Ashok Singh vs. State Of U.P.

2025 INSC 427
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4171 OF 202 4
ASHOK SINGH …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
R1: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
R2: RAVINDRA PRATAP SINGH
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
The present appeal impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated
21.02.2024 in Criminal Revision Petition No.619 of 2020 (hereinafter
1
referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench (hereinafter referred to as the

2
‘High Court’), allowing the petition and setting aside the concurrent
findings of guilt and conviction recorded against respondent no.2
(hereinafter also referred to as the ‘accused’) in the Order dated
12.04.2019 in Complaint Case No.6650/2012 passed by the Presiding
Officer/Additional Court, Room No.5, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Trial Court’) as later upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court
No.1, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’) vide
Order dated 23.10.2020 in Criminal Appeal No.148/2019.
FACTS:
2. The appellant is the complainant in Complaint Case
No.6650/2012. He alleged that he had advanced a loan of Rs.22,00,000/-
(Twenty-Two lakhs) to the respondent no.2 on the assurance that the
entire amount will be returned. When the appellant demanded return of
the money, the accused issued Cheque No.726716 dated 17.03.2010 for
an amount of Rs.22,00,000/- (Twenty-Two lakhs) drawn on the Bank of
Baroda. The appellant presented the said cheque for encashment at IDBI
Bank, Main Branch, Lucknow. On 07.05.2010, the cheque was
dishonoured with the endorsement ‘ payment stopped by drawer ’ and the
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cheque along with receipt was returned. Subsequently, the appellant
attempted to contact the accused seeking return of the money but the
accused neither met him nor returned the money. The appellant sent a
Legal Notice dated 18.05.2010 through Registered Post. However, the
accused did not reply to the Notice. Hence, a complaint case was
registered by the appellant.
3. On an appreciation of facts and the evidence presented before it,
the Trial Court vide Order dated 12.04.2019 found the accused guilty of
2
having committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and sentenced
him to one year of simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs.35,00,000/-
(Rupees Thirty-Five Lakhs). In case of default in making the payment of
2
‘ 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. —Where any cheque drawn by a
person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank
unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other
provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which
may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment
of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the
case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other
liability. ’
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fine, a further sentence of three months’ simple imprisonment was
directed to be served. It was ordered that a sum of Rs.30,00,000/-
(Rupees Thirty Lakhs) be given to the complainant as compensation. The
appeal preferred by the accused was dismissed by the Appellate Court
vide Order dated 23.10.2020 and the Order of the Trial Court was
confirmed.
4. The accused filed a criminal revision petition before the High
Court which came to be allowed vide the Impugned Order and the
conviction and sentence imposed on the accused/respondent no.2 was
set aside. While doing so, the High Court noted as under, inter alia :
‘ The complainant has failed to prove his case that the
cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful debt
specially when the complainant has failed to disclose
details of his Bank Account and date when he withdrew
the amount in question and paid to the revisionist as well
as the date when he obtained the cheque. Therefore,
there are glaring inconsistencies indicating doubt in the
complainant's version, hence, the conviction and sentence
cannot be sustained. ’
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
5. Mr. Pinaki Addy, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that
the High Court fell in error in upsetting the concurrent findings of facts
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recorded by the Courts below by re-appreciating and re-analyzing the
evidence. It was argued that during the cross-examination of the
accused, it was admitted that the intimation regarding loss of the cheque
was sent to the police in 2011 i.e., much after the cheque was presented
by the appellant on 17.03.2010. The said intimation is dated 12.03.2010
which proves that the document was manufactured in 2011 and back-
dated. The intimation also was never converted into a First Information
Report (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’), hence it carries no evidentiary
value.
6. It was submitted that the cheque was issued in discharge of loan
availed by the accused and hence presumption under Section 118 read
with Section 139 of the Act would operate in the appellant’s favour. The
burden of proof lies on the accused and he has to raise a probable
defence. In the absence of any evidence, a mere oral statement that
there did not exist any debt would not be sufficient to rebut the
presumption, especially when the signature on the cheque has been
admitted by the accused in his evidence.
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7. It was further submitted that the Trial Court and the Appellate
Court have duly considered the evidence on record and have rightly
disbelieved the story put forth by the accused and held the prosecution
case to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The counsel placed
reliance on the following decisions: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019)
4 SCC 197 ; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh , (2023) 10 SCC 148 ; Kishan
Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165 , and; Uttam Ram v. Devinder
Singh Hudan , (2019) 10 SCC 287 . It was prayed that the appeal be
allowed.
RESPONDENT NO.2-ACCUSED’S SUBMISSIONS:
8. Per contra , Mr Shadan Farasat, learned senior counsel for the
respondent no.2-accused submitted, at the outset, that the Impugned
Order is good in law and does not require any interference by this Court.
It was submitted that no proof of withdrawal of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees
Twenty-Two Lakhs) was placed on record by the complainant. The entire
story put forth by the complainant is fictitious and he has failed to prove
the circumstances in which the cheque was handed over and the
existence of any business relations between the parties.
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9. It was submitted that the complainant had also failed to prove his
capacity to advance such huge amount of loan in the absence of
adducing any evidence viz . ledger, Income-Tax Returns, money-lending
license, etc. In such circumstances, the complainant also failed to prove
that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt and such debt
existed on the date of presentation of the cheque.
10. It was his contention that the Trial Court as well as the Appellate
Court were misled by the appellant about the existence of two complaints
by the respondent no.2 and findings of both the Courts on this issue are
erroneous. Further, it was argued that the accused never handed over
the signed cheque to the appellant and the same was lost while he was
travelling from Sultanpur to Raebareli at Atheha Market and Missing
Report, in this connection, was also filed on 12.03.2010 at Police Station
Udaipur, District Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh.
11. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Bir Singh ( supra ),
Rajesh Jain ( supra ) and Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1899 , to highlight that the appellant did not discharge his burden of
establishing the factual basis to activate the presumptive clause. It was
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further submitted, that in any case, the complaint is not maintainable
since the drawer of the cheque i.e., the Partnership Firm viz . M/s Sun
Enterprises, has not been arrayed as a party. Additionally, learned senior
counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in John K John v. Tom
Varghese , (2007) 12 SCC 714 ; Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya
G Hegde , (2008) 4 SCC 54 , and; G Pankajakshi Amma v. Mathai
Mathew (Dead) through LRs. , (2004) 12 SCC 83 .
12. While it was urged that the appeal be dismissed, without prejudice
to the foregoing submissions, learned senior counsel canvassed that the
offence under the Act is compoundable and the accused being 58 years
of age with no criminal antecedents and the sole bread-earner of his
family comprising 8 members, if found and held guilty by this Court, may
only be saddled with monetary penalty, and a reasonable time-frame be
granted to make such payment.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
13. We have heard learned counsel and learned senior counsel for
the respective parties at length.
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14. The present case has travelled to this Court from three Courts and
this is the fourth Court. At the very first stage, the Trial Court on
appreciation of evidence had found that a legally enforceable debt
existed in favour of the complainant-appellant payable by the respondent
no.2-accused; returned a finding of guilt/conviction, and; sentenced the
respondent no.2 to one year simple imprisonment and fine of
Rs.35,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Lakhs). The Appellate Court upheld
the findings, whereas the High Court, by the Impugned Order, acquitted
the respondent no.2.
15. There can be no dispute that in matters relating to alleged
offences under Section 138 of the Act, the complainant has only to
establish that the cheque was genuine, presented within time and upon it
being dishonoured, due notice was sent within 30 days of such
dishonour, to which re-payment must be received within 15 days, failing
which a complaint can be preferred by the complainant within one month
as contemplated under Section 142 (1)(b) of the Act.
16. On the other hand, the foremost defence available to the accused
is to deny the very liability to pay the amount for which the cheque was
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issued on the ground that it was not a ‘ legally enforceable debt ’ under the
Act.
17. In the present case, there is no denial apropos the signature on
the cheque by the respondent no.2 and, as noted hereinbefore, the stand
taken is that the said cheque was lost. This is the reason given by the
respondent no.2 to have advised the bank to stop payment due to which
the cheque in question was not honoured/encashed. However, the
relevant dates beg to tell a different tale. The cheque in question dated
17.03.2010 was presented within time but returned un-encashed on
07.05.2010 with the endorsement ‘ payment stopped by drawer ’. A Legal
Notice was also sent by the appellant on 18.05.2010 through Registered
Post, i.e., within the stipulated thirty days period, intimating about the
dishonour of the cheque. As no reply was proffered by respondent no.2,
thus, an inference, albeit rebuttable, could arise that he had no
sustainable/valid defence to justify why the cheque in question was
dishonoured. Be that as it may, the respondent no.2 avers that no reply
was sent as he had not received any Legal Notice.
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18. Further, a defence raised by the respondent no.2 was that he had
intimated the police of the factum of the cheque being lost. However,
upon verification of the said claim, it emerges that such
intimation/information reached the police only in the year 2011, though
the intimation itself was dated 12.03.2010. Notably, the cheque was
presented on 17.03.2010. This sequence strengthens the statutory
presumption in favour of the appellant, as it cannot be believed that a
cheque having been lost on/about 12.03.2010, the respondent no.2
would intimate the police thereof only in the year 2011, moreso, when the
amount involved was a princely sum of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-
Two Lakhs). It is noted that during cross-examination, respondent no.2
admitted that such intimation was sent to the police only in 2011 but
never converted into a formal FIR. This further raises serious doubts with
regard to the veracity of the accused’s claims/defences insofar as the
story projected of the cheque having been lost is concerned.
19. The accused asseverates that the cheque was drawn by M/s Sun
Enterprises. Respondent no.2-accused was a Partner in the said
Partnership Firm. Learned senior counsel drew attention to Aneeta Hada
v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited , (2012) 5 SCC 661 ,
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where, looking to Section 141 of the Act, the Court held that if the person
committing an offence is a ‘ company ’, a complaint against its ‘ director ’,
without arraigning the ‘ company ’ as an accused would not be
maintainable. By way of Aparna A Shah v. Sheth Developers Private
Limited , (2013) 8 SCC 71 , it was held that ‘ …under Section 138 of the
Act, it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be prosecuted. ’ We are
of the view, in the prevalent facts and circumstances, that the dicta in
Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry , (2022) 10 SCC 152 would
apply:
‘ 36.  The High Court also rightly held that the Managing
Director or Joint Managing Director would admittedly be in
charge of the company and responsible to the company for
the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold
as Managing Director or Joint Manging Director. These
persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company and they get covered under
Section 141 of the NI Act. A signatory of a cheque is
clearly liable under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act.
37.  The High Court, however, failed to appreciate that none
of these appellants were Managing Director or Joint
Managing Director of the accused Company. Nor were
they signatories of the cheque which was
dishonoured.
xxx
40.  There can be no doubt that in deciding a criminal
revision application under Section 482CrPC for quashing
a proceeding under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act, the
laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and
sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions
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resulting in enactment of the said sections has to be
borne in mind. The provisions of Sections 138/141 of
the NI Act create a statutory presumption of
dishonesty on the part of the signatory of the cheque,
and when the cheque is issued on behalf of a
company, also those persons in charge of or
responsible for the company or the business of the
company. Every person connected with the company does
not fall within the ambit of Section 141 of the NI Act.
xxx
42.   Liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs
of a company and not on designation or status alone
as held by this Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals  [S.M.S.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89:
2005 SCC (Cri) 1975]. The materials on record clearly
show that these appellants were independent, non-
executive Directors of the company. As held by this Court
in Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of
Maharashtra [Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 384:
(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378] a non-executive Director is not
involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company or in the
running of its business. Such Director is in no way
responsible for the day-to-day running of the accused
Company. Moreover, when a complaint is filed against a
Director of the company, who is not the signatory of
the dishonoured cheque, specific averments have to
be made in the pleadings to substantiate the
contention in the complaint, that such Director was in
charge of and responsible for conduct of the business
of the Company or the Company, unless such Director
is the designated Managing Director or Joint Managing
Director who would obviously be responsible for the
company and/or its business and affairs.
xxx
48.  For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is
allowed. The judgment and order [Ashwini Kumar
Singh v. Panchami Stone Quarry, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal
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4491] of the High Court is set aside. Criminal Case No.
AC/121/2017 pending under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act
in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Suri,
Birbhum is quashed insofar as these appellants are
concerned. It is made clear that the proceedings may
continue against the other accused in the criminal
case, including in particular the accused Company, its
Managing Director/Additional Managing Director
and/or the signatory of the cheque in question. ’
(emphasis supplied)
20. No doubt the judgment by 2 learned Judges in Sunita Palita
( supra ) is innocent of the pronouncement by the 3-Judge Bench in
Aneeta Hada ( supra ). However, Sunita Palita ( supra ) has taken note of
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla , (2005) 8 SCC 89 ,
rendered also by a 3-Judge Bench, which was reiterated in Aneeta Hada
( supra ). As such, our harmonised reading of these judgments would lead
us to the conclusion, on facts herein, that as the signatory of the cheque
is arrayed as accused and is also the person in charge, the underlying
complaint would be maintainable. Even before us, it has never been
urged that the accused, a Partner in M/s Sun Enterprises is not the
person in charge thereof.
21. One of the grounds, which weighed heavily with the High Court to
acquit the respondent no.2 was that the appellant was unable to prove
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the source of Rs.22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Two Lakhs) given to the
respondent no.2 as loan. Admittedly, the signature on the cheque is of
the respondent no.2 himself. The decision in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v.
State of Gujarat , (2019) 18 SCC 106 can be profitably referred to:
‘ 18.   In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing
the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the
trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence
on the part of the complainant as regards the source of
funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of
examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly
extended him money for advancing it to the accused.
This approach of the trial court had been at variance
with the principles of presumption in law. After such
presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and
unless the accused had discharged the onus by
bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to
show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his
favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not
have been raised for want of evidence regarding the
source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant-
accused. The aspect relevant for consideration had
been as to whether the appellant-accused has brought
on record such facts/material/circumstances which
could be of a reasonably probable defence.
19.  In order to discharge his burden, the accused put
forward the defence that in fact, he had had the monetary
transaction with the said Shri Jagdishbhai and not with the
complainant. In view of such a plea of the appellant-
accused, the question for consideration is as to whether
the appellant-accused has shown a reasonable probability
of existence of any transaction with Shri Jagdishbhai? In
this regard, significant it is to notice that apart from
making certain suggestions in the cross-examination,
the appellant-accused has not adduced any
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documentary evidence to satisfy even primarily that there
had been some monetary transaction of himself with Shri
Jagdishbhai. Of course, one of the allegations of the
appellant is that the said stamp paper was given to Shri
Jagdishbhai and another factor relied upon is that Shri
Jagdishbhai had signed on the stamp paper in question
and not the complainant.
xxx
20.  Hereinabove, we have examined in detail the findings
of the trial court and those of the High Court and have no
hesitation in concluding that the present one was clearly a
case where the decision of the trial court suffered from
perversity and fundamental error of approach; and the High
Court was justified in reversing the judgment of the trial
court. The observations of the trial court that there was
no documentary evidence to show the source of funds
with the respondent to advance the loan, or that the
respondent did not record the transaction in the form
of receipt of even kachcha notes, or that there were
inconsistencies in the statement of the complainant
and his witness, or that the witness of the complaint
was more in the know of facts, etc. would have been
relevant if the matter was to be examined with
reference to the onus on the complaint to prove his
case beyond reasonable doubt. These considerations
and observations do not stand in conformity with the
presumption existing in favour of the complainant by
virtue of Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. Needless
to reiterate that the result of such presumption is that
existence of a legally enforceable debt is to be
presumed in favour of the complainant. When such a
presumption is drawn, the factors relating to the want
of documentary evidence in the form of receipts or
accounts or want of evidence as regards source of
funds were not of relevant consideration while
examining if the accused has been able to rebut the
presumption or not. The other observations as regards
any variance in the statement of complainant and witness;
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or want of knowledge about dates and other particulars of
the cheques; or washing away of the earlier cheques in the
rains though the office of the complainant being on the 8th
floor had also been irrelevant factors for consideration of a
probable defence of the appellant. Similarly, the factor that
the complainant alleged the loan amount to be Rs
22,50,000 and seven cheques being of Rs 3,00,000 each
leading to a deficit of Rs 1,50,000, is not even worth
consideration for the purpose of the determination of real
questions involved in the matter. May be, if the total
amount of cheques exceeded the alleged amount of loan, a
slender doubt might have arisen, but, in the present matter,
the total amount of 7 cheques is lesser than the amount of
loan. Significantly, the specific amount of loan (to the tune
of Rs 22,50,000) was distinctly stated by the appellant-
accused in the aforesaid acknowledgment dated 21-3-
2017. ’
(emphasis supplied)
22. The High Court while allowing the criminal revision has primarily
proceeded on the presumption that it was obligatory on the part of the
complainant to establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the
details of the bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal
of the said amount which was given to the accused and also the date and
time of the payment made to the accused, including the date and time of
receiving of the cheque, which has not been done in the present case.
Pausing here, such presumption on the complainant, by the High Court,
appears to be erroneous. The onus is not on the complainant at the
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threshold to prove his capacity/financial wherewithal to make the
payment in discharge of which the cheque is alleged to have been issued
in his favour. Only if an objection is raised that the complainant was not in
a financial position to pay the amount so claimed by him to have been
given as a loan to the accused, only then the complainant would have to
bring before the Court cogent material to indicate that he had the
financial capacity and had actually advanced the amount in question by
way of loan. In the case at hand, the appellant had categorically stated in
his deposition and reiterated in the cross-examination that he had
withdrawn the amount from the bank in Faizabad (Typed Copy of his
deposition in the paperbook wrongly mentions this as ‘Firozabad’). The
Court ought not to have summarily rejected such stand, more so when
respondent no.2 did not make any serious attempt to dispel/negate such
stand/statement of the appellant. Thus, on the one hand, the statement
made before the Court, both in examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, by the appellant with regard to withdrawing the money from
the bank for giving it to the accused has been disbelieved whereas the
argument on behalf of the accused that he had not received any payment
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of any loan amount has been accepted. In our decision in M/s S. S.
Production v. Tr. Pavithran Prasanth , 2024 INSC 1059 , we opined:
‘ 8. From the order impugned, it is clear that though the
contention of the petitioners was that the said amounts
were given for producing a film and were not by way of
return of any loan taken, which may have been a probable
defence for the petitioners in the case, but rightly, the High
Court has taken the view that evidence had to be adduced
on this point which has not been done by the petitioners.
Pausing here, the Court would only comment that the
reasoning of the High Court as well as the First Appellate
Court and Trial Court on this issue is sound. Just by
taking a counter-stand to raise a probable defence
would not shift the onus on the complainant in such a
case for the plea of defence has to be buttressed by
evidence, either oral or documentary, which in the
present cases, has not been done. Moreover, even if it
is presumed that the complainant had not proved the
source of the money given to the petitioners by way of
loan by producing statement of accounts and/or Income
Tax Returns, the same ipso facto, would not negate
such claim for the reason that the cheques having
being issued and signed by the petitioners has not
been denied, and no evidence has been led to show
that the respondent lacked capacity to provide the
amount(s) in question. In this regard, we may make
profitable reference to the decision in Tedhi Singh v
Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735 :
‘10. The trial court and the first appellate court
have noted that in the case under Section 138
of the NI Act the complainant need not show
in the first instance that he had the capacity.
The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI
Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the
complainant gives his evidence, unless a
case is set up in the reply notice to the
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statutory notice sent, that the complainant
did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be
expected of the complainant to initially lead
evidence to show that he had the financial
capacity. To that extent, the courts in our view
were right in holding on those lines. However,
the accused has the right to demonstrate
that the complainant in a particular case did
not have the capacity and therefore, the
case of the accused is acceptable which he
can do by producing independent materials,
namely, by examining his witnesses and
producing documents. It is also open to him
to establish the very same aspect by
pointing to the materials produced by the
complainant himself. He can further, more
importantly, achieve this result through the
crossexamination of the witnesses of the
complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty
of the courts to consider carefully and
appreciate the totality of the evidence and
then come to a conclusion whether in the
given case, the accused has shown that the
case of the complainant is in peril for the
reason that the accused has established a
probable defence. ’
(emphasis supplied) ’
(underlining in original; emphasis supplied by us in bold)
23. In the present case, on an overall circumspection of the entire
facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the appellant
succeeded in establishing his case and the Orders passed by the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court did not warrant any interference. The High
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Court erred in overturning the concurrent findings of guilt and
consequential conviction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court.
24. Accordingly, for reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The
Impugned Order is set aside. Though the natural consequence would
entail revival of the conviction and sentence imposed upon the
respondent no.2 i.e., one year simple imprisonment and fine of
Rs.35,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Lakhs), but having regard to the
parting submissions of learned senior counsel for the
accused/respondent no.2, to the effect that considering his age, he may
be only subjected to fine and not imprisonment, we are inclined to modify
the sentence to only payment of a fine restricted to Rs.32,00,000/-
(Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs). Acceding to the request by the learned
senior counsel, such fine be paid within four months from today to the
appellant, failing which the sentence in entirety, as awarded by the Trial
Court and upheld by the Appellate Court, will stand restored, with the
added modification that the entire fine of Rs.35,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-
Five Lakhs) will be payable to the appellant.
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25. Parties are left to bear their own costs. I.A. No.99358/2024
(exemption from filing Official Translation) is allowed. I.A.
No.234705/2024 (to file additional documents) is allowed; Annexure A-1
(Application/ Tehrir ) is taken on record.
.………………..........................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
…………………..................…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 02, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4171 OF 202 4 Page 22 of 22