Full Judgment Text
2023INSC793
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1271-1272 OF 2018
MUNNA PANDEY …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :
“A fair trial is one in which the rules of evidence are
honored, the accused has competent counsel, and the judge
enforces the proper court room procedures - a trial in which every
assumption can be challenged.”
─ Harry Browne
1. These appeals are at the instance of a convict accused
Signature Not Verified
sentenced to death for the offence of rape and murder of a
Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav
Date: 2023.09.04
17:09:27 IST
Reason:
10-year old girl named “X” and are directed against a common
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judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Patna dated 10.04.2018 in the Death Reference No. 4 of 2017
with Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 358 of 2017 by which the High
Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant
convict herein and thereby confirmed the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-
I, Bhagalpur in the Sessions Trial No. 581 of 2015 for the offence
punishable under Sections 302 and 376 resply of the Indian
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO
Act’).
2. Before we proceed to give a fair idea as regards the
prosecution case, it has to be mentioned that the High Court
had before it not only the appeal filed by the accused but also a
reference made by the Sessions Court for confirmation of the
capital sentence under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Time and again this Court has pointed
out that on a reference for confirmation of the sentence of death,
the High Court is under an obligation to proceed in accordance
with the provisions of Sections 367 and 368 resply of the CrPC.
Under these Sections the High Court must not only see whether
the order passed by the Sessions Court is correct but it is under
an obligation to examine the entire evidence for itself, apart from
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and independently of the Sessions Court's appraisal and
assessment of that evidence. From the long line of decisions
which have taken this view it would be enough to refer to the
decisions in Jumman v. State of Punjab , AIR 1957 SC
469; Rama Shankar Singh @ Ram Shankar Roy v. State of
West Bengal , AIR 1962 SC 1239; and Bhupendra
Singh v. State of Punjab , AIR 1968 SC 1438.
FACTS OF THE CASE
3. The facts of the case as recorded by the High Court in its
impugned judgment are stated hereinbelow:-
“3. Short fact of the case is that on 01.06.2015 at about
12:45 PM, fardbeyan of Kiran Devi (P.W.2) wife of Arvind
Sah and mother of the victim was recorded by Sub-
Inspector of Police-cum-S.H.O. Smt. Rita Kumari of Sabour
Police Station. The fardbeyan was recorded in the house
of Nawal Kishore Ojha @ Fuchan Pandey. Nawal Kishore
Ojha @ Fuchan Pandey is the own brother of the appellant
and in the said house, there were two rooms and one
room, from where dead body was recovered, was in
possession of the appellant. In the fardbeyan, the
informant/P.W.2 stated that on preceding date i.e.
31.05.2015, she was in the house of her late sister
Shakila Devi in the village Jamunia Parbatta. On the
same date at about 12:00 noon, her elder daughter
namely Priya Kumari (P.W.3) telephonically informed her
that her younger sister (victim) was missing. Thereafter,
she immediately moved for Sabour. After arrival in her
house in village Sabour, her elder daughter Priya
informed her that the victim had gone to watch television
in the house of Munna Pandey (appellant). When she did
not return till 11:00 AM, only thereafter, she (Priya)
informed the informant. While the informant went to the
house of Munna Pandey (appellant) in search of her
daughter, she found that the house of Munna Pandey
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(appellant) was locked. Thereafter, with some villagers,
the informant vigorously searched her daughter, but she
(victim) could not be traced. When Munna Pandey
(appellant) was asked to open the lock, he told that key
was not with him. Thereafter, she telephoned Fuchan
Pandey (brother of appellant Munna Pandey), who at the
relevant time was staying in his in-laws’ house. On 01-
06-2015, Nawal Kishore Ojha @ Fuchan Pandey at about
12:00 noon came to his house and opened the lock of his
room. In the said room, Pritam Tiwary son of Dilip Tiwary,
resident of village Shobhapur, P.S. Rajmahal, District –
Sahebganj had concealed himself. The lock of the room
was opened from the outside. When lock of the room of
Munna Pandey (appellant) was opened, dead body of the
daughter of the informant was found beneath the bed.
The informant claimed that Pritam Tiwary and Munna
Pandey (appellant) both after committing rape with her 11
years old daughter by way of throttling had killed her and
the dead body was concealed in his room. The fardbeyan
was read over to the informant and after finding it correct,
she, in presence of Babloo Sao (P.W.1), son of informant’s
sister of village Jamunia, P.S. Parbatta, Naugachia, put
her signature.”
4. On the basis of the complaint ( Fardbeyan ) lodged by the
mother of the victim PW 2 – Kiran Devi, the police registered a
formal First Information Report (FIR) on the very same day i.e.
on 01.06.2015 at 3.00 pm at the Sabour Police Station as Case
No. 106 of 2015 for the offence punishable under Sections
376(D), 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 4
of the POCSO Act against the appellant herein and co-accused
Pritam Tiwari (brother-in-law of the elder brother of the
appellant namely Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fuchan Pandey).
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5. On conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed
against the appellant herein and the co-accused named above.
As the offence was exclusively trialable by a Sessions Judge, the
case stood committed by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions
under the provisions of Section 209 of the CrPC and upon
committal, the same came to be registered as the Sessions Trial
No. 581 of 2015 in the Court of the First Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur.
6. The Trial Court framed charge vide order dated
04.11.2015 against the appellant and the co-accused for the
offence punishable under Sections 376(2)(g), 302 read with
Section 34, 120B of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
7. After framing of the charge, the co-accused namely
Pritam Tiwari raised the plea of being a juvenile. In such
circumstances, his case was separated vide order dated
03.02.2016 passed by the Trial Court and was referred to the
Juvenile Justice Board, Bhagalpur. The Trial Court proceeded
only against the appellant convict herein.
8. In the course of the trial, the prosecution led the following
oral evidence:-
(a) PW 1 Babloo Saw is the cousin brother of the
deceased and son of sister of the First Informant at
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whose place, the informant had gone on 31.05.2015.
This witness proved his signature on the fardbeyan ,
which was marked as Ext. 1 and he also proved the
signature of Kiran Devi/P.W.2 (informant) of the case,
which was marked as Ext. 1/1.
(b) PW 2 Kiran Devi is the informant and mother of
the deceased.
(c) PW 3 Priya Kumari is the elder daughter of the
informant and also the elder sister of the deceased.
(d) PW 4 Dr. Sandeep Lal, who at the relevant time,
was posted in the Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College and
Hospital, Bhagalpur conducted the post-mortem
examination on the dead body of the deceased.
(e) PW 5 Rita Kumari is the investigating officer and
she recorded the fardbeyan of the informant.
(f) PW 6 Vijay Prasad Sah is a co-villager and he
deposed that in his presence, the dead body was
recovered from the room of the appellant.
9. Upon conclusion of recording of the oral evidence, the
further statement of the appellant convict was recorded by the
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Trial Court under Section 313 of the CrPC. The appellant convict
stated as under:-
“I am innocent. I have been falsely implicated. I was not
living in the house from where the dead body was
recovered. I was residing in a rented house situated in
Mali Tola. I executed a deed in favour of my brother
Fuchan Pandey relating to an parental house situated at
Thatheri Tola and my brother Fuchan Pandey was living
in the house from where the dead body was recovered.”
10. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
on record, the Trial Court recorded a finding that the appellant
herein was guilty of the offence he was charged with. The Trial
Court treated the case as one falling under the category of
“rarest of the rare cases” and sentenced the appellant to death.
11. The appellant herein being aggrieved with the judgment
and order of conviction and capital sentence passed by the Trial
Court went in appeal before the High Court. The High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant convict and
confirmed the capital sentence imposed by the Trial Court in the
Death Reference No. 4 of 2017.
12. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant
convict is here before this Court with the present appeals.
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
13. Dr. Aditya Sondhi, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant convict, made the following submissions:-
“1 . Case purely of circumstantial evidence
1.1 The case against the Appellant, Munna Pandey is
based only on the last seen evidence and the conduct of
the Appellant and hence entirely circumstantial in nature.
It is a well established principle settled by this Hon’ble
Court that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances against the accused ought to be conclusive
in nature and there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused
and must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.
2. Failure to conduct medical examination u/s 53A
CrPC is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
2.1 Medical examination of the accused u/s 53A of
CrPC is required in cases of rape. Even though the
Appellant was taken to the hospital for the treatment of
his injuries incurred during the time of arrest, he was not
subjected to any such medical examination where his
samples were collected for the purpose of DNA
examination.
2.2 In cases of rape where the victim is dead and the
offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial
evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance.
The failure of the prosecution to subject the appellant to
medical examination is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
(Chotkau v State of Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCCOnline SC
1313 para 81,82)
2.3 If no DNA examination is conducted and if no
reasonable explanation is provided by the prosecution for
not conducting a DNA examination, adverse
consequences would fall on the prosecution. Moreover, if
reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of
the accused will not afford evidence as to the commission
of an offence, it is quite unlikely that a charge-sheet
would even be filed against the accused for committing
an offence of rape. (Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik v State
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of Maharashtra (2019) 12 SCC 495 para 49-57; Prakash
Nishad @ Kewat v State of Maharashtra 2023 SCCOnline
SC 666 para 57,58.59)
3. Prosecution did not place on record the
exculpatory evidence against the Appellant
3.1 The underwear of the Appellant was seized by the
[Ex 6 (Seizure memo)]
police on 01.06.2023 at 11:45 pm ,
and the underwear of the deceased was seized on
01.06.2015 at 11:00 pm [Ex 6/1 (Seizure memo)].
However, the prosecution failed to prove if they were sent
to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination.
3.2 As per the order dated 29.06.2015, a letter on
behalf of the officer in-charge of PS Sabour was filed
before the Ld Trial Court seeking permission to send the
articles to FSL Patna for examination. However PW5,
Reeta Kumari, the IO in her cross examination before the
Trial Court on 24.10.2016 admitted that she followed the
instructions of her senior police officer and did not receive
any FSL report. [PW5 para 8]
3.3 Further the vaginal swab of the deceased collected
at the time of post-mortem was sent by PW 4, Dr Sandeep
Lal to the pathology lab for examination. [Ex 2 (Post-
mortem report)]. However, the pathological report which
states that ‘spermatozoa not found’ was not produced by
the prosecution as evidence at the time of trial.
4. Last seen evidence not conclusively proved
against the Appellant
4.1 All the witnesses in their 161 statement stated
that the victim was last seen with Pritam Tiwari.
However, PW1, PW2 and PW3 in their Court testimony,
which was recorded 3 months after Pritam Tiwari was
declared a Juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board [Ex A
(order of the JJB)] improved their statement and said
that it was Munna Pandey and not Pritam Tiwari.
However, this was not corroborated by the independent
witness Vijay Sah (PW6). The said improvement on the
part of the interested witnesses could be motivated by the
fact that Pritam Tiwari (who was caught red handed)
was now only going to be subjected to a lenient
punishment under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and
therefore the Appellant alone remained accused in the
subject case.
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4.2 There are material contradictions in PW3’s court
testimony and her 161 statement. In her 161 statement
she states that Pritam Tiwari came to her house at 09:00
am and took the victim along with him to watch TV and
after 2 hours she saw Pritam Tiwari locking the grill of the
verandah. Whereas in her Court testimony, she states
that Munna Pandey was last seen with the victim. PW3
was confronted with this particular contradiction by the
defense counsel during her cross- examination but PW3
does not provide any reason for the said contradiction.
4.3 PW2 in her Fardbeyan [Ex 1] which was recorded
right after the victim’s body was recovered does not
mention anything about the Appellant in the context of a
last seen evidence but improves her testimony in Court to
state that the Appellant was last seen with the victim.
PW2 was confronted with this improvement in her cross
examination, where she merely stated that she had told
that Munna Pandey had spoken to her daughter PW3 and
that she did not state in her fardbeyan that PW3 saw
Munna Pandey locking the door. This Hon’ble Court has
held that especially in cases involving heinous crimes,
where there is inadequate cross-examination by the
defense counsel, the Trial Courts cannot be a mute
spectator and they have the power and duty under
Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 to discover relevant
facts when witnesses are not properly cross-
examined.(Rahul v State of NCT of Delhi (2023) 1 SCC 83
para 42-45)
4.4 As per the case of the prosecution, on 31.05.2015
at 09:00 when the Appellant came to the house of PW3 to
take the victim, the following persons were in the house
- the victim, PW3 and Kushboo Devi (her aunt). However
Kushboo Devi, the aunt was not examined as a last seen
witness but only PW3 (a minor) was examined by the
prosecution to prove its case.
4.5 In cases where the child witness’s testimony
regarding last seen evidence is inconsistent and when the
material witnesses are not examined by the prosecution,
the Court has rightly disbelieved the last seen evidence.
(Digamber Vaishnav v State of Chhatisgarh (2019) 4 SCC
522 para 40-43)
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5. Conduct of the accused at the relevant time
5.1 Frequent quarrels used to take place between
Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan Pandey and Munna
Pandey and hence they have been residing separately.
Munna Pandey was residing separately in a different
house in Mali Tola. Fuchhan Pandey handed over the key
to his house to Pritam Tiwari and Pritam Tiwari was
residing in the house of Fucchan Pandey for the past 2 to
3 months. Further, Munna Pandey was called from
elsewhere by the villagers every time, indicating that he
did not reside in the said house.
5.2 As per the spot map and the spot mahazar, the
building consists of an outer iron grill door, a verandah, 1
room in the north and 1 in the south. The room in the north
belongs to Fuchhan Pandey and the room in the south
belongs to Munna Pandey. Pritam was found inside the
room of Fucchan Pandey and the victim was found in the
room of Munna Pandey. The room of Munna Pandey also
had 2 windows without any iron grill but only an outer
wooden panel which was open. One window opened to
the verandah and the other window opened towards the
main road. The TV was in the room of Fucchan Pandey
where Pritam was admittedly residing.
5.3 The lock of the outer iron grill was broken open by
the villagers. The room of Fuchhan Pandey, where Pritam
Tiwari was present was locked from inside. The door of
Munna Pandey’s room was opened by the keys brought
by Fuchhan Pandey on 01.06.2015 [Ex 1].
5.4 As per the case of the prosecution, the door of
Munna Pandey’s room was opened by the villagers after
they snatched the keys from Munna Pandey although he
claimed that he did not have the keys to the house on the
previous day. As per the prosecution, this raised serious
doubts regarding his conduct. It is pertinent to note that
this suspicious conduct is not corroborated by the
independent witness PW6. Further, the villagers Manoj,
Anil and Murrai who allegedly snatched the keys from
Munna Pandey were not examined by the prosecution. It
is pertinent to note that Munna Pandey did not flee from
the village overnight or on the next day when the dead
body of the victim was recovered. Further this particular
circumstance that the Appellant refused to give the keys
to the villagers and threatened them with a case of
dacoity was not put to him during his 313 statement. This
Hon’ble Court has repeatedly held that the circumstances
11
not put to the accused in his 313 examination cannot be
relied upon.(Sharad Birdichand Sarda v State of
Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 para 145)
6. Alleged Confession of Pritam Tiwari implicating
Munna Pandey cannot be relied upon
6.1 As per the prosecution, right after Pritam Tiwari
was found in the house of Fucchan Pandey by the
villagers; he confessed to his crime and stated that he
along with Munna Pandey committed the offence against
the deceased. However, the said confession was made
after he was beaten by the police officers and was made
in the presence of police officers. Due to the bar u/s 26
of the Evidence Act, the said confession cannot be relied
upon the Courts. Further this alleged confession is not
corroborated by the testimony of the independent witness
Vijay Sah (PW6). Pritam Tiwari was also not deposed as
a witness in this regard.
7. 313 examination of the Appellant was not
conducted in a proper manner
7.1 Many crucial circumstances were not put to the
Appellant in his 313 examination, though were
considered as incriminating for the purpose of holding the
appellant guilty of the offence. Those are as under:-
● The circumstance of PW3 seeing the Appellant lock the
grill and the door of his room
● The circumstance that the Appellant gave false
information to PW3 that the victim had already left after
watching TV
● The circumstance of the accused refusing to open the
door as he did not have the key
● The circumstance of the Appellant giving the keys to the
villagers after he was assaulted
● The circumstance of the alleged extra-judicial
confession made by the co-accused Pritam Tiwari
implicating the Appellant
7.2 This Hon’ble Court has consistently held that the
circumstances not put to the Appellant cannot be relied
upon to convict an accused
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8. Flaws in the judgment of the Trial Court and the
High Court
8.1 The Trial Court in its judgment makes only a brief
discussion of the evidence and erroneously records that
Pritam Tiwari and Munna Pandey were found inside the
house.
8.2 The High of Judicature at Patna, in the impugned
judgment [at para 9]; observes that it is prima facie
satisfied that the Trial Court has not committed any error
in both convicting the Appellant and sentencing him to
death. In its said prima facie opinion on the matter it
heavily relies on the deposition of interested witnesses
PW1, PW2 and PW3 all of whom improved their versions.
The High Court has disregarded the evidence of the
independent witness and also the absence of material
evidence, compliance with section 53A requirements, the
absence of FSL report and pathological report. Hence the
said judgment suffers from perversity and is contrary to
the law
9. Mitigation
9.1 Without prejudice to the above submissions on
merits, the Courts below have incorrectly sentenced the
Appellant to undergo the sentence of death.
9.2 The Appellant has filed a mitigation report along
with the affidavits of the family members and the
villagers before this Hon’ble Court vide IA No 172211 of
2022. The following are the mitigating circumstances of
the Appellant:
(i) No criminal antecedents;
(ii) Satisfactory jail conduct as certified by the
Superintendent of Shahid Jubba Sahni Central Jail,
Bhagalpur;
(iii) Family impact - since his arrest, his family
including his wife Sangeeta and his 2 sons - Krishna (18
years at the time of incident) and Balram (12 years at the
time of incident) were ostracized from the village and they
have been residing with Sangeeta’s parents in village
Panchkathiya, Bihar
(iv) Continued family ties
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(v) Strong community links - Munna Pandey’s wife
Sangeeta was elected as the ward councilor in 2010. As
per the affidavit of Mohd. Aktar @ Pairu Miyan (resident
of village Sabour) the Appellant worked actively for the
community alongside his wife. He was considered
resourceful and many villagers approached him with their
problems in the village.
(vi) Age of the Appellant - he is currently 56 years old
(vii) Strong probability of reformation”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned
counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeals, the same
be allowed and the judgment and order of conviction and capital
sentence be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of all
the charges.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
15. On the other hand, these appeals were vehemently
opposed by Mr. Samir Ali Khan, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the State. He submitted that no error, not to speak
of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the
Courts below in holding the appellant guilty of the offence
charged with and treating the case to be one falling under the
category of “rarest of the rare cases”.
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16. The learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that it
was the appellant who visited the house of the victim at 9 o’clock
in the morning of 31.05.2015 and lured the victim to come to
his house to watch TV. It was argued that all the witnesses have
deposed that the victim went to the house of the appellant in the
morning on 31.05.2015 to watch TV and thereafter she went
missing. He submitted that the sister of the victim namely Priya
Kumari (PW 3) immediately informed her mother Kiran Devi (PW
2) who at the relevant point of time was at the house of her sister
at a different village. No sooner the mother of the victim came to
know that her daughter was missing, then she immediately
rushed back to her house and started enquiring as regards the
whereabouts of her minor daughter. It was argued that the
victim could be said to have been last seen with the appellant.
It was also argued that when the house was opened, the dead
body of the victim was recovered beneath a cot and the room
from where the dead body was recovered was of the ownership
of the appellant. He submitted that it was for the appellant to
explain, how the dead body of the victim was recovered from the
room of his house over which he had full control. It was also
argued that the PW 3 Priya Kumari in her deposition stated that
she had seen the appellant locking the door of his room. This is
suggestive of the fact that the keys of the room were with the
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appellant. The learned counsel submitted that the facts
established are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the appellant convict and are of a conclusive nature and
tendency. He submitted that the chain of evidence is so complete
that it does not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused.
17. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned
counsel prayed that there being no merit in these appeals, those
may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and having gone through the materials on record, the
only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High
Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment?
19. The case on hand is one of a very gruesome rape and
murder of a 10-year old girl. It is the case of the prosecution that
on the fateful day the victim had gone to the house of the
appellant to watch TV. According to the prosecution, it is the
appellant who came to the house of the victim and persuaded
her to come at his house to watch TV. The elder sister of the
victim, PW 3 Priya Kumari was at home when her younger sister
left for the house of the appellant to watch TV. When the younger
16
sister did not come back to her house, Priya Kumari started
searching for her and as her efforts failed to know the
whereabouts of her younger sister, she immediately informed
her mother Kiran Devi (the first informant). At the relevant time,
Kiran Devi was at the house of her elder sister namely Shakila
Devi at Jamunia Parbatta. The PW1 Babloo Saw is the son of
Shakila Devi. The PW 2 Kiran Devi happens to be the mousi of
PW 1 Babloo Saw. It is the case of the prosecution that while
Kiran Devi was at the house of her elder sister Shakila Devi, she
was informed by Priya Kumari on telephone that the victim had
gone to the house of the appellant in the morning to watch TV
and thereafter she went missing. It was PW 1 Babloo Saw who
brought Kiran Devi on his motorcycle back to her village i.e. her
house.
20. We shall now look into the findings recorded by the High
Court in its impugned judgment. To put it in other words, the
circumstances relied upon by the High Court and the line of
reasoning to hold the appellant herein guilty of the alleged crime
is as follows:-
“9 . … To start with, it would be firstly necessary to
examine the first hand information, which has come
from the mouth of elder daughter of the informant i.e.
P.W.3 namely Priya Kumari. She was the main witness,
who had seen that appellant had persuaded and
17
enticed the victim to go with him on the pretext of
witnessing T.V. serial.
10. … Munna Pandey (appellant) carried the victim, at
that time, it was about 9:00 AM (morning). After
preparing food, she went to call the victim to the house
of Munna Pandey (appellant), then she saw that Munna
Pandey (appellant) was putting lock on his door. She
saw that Munna Pandey (appellant), after putting lock
on his room, was coming out. When she reached near
the gate, till that time, Munna Pandey (appellant), after
putting lock on gate also, was trying to move, then she
asked Munna Pandey as to where is the victim, Munna
Pandey (appellant) replied that she, after witnessing
T.V., had already gone. P.W.3 thereafter returned back
to her house and tried to search nearby. When she did
not find the victim then she made telephone call to her
mother (P.W.2, Kiran Devi) and informed her. Her mother
on the same date came back with her (Priya) cousin
brother Babloo (P.W.1). Again, this witness narrated
everything to her mother. Thereafter, she, her mother,
aunt and cousin brother Babloo, all jointly started to
search, but the victim was not traced, then they went to
the house of Munna Pandey (appellant), where it was
noticed that there was lock on the room of Munna
Pandey (appellant). Outer gate was also locked.
Thereafter, she inquired from other villagers, on which,
villagers called Munna Pandey, then he came. The
appellant was inquired by villagers and her mother
(P.W.2) also regarding the victim. The appellant said that
he was not having the key of the room. After noticing this
fact, the villagers said that if he was not having key,
they will break the lock. On which, the appellant
threatened them for implicating in dacoity case, if lock is
broken. Munna Pandey (appellant) also stated that
Pritam (co-accused) was also not being located and he
said that it appears that he had gone somewhere with
the victim. On the strength of such statement of Munna
Pandey (appellant), they started to search Pritam also,
however; he could not be traced and thereafter, they
returned back to their house and again they went to the
house of Munna Pandey (appellant), where she noticed
that some light was coming from inside the house of
Fuchan Pandey. Thereafter, the villagers raised some
suspicion, as if, in the room, there was someone. Munna
Pandey (appellant) was again asked to break the lock,
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then he said that key was lying with Fuchan Pandey.
Villagers thereafter telephoned Fuchan, at that very
time, he was in his in-laws’ house. Fuchan over
telephone informed that in the morning, he would come.
Since by 8:00 AM, Fuchan did not arrive, P.W.3 with her
mother went to Sabour Police Station, however; in the
meanwhile, Fuchan reached to his house. Villagers by
using force also pushed Munna and carried him to the
said place. Thereafter, police also arrived there. Lock of
outer gate was broken. Thereafter, the key of the room
was provided by Munna Pandey (appellant). From the
room of Fuchan, Pritam Tiwary came out. In presence of
the Police and villagers, Pritam was inquired as to where
was the victim, then he explained that victim was in the
room of Munna Pandey (appellant). Pritam also said that
he and Munna Pandey both had jointly raped the victim
and thereafter, killed her. Dead body of the victim was
found beneath the bed of Munna Pandey (appellant). Her
body was undressed. Her urinal portion was swollen
and blood had come out. She had also dispersed her
waste (potty) and it was also swollen. Police carried the
dead body. She claimed to identify both accused
persons, which includes appellant. In cross-examination
in paragraph – 2, she stated that her father was living
in Gujarat. She further stated that Fuchan Pandey is
also known as Nawal Kishore Ojha. In paragraph – 7 of
her cross-examination, she claimed that she had seen
television in the room, where there was a bed, almirah
including fan. In paragraph – 8, she further stated that
she was visiting the said room and stated that Munna
Pandey (appellant) was her neighbour. In paragraph –
9, she explained that in search of the victim, they had
gone to several places including block, chowk, station
Sabour etc. In paragraph 12, she stated that Fuchan
Pandey and Munna Pandey (appellant) were the full
brothers and both brothers were having one room each
in their share. She stated in paragraph 12 that Munna
Pandey (appellant) was virtually residing somewhere
else and usually he was visiting to his room (place of
occurrence). She further stated that she was not
knowing about the rented house of Munna Pandey
(appellant). Again, in paragraph 12 itself, she deposed
that earlier there was no complaint against Munna
Pandey (appellant). It is necessary to indicate that there
was no complaint against the appellant prior to the
19
occurrence, which suggests that it was not a case of
false implication due to any old animosity. Of course, her
attention to her previous statement was drawn in
paragraph 13 of her cross-examination, but while the
investigating officer was being examined, no
contradiction was drawn and as such, there is no need
to take note of such so called minor inconsistencies. She
denied the suggestion that she had given false evidence
and falsely implicated the appellant. On examination of
entire evidence of P.W.3, it is evident that though this
witness was cross-examined at length, nothing could be
extracted to create any doubt on her evidence.
11. … Munna Pandey (appellant) was also called by
villagers. When the villagers asked Fuchan to open lock,
Fuchan replied that he was not having key. Villagers
thereafter started to assault Munna Pandey and asked
him to break the lock. When villagers broke one of the
lock, then Munna Pandey (appellant) took out the key
and from that key, lock of Fuchan’s door was opened,
however; the room was closed from inside. When the
door was pushed, it was opened by Pritam and he
concealed himself. All villagers entered into the house.
Police also arrived. Pritam was apprehended. When
Pritam was being assaulted, police had arrived there.
Lock of room of Munna was also opened by the villagers.
From the room of Munna Pandey (appellant), dead body
of the victim was recovered. Age of victim was 11 years
old and dead body was kept beneath the bed and police
took out the dead body from beneath the bed. The
informant started crying. She further stated that the
cloth of her daughter from lower portion was removed.
She noticed that urinal portion of her daughter was
ruptured and she also noticed potty there. She stated
that the anus was also ruptured. The face was swollen
and on cheek also, there was sign of injury. Villagers
thereafter started to assault Munna, Pritam and Fuchan.
Pritam, in presence of the Police, stated that he and
Munna Pandey both jointly had committed the crime.
This witness stated that her fardbeyan was recorded by
the police at the place of occurrence itself and she
identified her signature as well as signature of Babloo
(P.W.1) on the fardbeyan. Signature was identified as
Ext. 1/1. she claimed to identify Pritam and Munna
Pandey (appellant). At the time of cross-examination, it
was noticed by the Trial Judge that this witness was
20
very much nervous and also she was repeatedly
weeping and this was the reason that cross-examination
on the date i.e. 21.06.2016 was deferred. This reflects
regarding the agony suffered by the mother of the victim.
In paragraph 8 of her cross-examination, she stated that
Priya (P.W.3) had informed on telephone that the victim
was traceless. She further deposed in paragraph - 8 of
her cross-examination that family members of the
informant were in visiting term with Munna Pandey and
he was also visiting to the house of the informant. In
paragraph -10 of her cross-examination, she stated that
she was not knowing anything about the criminal nature
of the appellant. She stated that the appellant was her
neighbour and this was the reason regarding their
conversance. In paragraph - 11 of her cross-
examination, she stated that the room, in which, Pritam
was present was opened. The lock of room of Munna
Pandey (appellant) was opened. Munna Pandey
(appellant) and Fuchan Pandey were residing
separately. One room was of Fuchan and one room was
of Munna Pandey (appellant). She clarified in paragraph
- 12 that 10-15 days prior to the occurrence, Fuchan had
already gone to his in-laws’ house situated at village
Shobhapur. In paragraph – 17 of her cross-examination,
she reiterated that dead body of her victim daughter
was found in the room of Munna Pandey, whereas,
Pritam Tiwary had concealed himself in the room of
Fuchan. In paragraph 19 and 20 of her cross-
examination, P.W.2 denied the suggestion that lock of
two rooms were opened by Fuchan Pandey and denied
the suggestion that lock of the room of the Munna
Pandey (appellant) was also opened by Fuchan Pandey.
In paragraph - 23 of her cross-examination, she said that
she may not say exact date of recording fardbeyan,
however; she said that she can say the day on which it
was recorded. She stated that Rita Madam i.e. P.W.5
had recorded fardbeyan and it was read over to her,
however; she was not recollecting exactly what was the
time. In paragraph 26 and 27 of her cross-examination,
she stated that after arrival of Fuchan, when he denied
regarding possession of the key, then the villagers
started assaulting Munna Pandey (appellant). She
stated that Pritam was apprehended by Vijay (P.W.6)
Babloo (P.W.1) and other villagers and they also slapped
Pritam. Again in paragraph - 28 of her cross-
21
examination, she stated that the dead body of her
daughter was found in the house of Munna Pandey
(appellant). On examination of her entire evidence,
including cross-examination, it is evident that every fact
relating to the occurrence was reiterated in the cross
examination, but nothing could be doubted on her
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
16. On examination of entire evidence, it is established
that the learned Trial Judge has rightly held the
appellant guilty for commission of offence under Sections
302 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Trial
Judge, after convicting the appellant by its judgment
dated 02.02.2017, deferred the date of sentence and
after reasonable time, on 23.02.2017, the learned Trial
Judge, after hearing both the parties and balancing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, had come to
the conclusion that it was a fit case for imposing death
sentence and thereafter, death sentence was imposed
and it was referred to this Court under Section 366 of
the Cr.P.C. for its confirmation.
17. The evidence of P.W.3 is very much specific that on
the date of occurrence in the morning, this appellant had
reached the house of the informant, whereas, at that
very time, P.W.3 was preparing food. In her presence,
this appellant asked, rather lured the victim to
accompany him for witnessing T.V. programme inside
his house. At first instance, P.W.3, elder sister of the
victim, asked that she can go only after taking meal, but
that too was prevented by the appellant and he
(appellant) insisted and only thereafter, the victim, who
was aged about 11 years, had gone with the appellant
in the garb of witnessing T.V. programme in his house.
In the evidence of P.W.2 informant/mother of the victim,
this fact has come that appellant was neighbour of the
informant and they were on visiting term. Meaning
thereby that at the time, when the appellant had called
the victim, there was nothing in the mind of the elder
sister that her younger sister aged about 11 years will
be raped by the appellant, who obviously on the date of
occurrence was neither young nor very old. From the
judgment of conviction and sentence, it appears that his
(appellant) age was assessed as 50 years. Meaning
thereby that beyond stretch of imagination, the elder
22
sister was not having any apprehension that her minor
sister can be raped by a person, who was neighbour and
aged about approaching 50 years. This was the reason
that victim was allowed to move with the appellant. The
victim, who was aged about 11 years, was also
oblivious of the fact that as to what was occurring in the
mind of the appellant. After she was carried to the room
and within few hours, when P.W.3 (elder sister of the
victim) went to the house of the appellant, she noticed
that this appellant after locking the door was coming out.
This was not the end, even on inquiry, this appellant
gave false declaration that victim had already left after
witnessing T.V. programme. Again the criminal mind of
the appellant was operating and this was the reason
that even though, he had already committed rape and
murder of 11 years old girl and concealed the dead body
inside his room, he gave false information to the elder
sister of the victim (P.W.3). Since the victim could not be
traced by P.W.3 (Priya), the P.W.3 who was aged about
15-16 years old, and this was the reason that she was
not in a position to take any further decision and she
immediately ranged her mother (informant), who had
gone to village Jamunia, which was about 22 km. away
from the village Sabour. She informed her mother
regarding missing of the victim and she also explained
regarding other circumstances, which were sufficient to
raise suspicion on the appellant. Thereafter, the
informant from Jamunia came on a motorcycle with son
of her late sister P.W.1 (Babloo Saw) and all of them
again went to the house of the appellant and this time
they noticed that house as well as outer gate of the
appellant was locked and there was none, then the
search was made for the victim. Subsequently, villagers
called the appellant, who disclosed that he was not
having the key and he pretended, as if, key was left with
his brother Fuchan Pandey, who was away and staying
in his in-laws house. This time again this appellant gave
false information. By way of searching, day time had
come to end of the day and in the evening, informant
side and villagers noticed some light coming from the
house of the appellant, then suspicion got strengthened.
Thereafter, again the villagers called the appellant for
opening the door. On his denial, the villagers told that
they will break the lock of the door, in that event, this
appellant threatened the villagers that if lock is broken,
23
he will file a case of dacoity against them. All those
things depict about the criminal mind of the appellant.
Only in the next morning, when his brother Fuchan
arrived, who was telephonically asked to come, and he
disclosed that he was not having the key, the villagers
started to assault the appellant and one lock was broken
and only thereafter, this appellant took out the key.
Ofcourse subsequently, the room, which was said to be
in possession of the appellant, was opened and beneath
the bed of the appellant, dead body in ruptured condition
of the victim was found. Everything has already been
discussed hereinabove, as was explained by the
informant/P.W.2, P.W.3/Priya and P.W.1/Babloo.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Thus, all throughout, the High Court proceeded on the
footing that it was the appellant convict who came to the house
of the victim in the morning of 31.05.2015 and lured her to come
to his house to watch TV. The High Court took the view that
since the dead body of the victim was recovered from the room
owned by the appellant and he was seen by the PW 3 Priya
Kumari locking the door attached to his house, it could be none
other than the appellant who could be said to have committed
the crime. The High Court completely forgot that there was a
co-accused also namely Pritam Tiwari in the picture. Pritam
Tiwari being a juvenile was tried in accordance with the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and was held guilty
and sentenced to three years imprisonment.
24
FSL REPORT NOT OBTAINED:
22. We noticed few very serious lapses in the entire
investigation and, more particularly, the oral evidence of the
investigating officer PW 5 Rita Kumari disturbed us a lot. The
investigating officer in her cross examination deposed that in
accordance with the order dated 29.06.2015 a letter on behalf of
the officer-in-charge of the Police Station, Sabour, was filed before
the Trial Court seeking permission to send the muddamal articles
to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Patna for examination.
However, the PW 5 Rita Kumari in her cross examination before
the Trial Court admitted that following the instructions of her
senior officers, she did not take any steps to procure FSL report.
Who are these senior officers of PW 5 and why they instructed the
PW 5 not to procure the FSL report should have been a subject
matter of inquiry by both, the State as well as the trial court.
23. The aforesaid lapse is just a tip of the iceberg. We are at
pains to state that it is a very serious flaw on the part of the
investigating officer and that too in such a serious matter.
FAILURE TO CONDUCT MEDICAL EXAMINATION
24. One another serious flaw in the present case on the part
of the investigating officer that has come to our notice is the
failure to subject the appellant to medical examination by a
25
medical practitioner. No explanation, much less any reasonable
explanation, has been offered for such a serious flaw on the part
of the investigating officer.
25. Section 53(1) of the CrPC enables a police officer not below
the rank of sub-inspector to request a registered medical
practitioner, to make such an examination of the person arrested,
as is reasonably necessary to ascertain the facts which may afford
such evidence, whenever a person is arrested on a charge of
committing an offence of such a nature that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford
evidence as to the commission of an offence. Section 53(1) reads
as follows:-
“ Section 53. Examination of accused by medical
practitioner at the request of police officer .—(1)
When a person is arrested on a charge of committing an
offence of such a nature and alleged to have been
committed under such circumstances that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of
his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an
offence, it shall be lawful for a registered medical
practitioner, acting at the request of a police officer not
below the rank of sub-inspector, and for any person
acting in good faith in his aid and under his direction, to
make such an examination of the person arrested as is
reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts
which may afford such evidence, and to use such force as
is reasonably necessary for that purpose.”
26. By Act 25 of 2005, a new Explanation was substituted
under Section 53, in the place of the original Explanation. The
26
| Explanation so substituted under Section 53 by Act 25 of 2005 | ||
|---|---|---|
| reads as follows:- | ||
| “Explanation.—In this section and in Sections 53A and | ||
| 54— | ||
| (a) “examination” shall include the examination of blood, | ||
| blood stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, | ||
| sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings | ||
| by the use of modern and scientific techniques including | ||
| DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered | ||
| medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case; | ||
| (b) “registered medical practitioner” means a medical | ||
| practitioner who possess any medical qualification as | ||
| defined in clause (h) of Section 2 of the Indian Medical | ||
| Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956) and whose name has | ||
| been entered in a State Medical Register.” |
| 27. Simultaneously with the substitution of a new | ||
|---|---|---|
| Explanation under Section 53, Act 25 of 2005 also inserted a new | ||
| provision i.e. Section 53A. Section 53A reads as follows:- | ||
| “Section 53A. Examination of person accused of | ||
| rape by medical practitioner.—(1) When a person is | ||
| arrested on a charge of committing an offence of rape or | ||
| an attempt to commit rape and there are reasonable | ||
| grounds for believing that an examination of his person | ||
| will afford evidence as to the commission of such offence, | ||
| it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner | ||
| employed in a hospital run by the Government or by a | ||
| local authority and in the absence of such a practitioner | ||
| within the radius of sixteen kilometers from the place | ||
| where the offence has been committed by any other | ||
| registered medical practitioner acting at the request of a | ||
| police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, and | ||
| for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under | ||
| his direction, to make such an examination of the arrested | ||
| person and to use such force as is reasonably necessary | ||
| for that purpose. |
27
| (2) The registered medical practitioner conducting such | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| examination shall, without delay, examine such person | ||||
| and prepare a report of his examination giving the | ||||
| following particulars, namely— | ||||
| (i) the name and address of the accused and of the | ||||
| person by whom he was brought, | ||||
| (ii) the age of the accused, | ||||
| (iii) marks of injury, if any, on the person of the | ||||
| accused, | ||||
| (iv) the description of material taken from the person | ||||
| of the accused for DNA profiling, and | ||||
| (v) other material particulars in reasonable detail. | ||||
| (3) The report shall state precisely the reasons for each | ||||
| conclusion arrived at. | ||||
| (4) The exact time of commencement and completion of the | ||||
| examination shall also be noted in the report. | ||||
| (5) The registered medical practitioner shall, without | ||||
| delay, forward the report to the investigating officer, who | ||||
| shall forward it to the Magistrate referred to in Section | ||||
| 173 as part of the documents referred to in clause (a) of | ||||
| sub-section (5) of that section.” |
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chotkau v. State of
Uttar Pradesh , (2023) 6 SCC 742, had the occasion to consider
Sections 53, 53A and 164 of the CrPC in details. This Court
observed in para 80 to 83 as under:-
| “80. After saying that Section 53-A is not mandatory, this | |
|---|---|
| Court found in para 54 of the said decision that the failure | |
| of the prosecution to produce DNA evidence, warranted | |
| an adverse inference to be drawn. Para 54 reads as | |
| follows : (Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik case [Rajendra | |
| Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 | |
| SCC 460 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 420], SCC p. 485) | |
| “54. For the prosecution to decline to produce DNA | |
| evidence would be a little unfortunate particularly | |
| when the facility of DNA profiling is available in the | |
| country. The prosecution would be well advised to take | |
| advantage of this, particularly in view of the provisions |
28
| of Section 53-A and Section 164-ACrPC. We are not | |
|---|---|
| going to the extent of suggesting that if there is no DNA | |
| profiling, the prosecution case cannot be proved but we | |
| are certainly of the view that where DNA profiling has | |
| not been done or it is held back from the trial court, an | |
| adverse consequence would follow for the prosecution.” | |
| 81. It is necessary at this stage to note that by the very | |
| same Amendment Act 25 of 2005, by which Section 53-A | |
| was inserted, Section 164-A was also inserted in the | |
| Code. While Section 53-A enables the medical | |
| examination of the person accused of rape, Section 164-A | |
| enables medical examination of the victim of rape. Both | |
| these provisions are somewhat similar and can be said | |
| approximately to be a mirror image of each other. But | |
| there are three distinguishing features. They are: | |
| 81.1 Section 164-A requires the prior consent of the | |
| woman who is the victim of rape. Alternatively, the | |
| consent of a person competent to give such consent on | |
| her behalf should have been obtained before subjecting | |
| the victim to medical examination. Section 53-A does | |
| not speak about any such consent. | |
| 81.2 Section 164-A requires the report of the medical | |
| practitioner to contain among other things, the general | |
| mental condition of the woman. This is absent in | |
| Section 53-A. | |
| 81.3 Under Section 164-A(1), the medical examination | |
| by a registered medical practitioner is mandatory | |
| when, “it is proposed to get the person of the woman | |
| examined by a medical expert” during the course of | |
| investigation. This is borne out by the use of the words, | |
| “such examination shall be conducted”. In contrast, | |
| Section 53-A(1) merely makes it lawful for a registered | |
| medical practitioner to make an examination of the | |
| arrested person if “there are reasonable grounds for | |
| believing that an examination of his person will afford | |
| evidence as to the commission of such offence”. | |
| 82. In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a | |
| position to testify in court, it may be possible for the | |
| prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining | |
| the accused. But in cases where the victim is dead and | |
| the offence is sought to be established only by |
29
| circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great | ||
|---|---|---|
| importance. The failure of the prosecution to produce such | ||
| evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the | ||
| accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in | ||
| the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious | ||
| doubt on the case of the prosecution. We do not wish to | ||
| go into the question whether Section 53-A is mandatory | ||
| or not. Section 53-A enables the prosecution to obtain a | ||
| significant piece of evidence to prove the charge. The | ||
| failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the | ||
| appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the | ||
| prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is | ||
| found to be not trustworthy. | ||
| 83. Their failure to obtain the report of the Forensic | ||
| Science Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the | ||
| salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the | ||
| prosecution.” | ||
importance in cases where the victim of rape is dead and the
offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial
evidence.
FURTHER STATEMENT UNDER SECTION 313 CrPC
30. The further statement of the appellant convict was
recorded under Section 313 CrPC. We were shocked to see the
manner in which the Trial Court recorded the further statement
of the appellant convict under Section 313 CrPC. In all, four
questions were put to the appellant convict to enable him to
explain the incriminating circumstances pointing towards his
complicity in the alleged crime. The questions are as under:-
30
“(1) Question :- Have you heard the evidence of the
witnesses?
Answer :- Yes
(2) Question :- There is evidence against you that on
31.5.15, you took away X to your house by calling her, on
pretext of watching TV. What have you got to say?
Answer :- No Sir.
(3) Question :- There is also evidence against you that
you escaped after locking your house and later on the lock
was broken and then the dead body of X was recovered
lying under the wooden cot. What have you got to say in
this regard?
Answer :- No Sir.
(4) Question :- It has also come in evidence against you
that you in association with Preetam committed murder
of X after raping her. What have you got to say?
Answer :- No sir, it is wrong.”
31. However, for the purpose of holding the appellant herein
guilty of the alleged crime, the Trial Court looked into the
following additional circumstances:-
(a) The circumstance of PW 3 seeing the Appellant lock
the grill and the door of his room.
(b) The circumstance that the Appellant gave false
information to PW 3 that the victim had already left
after watching TV.
31
(c) The circumstance of the accused refusing to open
the door as he did not have the key.
(d) The circumstance of the Appellant giving the keys
to the villagers after he was assaulted.
(e) The circumstance of the alleged extra-judicial
confession made by the co-accused Pritam Tiwari
implicating the Appellant.
32. Indisputably, none of the aforesaid circumstances relied
upon by the Trial Court were put to the appellant convict so that
he could offer a proper explanation to the same.
33. Having regard to the fact that an innocent girl of 10 years
was lured, raped and brutally murdered, we looked into the
entire record very closely. Our mind got clouded with suspicion.
Ultimately, we noticed something very shocking. The shocking
aspect, we shall discuss about hereinafter, if would have gone
unnoticed at our end too, then it would have led to a serious
miscarriage of justice.
34. We thought fit to call for the papers of the charge sheet
and look into the FIR lodged by PW 2 Kiran Devi; the further
statement of PW 2 recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC in
furtherance of the FIR lodged by her and the police statements
of PW 1 Babloo Saw, and PW 3 Priya Kumari, the elder sister of
32
the victim and elder daughter of PW 2 (first informant). Reading
the FIR and the police statements of the aforesaid witnesses left
us aghast.
35. We first start with the FIR lodged by PW 2 which reads
thus:-
“Fardbayan of Kiran Devi aged about 40 years w/o
Arvind Sah, at Thateri Tola, Police Station- Sabour,
District Bhagalpur recorded by S.I. cum S.H.O. Rita
Kumari Sabour P.S. in house of Naval Kishore Ojha @
Fuchan Pandey dated 01-06-15 at 12:45 P.M.
My name is Kiran Devi, aged about 40 years old, w/o
Arvind Sah, Rio Thateri Tola Sabour Police Station- Saber,
District- Bhagalpur. I am giving this statement without
any pressure, in presence of the In-charge of Sabour
Police Station today on 01 June, 2015 at the house of
st
Naval Kishore (Fucchan Pandey) that yesterday on 31
May, 2015, I went to my late elder sister Sakila Devi's
home situated in Jamunia Parbatta. In the meantime, at
about 12 pm, my elder daughter Priya Kumari informed
me through telephone that my younger daughter, X is
nowhere to be found. Then I left for Sabour immediately.
When I reached home, my elder daughter Priya informed
me that X went to watch TV at Munna Pandey's home.
When she didn't come back till 11 am then my elder
daughter called me. When I went to Munna Pandey’s
home to find X, I found that Munna Pandey's house was
locked. We started searching for X along with our
relatives but X was nowhere to be found. When Munna
Pandey was asked to open the lock, he said that he docs
not have the keys. Then I called Munna Pandey’s brother
Fucchan Pandey who was at his in-law's house (sasural).
st
Today on 1 June, 2015, Naval Kishore Pandey @
Fucchan Pandey came at around 12 pm and opened the
lock of the room where it was found that Pritam Tiwari,
S/o Dilip Tiwari R/o Shobhapur, Police Station:
Rajmahal, District was hiding inside the room. The room
was locked from outside. When Munna Pandey's room
was opened, the dead body of my daughter was found
33
under the bed. I am certain that Pritam Tiwari, s/o Dilip
Tiwari, r/o Shobhapur, Police Station: Rajmahal District
Sahebanj and Munna Pandey s/o Late Bir Bahadur
Pandey r/o Thatcri Tola, Police Station: Sabour, District
Bhagalpur, jointly conspired and had committed rape on
my 11 y/o daughter (X) and after that strangulated her
and killed her and then hid her dead body in the room.
This is my statement which I heard and understood after
reading them I found the above statements correct and I
am putting my signature by my own will in the presence
of my sister's son, Bablu Sah s/o Satish Sah r/o
Jamunia, Toana Parvata (Navaghchiya) Bhagalpur.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. The further statement of Kiran Devi recorded by the police
under Section 161 CrPC reads thus:-
“Further investigation of this case, the police re-recorded
the statement of complainant of this case - Kiran Devi,
aged about 40 years, W/o - Arvind Sah, R/o - Thatheri
Tola, PS - Sabour, District - Bhagalpur. Concurring with
the FIR, she stated in her statement that in the
neighborhood in front of her house lived two brothers -
Munna Pandey and Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan
Pandey. They both have share in one room each. Frequent
quarrels used to take place between the two brothers, due
to which Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan Pandey used to
live at his in-law's place (sasuraal) and Munna Pandey,
Sabour used to live near Kali Sthan in a rented house.
Fucchan Pandey had handed over his room to his brother-
in-law (wife's brother) for its maintenance. Pritam Tiwary
worked in a cloth shop. People from the cloth shop also
used to visit the house of Fucchan Pandey occasionally.
There was a TV in the house of Fucchan Pandey. Children
from the neighborhood also used to visit his house to
watch the TV. On date 31.05.15, I (Kiran Devi) had gone
to the house of my late sister, Shakila Devi in Jamunia
Parvatta. On date 31.05.15 at about 12:00, her elder
daughter Priya Kumari informed her on telephone that her
younger daughter X was nowhere to be found. She
immediately left from there. After her arrival at Sabour in
her house, her elder daughter informed that her younger
daughter X had stated that she was going to the house
34
of Pritam Tiwary to watch TV. Pritam Tiwary had called
X to watch TV at his home at around 9 o'clock. When X
did not come home till eleven o'clock, her elder daughter
Priya went to the house of Pritam Tiwary to search for her.
At that time Pritam Tiwary was locking the door. When
she asked the whereabouts of X from Pritam Tiwary, he
told that she was not there. After that she went to a
mango orchard to look for her. She was not found there
also. Then Priya called all her relatives and went to
search her, but could not find her anywhere. Even after
such a hectic search, X was nowhere to be found. So we
all collectively decided to find Pritam Tiwary who was
also not to be found. The villagers became suspicious so
they all called Munna Pandey and asked him to open the
gate. But Munna Pandey declined to open the gates and
said that he did not have the keys to the lock. The local
villagers then telephoned Naval Pandey @ Fucchan
Pandey. At that time he was at his in-law's place at
Shobhapur. When Munna Pandey declined to hand over
the keys, everybody became suspicious that Pritam
Tiwary was not there and it was very much possible that
he (Pritam Tiwary) did some occurrence with her
daughter. On 01-06-2015, Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan
Pandey came with his wife and children and opened the
locks of the grill at about 12:00 noon. When lock was
opened, all the villagers entered the verandah and when
looked through the window in the room of Fucchan
Pandey, found Pritam Tiwary sleeping on the palang
(wooden cot) in the room. When Fucchan Pandey opened
the lock of his room, Pritam Tiwary started hiding himself
under the wooden bed. The villagers took him out from
the bed and started to ask the whereabouts of X. Initially
he refused to give any information. But when all the
people asked him strictly, he said that X (deceased) was
in the house of Munna Pandey. And when all the people
looked inside the room after breaking the locks of the
doors of Munna Pandey, they found the dead body of
eleven year old daughter X lying below the palang
(wooden cot) in the room. When I looked at my daughter,
she was already dead. We found her face extremely
swollen, both the lips swollen, blood stained wound was
seen on her right cheek. Her clothes were in (illegible)
manner. The private parts of deceased X were swollen
and blood stained wound and anus swollen with stool
sticking to it, were found. He further informed that both
35
the accused persons named in the FIR - (1) Pritam Tiwary,
S/o - Dilip Tiwary, R/o - Shobhapur, PS - Raj Mahal,
District - Sahebganj, State - Jharkhand, present address
Naval Kishore Ojha, Thatheri Toal - Sabour, PS - Sabour,
District - Bhagalpur, (2) Munna Pandey, S/o Late Bir
Bahadur Pandey, R/o - Thatheri, Toal - Sabour, PS -
Sabour, District - Bhagalpur raped her eleven year
daughter X (deceased) and with a view to remove the
evidence. strangled her and killed her and had hid the
dead body below the palang (wooden cot). The villagers
informed the police station. On receiving the information
police came and began their investigation. Besides this,
she did not tell any other important facts.”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. The police statement of PW 1 Babloo Saw reads thus:-
“In further investigation of this case recorded the witness
statement of Babloo Sah, s/o Satish Sah, r/o Jamunia,
PS - Parvatta, District - Khagaria, with complete support
to the occurrence in his statement informed that deceased
X is his aunt's (her mother's sister) daughter. On date
31.05.15 mother of the deceased came to his house.
Priya, the elder sister of the deceased X, informed her
mother over telephone that Pritam Tiwary, brother-in-law
(wife's brother) of her neighbor Naval Kishore Ojha called
X to watch television at his house and that she had not
returned home. On information, he along with his mausi
(mother's sister), Kiran Devi came to Sabour and along
with family members and with the help of local villagers
did exhaustive search in the nearby places, but could not
find X anywhere. During the course of search, when I
went to the house of Naval Kishore Ojha, I saw that his
house is locked. Few people suspected that Pritam Tiwary
had taken her somewhere or is inside the room, because
the light of bulb was emitting light from his house. Then
all the people called Munna Pandey and asked him to
open the lock to which he declined and made an excuse
that he does not possess the key. Then the suspicion of
all the people grew more. Then villagers informed Naval
Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan Pandey, brother of Munna
Pandey about the occurrence of the incident on telephone.
At that time of call Fuchchan Pandey was at his in-laws
house at Shobhapur. He was not living here since last two
months. On date 01.06.15 at about 12:00 noon, Fucchan
36
Pandey came along with his family and opened the lock
of the house and saw Pritam Tiwary hiding in his house.
When local people strictly enquired about the deceased
girl X, he informed that X (deceased) was in Munna
Pandey's house and then he tried to escape. Then all the
people broke the lock on the door of Munna Pandey's room
and when they looked inside they found the dead body
of X lying under the bed (wooden cot). The clothes on her
body were in haphazard condition. The women of the
village told that a lot of blood stained injury and swelling
was found around the private parts of X (deceased). The
face of deceased X was extremely swollen, blood stained
injury on both the lips which was hanging after being
swollen. He further stated that both accused persons.
named in the FIR called the girl on the pretext to watch
TV and raped her and with a view to hide the evidence
strangled her and killed her and hid the dead body below
the palang (wooden cot). The local police station was then
informed about the incident. Police came and started its
proceeding. He did not inform any important thing
further.” (Emphasis supplied)
38. The police statement of PW 3 Priya Kumari, the elder
sister of the victim, reads thus:-
“In further investigation of this case I recorded the
statement of witness Priya Kumari, aged about 15 years,
s/o - Arvind Sah, R/o - Thatheri, tola PS - Sabour, District
Bhagalpur. After certifying the FIR, she informed in her
statement that on dated 31.05.15 she was cooking in her
house. Her mother Kiran Devi had gone to the house of
her aunt (her mother's sister) in Parvatta. Her father
works as a laborer in Gujarat. There was no one else in
the house. At about 09:00 am her younger sister
deceased X had gone to the house of Fucchan Pandey to
watch TV. Pritam Tiwary, brother in law of (wife's sister)
Phuchchan Pandey lived in that house. He had called X
to watch TV at his house. When X did not return even after
two hours, Priya (elder sister) went to the room of Pritam
Tiwary to call her. On asking Pritam Tiwary about the
whereabouts of X, he told that X had not come there. At
that time Pritam was locking the grills of the verandah.
Then she went to the nearby mango orchard to look for
37
her. She did not find her there also. Finally the she
telephone her mother and informed her that X was
missing. On arrival of Kiran Devi everybody started
looking for X at all their relatives' place, but could not find
her anywhere. Some people suspected that X was with
Pritam Tiwary. Then everybody started searching for
Pritam Tiwary. He was also not found anywhere. Then
all the villagers and their relatives asked Munna Pandey
to open the house but Munna Pandey refused to do so and
made an excuse that he does not possess the keys. Then
the villagers telephoned Fucchan Pandey who is the
brother of Munna Pandey but they found that Fucchan
Pandey was living at his in law's place (sasuraal) at
Rajmahal since the last two months. On date 01.06.15 at
about 12:00 o'clock Naval Kishore Ojha @ Fucchan
Pandey came and opened the lock of his investigation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. Thus, the case of all the witnesses before the police was
that it was Pritam Tiwari who had come to the house of the
victim on the fateful day and date and had taken the victim along
with him to his house to watch TV. All the statements further
reveal that it was Pritam Tiwari who was found locking the door
when the witnesses enquired with Pritam Tiwari about the
whereabouts of the victim.
40. Neither the defence counsel nor the public prosecutor nor
the presiding officer of the Trial Court and unfortunately even
the High Court thought fit to look into the aforesaid aspect of
the matter and try to reach to the truth.
41. It was the duty of the defence counsel to confront the
witnesses with their police statements so as to prove the
38
contradictions in the form of material omissions and bring them
on record. We are sorry to say that the learned defence counsel
had no idea how to contradict a witness with his or her police
statements in accordance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act,
1872 (for short, ‘Evidence Act’).
42. The lapse on the part of public prosecutor is also
something very unfortunate. The public prosecutor knew that
the witnesses were deposing something contrary to what they
had stated before the police in their statements recorded under
Section 161 of the CrPC. It was his duty to bring to the notice of
the witnesses and confront them with the same even without
declaring them as hostile.
43. The presiding officer of the Trial Court also remained a
mute spectator. It was the duty of the presiding officer to put
relevant questions to these witnesses in exercise of his powers
under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Section 162 of the CrPC
does not prevent a Judge from looking into the record of the
police investigation. Being a case of rape and murder and as the
evidence was not free from doubt, the Trial Judge ought to have
acquainted himself, in the interest of justice, with the important
material and also with what the only important witnesses of the
prosecution had said during the police investigation. Had he
done so, he could without any impropriety have caught the
39
discrepancies between the statements made by these witnesses
to the investigating officer and their evidence at the trial, to be
brought on the record by himself putting questions to the
witnesses under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. There is, in
our opinion, nothing in Section 162 CrPC to prevent a Trial
Judge, as distinct from the prosecution or the defence, from
putting to prosecution witnesses the questions otherwise
permissible, if the justice obviously demands such a course. In
the present case, we are strongly of the opinion that is what, in
the interests of justice, the Trial Judge should have done but he
did not look at the record of the police investigation until after
the investigating officer had been examined and discharged as a
witness. Even at this stage, the Trial Judge could have recalled
the officer and other witnesses and questioned them in the
manner provided by Section 165 of the Evidence Act. It is
regrettable that he did not do so.
44. We take this opportunity of explaining the aforesaid a
little more explicitly.
45. Section 162 of the CrPC reads thus:-
“ Section 162. Statements to police not to be signed
: Use of statements in evidence.─ ( 1) No statement
made by any person to a police officer in the course of an
investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to
writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any
such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police
40
diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or
record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter
provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence
under investigation at the time when such statement was
made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the
prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has
been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his
statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused,
and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution,
to contradict such witness in the manner provided by
section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act , 1872 (1 of 1872);
and when any part of such statement is so used, any part
thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such
witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter
referred to in his cross-examination.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any
statement falling within the provisions of clause (1) of
section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872);
or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.
Explanation.--An omission to state a fact or circumstance
in the statement referred to in sub-section (1) may amount
to contradiction if the same appears to be significant and
otherwise relevant having regard to the context in which
such omission occurs and whether any omission amounts
to a contradiction in the particular context shall be a
question of fact.”
46. Section 162 CrPC says that no statement made by any
person to a police officer in the course of an investigation,
whether it be recorded or not, shall be used for the purpose save
as provided in the first proviso to the Section. The first proviso
says that when any witness, whose statement has been reduced
into writing by the police in accordance with the provisions of
the CrPC, is called for the prosecution in inquiry or trial the
accused with the permission of the court may contradict the
41
witnesses in the manner provided by Section 145 of the
Evidence Act. It could be argued that, as the first part of Section
162 prohibits the use of the statement of a witness to a police
officer for any purpose, other than that subsequently provided
for in the proviso, and as the proviso says that the Court may
permit the accused to contradict the witness with his previous
statement, the Court has no power to do anything suo motu . In
our opinion, this would be a misreading of the Section. The first
part of Section 162 says that the statement made by a person to
a police officer during investigation cannot be used for any
purpose other than that mentioned in the proviso. We lay stress
on the word “purpose”. The purpose mentioned in the proviso is
the purpose of contradicting the evidence given in favour of the
State by a prosecution witness in Court by the use of the
previous statement made by such witness to the police officer.
The purpose is to discredit the evidence given in favour of the
prosecution by a witness for the State. The Section prohibits the
use of the statement for any other purpose than this. It does not
say that the statement can only be used at the request of the
accused. The limitation or restriction imposed in the first part of
Section 162 CrPC relates to this purpose for which the
statement may be used; it does not relate to the procedure which
may be adopted to effect this purpose. The proviso which sets
42
out the limited purpose also mentions the way in which an
accused person may contradict the witness with his previous
statement made to the Police, but it does not in any way purport
to take away the power that lies in the Court to look into any
document, that it considers necessary to look into for the ends
of justice and to put such questions to a witness as it may
consider necessary to elicit the truth. We realise that the proviso
would prevent the Court from using statements made by a
person to a police officer in the course of investigation for any
other purpose than that mentioned in the proviso but it does not
in any other way affect the power that lies in the Court to look
into documents or put questions to witnesses . It seems
suo motu
to us to be absurd to suggest that a Judge cannot put a question
to a witness which a party may put. In this connection we would
refer to the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act, where
the necessity of clothing the Judge with very wide powers to put
questions to witnesses and to look into documents is recognised
and provided for. This is what Section 165 of the Evidence Act
says:—
“Section 165. Judge’s power to put questions or
order production. ─ The Judge may, in order to discover
or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any
question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any
witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or
irrelevant; and may order the production of any document
or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be
43
entitled to make any objection to any such question or
order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-
examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to
any such question: …”
47. There is in our opinion nothing in Section 162 of the CrPC
which prevents a Trial Judge from looking into the papers of the
chargesheet suo motu and himself using the statement of a
person examined by the police recorded therein for the purpose
of contradicting such person when he gives evidence in favour
of the State as a prosecution witness. The Judge may do this or
he may make over the recorded statement to the lawyer for the
accused so that he may use it for this purpose. We also wish to
emphasise that in many sessions cases when an advocate
appointed by the Court appears and particularly when a junior
advocate, who has not much experience of the procedure of the
Court, has been appointed to conduct the defence of an accused
person, it is the duty of the Presiding Judge to draw his attention
to the statutory provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act,
as explained in Tara Singh v. State reported in AIR 1951 SC
441 and no Court should allow a witness to be contradicted by
reference to the previous statement in writing or reduced to
writing unless the procedure set out in Section 145 of the
Evidence Act has been followed. It is possible that if the attention
of the witness is drawn to these portions with reference to which
44
it is proposed to contradict him, he may be able to give a
perfectly satisfactory explanation and in that event the portion
in the previous statement which would otherwise be
contradictory would no longer go to contradict or challenge the
testimony of the witness.
48. In our opinion, in a case of the present description where
the evidence given in a Court implicates persons who are not
mentioned in the first information report or police statements, it
is always advisable and far more important for the Trial Judge
to look into the police papers in order to ascertain whether the
persons implicated by witnesses, at the trial had been implicated
by them during the investigation.
49. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely on a
three-Judge Bench decision in the case of V.K. Mishra v. State
of Uttarakhand , (2015) 9 SCC 588, wherein this Court, after
due consideration of Section 161 of the CrPC and Section 145 of
the Evidence Act, observed as under:-
“16. Section 162 CrPC bars use of statement of witnesses
recorded by the police except for the limited purpose of
contradiction of such witnesses as indicated there. The
statement made by a witness before the police under
Section 161(1) CrPC can be used only for the purpose of
contradicting such witness on what he has stated at the
trial as laid down in the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC.
The statements under Section 161 CrPC recorded during
the investigation are not substantive pieces of evidence
but can be used primarily for the limited purpose: (i) of
45
contradicting such witness by an accused under Section
145 of the Evidence Act; (ii) the contradiction of such
witness also by the prosecution but with the leave of the
Court; and (iii) the re-examination of the witness if
necessary.
17. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to
police not proved and ask questions with reference to
them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the
witness in the court. The words in Section 162 CrPC “if
duly proved” clearly show that the record of the statement
of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence
straightaway nor can be looked into but they must be
duly proved for the purpose of contradiction by eliciting
admission from the witness during cross-examination
and also during the cross-examination of the investigating
officer. The statement before the investigating officer can
be used for contradiction but only after strict compliance
with Section 145 of the Evidence Act that is by drawing
attention to the parts intended for contradiction.
18. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
“145.Cross-examination as to previous statements in
writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to
previous statements made by him in writing or
reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in
question, without such writing being shown to him,
or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him
by the writing, his attention must, before the writing
can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are
to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.”
19. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended
to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced
into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to
those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of
contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While
recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of
the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement
with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought
to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The
attention of witness is drawn to that part and this must
reflect in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the
witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands
proved and there is no need to further proof of contradiction
46
and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he
denies having made that part of the statement, his attention
must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in
the deposition. By this process the contradiction is merely
brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter when
investigating officer is examined in the court, his attention
should be drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of
contradiction, it will then be proved in the deposition of the
investigating officer who again by referring to the police
statement will depose about the witness having made that
statement. The process again involves referring to the police
statement and culling out that part with which the maker of
the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness
was not confronted with that part of the statement with
which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court
cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved
in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act that is, by
drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
50. What is important to note in the aforesaid decision of this
Court is the principle of law that if the witness was not confronted
with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to
contradict him, then the Court cannot suo motu make use of
statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145
of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to prove
all major contradictions in the form of material omissions in
accordance with the procedure as established under Section 145
of the Evidence Act and bring them on record. It is the duty of the
defence counsel to do so.
51. This Court in Raghunandan v. State of U.P. reported in
(1974) 4 SCC 186, it was observed:-(SCC p. 191, para 16)
47
“16. We are inclined to accept the argument of the
appellant that the language of Section 162, Criminal
Procedure Code, though wide, is not explicit or specific
enough to extend the prohibition to the use of the wide
and special powers of the Court to question a witness,
expressly and explicitly given by Section 165 of the Indian
Evidence Act in order to secure the ends of justice.
….Therefore, we hold that Section 162, Criminal
Procedure Code, does not impair the special powers of the
Court under Section 165, Indian Evidence Act. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
52. This Court in Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of A.P .,
(1999) 7 SCC 69, it was held:-
“20. It must now be remembered that the said procedure
can be followed only when a witness is in the box. Barring
the above two modes, a statement recorded under Section
161 of the Code can only remain fastened up at all stages
of the trial in respect of that offence. In other words, if the
court has not put any question to the witness with
reference to his statement recorded under Section 161 of
the Code, it is impermissible for the court to use that
statement later even for drawing any adverse impression
regarding the evidence of that witness. What is
interdicted by Parliament in direct terms cannot be
obviated in any indirect manner.” (Emphasis supplied)
53. Sarkar (1999, 15th pp. 2319 etc.) says that a Judge is
entitled to take a proactive role in putting questions to ascertain
the truth and to fill up doubts, if any, arising out of inept
examination of witnesses. But, as stated by Lord Denning in
Jones v. National Coal Board , 1957 (2) All ER 155 (CA), the
Judge cannot “ drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the robe
of an advocate”.
48
54. Of course, the Judge should not be a passive spectator
but should take a proactive role as emphasized by Phipson
(Evidence, 1999, 15th Ed, para 1.21 as under:-
“When the form of the English trial assumed its modern
institutional form, the role of the judge was that of a
neutral umpire. This is still broadly the position in
criminal cases. In civil cases, the abandonment of jury
trial except in a few exceptional cases led to some dilution
of this principle. The wholesale changes in 1999 of the
rules governing civil procedure has emphasized the
interventionist role of the modern judge. Whereas formally
the tribunal was a ‘reactive judge (for centuries past at
the heart of the English Common Law -- concept of the
independent judiciary) instead we shall have a proactive
judge whose task will be to take charge of the action at
an early stage and manage its conduit.”
(Emphasis supplied)
55. This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ani @ Hanif and
Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 162, made very relevant and important
observations as under:-
“11. … Section 165 of the Evidence Act confers vast and
unrestricted powers on the trial court to put
“any question he pleases, in any form, at any time,
of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant
or irrelevant” in order to discover relevant facts. The said
section was framed by lavishly studding it with the word
“any” which could only have been inspired by the
legislative intent to confer unbridled power on the trial
court to use the power whenever he deems it necessary
to elicit truth. Even if any such question crosses into
irrelevancy the same would not transgress beyond the
contours of powers of the court. This is clear from the
words “relevant or irrelevant” in Section 165. Neither of
the parties has any right to raise objection to any such
question.
49
12. Reticence may be good in many circumstances, but a
Judge remaining mute during trial is not an ideal
situation. A taciturn Judge may be the model caricatured
in public mind. But there is nothing wrong in his becoming
active or dynamic during trial so that criminal justice
being the end could be achieved. Criminal trial should not
turn out to be a bout or combat between two rival sides
with the Judge performing the role only of a spectator or
even an umpire to pronounce finally who won the race. A
Judge is expected to actively participate in the trial, elicit
necessary materials from witnesses in the appropriate
context which he feels necessary for reaching the correct
conclusion. There is nothing which inhibits his power to
put questions to the witnesses, either during chief
examination or cross-examination or even during re-
examination to elicit truth. The corollary of it is that if a
Judge felt that a witness has committed an error or a slip
it is the duty of the Judge to ascertain whether it was so,
for, to err is human and the chances of erring may
accelerate under stress of nervousness during cross-
examination. Criminal justice is not to be founded on
erroneous answers spelled out by witnesses during
evidence-collecting process. It is a useful exercise for trial
Judge to remain active and alert so that errors can be
minimised.” (Emphasis supplied)
56. In the above context, it is apposite to quote the
observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Ram
Chander v. State of Haryana , (1981) 3 SCC 191:-
| “2. The adversary system of trial being what it is, there is | |
|---|---|
| an unfortunate tendency for a judge presiding over a trial | |
| to assume the role of a referee or an umpire and to allow | |
| the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution | |
| and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing | |
| from combative and competitive element entering the trial | |
| procedure. If a criminal court is to be an effective | |
| instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding judge must | |
| cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He | |
| must become a participant in the trial by evincing | |
| intelligent active interest by putting questions to | |
| witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. …” |
50
ROLE AND DUTY OF THE HIGH COURT IN CONFIRMATION
CASES
57. We regret to state that the High Court completely
overlooked the aforesaid aspects as discussed above. What was
expected of the High Court to do in such circumstances? If the
High Court would have taken little pains to look into the record,
then immediately it could have taken recourse to Section 367 of
the CrPC. We invite the attention of the High Court to the
provisions of Chapter XXVIII (Section 366 to Section 371) and
Chapter XXIX (Section 372 to Section 394). The provisions of
Section 366 to Section 368 and Sections 386 and Section 391
are quoted here for ready reference:-
“ Section 366. Sentence of death to be submitted by
Court of Session for confirmation.—( 1) When the
Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the
proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and the
sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by
the High Court.
(2) The Court passing the sentence shall commit the
convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.
Section 367. Power to direct further inquiry to be
made or additional evidence to be taken.— (1) If,
when such proceedings are submitted, the High Court
thinks that a further inquiry should be made into or
additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon
the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make
such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to be
made or taken by the Court of Session.
51
| (2) Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the presence | |
|---|---|
| of the convicted person may be dispensed with when | |
| such inquiry is made or such evidence is taken. | |
| (3) When the inquiry or evidence (if any) is not made or | |
| taken by the High Court, the result of such inquiry or | |
| evidence shall be certified to such Court. | |
| Section 368. Power of High Court to confirm | |
| sentence or annual conviction.—In any case | |
| submitted under Section 366, the High Court— | |
| (a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence | |
| warranted by law, or | |
| (b) may annul the conviction, and convict the accused of | |
| any offence of which the Court of Session might have | |
| convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or an | |
| amended charge, or | |
| (c) may acquit the accused person: | |
| Provided that no order of confirmation shall be made | |
| under this section until the period allowed for preferring | |
| an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented | |
| within such period, until such appeal is disposed of. | |
| x x x x | |
| Section 386. Powers of the appellate court.—After | |
| perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his | |
| pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he | |
| appears, and in case of an appeal under Section 377 or | |
| Section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate | |
| Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground | |
| for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may— | |
| (a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such | |
| order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the | |
| accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may | |
| be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according | |
| to law; | |
| (b) in an appeal from a conviction— | |
| (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or | |
| discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a |
52
| court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such | |
|---|---|
| Appellate Court or committed for trial, or | |
| (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or | |
| (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature | |
| or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, | |
| but not so as to enhance the same; | |
| (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence— | |
| (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or | |
| discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a | |
| court competent to try the offence, or | |
| (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or | |
| (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature | |
| or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, | |
| so as to enhance or reduce the same; | |
| (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such | |
| order; | |
| (e) make any amendment or any consequential or | |
| incidental order that may be just or proper: | |
| Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless | |
| the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause | |
| against such enhancement: | |
| Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict | |
| greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the | |
| accused has committed, than might have been inflicted | |
| for that offence by the court passing the order or sentence | |
| under appeal. | |
| x x x x | |
| Section 391. Appellate Court may take further | |
| evidence or direct it to be taken.—(1) In dealing with | |
| any appeal under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it | |
| thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record | |
| its reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or | |
| direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or when the | |
| Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or | |
| a Magistrate. | |
| (2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of | |
| Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such | |
| evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall | |
| thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal. |
53
(3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be
present when the additional evidence is taken.
(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be
subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an
inquiry.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. According to Section 366 when a Court of Session passes
a sentence of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the
High Court and the sentence of death is not to be executed unless
it is confirmed by the High Court. Section 367 then proceeds to
lay down the power of the High Court to direct further enquiry to
be made or additional evidence to be taken. Section 368,
thereafter, lays down the power of the High Court to confirm the
sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers
which the High Court can exercise is one under Section 368(c) of
the CrPC and that is to “acquit the accused person”. Pertinently,
the power to acquit the person can be exercised by the High Court
even without there being any substantive appeal on the part of
the accused challenging his conviction. To that extent, the
proceedings under Chapter XXVIII which deal with “submission
of death sentences for confirmation” is a proceeding in
continuation of the trial. These provisions thus entitle the High
Court to direct further enquiry or to take additional evidence and
the High Court may, in a given case, even acquit the accused
person. The scope of the chapter is wider. Chapter XXIX of the
54
CrPC deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 also entitles the appellate
court to take further evidence or direct such further evidence to
be taken. Section 386 then enumerates powers of the appellate
court which inter alia includes the power to “reverse the finding
and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him
to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to
such appellate court or committed for trial”. The powers of the
appellate court are equally wide. The High Court in the present
case was exercising powers both under Chapters XXVIII and XXIX
of the CrPC.
59. Ordinarily, in a criminal appeal against conviction, the
appellate court, under Section 384 of the CrPC, can dismiss the
appeal, if the Court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient
ground for interference, after examining all the grounds urged
before it for challenging the correctness of the decision given by
the Trial Court. It is not necessary for the appellate court to
examine the entire record for the purpose of arriving at an
independent decision of its own whether the conviction of the
appellant is fully justified. The position is, however, different
where the appeal is by an accused who is sentenced to death, so
that the High Court dealing with the appeal has before it,
simultaneously with the appeal, a reference for confirmation of
the capital sentence under Section 366 of the CrPC. On a
55
reference for confirmation of sentence of death, the High Court is
required to proceed in accordance with Sections 367 and 368
respectively of the CrPC and the provisions of these Sections
make it clear that the duty of the High Court, in dealing with the
reference, is not only to see whether the order passed by the
Sessions Judge is correct, but to examine the case for itself and
even direct a further enquiry or the taking of additional evidence
if the Court considers it desirable in order to ascertain the guilt
or the innocence of the convicted person. It is true that, under
the proviso to Section 368, no order of confirmation is to be made
until the period allowed for preferring the appeal has expired, or,
if an appeal is presented within such period, until such appeal is
disposed of, so that, if an appeal is filed by a condemned prisoner,
that appeal has to be disposed of before any order is made in the
reference confirming the sentence of death. In disposing of such
an appeal, however, it is necessary that the High Court should
keep in view its duty under Section 367 CrPC and, consequently,
the Court must examine the appeal record for itself, arrive at a
view whether a further enquiry or taking of additional evidence is
desirable or not, and then come to its own conclusion on the
entire material on record whether conviction of the condemned
prisoner is justified and the sentence of death should be
confirmed. [See: Bhupendra Singh (supra)]
56
60. In Jumman (supra), this Court explained the aforestated
position in the following words:-
| “10. … but there is a difference when a reference is made | ||
|---|---|---|
| under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code | ||
| (Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), | ||
| and when disposing of an appeal under Section 423 of | ||
| the Criminal Procedure Code (Section 386 of the Code of | ||
| Criminal Procedure, 1973) and that is that the High Court | ||
| has to satisfy itself as to whether a case beyond | ||
| reasonable doubt has been made out against the accused | ||
| persons for the infliction of the penalty of death. In fact | ||
| the proceedings before the High Court are a reappraisal | ||
| and the reassessment of the entire facts and law in order | ||
| that the High Court should be satisfied on the materials | ||
| about the guilt or innocence of the accused persons. Such | ||
| being the case, it is the duty of the High Court to consider | ||
| the proceedings in all their aspects and come to an | ||
| independent conclusion on the materials, apart from the | ||
| view expressed by the Sessions Judge. In so doing, the | ||
| High Court will be assisted by the opinion expressed by | ||
| the Sessions Judge, but under the provisions of the law | ||
| above-mentioned it is for the High Court to come to an | ||
| independent conclusion of its own.” | ||
| 61. The same principle was recognised in Ram Shankar<br>Singh (supra):-<br>“12. … The High Court had also to consider what order<br>should be passed on the reference under Section 374, and<br>to decide on an appraisal of the evidence, whether the<br>order of conviction for the offences for which the accused<br>were convicted was justified and whether, having regard<br>to the circumstances, the sentence of death was the<br>appropriate sentence. …” |
62. In Masalti v. State of U.P ., (1964) 8 SCR 133, this Court
was dealing with an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution
and, in that appeal, on behalf of the persons who were under
57
| sentence of death, a point was sought to be urged which was | ||
|---|---|---|
| taken before the trial court and was rejected by it, but was not | ||
| repeated before the High Court. This Court held:- | ||
| “11. …it may, in a proper case, be permissible to the | ||
| appellants to ask this Court to consider that point in an | ||
| appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution; after all in | ||
| criminal proceedings of this character where sentences of | ||
| death are imposed on the appellants, it may not be | ||
| appropriate to refuse to consider relevant and material | ||
| pleas of fact and law only on the ground that they were | ||
| not urged before the High Court. If it is shown that the | ||
| pleas were actually urged before the High Court and had | ||
| not been considered by it, then, of course the party is | ||
| entitled as a matter of right to obtain a decision on those | ||
| pleas from this Court. But even otherwise no hard and | ||
| fast Rule can be laid down prohibiting such pleas being | ||
| raised in appeals under Article 136.” | ||
320, this Court was dealing with an appeal filed by a convict
sentenced to death. It was noted that the High Court had dealt
with the reference in a very casual and callous manner by merely
stating that the counsel for the appellant therein pleaded for
sympathetic consideration in commuting the death sentence into
sentence for life. This Court noticed that there was absolutely no
consideration of the relative merits and demerits of the conviction
and the sentence imposed in the reference under Section 366(1)
CrPC in the manner in which it was required to be considered.
This Court while remitting the matter back to the High Court
observed thus:-
58
“16. In a case for consideration for confirmation of death
sentence under Section 366(1) CrPC, the High Court is
bound to examine the reference with particular reference
to the provisions contained in Sections 367 to 371 CrPC.
Under Section 367 CrPC, when reference is submitted
before the High Court, the High Court, if satisfied that a
further enquiry should be made or additional evidence
should be taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or
innocence of the convict person, it can make such enquiry
or take such evidence itself or direct it to be made or taken
by the Court of Session. The ancillary powers as regards
the presence of the accused in such circumstances have
been provided under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section
367 CrPC. Under Section 368, while dealing with the
reference under Section 366, it inter alia provides for
confirmation of the sentence or pass any other sentence
warranted by law or may annul the conviction itself and
in its place convict the accused for any other offence of
which the Court of Session might have convicted the
accused or order a new trial on the same or an amended
charge. It may also acquit the accused person. Under
Section 370, when such reference is heard by a Bench of
Judges and if they are divided in their opinion, the case
should be decided in the manner provided under Section
392 as per which the case should be laid before another
Judge of that Court who should deliver his opinion and
the judgment or order should follow that opinion. Here
again, under the proviso to Section 392, it is stipulated
that if one of the Judges constituting the Bench or where
the appeal is laid before another Judge, either of them, if
so required, direct for rehearing of the appeal for a
decision to be rendered by a larger Bench of Judges.
17. When such a special and onerous responsibility has
been imposed on the High Court while dealing with a
reference under Section 366(1) CrPC, we are shocked to
note that in the order [Criminal Murder Reference No. 1 of
2007 under S. 366(1) CrPC, decided on 11-7-2007 (Raj)]
impugned herein, the Division Bench merely recorded to
the effect that the counsel for the appellant pleaded for
sympathy to commute the death sentence into one for life
for the offence falling under Section 302 IPC while praying
for maintaining the sentence imposed for the offence
under Sections 376/511 IPC and that there was no
59
opposition from the learned Public Prosecutor. The
Division Bench on that sole ground and by merely stating
that there was no use of force of severe nature on the
victim at the hands of the appellant and that the
commission of offence of murder cannot be held to be
brutal or inhuman and consequently the death sentence
was liable to be altered as one for life for the offence
under Section 302 IPC. The Division Bench of the High
Court did not bother to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it
under Section 366(1) CrPC read with Sections 368 to 370
and 392 CrPC in letter and spirit and thereby, in our
opinion, shirked its responsibility while deciding the
reference in the manner it ought to have been otherwise
decided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. We feel
that less said is better while commenting upon the
cursory manner in which the judgment came to be
pronounced by the Division Bench while dealing with the
reference under Section 366(1) while passing the
impugned judgment [Criminal Murder Reference No. 1 of
2007 under S. 366(1) CrPC, decided on 11-7-2007 (Raj)].
| as a deterrent for others from indulging in such crimes. | ” |
|---|
60
CONCEPT OF FAIR TRAIL
64. All fair trials are necessarily legally valid, but is the
reverse necessarily true? What then is the genesis of the
concept of a fair trial? The concept of a fair trial has a very
impressive ancestry, is rooted in history, enshrined in the
Constitution, sanctified by religious philosophy and juristic
doctrines and embodied in the statute intended to regulate the
course of a criminal trial. Its broad features and ingredients have,
in course of time, been concretised into well recognised
principles, even though there are grey areas, which call for
further legal thought and research.
65. Truth is the cherished principle and is the guiding
star of the Indian criminal justice system. For justice to be done
truth must prevail. Truth is the soul of justice. The sole
idea of criminal justice system is to see that justice is done.
Justice will be said to be done when no innocent person is
punished and the guilty person is not allowed to go scot free.
66. For the dispensation of criminal justice, India follows the
accusatorial or adversarial system of common law. In the
accusatorial or adversarial system the accused is presumed to be
innocent; prosecution and defence each put their case; judge acts
61
as an impartial umpire and while acting as a neutral umpire sees
whether the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt or not.
67. Free and fair trial is sine-qua-non of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. If the criminal trial is not free and fair, then
the confidence of the public in the judicial fairness of a judge and
the justice delivery system would be shaken. Denial to fair trial is
as much injustice to the accused as to the victim and the society.
No trial can be treated as a fair trial unless there is an impartial
judge conducting the trial, an honest, able and fair defence
counsel and equally honest, able and fair public prosecutor. A
fair trial necessarily includes fair and proper opportunity to the
prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused and opportunity to
the accused to prove his innocence.
68. The role of a judge in dispensation of justice after
ascertaining the true facts no doubt is very difficult one. In the
pious process of unravelling the truth so as to achieve the
ultimate goal of dispensing justice between the parties the judge
cannot keep himself unconcerned and oblivious to the various
happenings taking place during the progress of trial of any case.
No doubt he has to remain very vigilant, cautious, fair and
impartial, and not to give even a slightest of impression that he
62
is biased or prejudiced either due to his own personal convictions
or views in favour of one or the other party. This, however, would
not mean that the Judge will simply shut his own eyes and be a
mute spectator, acting like a robot or a recording machine to just
deliver what stands feeded by the parties.
69. Malimath Committee on Judicial Reforms discussed
the paramount duty of Courts to search for truth. The relevant
observations of the Committee are as under:-
(a) The Indian ethos accords the highest importance to truth.
The motto “Satyameva Jayate” (Truth alone succeeds) is
inscribed in our National Emblem “Ashoka Sthambha”. Our
epics extol the virtue of truth.
(b) For the common man truth and justice are synonymous.
So when truth fails, justice fails. Those who know that the
acquitted accused was in fact the offender, lose faith in the
system.
(c) In practice however we find that the Judge, in his anxiety
to demonstrate his neutrality opts to remain passive and truth
often becomes a casualty.
(d) Truth being the cherished ideal and ethos of India, pursuit
of truth should be the guiding star of the Justice System. For
justice to be done truth must prevail. It is truth that must
63
protect the innocent and it is truth that must be the basis to
punish the guilty. Truth is the very soul of justice. Therefore,
truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue.
(e) Many countries which have Inquisitorial model have
inscribed in their Parliamentary Acts a duty to find the truth
in the case. In Germany Section 139 of the so called ‘ Majna
Charta ’, a breach of the Judges' duty to actively discover truth
would promulgate a procedural error which may provide
grounds for an appeal.
(f) For Courts of justice there cannot be any better or higher
ideal than quest for truth.
70. This Court has condemned the passive role played by the
Judges and emphasized the importance and legal duty of a Judge
to take an active role in the proceedings in order to find the truth
to administer justice and to prevent the truth from becoming a
casualty. A Judge is also duty bound to act with impartiality and
before he gives an opinion or sits to decide the issues between the
parties, he should be sure that there is no bias against or for
either of the parties to the lis . For a judge to properly discharge
this duty the concept of independence of judiciary is in existence
and it includes ability and duty of a Judge to decide each case
64
according to an objective evaluation and application of the law,
without the influence of outside factors.
71. If the Courts are to impart justice in a free, fair and
effective manner, then the presiding judge cannot afford to
remain a mute spectator totally oblivious to the various
happenings taking place around him, more particularly,
concerning a particular case being tried by him. The fair trial is
possible only when the court takes active interest and elicit all
relevant information and material necessary so as to find out the
truth for achieving the ultimate goal of dispensing justice with all
fairness and impartiality to both the parties.
72. In Ram Chander (supra), while speaking about the
presiding judge in a criminal trial, Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed
that if a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in
dispensing justice, the presiding judge must cease to be a
spectator and a mere recording machine. He must become a
participant in the trial by evincing intelligent active interest by
putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. The
learned Judge reproduced a passage from Sessions Judge,
Nellore v. Intha Ramana Reddy , 1972 Cri.L.J. 1485, which
reads as follows:—
“Every criminal trial is a voyage of discovery in which
truth is the quest. It is the duty of a presiding Judge to
65
explore every avenue open to him in order to discover the
truth and to advance the cause of justice. For that
purpose he is expressly invested by Section 165 of the
Evidence Act with the right to put questions to witnesses.
Indeed the right given to a Judge is so wide that he may,
ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any
time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact,
relevant or irrelevant. Section 172(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure enables the court to send for
the police-diaries in a case and use them to aid it in the
trial. The record of the proceedings of the Committing
Magistrate may also be perused by the Sessions Judge to
further aid him in the trial.”
73. For all the foregoing reasons, we are left with no other
alternative but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for deciding
the reference under Section 366 of the CrPC in the manner it
ought to have been decided, more particularly keeping in mind
the serious lapses on the part of the defence in not proving major
contradictions in the form of material omissions surfacing from
the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
74. If anyone would ask us the question, “What is the ratio of
this Judgment?” The answer to the same would be very simple
and plain, in the words of Clarence Darrow;
“Justice has nothing to do with what goes on in the
courtroom; Justice is what comes out of a courtroom.”
75. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is
set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for
66
reconsideration of the Death Reference No. 4 of 2017 and
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 358 of 2017. The Death Reference No.
4 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 358 of 2017 stand
restored for reconsideration of the High Court in accordance with
law.
76. The appellant is in jail past more than nine years. In such
circumstances, the Death Reference referred to above on being
restored to the file of the High Court shall be taken up for hearing
expeditiously. The learned Chief Justice of the High Court is
requested to notify the Death Reference along with the Criminal
Appeal for hearing before a Bench which he may deem fit to
constitute. We also request the learned Judges who would be
hearing the matter to give priority and dispose of the same at the
earliest in accordance with law.
77. As the appellant convict is in jail past more than nine
years, his family might be in dire straits. He may not be in a
position to engage a lawyer of his choice. Probably, he may not be
in a position to even understand what is said in this judgment.
In such circumstances, the High Court may request a seasoned
criminal side lawyer to appear on behalf of the appellant and
assist the Court.
67
78. The Registry shall forward one copy each of this judgment
to all the High Courts with a further request to each of the High
Courts to circulate the same in its respective district judiciary.
79. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
……………………………………..J.
( B.R. GAVAI )
……………………………………..J.
( J.B. PARDIWALA )
….………………………..………..J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 4, 2023
68