Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2024 INSC 428
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2024
Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) NO(S). 12842 OF 2018
MUKATLAL .…APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
KAILASH CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS.
AND ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal by special leave challenges the final
nd
judgment and order dated 2 November, 2017 passed by learned
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Special Appeal
(Writ) No. 1029 of 2006 whereby the appeal preferred by the
appellant questioning the legality and validity of the judgment
st
dated 21 July, 2006 passed by learned Single Judge of the
Digitally signed by
Deepak Singh
Date: 2024.05.16
12:43:12 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
1
Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1587 of 1993
was dismissed.
3. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to
by their rank in the Revenue Court.
4. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter
in the proper perspective, it would be beneficial to reproduce the
genealogical table/pedigree of the families of the parties.
Kishan Lal
Madho Lal (Died
Issueless in 1929)
Mangilal (Died 1912)
Widow-
Nandkanwarbai
Kanwarlal
(Died 1954)
(Died 1972)
Mukat Lal
Kailash Chand
(Appellant)
(on the basis of
(adopted by
Nandkanwarbai on
12.06.1959 after the
will dated
09.02.1949)
death of Madho Lal)
2
Chronological List of Events: -
| Dates | Event |
|---|---|
| After the death of Kishan Lal, Hindu Undivided Family(HUF) property<br>devolved among his two sons, Mangilal and Madho Lal. | |
| 1912 | Mangilal passed away. (Survived by his son, Kanwarlal) |
| 1929 | Madho Lal passed away (Issueless, survived by his widow- Smt.<br>Nandkanwarbai) |
| 09.02.1949 | Kanwarlal executed a will in favour of his son, Mukat Lal<br>(appellant herein). |
| 1954 | Kanwarlal Passed Away. |
| First Set of Legal Proceedings | |
| 1958 | Smt. Nandkanwarbai filed Civil Suit No. 11of 1958 for<br>declaration of title and possession in respect of the suit<br>property. |
| 21.05 .1959 | Civil Suit No. 11 of 1958 was dismissed however the Civil Judge<br>held that Smt. Nandkanwarbai had the right to be maintained<br>out of the suit property. |
| 12.06.1959 | Smt. Nandkanwarbai adopted Kailash Chand(original<br>respondent herein). |
| 12.07.1966 | Mukat Lal preferred Appeal No. 64 of 1966 against order dated<br>21.05.1959 passed in Civil Suit No. 11 of 1958. |
| 09.02.1968 | Civil Judge allowed Appeal No. 64 of 1966 and set aside the<br>order to the extent that it gave Smt. Nandkanwarbai the right<br>to be maintained out of the suit property.<br>Aggrieved, Smt. Nandkanwarbai preferred SB Civil Second<br>Appeal No. 347 of 1968 |
| 19 72 | Smt. Nandkanwarbai passed away. Kailash Chand was<br>substituted as legal representative of deceased Smt.<br>Nandkanwarbai in 1973. |
3
| 20.03 .1973 | High Court allowed SB Civil Second Appeal No. 347 of 1968<br>and held that Smt. Nandkanwarbai was entitled to the right of<br>maintenance out of the suit property, she being the widow of<br>the deceased coparcener in joint Hindu family property. |
|---|---|
| Present Proceedings | |
| 20.06 .1979 | Revenue Suit No. 37 of 1979 under section 53 of Rajasthan<br>Tenancy Act, 1956 was filed by Kailash Chand, for partition of<br>the suit property, in the capacity of the legal heir of his adopted<br>mother Smt. Nandkanwarbai. |
| 14.12 .1983 | Revenue Suit No. 37 of 1979 was allowed and decreed by Sub<br>Divisional Officer, Bundi wherein it was held that Kailash<br>Chand being the sole legal heir of Smt. Nandkanwarbai has<br>coparcenary rights over the lands belonging to Madho Lal. |
| 1984 | Mukat Lal preferred Appeal No. 12 of 1984 challenging order<br>dated 14.12.1983 before Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota. |
| 31.01 .1986 | Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota allowed Appeal No. 12 of<br>1984 and decree passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Bundi<br>dated 14.12.1983 was set aside. |
| 1986 | Kailash Chand preferred Second Appeal being S.A. 120 of 1986<br>before Board of Revenue, Ajmer. |
| 12.03 .1992 | Board of Revenue, Ajmer dismissed S.A. 120 of 1986 |
| 19 93 | Kailash Chand filed a Writ Petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition<br>No. 1587 of 1993 before High Court challenging the order<br>passed by Board of Revenue, Ajmer dated 12.03.1992. |
| 21.07 .2006 | Ld. Single Judge allowed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1587 of<br>1993 and set aside the judgments passed by Revenue Appellate<br>Authority, Kota and Board of Revenue, Ajmer. |
| 20 06 | Mukat Lal filed a Writ Appeal being DB Special Appeal (Writ)<br>No. 1029 of 2006 before the Division Bench. |
| 02.11.2017 | Ld. Division Bench dismissed DB Special Appeal (Writ) No.<br>1029 of 2006 and upheld the order of the Ld. Single Judge<br>dated 21.07.2006. |
4
| 06.02.2018 | Present SLP was filed. |
|---|
5. The core question of law involved in this appeal is as to the
right of the plaintiff Kailash Chand being legal heir of Hindu widow
Smt. Nandkanwarbai to enforce her right of succession in the
unpartitioned Joint Hindu Family property by virtue of Section
14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter being referred
to as ‘Succession Act’) by filing a suit in the Revenue Court.
6. Few facts, most germane and relevant to the issue are
required to be extracted from the chronology of dates and events.
The suit property was owned by Kishan Lal who had two sons,
namely, Mangilal and Madho Lal. Madho Lal was married to Smt.
Nandkanwarbai. Mangilal had a son Kanwarlal. Mangilal died in
the year 1912 whereas Madho Lal died issueless in 1929. Smt.
Nandkanwarbai claims to have adopted plaintiff Kailash Chand on
th
12 June, 1959 that is nearly after 30 years from the date of death
of Madho Lal. Kanwarlal had executed a will of the entire
unpartitioned estate in favour of defendant Mukat Lal(appellant
th
herein) on 9 February, 1949. Shri Kanwarlal passed away in the
year 1954. Thus, the suit property devolved upon defendant Mukat
Lal under the will executed by late Shri Kanwarlal.
5
7. Smt. Nandkanwarbai, widow of late Madho Lal filed a Civil
Suit No. 11 of 1958 seeking a declaration of title and possession
over the suit property contending that the property in question was
a joint Hindu family property and that the will allegedly executed
by late Kanwarlal was illegal. It was further contended in the suit
that defendant Mukat Lal was not entitled to any share in the HUF
property by virtue of the will. The Civil Court dismissed the said
st
suit vide judgment and decree dated 21 May, 1959 while
recognizing the right of Smt. Nandkanwarbai only to the extent of
receiving maintenance from the suit property.
8. Smt. Nandkanwarbai, did not challenge the said judgment
any further. However, defendant Mukat Lal on attaining majority,
st
preferred an appeal against the judgment dated 21 May, 1959
which was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge vide judgment
th
dated 9 February, 1968 and the judgment and decree passed by
the civil Court in favour of Smt. Nandkanwarbai to the extent of
the right to receive maintenance from the suit property was set
aside.
9. Being aggrieved, Smt. Nandkanwarbai preferred a Second
Appeal No. 347 of 1968 before the learned Single Judge of
Rajasthan High Court. During the pendency of the said second
6
appeal, in the year 1972 Smt. Nandkanwarbai passed away and
her legal heir i.e. plaintiff Kailash Chand was taken on record.
Learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court, vide judgment
th
dated 20 March, 1973 allowed the second appeal filed by Smt.
Nandkanwarbai and restored the civil Court’s judgment to the
extent of her right to be maintained from the suit property.
Resultantly, the status of defendant Mukat Lal as being the
beneficiary of the suit lands as being the legatee of the will made
by his father Shri Kanwarlal stood crystallized.
10. The plaintiff Kailash Chand filed Revenue Suit No. 37 of 1979
for partition of the suit property before the Revenue Court claiming
that Smt. Nandkanwarbai was entitled to a rightful share in the
property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Succession Act.
11. The present appeal arises from the aforesaid Revenue Suit
No. 37 of 1979 seeking partition which culminated in the
nd
impugned judgment dated 2 November, 2017 passed by the
learned Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.
12. It may be reiterated that the issue regarding title and
possession over the suit property stands concluded against Smt.
Nandkanwarbai(deceased widow) vide judgment and decree dated
st
21 May, 1959 passed in Civil Suit No. 11 of 1958. The said Civil
7
Suit was dismissed by the competent Court qua the relief of
possession and title while recognizing the right to Smt.
Nandkanwarbai only to the extent of receiving maintenance from
the estate. Admittedly, Smt. Nandkanwarbai did not challenge the
st
judgment and decree dated 21 May, 1959 and thus, it attained
finality to the extent of possession and title. Apropos, there is no
dispute qua the fact that Smt. Nandkanwarbai was never in
possession of the suit property.
13. Shri Puneet Jain, learned counsel representing the appellant
advanced the following pertinent submissions and urged that the
Division Bench erred in law in dismissing the appeal preferred by
the appellant affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge
and restoring the judgment and decree of the Revenue Court.
(i) That Smt. Nandkanwarbai had no interest, either
limited or otherwise, in the suit land which could fructify into
absolute ownership under section 14(1) of the Succession Act
and the Division Bench erred in treating “Charge over property
towards Maintenance” as possession over the property.
(ii) It was contended that in order to attract Section 14(1)
of the Succession Act, there must be a “Property possessed by
the Hindu Women” but in the present case, the suit for
8
possession and title filed by Smt. Nandkanwarbai was
dismissed and hence she was never in possession, either legal
or actual, over the suit property.
iii) That the civil suit for title and possession filed by Smt.
Nandkanwarbai having been dismissed, the judgment of the
civil Court operated as res judicata and hence the relief could
not have been granted to her adopted son[Kailash
Chand(plaintiff)] in the subsequent partition suit filed in the
Revenue Court.
iv) While placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
Ram Vishal(dead) by LRs. And Others v. Jagannath and
1
Another , it was contended that since Smt. Nandkanwarbai
was never in possession of the suit property which were
agricultural lands’ either by inheritance or in lieu of
maintenance, as a consequence, Section 14(1) of the
Succession Act could not be applied so as to confer proprietary
rights upon her adopted son[Kailash Chand(plaintiff)].
v) Learned counsel, Shri Jain further contended that reliance
placed by the learned Single Judge on the decision of Vasant
2
and Anr. v. Dattu & Ors. , is - erroneous as the said
ex facie
1
(2004) 9 SCC 302
2
(1987) 1 SCC 160
9
judgment deals with issues related to properties held by the
joint Hindu family having several surviving coparceners and
not that of a sole surviving coparcener.
He thus, implored the Court to accept the appeal and set aside
the impugned judgments.
14. E-converso , Shri Bishwajit Bhattacharya, learned senior
advocate representing the respondents, vehemently and fervently
opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
appellant and contended that the issue in the present case
regarding the ambit of the rights of a female Hindu on the
undivided joint Hindu family estate under Section 14(1) of the
Succession Act has been settled by this Court in the case of Munni
Devi alias Nathi Devi(Dead) Thr LRs & Ors. v. Rajendra alias
3
Lallu Lal(Dead) Thr LRs & Ors. He placed reliance on the
pertinent observations(reproduced infra ) made by this Court in
Munni Devi (supra) and implored the Court to dismiss the appeal
and affirm the impugned judgments.
15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the
impugned judgment and the material available on record.
3
2022 SCC OnLine SC 643
10
16. The plank contention of Shri Puneet Jain, learned counsel
representing the appellant for assailing the impugned judgments
was that the deceased widow Smt. Nandkanwarbai was never in
possession of the suit property and as a consequence, her adopted
son, plaintiff Kailash Chand, was precluded from claiming
partition of the suit property by virtue of succession and hence,
the Revenue suit was not maintainable. He had placed reliance on
the findings arrived at by the civil Court in the suit filed by Smt.
Nandkanwarbai to buttress this contention.
17. At the outset, it may be noted that in so far as the aspect that
Smt. Nandkanwarbai(deceased widow) had never been in
possession of the suit property is concerned, the same is virtually
an admitted position from the record because she never challenged
st
the judgment and decree dated 21 May, 1959 whereby the suit
filed by her for declaration of title and possession was dismissed
by the civil Court and she was held only entitled to receive
maintenance from the undivided estate. Thus, indisputably
neither Smt. Nadkanwarbai nor the plaintiff Kailash Chand were
ever in possession of the suit land.
18. In the case of Munni Devi which was heavily relied
(supra)
upon by the learned counsel for the respondent Shri Bhattacharya,
11
the admitted position was that Bhonri Devi, widow of Late
Dhannalalji was actually residing in the suit property during the
time the coparcener Shri Harinarayanji was alive and even after
his death, she continued to reside in the said house and used to
collect the rents from the tenants who were occupying the suit
property till the date of filing of suit.
19. A Bench of two Honourable Judges of this Court after
considering the gamut of Section 14 of the Succession Act in the
case of Munni Devi ( supra ) observed as below: -
“ 14. In view of the above, there remains no shadow of doubt
that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance was not and is not
an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a
matter of grace and generosity. It is a tangible right against the
property, which flows from the spiritual relationship between
the husband and the wife. The said right was recognised and
enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law, which existed even before
the passing of the 1937 or the 1946 Acts. Those Acts merely
gave statutory backing recognising the position as was existing
under the Shastric Hindu Law. Where a Hindu widow is in
possession of the property of her husband or of the husband's
HUF, she has a right to be maintained out of the said property.
She is entitled to retain the possession of that property in lieu
of her right to maintenance. Section 14(1) and the Explanation
thereto envisages liberal construction in favour of the females,
with the object of advancing and promoting the socio-economic
ends sought to be achieved by the said legislation. As explained
in V. Tulasamma (supra) case, the words “possessed by”
used in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude
and include the state of owning a property, even though the
Hindu woman is not in actual or physical possession of the
same. Of course, it is equally well settled that the
possession of the widow, must be under some vestige of a
claim, right or title, because the section does not
contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without
any right or title .
12
15. The undisputed facts in the instant case are that
Dhannalalji, the husband of Bhonri Devi expired in 1936,
Ganeshnarayanji, the father-in-law of Bhonri Devi expired in
1938 and Harinarayanji, the brother of Ganeshnarayanji died
on 11.11.1953. Daulalji was adopted by Sri Bakshji in the year
1916. Harinarayanji, Ganeshnarayanji and Sri Bakshji had
common ancestor Gopalji. It is also not disputed that the suit
property was an ancestral property in the hands of
Harinarayanji and Ganeshnarayanji. It is also not disputed
that Bhonri Devi was staying in the suit property before the
death of Harinarayanji, and after his death she was in
possession and in charge of the said property, and was
maintaining herself by collecting rent from the tenants who
were occupying part of the suit property.
16. Now it appears from the documents on record that the rent
notes (Exhibit A-2 to A-11) executed during the period 1955 to
1965 in respect of the part of the suit property, were executed
in the name of Bhonri Devi. The concerned defendants in the
suit had also filed their written statements, stating that they
were paying rent to Bhonri Devi only. It further appears from
the document (Exhibit A-13) that Daulalji had raised an
objection against Bhonri Devi paying the house tax in respect
of the suit property and that the Municipal Commissioner,
Jaipur vide order dated 28.03.1957 had observed that Bhonri
Devi was paying the tax in the past also. An appeal against the
said order was preferred by Daulalji before the Administrator of
Municipal Council, Jaipur however the same was also rejected
vide the order dated 28.01.1959. It was observed therein that
“In this case there is a dispute regarding ownership. Municipal
Commissioner who is the reversing authority in his judgment
dated 28.03.1957 held that Bhonri Devi who was paying tax to
the municipality in the past, should pay the tax and for
question of title the concerned party should seek remedy in the
Civil Courts.”
17. From the said documents it clearly emerges that Bhonri
Devi was paying the house tax prior to 1956 and was collecting
the rent from the tenants prior to and after 1956. Pertinently
from the document Exhibit-54, it emerges that in 1940 Bhonri
Devi, when she was staying with her in-laws, had no source of
maintenance, and therefore she was granted Rs. 2.50 per
month by way of maintenance, by the Punya Department of the
Government. She claiming to be a PARDANASHEEN lady had
authorised Daulalji to collect the said amount of maintenance.
The said document clearly shows that Bhonri Devi was residing
in the suit house since 1940. Be that as it may, it was well
established that Bhonri devi was in possession of the suit
house before and after the death of Harinarayanji in 1953
13
and had continued to remain in possession thereafter and
was collecting rent from the tenants who were in
occupation of part of the suit premises since 1955, till the
date of filing of the suit in 1965 by the plaintiff Daulalji.
18. The afore-stated facts and circumstances clearly
established that Bhonri devi had long settled possession of the
suit property, which she had acquired in lieu of her pre-existing
right to maintenance, prior to the commencement of the Act of
1956, which entitled her to become a full owner of the suit
property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act. Her exclusive
possession of suit property after the death of Harinarayanji in
1953 i.e., prior to coming into force of the said Act in 1956, was
not only not disputed but was admitted by the plaintiff Daulalji
in the plaint itself. Her pre-existing right to maintenance from
the estate of the HUF of her husband was also well established.
The submission of Mr. Jain for the appellants that mere right
to maintenance would not ipso facto create any charge on the
property and that for creating legal charge recognising right of
Hindu women to maintenance required execution of a
document, device or agreement, cannot be countenanced. Her
pre-existing right to maintenance, coupled with her settled
legal possession of the property, would be sufficient to
create a presumption that she had a vestige of right or
claim in the property, though no document was executed
or specific charge was created in her favour recognizing her
right to maintenance in the property.
19. It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji
in favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property.
What was stated in the Will was that whatever movable and
immovable property, which belonged to Harinarayanji would be
devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the Probate proceedings
filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had shown the
suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections
raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of
Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the
alleged Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi
was also not proved by her in the said proceedings.
Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to
maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and
in view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit
property prior to and after the commencement of the Act
of 1956, the only conclusion which could be drawn, would
be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu
of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had
held the suit property as the full owner and not limited
owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956.
14
20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a
tangible right against the property which flows from the
spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. Such
right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu
Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts.
Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled
legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would
create a presumption that such property was earmarked for
realization of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more
particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not
earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-
existing right of maintenance. The word “possessed by” and
“acquired” used in Section 14(1) are of the widest
amplitude and include the state of owning a property. It is
by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu
widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an
absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether
acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu
of her right to maintenance.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Thus it is clear from the above observations and findings in
the case of Munni Devi ( supra ) that this Court after taking into
consideration the pre-existing right of Bhonri Devi to maintenance
from the estate of the HUF of her husband and her exclusive
settled possession over the suit property concluded that she had
acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to
maintenance and that she had held the suit property as the full
owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the
Succession Act.
21. Thus, what we are required to adjudicate in the present case
is as to whether in absence of even a semblance of possession
either actual or legal over the suit property, plaintiff Kailash Chand
15
being the legal heir of Smt. Nandkanwarbai was entitled to
institute a Revenue suit for partition of the suit property based on
the succession rights of the widow on the joint Hindu family
property. In this very context, we would like to gainfully refer to
the judgments of this Court which were relied upon by Shri Puneet
Jain, learned counsel for the appellant.
22. In the case of Ram Vishal (supra) this Court held as under: -
“ 16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case [(1998)
6 SCC 314] can be of no assistance to the respondent. As has
been held by this Court, a pre-existing right is a sine qua
non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of
the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only
be possessed of the property but she must have acquired
the property. Such acquisition must be either by way of
inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of
maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or by her
own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription . In
the present matter, it is nobody's case that Manki had got
possession of the 1/4th share in lieu of maintenance or in
arrears of maintenance. It was also not their case that there
was a partition of the property and that in such partition, she
had been given the property. A mere right of maintenance
without actual acquisition in any manner is not sufficient to
attract Section 14.” (emphasis supplied)
23. Further, in the case of M. Sivadasan (Dead) through Lrs.
4
and Others v. A. Soudamini (Dead) through Lrs. and Others ,
this Court held as under: -
“4. This argument of the plaintiff was rejected by the Trial Court
and the same was upheld by the First Appellate Court as well
as by the Second Appellate Court on the reasoning that after
the death of Sami Vaidyar, his son Sukumaran succeeded in
the property in year 1942 itself. Thereafter, Sukumaran and
later the children succeeding Sukumaran had the right over the
4
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1078
16
property which undisputedly remained in their possession.
Section 14 sub-Section (1) had no application in this case. The
essential ingredient of Section 14 sub-Section (1) is
possession over the property. Admittedly the plaintiff was
never in possession of the property. The possession was
always that of the defendant and therefore Section 14 sub-
Section (1) would not be applicable. In Ram Vishal (dead) by
lrs. v. Jagan Nath. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 302 the position of
possession being a pre-requisite to sustain a claim under sub-
section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act was confirmed in Para
16 which is quoted below:
‘16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case
[(1998) 6 SCC 314] can be of no assistance to the
respondent. As has been held by this Court, a pre-
existing right is a sine qua non for conferment of
a full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only
be possessed of the property but she must have
acquired the property . Such acquisition must be
either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition
or “in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance”
or by gift or by her own skill or exertion, or by
purchase or by prescription…’
5. As per the law as it existed at their relevant time the property
which was an agricultural property would devolve upon the
male child and daughters would get only a limited right to
maintenance till, they were married and the widow would be
entitled to maintenance from the income from the property till
her death or remarriage. As per the family Settlement Deed
dated 12.03.1938 which was relied upon by both the parties,
the property in dispute was specifically allotted to Sami Vaidyar
and his only son Sukumaran. Therefore, the widow of Sami
Vaidyar i.e., Choyichi will not have any right over the property.
The findings of all the courts below were that Choyichi was
never in possession of the property and therefore she would not
get the right, as claimed by her under Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Seen in the light of the ratio of the above judgments, it is clear
that for establishing full ownership on the undivided joint family
estate under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act the Hindu female
17
must not only be possessed of the property but she must have
acquired the property and such acquisition must be either by way
of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of maintenance
or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or be her own skill or exertion,
or by purchase or by prescription.
25. Even on going through the pleadings in the Revenue suit for
partition filed by plaintiff Kailash Chand, it is clear that there is
not even a whisper in the plaint that Smt. Nandkanwarbai or the
plaintiff Kailash Chand himself were ever in possession of the suit
property. As a matter of fact, the suit was filed by pleading that the
suit property was a joint Hindu family property and defendant-
Mukat Lal(appellant herein) had consented to give half share of
the suit property to the plaintiff Kailash Chand on his demand.
This assertion was denied by defendant-Mukat Lal.
26. In this context, when we consider the effect of the earlier civil
suit instituted by Smt. Nadkanwarbai(deceased widow), it becomes
clear that she was never in possession of the suit property because
the civil suit was filed by her claiming the relief of title as well as
possession and the same was dismissed. This finding of the civil
Court was never challenged. Since, Smt. Nadkanwarbai was never
in possession of the suit property, as a necessary corollary the
18
Revenue suit for partition claiming absolute ownership under
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act could not be maintained
by her adopted son, plaintiff Kailash Chand by virtue of
inheritance.
27. On close scrutiny of the judgments rendered by the learned
Single Judge and the learned Division Bench of the High Court, we
find that there is no consideration in these judgments that the
predecessor of the plaintiff Kailash Chand or the plaintiff himself
were ever in possession of the suit property or had acquired the
same in the manner as indicated in the judgment of M.
Sivadasan (supra).
28. As a consequence of the above discussion, the impugned
judgments do not stand to scrutiny and cannot be sustained.
nd
29. Resultantly, the judgment dated 2 November, 2017
st
rendered by learned Division Bench and the judgment dated 21
July, 2006 rendered by the learned Single Judge are hereby
reversed and set aside.
30. Consequently, the Revenue Suit No. 37 of 1979 filed by the
plaintiff is dismissed.
31. The appeal is allowed in these terms. No costs.
19
32. Decree be prepared accordingly.
33. Pending application(s), if any, shall stands disposed of.
………………….……….J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
New Delhi;
May 16, 2024
20