Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COMMERClAL AVIATION & TRAVEL COMPANY & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
VIMAL PANNALAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/07/1988
BENCH:
DUTT, M.M. (J)
BENCH:
DUTT, M.M. (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
CITATION:
1988 AIR 1636 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 431
1988 SCC (3) 423 JT 1988 (3) 41
1988 SCALE (2)1
ACT:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908: order Vll Rule (11b)-Plaint
to be rejected where relief claimed undervalued-Duty of
Court to come to a finding that relief claimed is
undervalued.
Court Fees Act 1870: Section 7(iv) (f)-Suit for
dissolution of partnership and accounts-Valuation of suit-
Suit valued for jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and at Rs.500
for court fee-Whether suit undervalued for the purpose of
court fee.
Suits Valuation Act 1887/Rules Framed by Punjab High
Court as Applicable to Delhi. -
HEADNOTE:
The respondent plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court
against the appellants inter alia for dissolution of
partnership and for accounts. The plaintiff valued the suit
for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and for the
purpose of court fee at Rs.500.
The appellants raised a preliminary objection as to the
valuation of the suit contending that the relief sought for
in the suit had been grossly undervalued and the Court
should reject the plaint under order VII, Rule 11(b), Civil
Procedure Code.
The learned Single Judge overruled the preliminary
objection and held that the suit was not undervalued. The
Division Bench in dismissing the appeal; followed a Full
Bench decision of the same High Court wherein it was
observed that paragraph (iv) of section 7 of the Court Fees
Act gave the right to the plaintiff in any of the suits
mentioned in the clauses of that paragraph to place any
value that he liked on the relief he sought, subject,
however, to any rule made under section 9 of the Suits
Valuation Act, and the Court had no power to interfere with
the plaintiff’s valuation.
Before this Court, the appellant contended (1) that in
a suit for accounts the plaintiff could not value the suit
most arbitrarily according to her whims and (2) that an
objective standard or positive material
432
appeared on the face of the plaint and the valuation of the
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relief ignoring such objective standard was demonstratively
arbitrary.
Dismissing the appeal it was,
^
HELD: (1) The suits which are mentioned under section
7(iv) are of such nature that it is difficult to lay down
any standard of valuation. Indeed, the Legislature has not
laid down any standard of valuation in the Court Fees Act.
[435B-C]
(2) It is apparent from Rule 4(i) of the Rules framed
by the Punjab High Court under section 9 of the Suits
Valuation Act, which are applicable to the Union Territory
of Delhi, that valuation for the purposes of Court Fee and
jurisdiction is not the same. Under these Rules, the value
of suit for accounts for purposes of court fee will have to
be determined by the plaintiff. [434G-H]
(3) It is manifestly clear from the provision of order
VII, Rule 11 (b), that a Court has to come to a finding that
the relief claimed has been undervalued which necessarily
means that the Court is able to decide and specify proper
and correct valuation of the relief. But ordinarily it is
not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to
determine the value of the relief in a suit for accounts
simpliciter and the Court has no other alternative than to
accept plaintiff‘s valuation tentatively. [435G-H; 436B-C]
(4) Where there are objective standard of valuation or,
in other words, the plaintiff or the Court can reasonably
value the relief correctly on certain definite and positive
materials, the plaintiff will not be permitted to put an
arbitrary valuation dehors such objective standards or
materials. [439C-D]
(5) The plaintiff cannot whimsically choose a
ridiculous figure for filling the suit where there are
positive materials and/or objective standards of valuation
of the relief appearing on the face of the plaint. These
materials or objective standards will also enable the Court
to determine the valuation for the purpose of Order VlI,
Rule 11(b), of the Code of Civil Procedure.[441C-D]
(6) The valuation of the relief in the instant case,
for the rendition of accounts under Section 7(iv)(f) of the
Court Fees Act. is neither unreasonable nor it is
demonstratively arbitrary.[442E]
433
Smt. Sheila Devi & Ors. v. Shri Kishan Lal Kalra &
Ors., ILR 1974 Delhi 491; S. Rm. Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar
v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, 119581 SCR 1024;
Urmilabala Biswas v. Binapani Biswas, AIR 1938 Cal 161;
Kishori Lal Marwari v. Kumar Chandra Narain Deo, AIR 1939
Patna 572; Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari,
AIR 1940 Cal 482; Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v.
Venkatachalam Chettiar,[1979] 3 SCR 385; Tara Devi v. Sri
Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, [1987] 4 SCC; Abdul Hamid
Shamsi v. Abdul Majid, JT (1988) 2 SC 69 and Atma Ram Charan
Das v. Bisheshar Nath Dina Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 689 referred
to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2137 of
1988.
From the Judgment and order dated 14.3.1986 of the
Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (O.S.) No. 65 of 1986.
Soli J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.H. Parekh and M.K.S.
Menon for the Appellants.
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Rajinder Sachar, K.C. Dua and G.S. Sistan for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DUTT, J. Special leave is granted. Heard learned
Counsel for the parties.
This appeal is at the instance of the defendants and is
directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court whereby the Division Bench affirmed the
judgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court rejecting
the contention of the appellants that the suit was
undervalued by the plaintiff-respondent and, accordingly,
the plaint should be rejected under clause (b) of Rule 11 of
order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The respondent, who is the plaintiff, has filed a suit
against the appellants, inter alia, for dissolution of
partnership and for accounts. The suit has been valued for
the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and at Rs.500 for
the purpose of court fee.
The appellants filed an application wherein a
preliminary objection was raised as to the valuation of the
suit. It was contended by them that the relief sought for in
the suit had been grossly undervalued
434
and the Court should reject the plaint under order VII, Rule
11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Single
Judge of the High Court overruled the said preliminary
objection and held that the suit was not undervalued. On
appeal by the appellants, a Division Bench of the High Court
took the same view as that of the learned Single Judge. The
Division Bench placed reliance upon and followed a Full
Bench decision of the same High Court in Smt. Sheila Devi &
Ors. v. Shri Kishan Lal Kalra & Ors., ILR 1974 Delhi 491
where it has been observed, inter alia, that paragraph (iv)
of section 7 of the Court Fees Act gives a right to the
plaintiff in any of the suits mentioned in the clauses of
that paragraph to place any value that he likes on the
relief he seeks, subject, however, to any rule made under
section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and the Court has no
power to interfere with the plaintiffs valuation. The
Division Bench felt itself bound by the said Full Bench
decision and, accordingly, it dismissed the appeal of the
appellants. Hence this appeal.
At the outset, it may be mentioned that in regard to
suits for accounts, the Punjab High Court has framed rules
under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act fixing court fee
and jurisdictional value of a suit for accounts. Rule 4 of
the Rules framed by the Punjab High Court provides as
follows:
"4(i) Suits in which the plaintiff in the plaint
seeks to recover the amount which may be found to
the plaintiff on taking unsettled account between
him and defendant;
(ii). suits of either of the kinds described
in order XX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil
Procedure:
Value for the purpose of court fee .. as deter
mined by the Court Fees Act, 1870.
value for the purposes of jurisdiction for the
purpose of Suits Valuation Act, 1887 and the
Punjab Courts Act, 1918 as valued by the plaintiff
in the plaint subject to determination by the
court at any stage of the trial."
It is not disputed that the above rules framed by the
Punjab High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act
are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi. It is
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apparent from Rule 4 extracted above that valuation for the
purposes of court fee and jurisdiction is not the same.
Indeed, in the instant case, the respondent has valued
435
the suit at Rs.25 lakhs for the purpose of jurisdiction.
That valuation has not been challenged by the appellant
either in the High Court or in this Court. The only
challenge that has been made by the appellant is the
valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee.
So far as suits coming under section 7(iv) of the Court
Fees Act are concerned, the Legislature has left the
question of valuation of the relief sought in the plaint or
memorandum of appeal to the plaintiff. The reason is
obvious. The suits which are mentioned under section 7(iv)
are of such nature that it is difficult to lay down any
standard of valuation. Indeed, the Legislature has not laid
down any standard of valuation in the Court Fees Act. Under
Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, the High Court may,
with the previous sanction of the State Government, frame
rules for the valuation of suits referred to in section
7(iv) of the Court fees Act. Although the Punjab High Court
has framed rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act
which are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, such
rules do not lay down any standard of valuation with regard
to suits coming under section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act.
It has already been noticed that under Rule 4(i) of the
Punjab High Court Rules, the value of suit for accounts for
purposes of court fee will be as determined by the Court
Fees Act, which means that the valuation of the relief will
have to be made by the plaintiff under section 7(iv)(f) of
the Court Fees Act.
In a suit for accounts it is almost impossible for the
plaintiff to value the relief correctly. So long as the
account is not taken, the plaintiff cannot say what amount,
if at all, would be found due to him on such accounting. The
plaintiff may think that a huge amount would be found due to
him, but upon actual accounting it may be found that nothing
is due to the plaintiff. A suit for accounts is filed with
the fond hope that on accounting a substantial amount would
be found due to the plaintiff. But the relief cannot be
valued on such hope, surmise or conjecture.
In this connection, we may refer to the provision of
order VII, Rule II(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides, inter alia, that the plaint shall be rejected
where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff,
on being required by the Court to correct the valuation
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. It
is manifestly clear from the provision of order VII, Rule
II(b) that a Court has to come to a finding that the relief
claimed has been undervalued, which necessarily means that
the Court is able to decide and specify proper and correct
valuation of the relief and, after determination of
436
the correct value of the relief, requires the plaintiff to
correct his valuation within a time to be fixed by the
Court. If the plaintiff does not correct the valuation
within the time allowed, the plaint is liable to be
rejected. The question is whether in a suit for accounts
simpliciter, the Court can come to a finding as to the
proper and correct value of the relief until the final
determination is made. In our opinion, ordinarily it is not
possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determining
the value of the relief in a suit for accounts simpliciter.
If the Court is itself unable to say what the correct
valuation of the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff
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to correct the valuation that has been made by him. Indeed,
in a suit for accounts it is also difficult for the Court to
come to a finding even as to the approximate correct
valuation of the relief. In such a case, the Court has no
other alternative than to accept plaintiff’s valuation
tentatively.
There has been a divergence of judicial opinion on the
question as to whether the plaintiff in a suit for accounts
is entitled to put any valuation he likes. It is not
necessary to refer to the decisions of different High Courts
on the point, and suffice it to say that they are not
uniform, some holding that the plaintiff is free to give his
own valuation and others holding that the plaintiff is not
entitled to give an arbitrary valuation without having any
link or connection with the relief in question.
In this connection, we may refer to a Five-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in S.Rm. Ar. S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar
v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, [1958] SCR 1024
Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court observed as
follows:-
"If the scheme laid down for the computation of
fees payable in suits covered by the several sub-
sections of s. 7 is considered, it would be clear
that in respect of suits falling under sub-s.
(iv), a departure has been made and liberty has
been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for
the purposes of court fees. The theoretical basis
of ’this provision appears to be that in cases in
which the plaintiff is given the option to value
his claim, it is really difficult to value the
claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for
instance the claim for partition where the
plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in
any property on the ground that is joint family
property. The basis of the claim is that the
property in respect of which a share is claimed is
joint family property. In other words, it is
property in which the
437
plaintiff has an undivided share. What the
plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for
partition is to ask the court to give him certain
specified properties separately and absolutely on
his own account for his share in lieu of his
undivided share in the whole property. Now it
would be clear that the conversion of the
plaintiff’s alleged undivided share in the joint
family property into his separate share cannot be
easily valued in terms of rupees with any
precision or definiteness. That is why legislature
has left it to the option of the plaintiff to
value his claim for the payment of court fees. It
really means that in suits falling under s.
7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the
value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to
be accepted by the court in computing the court
fees payable in respect of the said relief. In the
circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to
consider whether, under the provisions of this
section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute
right or option to place any valuation whatever on
his relief. "
In the above decision, this Court took the view that
the conversion of the plaintiff’s undivided share in the
joint family property into his separate share cannot be
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easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or
definiteness. It is true that the Court did not consider
whether the plaintiff had been given an absolute right or
option to place any valuation whatever on his relief under
the provision of section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, but
the difficulty that would be felt by the Court in exercising
its power under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure is that if it is unable to determine the correct
value of the relief, it cannot direct the plaintiff to
correct the valuation. Order VII, Rule 11(b) contemplates
correct valuation and not approximate correct valuation and
such correct valuation of the relief has to be determined by
the Court. If the Court cannot determine the correct
valuation of the relief claimed, it cannot require the
plaintiff to correct the valuation and, consequently, order
VII, Rule 11(b) will not be applicable.
But, there may be cases under section 7(iv) where
certain positive objective standard may be available for the
purpose of determination of the valuation of the relief. If
there be materials or objective standards for the valuation
of the relief, and yet the plaintiff ignores the same and
puts an arbitrary valuation, the Court, in our opinion, is
entitled to interfere under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure. for the Court will be in a Position
to determine the correct
438
valuation with reference to the objective standards or
materials available to it. In Urmilabala Biswas v. Binapani
Biswas & ors., AIR 1938 Cal 161 a suit was instituted for
declaration of title to Provident Fund money amounting to a
definite sum with a prayer for injunction restraining the
defendant from withdrawing the said money. It was held that
there was no real distinction between the right to recover
money and the right to that money itself, and that the
relief should have been valued at the Provident Fund amount
to which title was claimed by the Plaintiff. Thus, it
appears that although in that case the suit was one under
section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, there was an
objective standard which would enable the plaintiff and the
Court too to value the relief correctly and, in such a case,
the Court would be competent to direct the plaintiff to
value the relief accordingly.
In Kishori Lal Marwari v. Kumar Chandra Narain Deo and
another, AIR 1939 Patna 572 a question arose as to the
valuation of a suit for injunction restraining a decree-
holder from executing his decree on the ground that the
decree was collusive and obtained by fraud and, therefore,
void and incapable of execution. It was held by the Patna
High Court that the plaintiff must value his suit according
to the amount of decree and must pay ad valorem court fee on
such amount. In this case also, there was a positive
objective standard for the valuation of the suit.
We may now refer to a decision of the Calcutta High
Court in Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur v. Radhashyam Marwari &
Ors., AIR 1940 Cal 482. But, before we refer to the
decision, we may point out that by the Bengal Amendment Act
VII of 1935, a new section 8-C has been inserted in the
Court Fees Act. Section 8-C provides that if the Court is of
opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly
valued, it may revise the valuation and determine the
correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it thinks fit
for such purpose. In Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur’s case
(supra), it has been observed that although a satisfactory
valuation may not be possible in the majority of the cases
falling under section 7(iv), when once the Court has formed
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the opinion that the plaintiff’s estimate is wrong, it
becomes the duty of the Court to estimate a correct and
reasonable valuation of the relief claimed and it is for the
Court to decide on the merits of each particular case
whether the provisions of section 8-C should be invoked for
the purpose of revising the plaintiff’s valuation. Further,
it has been observed that if the relief claimed is
impossible to value, the Court is, of course, not in a
position to say that such relief has been wrongly valued and
there is consequently no scope for the operation of section
439
8-C, but in a suit where it is sought to set aside a decree,
such valuation, although difficult, is not impossible. In a
suit to set aside a decree prima facie the value of the
relief claimed by the plaintiff would be the value of the
decree and the onus would clearly lie on him to show that
the relief should be valued at some smaller amount. It thus
follows from the above decision that if the Court is of the
opinion that the plaintiff’s estimate is wrong, it becomes
the duty of the Court to estimate a correct and reasonable
value of the suit. If, however, the Court is not in a
position to decide the correct value of the suit, it has to
accept the value that has been put the plaintiff on the
relief claimed. In Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur’s case (supra),
there was an objective standard of valuation, namely, the
decree which was souyht to be set aside.
Thus, where there are objective standards of valuation
or, in other words, the plaintiff or the Court can
reasonably value the relief correctly on certain definite
and positive materials, the plaintiff will not be permitted
to put an arbitrary valuation dehors such objective
standards or materials.
Mr. Sorabjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellants, has strenuously urged that, in the instant
case, the respondent has valued the suit most arbitrarily
according to her whims. It is submitted by him that in a
suit for accounts the plaintiff cannot put an arbitrary
valuation on the relief claimed by him. Much reliance has
been placed by him on a few decisions of this Court which
will be referred to presently.
In Meenaakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam
Chettiar, [1979] 3 SCR 385 this Court made the following
observation:
"The plaintiff is required to state the amount at
which he values the relief sought. In suits for
accounts it is not possible for the plaintiff to
estimate correctly the amount which he may be
entitled to for, as in the present case, when the
plaintiff asks for accounting regarding the
management by a power of attorney agent, he might
not know the state of affairs of the defendant’s
management and the amount to which he would be
entitled to on accounting. But it is necessary
that the amount at which he values the relief
sought for should be a reasonable estimate."
That observation has been made by this Court with
reference to
440
the special provision, namely, section 35(1) of the Tamil
Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act XIV of 1955. Section
35(1) provides that in a suit for accounts, fee shall be
computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint.
Section 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits
Valuation Act is different from section 7(iv)(f) of the
Court Fees Act. While under section 7(iv), the court fee is
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payable according to the amount at which the relief sought
is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal, under
section 35(1), the court fee shall be computed on the amount
sued for as estimated in the plaint. In Meenakshisundram’s
case (supra) the plaintiff had given a detailed estimate in
the plaint and this Court was satisfied that the estimate
was quite adequate and reasonable.
In Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj,
[1987] 4 SCC 69 it has been laid down by this Court that in
a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling
under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff
is free to make his own estimation of the relief sought in
the plaint and such valuation both for purposes of court fee
and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. Further it
has been observed that it is only in cases where it appears
to the Court on a consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary,
unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively
undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can
revise the same. In that case, the plaintiff had valued the
lease-hold interest on the basis of the rent and such
valuation was held to be reasonable and not demonstratively
arbitrary.
In making the above observation, this Court has placed
reliance upon its earlier decision in Meenakshisundram’s
case (supra) which, as noticed above, related to section
35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act.
But one significant fact that is to be noticed in the case
is that there is an objective standard of valuation, that
is, the rent of the lease-hold interest. It may be
reiterated that when there is an objective standard of
valuation, to put a valuation on the relief ignoring such
objective standard, might be a demonstratively arbitrary and
unreasonable valuation and the Court would be entitled to
interfere in the matter.
Another decision of this Court on which much reliance
has been placed by the appellants is the case of Abdul Hamid
Shamsi v. Abdul Majid & ors, JT 1988 (2) SC 69. It was also
a suit for accounts and came under section 7(iv)(f) of the
Court Fees Act. It has been observed as follows:
VINEET
441
"It is true that in a suit for accounts the
correct amount payable by one party to the other
can be ascertained only when the accounts are
examined and it is not possible to give an
accurate valuation of the claim at the inception
of the suit. The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed
to give his own tentative valuation. Ordinarily
the Court shall not examine the correctness of the
valuation chose, but the plaintiff cannot act
arbitrarily in this matter. If a plaintiff chooses
whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount
to not exercising his right in this regard. In
such a case it is not only open to the Court but
its duty to reject such a valuation. The cases of
some of the High Courts which have taken a
different view must be held to be incorrectly
decided."
We are also of the view that the plaintiff cannot
whimsically choose a ridiculous figure for filing the suit
most arbitrarily where there are positive materials and/or
objective standards of valuation of the relief appearing on
the face of the plaint. These materials or objective
standards will also enable the Court to determine the
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valuation for the purpose of order VII, Rule 11(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Indeed, in Abdul Hamid Shamsi’s
case, it has been noticed by this Court that the plaintiff
has laid a claim to a sum of Rs1,26,796.72, besides another
sum of over Rs.84,000 as his share in the profit for a
particular period by reference to the proceeding of the
Incom-Tax Department mentioned in paragraph 11 of the
plaint. Further, a copy of the profit and loss account for
the calendar year 1979 was annexed by the plaintiff to the
additional affidavit filed on his behalf before this Court,
which also gave positive indication as to the valuation of
the relief. The plaintiff in that case valued the suit
without making any reference whatsoever to those materials
or objective standards available to him and in the context
of these facts, this Court made the above observation. But,
if there be no material or objective standard, the
plaintiff’s valuation has to be accepted.
It is however, urged by Mr. Sorabjee that such an
objective standard or positive material appears on the face
of the plaint. Our attention has been drawn to paragraph 33
of the plaint where it has been stated by the plaintiff that
on rendition of accounts, the plaintiff estimates that
approximately a sum of Rs.25 lakhs to 30 lakhs would become
due to her share. It is submitted on behalf of the
appellants that in view of such a statement in the plaint,
the respondent should have valued the relief for rendition
of accounts at Rs.25 lakhs. We are unable to accept the
contention. The statement does not, in our opi-
442
nion, constitute any objective standard of valuation or a
positive material from which it can be said with any amount
of certainty that the valuation of the relief for accounts
should be at the sum of Rs.25 lakhs. The respondent was not
required to make such a statement in the plaint. It is the
wishful thinking of the respondent that on account being
taken, she would be entitled to such a huge amount. The
respondent has not given in the plaint any material in
support of the estimate of Rs.25 lakhs to Rs.30 lakhs to her
share. As has been stated already, this is no material at
all on which any reliance can be placed for the purpose of
valuation of the relief. In this connection, we may refer to
a decision of the Lahore High Court in Atma Ram Charan Das
v. Bisheshar Nath Dina Nath, AIR 1935 Lahore 689. In that
case also the question was whether the plaintiff had
correctly valued the relief for the rendition of accounts.
in the plaint, the plaintiff stated that a sum of Rs.8,000
was due to him from the defendants, but he valued the suit
for purposes of jurisdiction and court fee at Rs.5000
tentatively. It was . held that the plaintiff could not be
prejudiced or damnified merely because he added to the
plaint a computation which was unnecessary for him to live.
We have considered the facts and circumstances of the
case and also the legal position and, in our view, the
valuation of the relief for the rendition of accounts under
section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act is neither
unreasonable nor it is demonstratively arbitrary.
In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with
costs quantified at Rs.5,000.
R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.
443