Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 6295 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.3458 of 2015)
Asst. Provident Fund Commissioner
EPFO, Bareilly ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/s U.P. State Warehousing Corp.
& Anr. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1.
Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2019.08.14
17:59:19 IST
Reason:
and order dated 27.08.2013 passed by the High
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Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No.
49599 of 2011 whereby the High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and
quashed the awards dated 03.08.2010 and
02.12.2002 passed by the Employees’ Provident
Fund Appellate Tribunal and the Employees’
Provident Fund Organization, SubRegional Officer
respectively.
3. In order to appreciate the short issue involved
in this appeal, a few facts need mention infra .
4. The appellant herein is respondent No. 1
whereas respondent No.1 herein is the writ
petitioner and respondent No. 2 herein is
respondent No. 2 in the writ petition before the High
Court out of which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant is the Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner of the Employees’ Provident Fund
under the Employees’ Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter
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referred to as “the Act”). Respondent No.1 is the
statutory Corporation known as U.P. State
Warehousing Corporation for the State of U.P.
(hereinafter referred to as "Corporation") and
respondent No. 2 is the Union of workers.
6. The Corporation is inter alia engaged in the
business of stocking the grains and other
commodities in its Godown. The work of loading and
unloading of the commodities in the Godown is
done by the workers on regular basis. The business
of Corporation is governed by the provisions of
Warehousing Corporation Act, 1962 (for short
called, “The Act 1962”).
7. It is the case of the Corporation that the
stocking, loading and unloading of the commodities
in its Godowns is done through Contractor, who, in
turn, employs the workers for doing the work of
loading and unloading for the Corporation in their
Godowns. These workers have formed their Union
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called U.P. Rajya Bhandar Nigam Asthayi Handling
Mazdoor Union respondent No. 2 herein.
8. The question arose as to whether the workers
(total 159 at the relevant time), who were engaged in
the work of loading and unloading in the Godowns,
are entitled to claim the benefit of the Act and, if so,
whether the Corporation is liable to pay the
statutory contribution in relation to such workers in
accordance with the provisions of the Act so as to
entitle the workers to claim the benefits of the Act.
9. The appellant with a view to decide this
question accordingly issued notice to the
Corporation under Section 7A of the Act and called
upon them to pay the arrears due towards provident
fund contribution of these workers (159) in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
10. The Corporation contested the show cause
notice inter alia on the ground that since there was
no relationship of employer and employee between
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the Corporation and these workers, the Corporation
was not liable to pay any contribution of these
workers under the Act.
11. The Corporation also pointed out that the
question as to whether these workers were the
employees of the Corporation or not was already
gone into between the parties before the Labour
Court in adjudication Case Nos. 89/2006 and
3/2009 and the same was decided by the Labour
Court in workers’ favour but later the award of the
Labour Court was set aside by the High Court by
order dated 15.05.2013 in W.P. No 72314 of 2010.
It is on this basis, the Corporation contended that
in the light of this finding having been recorded by
the High Court in their favour, the present
proceedings initiated under Section 7A of the Act
against the Corporation are wholly devoid of any
merit and hence the proceedings be withdrawn.
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12. By assessment order dated 02.12.2002, the
adjudicating authority did not accept the
contentions raised by the Corporation and held that
the Corporation was liable to pay the contribution of
these workers in accordance with the provisions of
the Act. The appellate authority constituted under
the Act upheld the order, which gave rise to filing of
the writ petition by the Corporation in the High
Court of Allahabad.
13. By impugned order, the High Court (Single
Judge) allowed the writ petition and set aside the
order of the adjudicating authority and the appellate
authority. The High Court simply placed reliance on
the finding recorded by the High Court in the earlier
proceedings and held that since there was no
relationship of master and servant between the
Corporation (as master) and the workers (as
servants) as was held by the High Court in the
earlier writ proceedings, the proceedings in question
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are rendered bad in law and deserves to be
quashed.
14. It is against this order, the Provident Fund
Authorities felt aggrieved and filed this appeal by
way of special leave in this Court questioning its
legality and correctness.
15. So the short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was justified in allowing the writ petition filed
by the Corporation and thereby was also justified in
setting aside the orders of the adjudicating
authority and the appellate authority.
16. Heard Mr. Keshav Mohan, learned counsel for
the appellant and Mr. P.S. Misra, learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. R.R. Rajesh,
learned counsel for respondent No.2.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are constrained to allow the appeal and while
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setting aside the impugned order remand the case
to the High Court (writ court) for deciding the writ
petition afresh on merits.
18. In our considered opinion, the need to remand
the case to the High Court has arisen for the reason
that the High Court failed to examine the issue
keeping in view the definition of “employee" as
defined under Section 2(f) of the Act which reads as
under:
“2(f) “employee” means any person who is
employed for wages in any kind of work,
manual or otherwise, in or in connection with
the work of an establishment, and who gets,
his wages directly or indirectly from the
employer, and includes any person,
(i) employed by or through a contractor in
or in connection with the work of the
establishment;
(ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an
apprentice engaged under the
Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), or
under the standing orders of the
establishment;”
(emphasis supplied)
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19. In our view, the High Court should have seen
that the proceedings in question have arisen out of
the Act in question and, therefore, the issue was
required to be decided in the light of the relevant
provisions of the Act in question but not in the light
of the finding recorded in the proceedings arising
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinafter
referred to as “the ID Act”).
20. The High Court also should have seen that in
order to decide the relationship of employer and
employee for the purpose of applicability of the Act
in question, the issue has to be decided in the light
of definition of "employee" as defined under Section
2(f) of the Act.
21. It should have been seen that firstly, the
definition of "employee" under the ID Act is not
identical to the definition of “employee” defined
under Section 2(f) of the Act; and secondly, the
object of the ID Act and the Act in question is not
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the same. In other words, the definition of
“employee” under the ID Act and the one defined
under the Act in question are not similar. Even
their objects are also not identical.
22. It is for these two reasons, any finding
recorded by the Labour Court while deciding the
dispute under the ID Act will be of no consequence
while deciding the question arising under the Act in
question. The issue was, therefore, required to be
decided independently and de hors the proceedings
decided under the ID Act.
23. Since the High Court did not notice the
definition of "employee" defined under Section 2(f) of
the Act and proceeded to pass the impugned order
only in the light of finding recorded in the
proceedings arising under the ID Act in the order
dated 15.05.2013 passed in W.P. No.72314 of 2010,
the impugned order is rendered bad in law and,
therefore, calls for interference in this appeal.
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24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the
appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The
impugned order is set aside. The case (writ petition)
is remanded to the High Court (writ court) for
deciding the Corporation's writ petition afresh on
merits keeping in view the definition of "employee''
as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act and then
decide as to whether the proceedings under section
7A of the Act are legal and proper or not.
25. We request the High Court to decide the writ
petition expeditiously.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
August 14, 2019
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