or orders made under this Act,
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void.
(2) If in the opinion of the High Court, a returned
candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his
election agent, of any corrupt practice but the High Court
is satisfied-
(a) that no such corrupt practice was
committed at the election by the candidate or
his election agent, and. every such corrupt
practice was committed contrary to the orders,
and without the consent of the candidate or
his election agent;
(c) that the candidate and his election agent
took all reasonable means for preventing the
commission of corrupt practices at the
election; and
(d) that in all other, respects the election
was free from any corrupt practice on the part
of the candidate or any of his agents,
then the High Court may decide that the election of the
returned candidate is not void."
Section 101 reads
"If any person who has lodged a petition has, in addition to
calling in question the election of the returned candidate,
claimed a declaration that he himself or any other candidate
has been duly elected and the High Court is of opinion-
(a) that in fact the petitioner or such other
candidate received a majority of the valid
votes; or
1032
(b) that but for the votes obtained by the
returned candidate by corrupt practices the
petitioner or such other candidate would have
obtained a majority of the valid votes;
the High Court shall after declaring the
election of the returned candidate to be void
declare the petitioner or such other
candidate, as the case may be, to have been
duly elected."
In the present case the grounds for setting aside the
election of the petitioner are that the result of the
election in so far as the appellant was concerned hag been
materially affected
(i)...............................
(ii)..............................
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(iii) by improper reception, refusal or
rejection of votes which is void, or
(iv) by non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of the Act or of any rules
or orders made under the Act.
The only ground on which the defeated candidate could be
declared to be elected is under s. 101(a) that in fact he
had received a majority of valid votes. But it is in
deciding who has got the majority of valid votes that s. 97
comes into play. When in an election petition a declaration
that any candidate other than the returned candidate has
been duly elected is claimed, the returned candidate or any
other party may give evidence to prove that the election of
such candidate would have been void if he had been the
returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling
in question his election. This right the appellant had but
this right is subject to the provision that he entitled to
give, evidence to prove that the election of the petitioner
in this case i.e. the respondent would have been void if he
had been the returned candidate and the petitioner had
presented petition calling in question the election unless
he had given notice of his intention to give such evidence
and also given security and the further security referred to
in ss. 117 and 118 respectively, and every such notice has
to be accompanied by the. statement and particulars required
tinder s. 83 in case of an election petition and shall be
signed and verified in the like manner. None of these
things was done in this case. The petition by the
respondent had been filed on 23-4-1971. The orders for the
appearance of the respondent were passed on 12-7-1971. The
appellant, who was the respondent in that petition, should
have given notice under S. 97 within 14 days of his
appearance i.e. on 26-7-1971 and also complied with the
other requirements specified therein. The
1033
issues were framed on 27-7-1971, the recount was ordered on
3-2-1972 and the judgment itself was pronounced on 13-3-
1972. It was on 10-3-1972 that an attempt was made to file
a recrimination petition with a petition to excuse the
delay. But even then the other requisites of s. 97 like
giving security or the petition being accompanied by
statement and particulars required by s. 83 were not
complied with. A special leave petition was filed in this
Court again applying for permission to receive a
recrimination petition. There is, thus, no doubt at all
that the appellant did not comply with the requirements of
s. 97.
The question still remains ’whether the requirements of s.
97 have to be satisfied in this case. it is argued by Mr.
Venugopal that the gravamen of the respondent’s petition was
breach of many of the election rules and that he asked for a
total recount, a request to which the appellant had no
objection and that there was, therefore, no rule or need for
filing a recrimination petition under s. 97. This, we are
afraid, is a complete misreading of the petition. No doubt
the petitioner has asked for a recount of votes. It may
legitimately be presumed to mean a recount of all the votes.
but such a recount is asked for the purpose of obtaining a
declaration that the appellant’s election was void and a
further declaration that the respondent himself had been
elected. This aspect of the matter should not be lost sight
of. Now, when the respondent asked for a recount, it was
not a mere mechanical process that he was asking for. The
very grounds which he urged in support of his petition (to
which we have referred at an earlier stage) as well as the
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application for recount and the, various grounds on which
the learned Judge felt that a recount should be ordered
showed that many mistake were likely to have arisen in the
counting- and as revealed by the instances which the learned
Judge himself looked into and decided. It may be useful at
his stage to set out Rule 56 of the Conduct Election Rules,
1961 :
"56. Counting of Votes.--(1) Subject to such
general or special directions, if any, as may
be given by Election commission in this
behalf, the ’ballot papers taken out of all
boxes used in a constituency shall be mixed
together and then arranged in convenient
bundles and scrutinised.
(2) The returning officer shall reject a
ballot paper-
(a) if it bears any mark or writing by which
the elector can be identified, or
(b) if, to indicate the votes, it ’bears no
mark at all or bears mark made otherwise than
with the instrument supplied for the purpose,
or
8--L797SupCI 73
1034
(c) if votes are given on it in favour of more
than one candidate, or
(d)if the mark indicating the vote thereon is
placed in such manner as to make it doubtful
to which candidate the vote has been given, or
(e) if it is a spurious ballot paper, or
(f) if it is so damaged or mutilated that its
identity as a genuine ballot paper cannot be
established, or
(g) if it bears a serial number, or is of a
design, different from the serial number, or ,
as the case may be, design, of the ballot
papers authorised for use at the particular
polling station, or
(h) if it does not bear both the mark and the
signature which it should have borne under the
provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 38;
Provided that where the returning officer is
satisfied that any such defect as is mentioned
in clause (g) or clause (h) has been caused by
any mistake or failure on the part of a
presiding officer or polling officer, the
ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on
the ground of such defect
Provided further that a ballot paper shall not
be rejected merely on the ground that the mark
indicating the vote is indistinct or made more
than once, if the intention that the vote
shall be for a particular candidate clearly
appears from the way the paper is marked.
(3) Before rejecting any ballot paper under
subrule (2), the returning officer shall allow
each counting agent present a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the ballot paper but
shall not allow him to handle it or any other
ballot paper.
(4) The returning officer shall endorse on
every ballot paper which he rejects the word
"Rejected" and the grounds-of rejection in
abbreviated form either in his own hand or by
means of a rubber stamp and shall initial such
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endorsement.
(5) All ballot papers rejected under this rule
shall be bundled together.
(6) Every ballot paper which is not rejected
under this rule shall be counted as one valid
vote
1035
Provided that no cover containing tendered
ballot papers shall be opened and no such
paper shall be’ counted.
(7) After the counting of all ballot papers
contained in all the ballot boxes used in a
constituency has been completed, the returning
officer shall make the entries in a result
sheet in Form 20 and announce particulars.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this rule, the
expression "constituency" shall, in relation
to an election from a parliamentary
constituency, mean the assembly constituency
comprised therein."
So, when counting goes on the returning officer may have
rejected a ballot paper on any one of the grounds mentioned
in sub-rule (2) of that rule. He might have made a mistake
or his decision may be wrong on any one of the points. That
is what explains the large number of concessions made by
either side when the recount was made before the Assistant
Registrar of the High Court as well as before the learned
Judge. So, it is not proper to interpret the respondent’s
prayer for recount as a request for a mere mechanical
process of counting. It was counting contemplated under
Rule 56 with all its implications that he was asking for.
The very grounds on the basis of which the recount was
ordered by the learned Judge show that there was a
possibility of mistakes having arisen under anyone of the
grounds set out in Rule 56(2) clauses (a) to (h) and it is
to have them taken into account and decided correctly that
the respondent wanted a recount. Now, when lie wants a
recount for the purpose of setting aside the appellant’s
election he necessarily has got to have not merely the
benefits of votes which would have originally (,One to him
but which had been wrongly given to the appellant but also
all votes which had been cast in his favour (the respondent)
but had been rejected wrongly on one or other of the grounds
mentioned in Rule 5 6 (2) clauses (a) to (h). So, it was
necessary for the purpose of the respondent’s case not
merely that votes which were held invalid should be re-
scrutinised but also votes which had been held to have been’
cast in favour of the appellant. The improper reception or
rejection, therefore, would include not merely cases where a
voter appears before the presiding officer at the time of
polling and his vote is received where it should not have
been received and his vote rejected where it should not have
been rejected. The improper rejection or reception con-
templated under s. 100(1)(d)(iii) would include mistakes or
wrong judgments made by the returning officer while counting
and exercising his powers under Rule 56(2) clauses (a) to
(h). The fact , therefore, that the respondent asked for
recounting of all the votes does not mean that he wanted
also that votes which had
1036
been wrongly held to have been cast in his favour but should
have gone to the appellant as also votes which had been
rejected, but which should have gone to the appellant should
be taken into account. The respondent was interested in no
such thing. He made no such prayer. It was only the
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appellant that was interested and bound to do it if he
wanted to defeat the respondent’s claim that he should be
declared elected and s. 97 is intended for just such a
purpose. It was asked what was the purpose and where was
the need for the appellant to have filed a recrimination
under s. 97 and what he could have filed when the respondent
had asked for a total recount. What we have stated above
furnishes the necessary answer. The appellant knew not only
that the respondent wanted his election to be set aside but
also that he wanted himself (the respondent) to be declared
elected, He should have, therefore, stated whatever material
was necessary to show that the respondent, if he had been
the successful candidate and the petition had been presented
calling in question his election, his election would have
been void. in other words comply with section 83. He could
have stated therein setting out that while he had no
objection to a recount to be ordered (we have already shown
that he strongly opposed the recount) there were many votes
which would have rightly gone to him (the appellant) which
have wrongly been given to the respondent, that there were
many votes which should have rightly gone to him but which
have been improperly rejected. He should also have complied
with the other requirements of section 97. If he had done
that could have been taken into consideration. There was
no difficulty at all about his doing all this. His
contention that he had no objection to the recount and there
was no rule or any need for him to file a recrimination is
wholly beside the point. He had in his counter to the main
election petition repudiated every one of the allegations in
the election petition. It was at that stage that he should
have filed the petition under section 97 (of course, within
14 days of his appearance). It was not at the stage when
the petitioner filed his application for recount that the
opportunity or need for a petition under s. 97 arose.
It was then urged that when all the material was before the
court it was unnecessary for him to have done so. As we
have already pointed out this is not an action at law or a
suit in equity but one under the provisions of the statute
which has specifically created that right. If the appellant
wanted an opportunity to question the respondent’s claim
that he should be declared elected he should have followed
the procedure laid down in s. 97. In this connection it is
interesting to note that in the decision in jabar Singh v.
Genda Lal (supra) the successful candidate n his own
petition had pleaded that many votes cast in favour of
himself had been wrongly rejected, in regard to which
details were given,
1037
and that similarly several votes were wrongly accepted in
favour of the election petitioner and in regard to which
also details were given, and it ended with the prayer that
if a proper scrutiny and recount were made of the valid
votes received by each, it would be found that he-the
returned candidate had in fact, obtained a larger number of
votes than the election petitioner and for this reason he
submitted that the election petition ought to be dismissed.
In spite of this it was held that he had to fail because he
had not filed a recrimination petition under s. 97. So it
is not enough to say that what ought to be looked into is
the substance and not the form. If a relief provided under
a statute could be obtained only by following a certain
procedure laid therein for that purpose, that procedure must
be followed if he is to obtain that relief.
What we have pointed out just now shows that it is not a
question of mere pleading, it is a question of jurisdiction.
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The Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the
question whether any wrong votes had been counted in favour
of the election-petitioner, who had claimed the seat for
himself unless the successful candidate had filed a petition
under s. 97. The law reports are full of cases where
parties have failed because of their failure strictly to
conform to the letter of the law in regard to the procedure
laid down under the Act and the rules.
Point 3 raised by the appellant has .no substance because it
was not necessary to lead evidence in respect of any
individual vote about improper reception or improper
rejection. The decision about improper reception or
improper rejection has been given in this case mostly on
concessions by both the parties and in a few cases by the
Judge himself scrutinising and deciding about all disputed
cases. Indeed, there was no need for any evidence except a
proper scrutiny of the votes and a correct decision based on
such scrutiny as to the candidate for whom it was cast or
whether it was invalid. We may at the risk of repetition
point out that the process of recounting included decision-
regarding the question of improper reception or improper
rejection and there, is no such thing as a general recount
and there is no authority in law for suggesting that all
that the respondent could have asked for was either a
general recount or none at all. Indeed there is no pro-
vision in the Act for a petition to be filed alleging "’Let
all’ votes be recounted and whoever gets more votes be
declared elected." Nor do we think that any question of
Stopper arises. Estoppel may arise in respect of each
individual vote conceded by one party or the other as valid
and given in favour of the other in the sense that having
conceded that a disputed vote should have, gone to one or
other of the parties the party who made that concession
cannot go black on it. But where the law provides that no
evidence
1038
can be given about the improper reception of votes in favour
of the defeated candidate who had claimed a seat for himself
unless the successful candidate had complied with s.97, no
question of estoppel arises. Concession is akin to
admission and the use of such an admission would be
evidence. What is barred under the proviso to s.97 is the
giving of evidence by the appellant. Appellant can give
evidence either by relying on the respondent’s admissions or
leading independent evidence. In either case it would be
giving evidence. And since giving- of evidence is barred,
the concessions cannot be used as evidence in favour of the
appellant. This is what the learned Judge has very clearly
pointed out in his order. We have earlier quoted from the
decision in Bhim Sen v. Gopali (supra) where the provisions
of s. 97 had not been complied with. Even though as a
matter of ’act the valid as well as the invalid votes in
favour of both the petitioner as well as the respondent
might have been counted, the evidence furnished by such
votes, was not a admissible must because of failure to
comply with the provisions of section 97.
Finally, we must deal with the appeal made to us that the
justice should be done irrespective of technicalities.
Justice has got to be done according to law. A Tribunal
with limited jurisdiction cannot go beyond the procedure
laid down by the statute for its functioning. If it does so
it would be acting without jurisdiction.
We are, therefore, satisfied that the learned Judge was
right in holding that though a general recount had been
ordered and an account taken of the valid votes given for
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both the candidates, it was not possible to take into
account any vote in favour of the appellant because of his
failure to comply with section 97. Nor are we satisfied
that we would be justified in ordering that this case
should, be reconsidered by a larger Bench.
This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The appellant will
pay the first respondent’s costs. Special Leave petition
1347/72 preferred against Application No. 648/72 in.
Election Petition O.S. No. 2/1971 is dismissed.
S.B.W.
Appeal dismissed.
L797Sup.Cl/73--2500 ---5-10-74--GIPF.
1