Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 874-875 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) Nos.4286-87 OF 2011)
P. Sanjeeva Rao …Appellant
Versus
The State of A.P. …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, J.
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1. Leave granted.
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2. These appeals arise out of an order dated 29 March,
2011, passed by the High Court of Judicature for Andhra
Pradesh whereby Criminal Revision Petitions No.534 and
710 of 2011 filed by the appellant have been dismissed and
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order dated 22 January, 2011 passed by the Special Judge
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for CBI cases at Hyderabad in Crl. M.P. Nos.18 and 19 of
2011 upheld.
3. The appellant is being prosecuted for offences
punishable under Sections 7 & 13 (1) read with Section
13(1)(D) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, before the
Special Judge for CBI cases at Hyderabad. Around the time
the prosecution concluded its evidence, the appellant filed
Crl. Misc. Petitions No.18 and 19 of 2011 under Sections
242 and 311 Cr.P.C. for recall of prosecution witnesses
No.1 and 2 for cross-examination. The appellant’s case in
the said Criminal Misc. Petition No.18 of 2011 was that
cross-examination of PWs 1 and 2 had been deferred till
such time the Trap Laying Officer (PW 11) was examined by
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the prosecution and since the said officer had been
examined, PWs 1 and 2 need be recalled for cross-
examination by counsel for the accused-appellant. In Crl.
Misc. Petition No.19 of 2011 the petitioner made a prayer
for deferring the cross-examination of Investigating Officer
(PW12) in the case till such time PWs 1 and 2 were cross-
examined.
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4. Both the applications mentioned above were opposed
by the prosecution resulting in the dismissal of the said
applications by the Trial Court in terms of its order dated
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22 January, 2011. The Trial Court observed:
“For what ever be the reasons the cross-examination of
PWs 1 and 2 has been recorded as “nil”. There is
nothing to show on the record that the petitioner had
reserved his right to cross examine the witnesses at a
later point of time. The dockets of the Court do not
reflect any such intention of the petitioner.”
5. The Trial Court also held that recall of PWs 1 and 2 for
cross-examination more than 3 and ½ years after they had
been examined in relation to an incident that had taken
place 7 years back, was bound to cause prejudice to the
prosecution. The Trial Court was of the view that the
appellant had adopted a casual and easy approach towards
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the trial procedure and that he could not ask for the recall
of any witness without cogent reasons.
6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Trial Court the
appellant filed two revision petitions before the High Court
which, as noticed earlier, have been dismissed by the High
Court in terms of the order impugned in these appeals. The
High Court took the view that PWs 1 and 2 had been
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examined on 13 June, 2008 and 31 July, 2008
respectively followed by examination of nearly one dozen
prosecution witnesses. The High Court held that since this
was an old case of the year 2005 and the matter was now
coming up for examination of the appellant-accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., there was no justification for recall of
the prosecution witnesses No.1 and 2. The revision
petitions were accordingly dismissed.
7. Appearing for the appellant Mr. A.T.M Ranga
Ramanujan, learned senior counsel, contended that the
Trial Court as also the High Court had taken a hyper
technical view of the matter without appreciating that grave
prejudice will be caused to the appellant if the prayer for
cross-examination of PWs. 1 and 2 was not granted and the
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recall of the witnesses for that purpose declined. He
submitted that counsel for the appellant before the Trial
Court was under a bona fide belief that the cross-
examination of the prosecution witnesses PWs. 1 and 2,
who happened to be the star witnesses, one of them being
the complainant and the other a witness who allegedly
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heard the conversation and observed the passing of the
bribe to the accused could be conducted after PW-11 had
been examined. It was contended that the lawyer
appearing before the Trial Court had also filed a personal
affidavit stating that PWs. 1 and 2 had not been cross-
examined by him under a bona fide impression that he
could do so after the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer
(PW-11) had been recorded. Mr. Ramanujan urged that
while the lawyer may have committed a mistake in
presuming that the prosecution witnesses No. 1 and 2 could
be recalled for cross-examination at a later stage without
the Trial Court granting to the accused the liberty to do so,
such a mistake should not vitiate the trial by denying to the
appellant a fair opportunity to cross-examine the said
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witnesses. Heavy reliance was placed by learned counsel
on the decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Vs.
Narcotic Cell [1999 SCC (Cri) 1062], in support of his
submission that no party to a trial can be denied the
opportunity to correct errors if any committed by it. If
proper evidence was not adduced or the relevant material
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was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the
Court should be magnanimous in permitting such a mistake
to be rectified.
8. Appearing for the respondent Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned
Additional Solicitor General, contended that while cross-
examination of PWs. 1 and 2 could be deferred at the
option of the accused to a later stage, the Court record
does not show any such request having been made or any
liberty being reserved to the accused. It was, according to
Mr. Rawal, a case where an opportunity to cross-examine
had been given to the accused and his counsel but they had
chosen not to avail of the same, in which case a belated
request for recall of the witnesses to exercise the right to
cross-examine could and has been rightly rejected by the
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Trial Court and that rejection affirmed by the High Court. It
was also submitted that the recall of the prosecution
witnesses, who have gone without cross-examination at an
earlier stage, is likely to prejudice the prosecution
inasmuch as the incident in question is as old as of the year
2005, while the request for recall was made only in the
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year 2011, nearly four years after the framing of the
charges against the appellant.
9. The appellant who was working as Sub Divisional
Officer in the B.S.N.L., Karimnagar, is accused of having
demanded and received a bribe of Rs.3,000/- from the
complainant who was examined as PW1 at the trial. The
trap led by the CBI in which PW2 was associated as an
independent witness is said to have succeeded in catching
the petitioner red-handed with the bribe money eventually
leading to the filing of a charge-sheet against him before
the Court of Special Judge for CBI cases at Hyderabad in
March, 2005. Charges were framed against the petitioner
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on 7 December, 2006. While PW1, the complainant in the
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case, was examined on two different dates i.e. 3 March,
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2008 and 13 June, 2008, prosecution witness No.2 was
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similarly examined on 18 July, 2008 and 31 July, 2008.
It is common ground that both the witnesses have stood by
the prosecution case for they have not been declared
hostile by the prosecution. This implies that the depositions
of the two witnesses are incriminating against the appellant
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and in the absence of any cross-examination their version
may be taken to have remained unchallenged. It is also
common ground that PWs. 3 to 11 were examined during
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the period 31 July, 2008 and 28 December, 2011. The
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Trap Laying Officer (PW 11) was examined on 18
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February, 2010 and on 1 April, 2010. The two applications
referred to earlier were filed before the Trial Court at that
stage, one asking for recall of PWs. 1 & 2 for cross-
examination and the other asking for a deferring that the
cross-examination of PW 12 till PWs. 1 and 2 are recalled
and cross-examined.
10. The only question that arises in the above backdrop is
whether the decision not to cross-examine PWs 1 and 2
was for the reasons stated by the petitioner or for any
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other reason. There is no dispute that no formal application
was filed by the petitioner nor even an oral prayer made
before the Trial Court to the effect that the exercise of the
right to cross-examine the two witnesses was being
reserved till such time the Trap Laying Officer was
examined. This is precisely where counsel for the appellant
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has stepped in and filed a personal affidavit in which he has
stated that even though there is no formal prayer made to
that effect he intended to cross-examine the two witnesses
only after the deposition of the Trap Laying Officer was
recorded. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, we
feel that the version given by the counsel may indeed be
the true reason why two witnesses were not cross-
examined on the conclusion of their examination-in-chief.
We say so primarily because no lawyer worth his salt
especially one who had sufficient experience at the Bar like
the one appearing for the appellant would have let the
opportunity to cross-examine go unavailed in a case where
the witnesses had supported the prosecution version not
only in regard to the demand of bribe but also its payment
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and the success of the trap laid for that purpose. There is
no gainsaying that every prosecution witness need not be
cross-examined by the defence. It all depends upon the
nature of the deposition and whether the defence disputes
the fact sought to be established thereby. Formal witnesses
are not at times cross-examined if the defence does not
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dispute what is sought to be established by reference to
his/her deposition. The decision to cross-examine is
generally guided by the nature of the depositions and
whether it incriminates the accused. In a case like the one
at hand where the complainant examined as PW1 and the
shadow witness examined as PW2 had clearly indicted the
appellant and supported the prosecution version not only
regarding demand of the bribe but also its receipt by the
appellant there was no question of the defence not cross-
examining them. The two witnesses doubtless provided the
very basis of the case against the appellant and should
their testimony have remained unchallenged, there was
nothing much for the appellant to argue at the hearing.
The depositions would then be taken to have been accepted
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as true hence relied upon. We may, in this connection, refer
to the following passage from the decision of this Court in
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 1 SCC 240:
“ It is a rule of essential justice that whenever the
opponent has declined to avail himself of the
opportunity to put his case in cross-examination it must
follow that the evidence tendered on that issue ought
to be accepted .”
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11. We are, therefore, inclined to believe that the two
prosecution witnesses were not cross-examined by the
counsel for the appellant not because there was nothing
incriminating in their testimony against the appellant but
because counsel for the appellant had indeed intended to
cross-examine them after the Trap Laying Officer had been
examined. The fact that the appellant did not make a
formal application to this effect nor even an oral prayer to
the Court to that effect at the time the cross-examination
was deferred may be a mistake which could be avoided and
which may have saved the appellant a lot of trouble in
getting the witnesses recalled. But merely because a
mistake was committed, should not result in the accused
suffering a penalty totally disproportionate to the gravity of
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the error committed by his lawyer. Denial of an opportunity
to recall the witnesses for cross-examination would amount
to condemning the appellant without giving him the
opportunity to challenge the correctness of the version and
the credibility of the witnesses. It is trite that the credibility
of witnesses whether in a civil or criminal case can be
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tested only when the testimony is put through the fire of
cross-examination. Denial of an opportunity to do so will
result in a serious miscarriage of justice in the present case
keeping in view the serious consequences that will follow
any such denial.
12. The nature and extent of the power vested in the
Courts under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to recall witnesses was
examined by this Court in Hanuman Ram v. The State of
Rajasthan & Ors. (2008) 15 SCC 652. This Court held
that the object underlying Section 311 was to prevent
failure of justice on account of a mistake of either party to
bring on record valuable evidence or leaving an ambiguity
in the statements of the witnesses. This Court observed:
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“This is a supplementary provision enabling, and in
certain circumstances imposing on the Court, the duty
of examining a material witness who would not be
otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest
possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with
regard to the stage at which the powers of the Court
should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in
which it should be exercised. It is not only the
prerogative but also the plain duty of a Court to
examine such of those witnesses as it considers
absolutely necessary for doing justice between the
State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the
Court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one
of such means is the examination of witnesses of its
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| own accord when for certain obvious reasons either<br>party is not prepared to call witnesses who are known<br>to be in a position to speak important relevant facts. | |
|---|---|
| The object underlying Section 311 o f the Code is that | |
| there may not be failure o f justice on account o f | |
| mistake o f either party in bringing the valuable | |
| evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the | |
| statements o f the witnesses examined from either side. | |
| The determinative factor is whether it is essentia l to | |
| the just decision o f the case . The section is not limited<br>only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an<br>improper exercise of the powers of the Court to<br>summon a witness under the Section merely because<br>the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and<br>not that of the accused. The section is a general section<br>which applies to all proceedings, enquires and trials<br>under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to issue<br>summons to any witness at any stage of such<br>proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the<br>significant expression that occurs is "at any stage o f | |
| inquiry or tria l or other pro<br>is, however, to be borne<br>section confers a very wid<br>summoning witnesses, the<br>exercised judiciously, as<br>greater is the necessity for | ceeding under this Code". It<br>in mind that whereas the<br>e power on the Court on<br>discretion conferred is to be<br>the wider the power the<br>application of judicial mind.” |
(emphasis supplied)
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13. Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove
his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed
this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of
Customs, Amritsar (2000) 10 SCC 430. The following
passage is in this regard apposite:
| “ | In | such | circumstances, if t | he new | Counsel | thought | to | |||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| have | the | materia | l | witness | es further | examined, | the |
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| Cou | rt | could | adopt latitud | e and a | liber | a l vi | ew in | the | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| interest | o f j | ustice, partic | ularly w | hen | the | Court | has | |||||
| unbridled | po | wers in th | e matte | r | as | enshrine | d | in | ||||
| Section | 311 o | f the Code. | After al l | the t | ria l i | s basically | ||||||
| for | the | pri | soners and | courts | shoul | d a | fford | the | ||||
| opportunity t | o them in the | fairest m | anne | r possible . |
(emphasis supplied)
14. The extent and the scope of the power of the Court to
recall witnesses was examined by this Court in Mohanlal
Shamji Soni v. Union of India & Anr. 1991 Supp (1)
271, where this Court observed:
| expressed by | this Court i | n the above | d | ecisio | ns is | that | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the | crimina l | court has a | mple power | to | summon | any | |||||
| person | as a | witness or re | cal l and r | e-examine | any | such | |||||
| person | even i | f the evidenc | e on bot | h side | s is | closed | and | ||||
| the | jurisdictio | n o f the cou | rt must o | bviously b | e dictated | ||||||
| by | exigency | o f the situat | ion, and | fair-play | and | good | |||||
| sens | e | appear | to be the o | nly safe | guides | and | that | only | |||
| the | requirements o f justic | e command | an | d ex | amination | ||||||
| o f | a | ny | perso | n which wou | ld depe | nd | on | the | facts | and | |
| circumstance | JUDG<br>s o f each cas |
(emphasis supplied)
15. Discovery of the truth is the essential purpose of any
trial or enquiry, observed a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo
Jack de Sequeria through LRs. 2012 (3) SCALE 550.
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A timely reminder of that solemn duty was given, in the
following words:
| “What people expect is that the Court should discharge<br>its obligation to find out where in fact the truth lies.<br>Right from inception of the judicial system it has been<br>accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment<br>of truth are the main purposes underlying the existence<br>of the courts of justice.” | “What people expect is that the Court should discharge<br>its obligation to find out where in fact the truth lies.<br>Right from inception of the judicial system it has been<br>accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment<br>of truth are the main purposes underlying the existence<br>of the courts of justice.” | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 16. We are conscious of the fact that recall of the<br>witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they<br>were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly<br>seven years old. Delay takes a heavy toll on the human<br>memory apart from breeding cynicism about the efficacy of<br>the judicial system to decide cases within a reasonably<br>foreseeable time period. To that extent the apprehension<br>JUDGMENT<br>expressed by Mr. Rawal, that the prosecution may suffer<br>prejudice on account of a belated recall, may not be wholly<br>without any basis. Having said that, we are of the opinion<br>that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the<br>consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the<br>witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant<br>getting an opportunity rather than protecting the |
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prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost.
Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our
judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that
virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a
price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair
opportunity to the accused to defend himself.
17. In the result, we allow these appeals, set aside the
orders passed by the Trial Court as also the High Court and
direct that the prosecution witnesses No.1 and 2 shall be
recalled by the Trial Court and an opportunity to cross-
examine the said witnesses afforded to the appellant. In
fairness to the counsel for the appellant, we must record
that he assured us that given an opportunity to examine
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the witnesses the needful shall be done on two dates of
hearing, one each for each witness without causing any un-
necessary delay or procrastination. The Trial Court shall
endeavour to conclude the examination of the two
witnesses expeditiously and without unnecessary delay. The
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parties shall appear before the Trial Court on 6 August,
2012.
……………………….……..……J.
(T.S. THAKUR)
………………………….…..……J.
(GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
July 2, 2012
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