Full Judgment Text
2023INSC606
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5107 OF 2022
VINOD KUMAR & ORS. …Appellant(s)
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MAU & ORS. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :
This appeal is at the instance of unsuccessful
original writ petitioners and is directed against the order
passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
th
at Allahabad dated 28 February, 2020 in WritC No. 7310
of 2020 by which the High Court rejected the writ
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Singh
Date: 2023.07.07
14:19:34 IST
Reason:
application filed by the appellants taking the view that the
District Magistrate is competent to look into the legality and
1
validity of the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer (for short, ‘SLAO’) under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Authority Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act
1956’).
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The Central Government issued a notification dated
23.01.2015 in exercise of power under Section 3A(1) of the
Act 1956 proposing to acquire few parcels of land situated
in the District Mau for the purpose of four lane widening of
the National Highway No. 29. The said notification included
the land bearing Gat Nos. 158, 160 and 161 resply of the
village Ahirani Bujurg, District Mau (UP).
3. In the aforesaid context, a further notification dated
21.01.2016 was issued under Section 3D of the Act 1956
declaring that the land as aforestated would be acquired for
the public purpose. Upon issuance of such notification, the
land vested in the Central Government.
2
4. The competent authority i.e. the Special Land
Acquisition Officer vide award dated 28.11.2016 passed
under Section 3G of the Act 1956 determined the
compensation to be paid to the landowners (parties before
us) for the acquired land. The relevant portion of the award
passed by the competent authority reads thus:
“By assuming the rate of Rs.4,50,00,000.00 as the
stamp rate determined for the transferable land as
basis, compensation of the land measuring 3.269
hec. situated in village Ahirani Buzurg which is
being acquired comes out to Rs.14,71,05,000.00,
double amount of which happens to be
Rs.29,42,10,000.00 and compensation of the
structure and tree comes at Rs.8,01,582.00, total
double amount of which comes out at
Rs.15,29,06,582.00. Amount of 100% Solatium
amount on this amount comes out to
Rs.30,00,11,582.00. Additional Compensation of
Rs.3,16,66,953.00 is payable at the rate of 12%
from the last publication of Section 3A dated 6th
March, 2015. Thus, total compensation amount
comes out to Rs.63,16,90,117.00 (Rupees sixty
three crores sixteen lakhs ninety thousand one
hundred and seventeen only), I regard to which I
declare the Award. By recovering land acquisition
expenses of Rs.6,31,69,012.00 at the rate of 10% of
the total amount of compensation and 100 times of
registered value of less land revenue which comes
out at Rs.7476.00 from the Acquiring Authority,
same be got deposited in the prescribed Account
Head. Accordingly, Notice be sent to the concerned
3
Tehsil for proceedings of making entry. While
making one copy of the Award Order to Indian
National Highway Authority, Gorakhpur, letter be
sent for making available the entire amount covered
by the Award in question.”
5. On 11.12.2019, the respondents herein raised a
dispute regarding apportionment of the compensation
between themselves and the appellants herein. With
respect to the three parcels of land, the respondents
claimed half share of compensation in Gat No. 158 and
rd
1/3 share of compensation in Gat Nos. 160 and 161
th
respectively, while the appellants herein claimed 5/8
th
share in the compensation in Gat No. 158 and 13/16
share in Gat Nos. 160 and 161 respectively.
6. In accordance with the legislative scheme i.e. Section
3H(3) of the Act 1956, the competent authority is required
to determine the shares of the landowners in the
compensation. In such circumstances, the competent
authority called for a report from the revenue authorities.
The revenue authorities vide its report dated 11.04.2019
reported the share of the appellants and respondents
4
herein. This report was in favour of the appellants. The
relevant portion of the report reads thus:
“4. That on the basis of copy of Khasra No. 1353,
Gata No. 213 is mentioned which is having present
No. 232/ 51 min. and present No. of Gata No. 213 B
is 232 Min./183 and present No. of 213 is 232
min./ 519. Similarly present No. of Gata No. 233 is
214/ 644 acres and type of land is mentioned as
"Bagh Digar". Apart from it, present No. of Gata No.
208 is 227 / 1.440 acres in which "Bagh Digar" is
mentioned, which is correct.
5. That names of Mahadav Shahi, son of Sitaram
Shahi and Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son
of Brijrnohan, Caste Kandu are recorded in Khata
No. 46 of Copy of Khatauni for the crop year 1348,
Ahirani Buzurg, in which Gata No. 232 acres is
recorded and name of Mahadev, son of Sitaram
Shahi and Bholanath, son of Ganga and Saryu, son
of Brijmohan, Caste Kanu is recorded in respect of
Gata No. 128 for the crop year 1348. Gata No. 232/
0.284 acres is mentioned in it and names of
Mahadev, son of Sitaram Shahi and Bholanath, son
of Brij Mohan, Caste Kandu are recorded in Khata
No. 92. Gata No. 232/0.539 and Gata No.
233/0.644 two Gatas admeasuring 1.163 acres are
mentioned in it, which is correct. On the basis of the
crop year 1348, which has been mentioned as
Jamman 12. On its basis, ½ equal share in Gata
No. 227 / 1.440, equal share of Salum in Gata No.
232 min./ 0.551, 232/ 0.183, 232/ 0.539 and 233/
1.624 have been determined, which road is situated
on both sides of Hashiya Doharighat to Gazipur, in
rd
which Applicant has got 1/3 share in Gata Nos.
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232 and 233 and Applicants have got ½ share in
Gata No. 227 / 1.440 acres and present Gata No.
158, in regard to which according to the order
passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarh on
31.05.1976, Applicants Suresh and others have got
th
1/8 share in Gatas No. 232, 233 i.e. in present
th
Gata No. 158 measuring 0.583 and 1/16 share in
Gatas No. 160 and 161.”
7. The respondents herein objected to the aforesaid report.
Both the parties were given opportunity to file their documents.
An opportunity of hearing was also given to the parties and
thereafter the competent authority i.e. SLAO, Mau proceeded to
determine the shares of the various parties in the land in
question vide order dated 11.12.2019. This order was passed
under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. The SLAO relied upon the
earlier judgment of the Civil Court dated 31.05.1976. It is the
case of the appellants that the SLAO has correctly determined
the shares between the parties. The relevant portion of the
order passed by the competent authority/SLAO reads thus:
“Above parties have been heard and evidences
available in the file have been duly perused.
Khatauni for the crop year 1348 produced by the
Objector in his support as evidence have been
examined. Present Khatauni for the crop year 1423
6
1428, C. H. Form41 and 45 and Form11, previous
Khatauni and order dated 31.05.1976 passed by
the Hon'ble Court of Additional Civil Judge,
Azamgarh have been perused. Hon'ble Court of
Additional Civil Judge in its very passed order has
mentioned the pedigree of the family, which has
been mentioned by Tehsildar, Ghosi while perusing
all the documents. This pedigree and share
mentioned in it confirms the submission of the
report. The Hon'ble Civil Court has categorically
spoken on the issue of share in the suit while
framing issue No.1 "Whether the Plaintiff is co
owner and in the possession over the trees of list Ka
th th
to the extent of the 1/4 and list Kha 1/8 and
th
1/12 of the list Ga as alleged in the plaint?" While
deciding the above mentioned issue as well as
others, Hon'ble Court of Additional Civil Judge,
Azamgarh has clearly mentioned in its order "In
view of the above pedigree and the documents, the
share of Ganga, father of Bhola and Sukdeo was
th
1/4 in the grove of plot No. 208 (new number 158).
"Further, "In view of what has been discussed
above, I arrived at the irresistible conclusion that
Bhola had 1;sth share in Plot No. 208 (Old 227),
nd
1/32 share into trees of plot No. 213 and 214 (232
th
and 233 old) and 1/16 share in tree of Doharighat
Ghazipur Road." In the above judicial order,
partition of trees with land and shares finds
mention, but balance of convenience is falling in
favour of the Respondent Vinod. In my view, all the
people who are present in the joint tenureship/co
tenureship their share is to be decided on the basis
of pedigree. Therefore, when the pedigree has been
decided by a competent Civil Court against which
the Defendants have never appealed, hence judicial
estoppel also in the same. Accordingly, the claim of
Mr. suresh Gupta is not justified. Even earlier also,
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report was sought from Tehsil Ghosi in the present
case in regard to objection on the determination of
the share, on which while granting sufficient
opportunity of hearing to both the parties, same was
furnished by Tehsildar Ghosi while determining the
share. Even by appearing before the Court, both the
parties have expressed the consent in regard to this
fact that Suraj, Ganga, Baldev Salik and
Radhakrishan were the children of Shri Brijmohan,
in which Baldev died without children and thus, all
th
of them shall have 1/4 share in the property of
Brijmohan. Ganga had two children namely
Bholanath and Sukt1dev. Applicant Suresh is the
heir of Shri Dwarika, son of Parag, who had bought
the property from Bholanath in the auction.
Accordingly, Bholanath can auction out that much
only of which he is an owner lawfully. It shall also
be pertinent to mention this fact also that
consolidation proceedings have already been
conducted in village Ahirani Buzurg, only after
which, present records CH Form 11, 23, 41 and 45
have been prepared and Khatauni has been formed
on their basis. Applicant Suresh Gupta or any
member of his family has neither raised any
objection in this regard before the Court nor has
produced any evidence of initiating any proceedings
in the Court, therefore, he is barred by Section 49 of
the Consolidation of Holding Act.
ORDER
Thus, in pursuance of the evidence available on the
file, present Khatauni, report of the then Tehsildar,
Ghosi and order of Hon'ble Court of Additional Civil
Judge, share produced on the file are satisfactory
and correct. Accordingly, by preparing file for
8
payment of compensation, same be produced. After
doing needful, file be consigned to Record Room.
Sd/ illegible
(Atul Vats)
Competent Authority/ SLAO
Mau
11.12.2019”
8. The respondents, being dissatisfied with the order dated
11.12.2019 passed by the SLAO referred to above, challenged
the same by filing a petition before the District Magistrate, Mau
invoking Section 3G(5) of the Act 1956. It is the case of the
appellants herein that the District Magistrate, Mau without any
jurisdiction and further without giving any opportunity of
hearing to the appellants proceeded to pass an order dated
16.01.2020 granting higher shares in favour of the respondents
towards compensation. The operative portion of the order
passed by the District Magistrate, Mau reads thus:
“ORDER
On the basis of the above examination, order dated
11.12.2019 of the competent Officer/Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Mau is set aside. File is
remanded back to the competent Officer with this
direction that while duly examining the records
produced by the above parties, keeping in view the
ownership of the land acquired by the ancestors of
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the objectors in the auction and according to the
separate pedigrees of Khatedar, share of Khatedars
be determined and also produce the proposal from
Tehsil for taking action against the
officials/employees who produced erroneous
report.”
9. The appellants herein, being dissatisfied with the order
passed by the District Magistrate, Mau referred to above,
challenged the same before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad by filing WritC No. 7310 of 2020. The said writ
application came to be rejected by a Division Bench of the High
Court vide its order dated 28.02.2020. The order passed by the
High Court reads thus:
“1. Heard Sri Yadvendra Pratap Singh, learned
counsel for petitioners and learned Standing
Counsel for respondents.
2. Writ petition is directed against order dated
16.01.2020 passed by District Magistrate, Mau in
purported exercise of power under Section 3(G)(5) of
National Highway Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to
as "Act, 1956") whereby he has set aside order
passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mau
passed on 11.12.2019 and remanded the matter for
redetermination.
3. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that
determination was already made but could not
10
dispute that District Magistrate was competent to
examine the order passed by Special Land
Acquisition Officer and take appropriate decision in
accordance with law and order impugned in present
writ petition is not without jurisdiction. No otherwise
error could be shown in the impugned order.
4. Writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed.”
10. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants
came before this Court by filing the special leave petition. This
Court vide order dated 31.08.2020 issued notice and stayed the
operation of the order passed by the District Magistrate, Mau
dated 16.01.2020. Later, leave was granted and the appeal
came to be admitted.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
11. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, the learned counsel appearing for
the appellants, vehemently submitted that the High Court
committed a serious error in passing the impugned order. He
submitted that the order which came to be passed by the
competent authority dated 11.12.2019 could be said to be
under Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. If the respondents had any
grievance in regard to the order passed by the competent
11
authority the remedy available in law to them was to approach
the competent authority so that the competent authority could
have referred the matter to the Civil Court. According to the
learned counsel, such procedure is laid down under Section
3H(4) of the Act 1956.
12. The learned counsel further submitted that the District
Magistrate, Mau who is an arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government does not have any jurisdiction to decide the
apportionment of the compensation. He is empowered only to
decide the quantum of compensation under Section 3G(5) of the
Act 1956 as an arbitrator.
13. The learned counsel submitted that challenge before the
District Magistrate, Mau was to the order dated 11.12.2019
passed by the competent authority which he could not have
entertained. The order passed by the District Magistrate dated
16.01.2020 could be said to be without jurisdiction.
14. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that even
otherwise the impugned order passed by the District
Magistrate, Mau, could be said to be without jurisdiction as no
12
notice or any opportunity of hearing was given to the
appellants.
15. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned
counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same
may be allowed and the order passed by the District Magistrate,
Mau dated 16.01.2020 be quashed and set aside and the writ
application filed by the appellants before the High Court be
allowed.
SUMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 –
DISTRICT MAGISGRATE, MAU AND THE RESPONDENT NO.
2 COMPETENT AUTHORITY/SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER, MAU
16. Shri V.K. Shukla, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the District Magistrate, Mau (respondent No. 1) and
Competent Authority/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Mau
(respondent No. 2), very fairly submitted that the High Court
committed an error in rejecting the writ application filed by the
appellants herein. Shri Shukla submitted that the District
Magistrate, Mau could not have entertained any petition filed at
the instance of the respondents seeking to challenge the order
13
passed by the competent authority dated 11.12.2019 under
Section 3H(3) of the Act 1956. In such circumstances referred
to above, Shri Shukla submitted that appropriate relief be
granted in favour of the appellants.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 4, 6 AND
16
17. Shri Arvind Kumar Shukla, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16, submitted that
no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have
been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned
order. He submitted that the dispute, in substance, is not one
of apportionment but is in respect of the share in the subject
land. In such circumstances, the District Magistrate, Mau had
the jurisdiction and competence to look into the order passed
by the competent authority by relying upon the order dated
31.05.1976 passed by the Principal Civil Judge, Azamgarh in
Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970. In such circumstances referred to
above, the learned counsel prayed that there being no merit in
the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.
14
ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and having gone through the materials on record, the
only question that falls for our consideration is whether the
High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order.
19. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on
either side, we must look into few relevant provisions of the Act
1956.
20. Section 3A reads thus:
“ 3A. Power to acquire land, etc. —(1) Where the
Central Government is satisfied that for a public
purpose any land is required for the building,
maintenance, management or operation of a
national highway or part thereof, it may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare its
intention to acquire such land.
(2) Every notification under subsection (1) shall
give a brief description of the land.
(3) The competent authority shall cause the
substance of the notification to be published in two
local newspapers, one of which will be in a
vernacular language.”
15
21. Section 3C provides for hearing of objections. Section 3D
provides for declaration of acquisition. Section 3E provides for
power to take possession. Section 3G is with respect to
determination of amount payable as compensation. Section 3G
reads thus:
“
3G. Determination of amount payable as
—(1) Where any land is acquired
compensation.
under this Act, there shall be paid an amount
which shall be determined by an order of the
competent authority.
(2) Where the right of user or any right in the
nature of an easement on, any land is acquired
under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to
the owner and any other person whose right of
enjoyment in that land has been affected in any
manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition
an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the
amount determined under subsection (1), for that
land.
(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount
under subsection (1) or subsection (2), the
competent authority shall give a public notice
published in two local newspapers, one of which
will be in a vernacular language inviting claims
from all persons interested in the land to be
acquired.
4) Such notice shall state the particulars of (
the land and shall require all persons
16
interested in such land to appear in person
or by an agent or by a legal practitioner
referred to in subsection (2) of section 3C,
before the competent authority, at a time
and place and to state the nature of their
respective interest in such land.
(5) If the amount determined by the competent
authority under subsection (1) or subsection (2)
is not acceptable to either of the parties, the
amount shall, on an application by either of the
parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be
appointed by the Central Government.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration
under this Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while
determining the amount under subsection (1) or
subsection (5), as the case may be, shall take
into consideration—
(a) the market value of the land on the date
of publication of the notification under
section 3A;
(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the
person interested at the time of taking
possession of the land, by reason of the
severing of such land from other land;
(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the
person interested at the time of taking
possession of the land, by reason of the
acquisition injuriously affecting his other
immovable property in any manner, or his
earnings;
17
(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of
the land, the person interested is
compelled to change his residence or
place of business, the reasonable
expenses, if any, incidental to such
change.” (Emphasis supplied)
22. Section 3H is with respect to deposit and payment of
amount. What is relevant for our purpose is subclause (4) of
Section 3H. Subclause (4) reads thus:
“ 3H. Deposit and payment of amount .—
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the
amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom
the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent
authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the
principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the
limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.”
23. The scheme of the Act 1956 and the statutory provisions
referred to above makes it very clear that once any land is
acquired under the Act 1956, the competent authority is
obliged to pay an amount by way of compensation. There is a
procedure which has been prescribed under Section 3G of the
Act 1956. Subclause (5) of Section 3G makes it abundantly
clear that if the amount determined by the competent authority
18
under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of Section 3G is not
acceptable to either of the parties, the amount will have to be
determined by the arbitrator who may be appointed by the
Central Government on the strength of an application by either
of the parties. Section 3H provides that the amount determined
towards compensation under Section 3G will have to be
deposited by the Central Government in accordance with the
rules. It is only after such amount is deposited by the
competent authority that the possession of the land can be
taken. Subclause (4) of Section 3H talks about apportionment
of the amount. The language of subclause (4) of Section 3H is
plain and simple. It provides that if any disputes arises as to
the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof, the
competent authority is obliged to refer the dispute to the
decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.
24. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have
completely misread the provisions of the Act 1956. It fell into
error as it failed to apply the well settled principle of law that
19
for construing a legal provision, the first and foremost rule of
construction is the literal construction. All that the Court has
to see at the very outset is what does the provision state. If the
provision is unambiguous and from the provision the legislative
intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules
of construction of statute. The other rules of construction are
called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.
25. It may be mentioned in the aforesaid context that the
first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in
every system of interpretation is the literal rule of
interpretation. The other rules of interpretation, for example,
the mischief rule/ purposive construction, etc. can only be
resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or
lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the
very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are
absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to
the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule. The
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made
20
no mistakes. The presumption is that it intended to say what it
has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the
words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make
up the deficiency.
26. There is a fine distinction between determining the
amount to be paid towards compensation and the
apportionment of the amount. The legislature has thought fit to
confer powers upon the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction to determine the dispute arising as to the
apportionment of the amount. There is a reason, why the
legislature has thought fit to confer such power to the Principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose
jurisdiction is land is situated. We shall try to explain
hereinafter.
27. The question of apportionment of compensation is not
free from difficulties. In apportioning the compensation, the
Court has to give to each claimant the value of the interest
which he has lost by compulsory acquisition. So stated, the
proposition may appear simple, but in its practical application
21
numerous complicated problems arise in apportioning the
compensation awarded. The difficulty experienced is due to the
nature of a variety of interests, rights and claims to land which
have to be valued in terms of money. The compensation
awarded for compulsory acquisition is the value of all the
interests which are extinguished and that compensation has to
be distributed equitably amongst persons having interest
therein and the Court must proceed to apportion the
compensation so that the aggregate value of all interests is
equal to the amount of compensation awarded. But in the
valuation of competing interests, which from its very nature is
dependent upon indefinite factors and uncertain data,
considerable difficulty is encountered. Indisputably, in
apportioning compensation the Court cannot proceed upon
hypothetical considerations but must proceed as far as possible
to make an accurate determination of the value of the
respective interests which are lost. The Court must, in each
case, having regard to the circumstances and the possibility of
a precise determination of the value having regard to the
22
materials available, adopt that method of valuation which
equitably distributes the compensation between the persons
entitled thereto. [See :
Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M.
Bharucha, (1956) 60 Bom LR 1208 ]
28. Thus, the only general principle one could state is that
apportionment under subclause (4) of Section 3H of the Act
1956 is not a revaluation but a distribution of the value already
fixed among the several persons interested in the land acquired
in accordance with the nature and quantum of the respective
interests. In ascertainment of those interests, the
determination of their relative importance and the manner in
which they can be said to have contributed to the total value
fixed are questions to be decided in the light of the
circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of law
governing the rights of the parties. The actual rule for
apportionment has to be formulated in each case so as to
ensure a just and equitable distribution of the total value or
compensation among the persons interested in the land.
23
29. In the circumstances referred to above, the legislature
thought fit to assign such function to none other than the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
30. We are not impressed by the submission canvassed on
behalf of the respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 16 that the dispute
between the parties is not one of apportionment but the same is
with regard to giving effect to the order passed by the Civil
Court in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1970 decided on 31.05.1976. What
is perhaps sought to be argued is that the shares in the land
acquired should be determined on the basis of some order
passed by the Civil Court referred to above. Thus, if the private
respondents want to rely upon the order passed by the Civil
Court, they can do so before the Court of the Principal Judge of
original jurisdiction. We hold that the District Magistrate, Mau
has no power or jurisdiction in regard to the apportionment of
the amount.
31. We fail to understand on what basis the High Court in its
impugned order has observed that the District Magistrate is
competent to examine the order passed by the Special Land
24
Acquisition Officer and decide the dispute as to the
apportionment of the amount.
32. In the decision in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar ,
reported in 2003 MhLJ Online (S.C.) 23 = AIR 2003 SC 942,
this Court had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of
Sections 30 and 31 resply of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In
analyzing and interpreting these provisions, this Court held as
under:
“23. The two provisions contemplating power of the
Collector to make reference as contained in Section
18 and Section 30 of the Act need a comparative
study. Under Section 18 the subjectmatter of
reference can be a dispute as to any one or more of
the following: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii)
as to the amount or the quantum of the compensation,
(iii) as to the persons to whom the compensation is
payable, (iv) as to the apportionment of the
compensation among the persons interested.
Under Section 30 the subject matter of dispute can be:
(i) the apportionment of the amount of compensation or
any part thereof, (ii) the persons to whom the amount
of compensation or any part thereof is payable.
Though the expression employed in Section 18 is 'the
amount of compensation' while the expression
employed in Section 30 is 'the amount of compensation
or any part thereof', this distinction in legislative
drafting is immaterial and insignificant and a dispute
as to entitlement or apportionment of part of the
25
compensation would also be covered by Section 18 of
the Act on the principle that the whole includes a part
too. Thus, at the first blush, it seems that Section
30 overlaps Section 18 in part; but as will be seen
shortly hereinafter, it is not so.
24. Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar (supra) is a
threeJudge Bench decision of this Court wherein the
scheme of the Act by reference to the power vesting in
the Collector to make a reference came up for the
consideration of the Court. The threeJudge Bench by
a majority of 2:1 laid down the following principles :
(i) There are two provisions in the Act under which
the Collector can make a reference to the Court,
namely, Section 18 and Section 30 . The powers
under the two sections are distinct and may be
invoked in contingencies which do not overlap. A
person shown in that part of the award which
relates to apportionment of compensation who is
present either personally or through a
representative or on whom notice is issued
under Section 12(2) , must, if he does not accept
the award, apply to the Collector to refer the
matter to the Court under Section 18 within the
time prescribed thereunder. But a person who has
not appeared in the acquisition proceedings before
the Collector may, if he is not served with notice of
filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to
the persons to whom it is payable and apply to
the Court for a reference under Section 30 , for
determination of his right to compensation which
may have existed before the award, or which may
have devolved upon him since the award. For a
reference under Section 30 , no period of limitation
is prescribed.
(ii) It is not predicated of the exercise of the power
to make a reference under Section 30 that the
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Collector has not apportioned the compensation
money by his award.
(iii) The award made by the Collector
under Section 11 is not the source of the right to
compensation. An award is strictly speaking only
an offer made by the Government to the person
interested in the land notified for acquisition; the
person interested is not bound to accept it and the
Government can also withdraw the acquisition
u/s 48. It is only when possession of the land has
been taken by the Government u/s 16 that the
right of the owner of the land is extinguished.
Therefore the appellant's contention that title to
compensation is derived solely from and on the
date of the award could not be accepted.
(iv) The liability of the Government u/s 31 to pay
compensation to the person entitled thereto under
the award does not imply that only the persons to
whom compensation is directed to be paid under
the award may raise a dispute u/s 30. The
scheme of apportionment by the Collector
under Section 11 is conclusive only between the
Collector and the persons interested and not
among the persons interested. Payment of
compensation u/s 31 to the persons declared in
the award to be entitled thereto discharges the
State of its liability to pay compensation leaving it
open to the claimant to compensation to agitate
his right in a reference u/s 30 or by a separate
suit.
(v) Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act the title of
the appellant to the land noticed for acquisition
became vested in the State and therefore the right
to compensation for the land acquired devolved
upon the State. A dispute then arose between the
State Government and the appellant "as to the
persons to whom" compensation was payable.
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The State had no right to the compensation
payable for the land under a title existing before
the date of the award of the Collector and no
application could be made by it as a person
interested within the meaning of Section 18 . But a
dispute between the appellant and the State as to
their conflicting claims to the compensation money
was clearly a dispute which could be referred u/s
30 of the Act to the Court. There is nothing
in Section 30 which excludes a reference to the
Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom
the title of the owner of the land has since the
award, devolved.
30. The scheme of the Act reveals that the remedy of
reference u/s 18 is intended to be available only to a
'person interested'. A person present either personally
or through representative or on whom a notice is
served u/s 12(2) is obliged, subject to his specifying
the test as to locus, to apply to the Collector within the
time prescribed u/s 18(2) to make a reference to the
Court. The basis of title on which the reference would
be sought for u/s 18 would obviously be a pre
existing title by reference to the date of the award. So
is Section 29 , which speaks of 'persons interested'.
Finality to the award spoken of by Section 12(1) of the
Act is between the Collector on one hand and the
'persons interested' on the other hand and attaches to
the issues relating to (i) the true area, i.e.
measurement of the land, (ii) the value of the land, i.e.
the quantum of compensation, and (iii) apportionment
of the compensation among the 'persons interested'.
The 'persons interested' would be bound by the award
without regard to the fact whether they have
respectively appeared before the Collector or not. The
finality to the award spoken of by Section 29 is as
between the 'persons interested' inter se and is
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confined to the issue as to the correctness of the
apportionment. Section 30 is not confined in its
operation only to 'persons interested'. It would,
therefore, be available for being invoked by the
'persons interested' if they were neither present nor
represented in proceedings before the Collector, nor
were served with notice u/s 12(2) of the Act or when
they claim on the basis of a title coming into existence
post award. The definition of 'person interested'
speaks of 'an interest in compensation to be made'. An
interest coming into existence post award gives rise to
a claim in compensation which has already been
determined. Such a person can also have recourse
to Section 30 . In any case, the dispute for
which Section 30 can be invoked shall remain
confined only (i) as to the apportionment of the amount
of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) as to the
persons to whom the amount of compensation
(already determined) or any part thereof is payable.
The State claiming on the basis of a preexisting right
would not be a 'person interested', as already pointed
out hereinabove and on account of its right being pre
existing, the State, in such a case, would not be
entitled to invoke either Section 18 or Section
30 seeking determination of its alleged preexisting
right. A right accrued or devolved post award may be
determined in a reference u/s 30 depending on
Collector's discretion to show indulgence, without any
bar as to limitation. Alternatively, such a right may be
left open by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in
any independent legal proceedings. This view is just,
sound and logical as a title post award could not have
been canvassed upto the date of the award and
should also not be left without remedy by denying
access to Section 30 . Viewed from this angle, Section
18 and 30 would not overlap and would have fields to
operate independent of each other.
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37. The Collector acts as a representative of the
State whilst holding proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act . In fact, he conducts the proceedings
on behalf of the State. The award of the Collector is
not the source of the right to compensation; it is the
pre existing right which is recognized by the Collector
and guided by the findings arrived at in determining
the objections, if any, the Collector quantifies the
amount of compensation to be placed as an offer of
the appropriate Government to the owner recognized
by the State. The offeree may accept or decline the
offer. It he accepts the offer and the Government takes
possession over the land, the title of the offeree is
extinguished and vests absolutely in the Government
free from all encumbrances. The power to make an
award under Section 11 and to make a reference
under Sections 18 or 30 of the Act is a statutory
power. The sweep of jurisdiction of Court to determine
the disputes is also statutory and is controlled by the
bounds created by Section 17 or 30 whereunder the
reference has been made to the Court. The power has
to be exercised to the extent to which it has been
conferred by the Statute and on availability of pre
existing conditions on the availability of which and
which alone the power can be exercised.
38. Award made by the Collector is final and
conclusive as between the Collector and the 'persons
interested', whether they have appeared before the
Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area, i.e.
measurement of land acquired, (ii) as to value of the
land, i.e. the amount of compensation, and (iii) as to
the apportionment of the compensation among the
'persons interested' again, between the Collector and
the 'persons interested' and not as amongst the
'persons interested' inter se. In the event of a reference
30
having been sought for u/s 18, the Collector's award
on these issues; if varied by Civil Court, shall stand
superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does
not attach a similar finality to the award of the
Collector on the issue as to the person to whom
compensation is payable; in spite of the award by
Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such
issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon
by any competent forum.”
33. We are of the view that when it comes to resolving the
dispute relating to apportionment of the amount determined
towards compensation, it is only the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction which can do so. Principal Civil Court
means the Court of the District Judge.
34. Our final conclusion is as under: If any dispute arises as
to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to
any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable,
then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the
decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The
competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil
Court, but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the
summary power, vesting in the competent authority of
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rendering an opinion in terms of subsection (3) of Section 3H,
will not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature
triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for
that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of
the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the
same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be
decided by that Court.
35. In such circumstance referred to above, the order passed
by the District Magistrate, Mau dated 16.01.2020 is hereby
quashed and set aside. The writ application No. 7310 of 2020
stands allowed. In view of the dispute between the parties as
regards apportionment of the amount of compensation, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer shall now refer the dispute to
the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in accordance
with subclause (4) of Section 3H of the Act 1956.
36. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
37. There shall be no order as to costs.
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38. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of
accordingly.
………………………………..J.
( B.R. GAVAI )
………………………………..J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 07, 2023
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