Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 617 of 2000
PETITIONER:
RAMESH KUMAR
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/10/2001
BENCH:
DR. A.S. ANAND C.J. & R.C. LAHOTI & K.G. BALAKRISHNAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2001 Supp(4) SCR 247
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R.C. LAHOTI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against con-
viction of Ramesh Kumar, the accused-appellant, on charges under Sections
306 and 498-A IPC. He was sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment
under Section 306 IPC and to two years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section
498-A IPC, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. The
conviction along with sentences has been maintained by the High Court. His
father Shiv Kumar, mother Gargi Devi and brother Mahesh were also tried for
offences under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. The Trial Court found them "not
guilty" and "innocent" and hence acquitted the three of them of both the
charges. That acquittal has achieved a finality as not challenged by any
one.
Seema Devi, daughter of Sohan Lal Sharma (PW16) and Smt. Prabhawati Devi
(PW19) was married with accused-appellant on 23.6.1985. On 17.6.1986,
within one year of marriage, Seema died of suicide. On 16.6.1986, she
poured kerosene on herself and set herself to fire. Before committing
suicide she wrote a suicide note and a letter to her husband in a diary
(Article ’A’) on pages 11 and 12 thereof. Her dying-declaration (Exbt.
P/10) was recorded on 16.6.1986 by PW13, Parmeshwar Dayal, Tehsildar and
Executive Magistrate. Sohan Lal Sharma is a resident of Raipur, Madhya
Pradesh. The accused-appellant was residing in Shantinagar locality of
Raipur. Seema’s elder sister Shalini (PW5) married with Dr. Ramadhar Sharma
(PW6) is also residing in Raipur. Thus, the three families, i.e., the
family of father of Seema, the family of her elder sister Shalini. and the
family of the accused-appellant are all residents of Raipur though residing
in different localities at reasonable distances from each other.
Nevertheless the three families were on visiting terms as admitted by
almost all the witnesses. The finding of guilt as recorded by the Trial
Court and the High Court rests on the testimony of five witnesses, namely,
Atul Kumar (PW4), brother of the deceased, Shalini and Dr. Ramadhar Sharma
(PW5 and PW6), respectively the sister and sister’s husband of the
deceased, Sohan Lal Sharma and Prabhawati Devi (PW16 and PW19), parents of
the deceased. In addition, there is a very pertinent evidence - a document,
Exbt. P/13 which is an undated letter written by the deceased and managed
by her to be sent to her father. We will briefly discuss this evidence.
According to Sohan Lal (PW16) marriage of Seema with the accused-appellant
was performed in a cordial manner. Dowry, as the parents wished, was given
to Seema. Seema and Ramesh were quite often coming to meet with them.
However, Sohan Lal did make a general statement that at one point of time
when he had gone to see his daughter Seema in the house of the accused-
appellant, Seema had told him that the accused was complaining that the
items given in dowry were of inferior quality. However, this statement is
belied and cannot be accepted for two reasons. Firstly, such a material
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fact though in his knowledge was not disclosed by him to the police; on the
contrary his statement to the police was that Seema never told him of
anything about her in-laws’ house. Prabhawati Devi admits that the
behaviour of the accused-appellant towards her was good and he always
treated her with respect and reciprocal affection. She also admitted that
her husband, i.e., Sohan Lal. PW16 never complained about the behaviour of
the accused-appellant towards him. She very clearly stated that the
accused-appellant had never asked her anything about dowry. If only Seema’s
father would have been told by Seema that the accused-appellant had ever
demanded dowry from her or was harassing her for dowry then such fact in
ordinary course of things would have been told by him to his wife, i.e.,
the mother of Seema and would also have been disclosed by him to the
police.
Atul Kumar, PW4 is younger brother of late Seema. According to him, he was
told by his parents that the accused was teasing Seema. He visited Seema
and her in-laws about 15 to 20 times but Seema never told him anything.
However, according to Atul Kumar, ’her face was tense and terrorized and
she had asked me to go back’. Immediately we may observe that Atul Kumar’s
testimony suffers from exaggeration because both his parents, examined in
the Court, do not depose that the accused had started teasing Seema soon
after the marriage. If Atul Kumar had seen Seema tense and terrorized, he
must have told this fact in the ordinary course of things to his parents.
But the parents do not say so. During cross examination, Atul Kumar
admitted that between him and accused Ramesh there were ’good relations’.
He never asked Ramesh whether and why the accused was teasing or harassing
his sister. He could not give any explanation why such a natural query he
did not put across to Ramesh inspite of there being good relations between
the two. He further admitted that accused Ramesh and Seema often used to
visit him and his parents specially on the festival days. During less than
a year of marriage, Seema twice stayed with her parents for about four days
each. When Shalini gave birth to a child, Seema stayed at her parents house
for two days and afterwards also kept on coming to her parents and visiting
hospital where Shalini was admitted. Atul Kumar specifically stated -
"Seema had good terms with her in-laws and brothers-in-law". The testimony
of Atul Kumar spells out that Seema’s move-ments were not restricted by the
accused; she was liberally allowed to see her parents and other relations
and she never complained of any dowry demands or any serious problem being
faced by her from the accused or her in-laws. Atul Kumar felt that Seema
was ’tense and terrorised’ is his own impression and certainly no cause is
discernible for such an impression from his testimony.
A very material piece of evidence is an undated letter, Exbt. P/13 which
from the evidence adduced appears to have been written by the deceased
Seema at about 3 or 4 months before her death. Desh Bandhu Sathe (PW9) was
working as a Technical Officer in State Bank of India, Regional Office
while Sohan Lal was working in Branch Office of the same bank and therefore
they knew each other. Desh Bandhu Sathe (PW9) stated that at about 3 to 4
months before the death of Seema, his wife gave the letter, Exbt. P/13 to
him stating that the letter was given to her by Seema with a request to
have it delivered to her father. Although the authenticity of this letter
was vehemently disputed by the defence alleging it to be fabricated,
however, the Trial Court and the High Court have on an evaluation of
evidence believed the same. The finding that the letter was written by
deceased Seema is based on the testimony of handwriting expert. There is no
reason to disbelieve the statement of Desh Bandhu Sathe that the letter was
in existence about 3 to 4 months before Seema’s death. What is material are
the contents of the letter. The letter (English translation, as filed) is
reproduced as under :-
"Respected Babu Ji,
Sadar Parnam,
Babuji, I am writing this letter in very helplessness (constraint) and this
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should not be known to any one that I have written this letter. If my
Bangles (chudi) and Mangalsutra-payal etc. ornaments all have been repaired
or get them repaired in any way and you yourself come bringing them
immediately today or tomorrow by remembrance. Do not sent Atul and Sudhir
and no body should come to meet me. You understand this much only that
Seema is not existing. Yesterday Shalini had come then we people were not
in the house. Why I do not remember that thing, saying so I was pushed and
turned out from the house. I alone had come out to come to Brahmanpara. He
himself came behind me and we both had gone upto house. Then he conciliated
(persuaded) and bring me to home back and after coming in the house he
started marpit (beating) with me from 9 O’clock in the night which
continued till 21/2 O’clock in the night. Then he again started marpit
(beating) in the morning and his mind is still bad. You send the ornaments
immediately and now you yourself come and do not tell the thing of letter
and marpit. Tell Atul and Sudhir not to come at all. I will not come in
Holi. But you come to take me and take sofa and give another. Enough,
Seema."
The author of the abovesaid letter is not alive. There is no one else in
whose presence the letter was written. We cannot therefore read anything in
the letter which it is not there. The letter has to be read as it is and
inferences have to be drawn therefrom based on the expressions employed
therein and in the light of other evidence adduced in the case.
The letter nowhere indicates any demand of dowry having been made by the
accused or the deceased having been pressurized by the accused for bringing
more dowry. The first thing the letter states is a request to her father to
return some of her ornaments. Sohan Lal (PW16) has himself admitted that
his daughter had given some of her ornaments to him for the purpose of
being repaired. There is nothing wrong, unusual or abnormal in Seema
reminding her father to bring back the ornaments "if they have been
repaired" or "to get them repaired" if not already done. The second thing
which the letter suggests is of her having been beaten by her husband and
her having been pushed out of the house by the accused and when she wanted
to go away from the house then she having been persuaded by her husband to
return to house. The accused had also tried to conciliate. Further on
Seema’s return the accused gave her a beating. Why this happened is
slightly indicated in the letter and narrated by Shalini (PW5) and her
husband (PW6). Seema had invited her sister and sister’s husband for taking
food with them in her house but after extending invitation she forgot about
it and went out of the house with her husband. Her sister and sister’s
husband came to her house but there was no one and therefore they went
back. This enraged the accused and he chastised his wife Seema for her
forgetfulness which in his opinion was an act devoid of etiquettes and
courtesy - extending an invitation to relatives and then forgetting about
it and being not available to receive and entertain them. Yet another fact
disclosed by Shalini and Ramadhar is that Seema had told them that the
accused was suspicious of Seema having had undue intimacy with co-cds while
studying in college and her continuing undue intimacy with old-time
friends, which was not to the liking of the accused. These were the real
causes for difference between Seema and the accused. If appears that on
Seema having committed suicide there was an attempt to give it a twist of
dowry death and for that purpose some plea as to demand for dowry was
introduced. The finding as to demand for dowry by accused has been arrived
at by the Trial Court and the High Court by placing reliance on stray
general allegations occurring here or there in evidence and by ignoring
such facts as were brought on record through cross-examination of the
prosecution witnesses which demolished the theory of there being any demand
for dowry by the accused-appellant. The reading of the entire evidence
shows that the present one is a case of marital mal-adjustment between the
deceased and the accused. The accused is a Professor. The deceased did not
come up to the expectations of the accused. She was forgetful and the
manner in which she dealt with the visitors, guests and relations was not
to the liking of the accused-appellant. This is also borne out from a few
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writings such as Exbts. D/4 and D/5 which are in the form of essays written
by the deceased which are full of appreciation of the respondent
acknowledging the love and affection which the accused-appellant had for
her but which also go to state that there was ’some deficiency’ in her, she
did not have a compromising temperament and therefore accused used to get
annoyed and get angry on minor mistakes committed by the deceased. In such
writings, written at different times, she has recalled the sweet memories
of her marriage with the appellant, several ceremonies and functions
related with the marriage which made her feel joyous and how well she was
received by the accused-appellant and his relations in the matrimonial home
after the marriage.
From an independent evaluation of evidence and having gone through oral
evidence adduced and the several documents available on record, mostly the
writings of the deceased we are satisfied that the present one is not a
case of dowry death or the deceased having been instigated into committing
suicide for her failure to satisfy the dowry demands of the accused-
appellant. However, teasing by the accused-appellant of the deceased, ill-
treating her for her mis-takes which could have been pardonable and turning
her out of the house, also once beating her inside the house at the odd
hours of night did amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of
IPC and therefore we agree with the Trial Court as also with the High Court
though to some extent at variance with the cause for cruel treatment that
the accused-appellant subjected deceased Seema to cruelty and therefore
conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 498-A deserves to be
maintained.
So far as the offence under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, in our
opinion, the Trial Court and the High Court have committed gross error of
law in holding the accused-appellant guilty and therefore conviction under
Section 306 IPC deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Section 306 IPC provides that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets
the commission of such suicide, shall be liable to be punished. The
ingredients of abetment are set out in Section 107 of IPC which reads as
under:
"707. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who-First-
Instigate any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that
thing; or
Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of
that thing."
There is no direct evidence adduced of the accused-appellant having abetted
Seema into committing suicide. The prosecution has relied on Section 113-A
of Evidence Act which reads as under :-
113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.-When the
question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted
by her or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected
her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruetly" shall have the
same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.
This provision was introduced by Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983
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with effect from 26.12.1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty
of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to
commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was
usually available within the four-corners of the matrimonial home and hence
was not available to any one outside the occupants of the house. How-ever
still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to
operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the
presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare
reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicabilty of Section 113-
A, it must be shown that (i) woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide
has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected
her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid
circumstances, the Court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by
her husband or by such relatives of her husband. The Parliament has chosen
to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it
is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests.
Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three
circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being
drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the Court shall have to have
regard to ’all the other circumstances of the case’. A consideration of all
the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may
dictate the conscience of the Court to abstain from drawing the
presumption. The expression - ’The other circumstances of the case’ used in
Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause and effect relationship
between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a
presumption. Last but not the least the presumption is not an irrebuttable
one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in
defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may
destroy the presumption. The phrase ’May presume’ used in Section 113-A is
defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says-’whenever it is
provided by this Act that Court may presume a fact, it may either regard
such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof
of it.’
The present case is not one which may fall under clauses, secondly and
thirdly of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code. The case has to be decided by
reference to the first clause, i.e., whether the accused-appellant abetted
the suicide by instigating her to do so.
It is beyond doubt that Seema did commit a suicide. Undisputedly, such
suicide has been committed within a year of the date of marriage. What
happened on the date of occurrence is very material for the purpose of
recording a finding on the question of abetment. Enough material is
available on record by way oral and documentary evidence with which we
shall now deal with. What transpired on the date of the incident is known
only to two persons, namely, the deceased and the accused. The deceased’s
version of that day’s happening constituting the proximate cause provoking
her suicide is to be spelled out from what is contained in a diary (Article
A) in the handwriting of the deceased herself and in the dying-declaration
Exbt. P/10. The deceased wrote on page 11 of diary (Article A):
"1. Smt. Seema Dubey, ashamed of my own faults, am committing suicide.
Nobody is responsible and none should be harassed for it".
On page 12 she wrote a letter to her husband as under :-"Dear Raja,
With all love,
Raja this is my last love. You have made me free that I may do whatever I
wish and go where-ever I like. Raja, after coming in this house now I have
no other place to go leaving you. You know, you have now made me free of
the words I had given that I would not
commit suicide. Now I would die peacefully..............Raja, this is my
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last word I do love you and you only, not anyone else.
Now I cannot write ’yours’ SEEMA"
Both the writings as held by the Trial Court are in the hand of the
deceased.
The dying-declaration Exbt. P/10 recorded on 16.6.1986 at 3 p.m. by
Parmeshwar Dayal, Executive Magistrate, PW13 is in question-answer form and
reads as under :-
"Q. What is your name? What is the name of Husband? Marriage when done.
Ans. Seema Bai, Name of Husband - Ramesh Dubey. Marriage per-formed in
June, 85.
Q. What happened with you?
Ans. Today in the morning I poured kerosene on me and set fire.
Q. Why you set fire?
Ans. Today in the morning quarrel had occurred between me and my husband.
Q. Previously also quarrel had occurred at any time.
Ans. No. From being aggrieved by the quarrel of today. I set fire.
Q. What happened in to-day’s quarrel?
Ans. In the morning he told me that you are free. You go where ever you
want to go.
Q. Whether you want to say any thing more? Ans. No."
In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused appellant stated
that he did never ask any dowry nor harassed Seema. On the day of the
incident he was preparing to go to his duty but Seema was pressing him to
leave her at Shalini’s house in Samta colony. The accused had asked her to
go there alone. When he was getting ready to leave for his duty he heard a
cry of Seema from kitchen. He saw her burning. He ran to save her and in
doing so he burnt his hands, legs and chest.
Shashi Gupta, PW3 is a neighbour of the accused. On 16.6.1986 at about 8.30
a.m. she was outside her house to purchase vegetables. She saw smoke coming
out from the house of the accused and soon she heard a cry from inside the
house. She thought that the house of the accused was on fire. She called
her father and younger brother who pushed the door open. They entered the
house. What was seen is pertinent. Seema Devi was standing and the accused
was putting a bed-sheet around her body. The accused wrapped up Seema with
the bedsheet. Seema was naked and her body was burnt. Shashi Gupta asked
her elder brother to bring the jeep and call the driver. Driver of a
neighbour brought the jeep. Accused Ramesh and two other persons took Seema
to hospital in the jeep.
The picture which emerges from a cumulative reading and assessment of the
material available is this. Presumably because of disinclination on the
part of the accused to drop the deceased at her sister’s residence the
deceased felt disappointed, frustrated and depressed. She was overtaken by
a feeling of shortcomings which she attributed to herself. She was overcome
by a forceful feeling generating within her that in the assessment of her
husband she did not deserve to be his life-partner. The accused Ramesh may
or must have told the deceased that she was free to go anywhere she liked.
May be that was in a fit of anger as contrary to his wish and immediate
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convenience the deceased was emphatic on being dropped at her sister’s
residence to see her. Presumably the accused may have said some such thing-
you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like. The deceased
being a pious Hindu wife felt that having being given in marriage by her
parents to her husband, she had no other place to go excepting the house of
her husband and if the husband had "freed" her she thought impulsively that
the only thing which she could do was to kill herself, die peacefully and
thus free herself according to her understanding of the husband’s wish. Can
this be called an abetment of suicide? Unfortunately, the Trial Court mis-
spelt out the meaning of the expression attributed by the deceased to her
husband as suggesting that the accused had made her free to commit suicide.
Making the deceased free - to go wherever she liked and to do whatever she
wished, does not and cannot mean even by stretching that the accused had
made the deceased free "to commit suicide" as held by the Trial Court and
upheld by the High Court.
Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do
"an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not
necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes
instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be
capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused
had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created
such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except
to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A
word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the
consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.
In State of West Bangal v. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr., [ 1994] 1 SCC 73, this
Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing
the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the
trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the
victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicde. If it
transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive
to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance,
discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly
circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the
conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that
the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found
guilty.
Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute different
offences. Though depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual
case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under Section
498-A and may also, if a course of conduct amounting to cruelty is
established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide,
amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused
has been held liable to be punished under Section 498-A IPC it does not
follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held
guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned.
Evidential value of the two writings contained in diary Article A is that
of dying declarations. On the principle underlying admissibility of dying
declaration in evidence that truth sits on the lips of a dying person and
the Court can convict an accused on the basis of such declaration where it
inspires full confidence, there is no reason why the same principle should
not be applied when such a dying declaration speaking of the cause of death
exonerates the accused unless there is material available to form an
opinion that the deceased while making such statement was trying to conceal
the truth either having been persuaded to do so or because of sentiments
for her husband. The writing on page 11 of diary (Article A) clearly states
that the cause for committing suicide was her own feeling ashamed of her
own faults. She categorically declares - none to be held responsible or
harassed for her committing suicide. The writing on page 12 of diary
(Article A) clearly suggests that some time earlier also she had expressed
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her wish to commit suicide to her husband and the husband had taken a
promise from her that she would not do so. On the date of the incident, the
husband probably told the deceased that she was free to go wherever she
wished and wanted to go and this revived the earlier impulse of the
deceased for committing suicide. The dying declaration Exbt. P/10
corroborates the inference flowing from the two writings contained in the
diary and as stated hereinabove. The conduct of the accused trying to put
off the fire and taking his wife to hospital also improbabilises the theory
of his having abetted suicide.
In our opinion there is no evidence and material available on record
wherefrom an inference of the acucsed-appellant having abetted the
commission of suicide by Seema may necessarily be drawn. The totality of
the circum-stances discussed hereinabove, especially the dying-declaration
and the suicide notes left by the deceased herself, which fall for
consideration within the expression "all the other circumstances of the
case" employed in Section 113-A of Evidence Act, do not permit the
presumption thereunder being raised against the accused. The accused-
appellant, therefore, deserves to be acquitted of the charge under Section
306 IPC.
The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the accused-appellant under
Section 306 IPC and sentence passed thereon are set aside. His convic-tion
under Section 498-A IPC and sentence passed thereon are maintained.