Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1370
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8865 of 2025)
SAGAR … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UP & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8866 of 2025)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.11.29
17:35:13 IST
Reason:
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 1 of 17
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
Crl.A. No.........of 2025@ SLP (Crl) No. 8865 of 2025
2. The appellant-complainant is aggrieved by an order
granting bail in connection with Case Crime No. 0159 P.S.
th
Hastinapur, dated 28 June, 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149,
1
302, 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 , to one Rajveer by order
rd
dated 3 January 2025 in Cr. Misc. Bail Application No. 44876
of 2024 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
2
3. A perusal of the First Information Report reveals that the
genesis of the instant proceedings was a verbal spat between the
appellant-complainant and one Suresh Pal and his son Aditya,
who were his co-villagers. The former’s father, Sonveer, opposed
the escalation of the dispute, resulting in threats from the latter.
On the day of lodging of the FIR, while the appellant-
complainant and his parents were, for matters unrelated to the
accused, on their way to the land of one Ravindra, then allegedly,
the accused persons namely Suresh Pal, Rajveer, Saurav, Aditya,
1
Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
2
FIR for short
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 2 of 17
Prince, and Bijendra, armed with pistols came forward to block
their way and prevent them from proceeding further. The
respondent-accused Rajveer came forward and threatened them
to the effect that they would all, particularly Sonveer, be taught a
lesson for opposing them. Suresh Pal, then instigated the accused
Aditya to shoot Sonveer, which he did, and the bullet hit him on
the chest below the shoulder, making him fall to the ground and
meet his end.
4. Consequent to the FIR, accused Rajveer was arrested. The
record speaks about his applications for regular bail being
rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 7, Meerut
on at least two occasions. It is the second order of rejection dated
th
12 September 2024, which was challenged before the High
Court and resulted in the impugned order. The reasoning given
by the Additional Sessions Judge, in rejecting the bail
application, was the presence of ante mortem injuries resulting
in, more particularly, the gunshot wound and two lacerated
wounds. It was observed that the nature of the crime of which the
accused had been charged is serious and, in these circumstances,
bail had to be rejected.
5. The High Court, in terms of the impugned order, observed
thus:-
“4. It is argued by the learned counsel or the applicant
that co-accused Suresh Pal has been released on bail
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 3 of 17
by this Court vide its order dated 22.11.2024 passed
in Miscellaneous Bail Application No.36116 of 2024.
It is further argued that since the role of the applicant
is similar to that of the co-accused who has already
been released on bail, therefore, on the basis of parity,
the applicant is also entitled to get bail. The applicant
has no criminal history. He has been in jail since
29.06.2024. It is also argued that if he is released, he
will not misuse the bail.
5. Bail has been opposed on behalf of the plaintiff
and the State, though the factual aspect of similarity
of the applicant with the co-accused has not been
contested.
6. The principles enunciated by this Court in Nanha
Putra Nabha Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1993
Criminal Law Journal 938 and by the Supreme Court
in Paras Ram Bishnoi v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation MANU/SCOR/22410/2021 and
Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation & Ors., 2022 INSC 690, without
expressing any opinion on the facts and
circumstances and merits of the case, In the opinion
of the court, the applicant is entitledto get bail on the
basis of equality. The bail application of the applicant
is accepted on the basis of equality.”
{{{{{
6. The only two observations on the merit of the bail
application are that the respondent-accused has no criminal
antecedent(s) and that his father had been released on bail by the
nd
order of the High Court dated 22 November 2024 in Misc. Bail
Application No. 36116 of 2024. In essence, however, parity with
his father was the only ground to grant the respondent-accused
bail.
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 4 of 17
7. The reasons given by the High Court in releasing accused
Suresh Pal on bail was that the prosecution could not present any
circumstance suggestive of him fleeing from justice or creating
further trouble by repeating the offences that he has been accused
of. The learned Judge also took note of the ‘ strong alibi ’ of him
being a class-IV employee at BSA Office, Meerut along with
inability of the prosecution to explain the presence of lacerated
wounds.
8. The appellant-complainant aggrieved by such an order had
carried the matter in appeal before us, and by way of our order
rd
dated 03 March 2025 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1200 of
2025, we had set aside the order granting bail, observing thus:-
“6. As is evident from the impugned order, the High
Court has not assigned any reason, whatsoever, in
allowing the application, granting bail, save and
except observing that “there is no material particulars
or circumstances suggestive of the applicant fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice”. The
least that was expected of the High Court was to have
appreciated the facts and applied the settled principles
of law, more so in a case involving allegations of
murder, in granting bail.
7. As such, we quash and set aside the order dated
22.11.2024 in CRMBA No. 36116/2024 titled
“Suresh Pal Vs. State of U.P.” passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad and direct the
respondent No.2-Suresh Pal to surrender forthwith.”
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 5 of 17
9. It is also required to be noted that Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 26358 of 2025 filed by the third accused-Aditya
th
stands rejected by the High Court by order dated 07 August
2025.
10. The question that arises for consideration is whether, as
done by the High Court in the impugned order, parity with the
co-accused persons can be the sole reason for granting bail. Bail
has often been stated to be the rule, and jail, the exception. This
cannot be emphasized enough. At the same time, this, however,
does not mean that the relief of bail is to be granted without due
regard to the circumstances involved in the alleged offence for
which the accused person has been arrested. In this regard, it has
to be noted that a Court, while granting bail, has to consider a
number of aspects. Judgments too many to count, delivered by
this Court have delineated the relevant considerations to be kept
in mind. A recent reiteration thereof was in Ashok Dhankad v.
3
State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. The relevant extracts thereof are
as under :-
“ 19. The principles which emerge as a result of the
above discussion are as follows:
(i) An appeal against grant of bail cannot be
considered to be on the same footing as an
application for cancellation of bail;
3
2025 SCC Online SC 1690
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 6 of 17
(ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a
threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by
prosecution. The merits of such evidence must not
be adjudicated at the stage of bail;
(iii) An order granting bail must reflect application
of mind and assessment of the relevant factors for
grant of bail that have been elucidated by this
Court.
[See: Y v. State of Rajasthan (Supra)
; Jaibunisha v. Meherban and Bhagwan
Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu ]
(iv) An appeal against grant of bail may be
entertained by a superior Court on grounds such as
perversity; illegality; inconsistency with law;
relevant factors not been taken into consideration
including gravity of the offence and impact of the
crime;
(v) However, the Court may not take the conduct
of an accused subsequent to the grant bail into
consideration while considering an appeal against
the grant of such bail. Such grounds must be taken
in an application for cancellation of bail; and
(vi) An appeal against grant of bail must not be
allowed to be used as a retaliatory measure. Such
an appeal must be confined only to the grounds
discussed above.”
11. It is clear from the perusal of the above factors that the
High Court failed to consider all that was relevant. On parity, it
is necessary to refer to Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai
4
Hirabhai Makwana(Koli) and Anr. . This Court observed that
while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the same must focus
on the role of the accused and cannot be utilized solely because
4
(2021) 6 SCC 230
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 7 of 17
another accused person was granted bail in connection with the
same offence, and neither can this ground be claimed as a matter
of right. [ See also: Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director
5
Directorate of Enforcement ; Sabita Paul v. State of West
6
Bengal and Anr. ]
12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have erroneously
granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of
parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application
as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the
accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only
common factor between the accused persons. On this count alone
we can set aside the impugned judgment and order. However, we
propose not to do so and proceed to delve further.
13. In an attempt to clarify the position of law qua parity as a
ground, we may refer to certain judgments of the High Court to
appreciate whether there is convergence or divergence of
opinion/understanding.
13.1 The Allahabad High Court in Nanha v. State of
7
U.P. , observed as under :-
24. My answer to the points referred to us is that
parity cannot be the sole ground for granting bail
even at the stage of second or third or subsequent
5
2023 SCC Online SC1486
6
2024 SCC Online SC 374
7
1992 SCC OnLine All 871
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 8 of 17
bail applications when the bail applications of the
co-accused whose bail application had been
earlier rejected are allowed and co-accused is
released on bail. Even then the court has to satisfy
itself that, on consideration of more materials
placed, further developments in the
investigations or otherwise and other different
considerations, there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail. If an examination
of a given case, it transpires that the case of the
applicant before the court is identically similar to
the accused on facts and circumstances who has
been bailed out, then the desirability of
consistency will require that such an accused
should be also released on bail. As regards the
second part of the referred question my answer is
that it is not at all necessary for an accused to
state in his application that the application of a
co-accused had been rejected previously.
(emphasis supplied)
8
13.2 The Delhi High Court in Harbhajan Singh v. State ,
while holding that parity cannot be the sole ground for the
grant of bail, observed:
“ 15. ... In this regard, this Court thinks fit to
reiterate the settled principle that in a criminal
jurisprudence, every case stands on different
footings and no straightjacket formula can be
adopted in the facts of each case. No doubt, the
weight of judicial parity should be followed, but
on the other hand, this Court is of the conscious
opinion that the word ‘parity’ connotes a state
when a person is placed on the same footing as
of the other person. This court is also of the
opinion that that parity cannot be the sole
ground for granting bail in a case where the bail
8
2016 SCC OnLine Del 4920
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 9 of 17
applications of other co-accused whose bail
applications had been allowed and are released
on bail. It is purely a discretion of the court.
Before granting or refusing bail, the court must
satisfy itself after considering the material
placed on record and further developments in
the investigations or otherwise and other
peculiar circumstances of each case, which
show that there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail If on
examination of any case, it transpires that the
case of the applicant before the court is
identically similar to the accused on facts and
circumstances, who has been bailed out, then
the desirability of consistency will require that
such an accused should be also released on bail.
(emphasis supplied)
13.3 The Himachal Pradesh High Court in Abhay
9
Gupta v. State of H.P . held that:
“ It is more than settled that parity alone cannot
be the sole ground for granting of bail. It is only
one of the grounds for consideration of the
question of bail. There is no absolute hide
bound rule that bail must necessarily be granted
to the co-accused when another co-accused has
been granted bail. If on careful scrutiny in a
given case it transpires that case of the bail
petitioner is identically similar to the accused
and facts and circumstances of the case who has
been bailed out, then desirability of consistency
will require that such an accused should also be
released on bail.”
13.4 The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Shri
10
Narayanaswamy v. State of Karnataka , speaking
9
2016 SCC OnLine HP 1758
10
2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1066
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 10 of 17
through Aravind Kumar J., ( as he then was ) observed as
hereinbelow:
“ 24. The law of Parity would be applied in
granting bail to an accused, where the co-
accused has been granted bail on similar set of
circumstances. Law of Parity is a desirable rule
where the case of accused/petitioner is identical
with the co-accused, who is already enlarged on
bail. Simply because the co-accused has been
granted bail also cannot be the sole criteria for
granting bail to another accused if they are
standing on different footings.
25. Parity cannot be the sole ground for
granting bail and if on scrutiny and examination
of records in a given case it transpires that the
case of the petitioner before the Court is
identically similar to the accused, who has
already been granted bail, then it would be
desirable that petitioner should also be enlarged
on bail. However, if material placed by the
prosecution and further developments in the
investigation unraveling changed
circumstances, this aspect also requires to be
taken into consideration and in such
circumstances the principle of Parity as an
universal application or a straight jacket
formula cannot be applied.
(emphasis supplied)
13.5 The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Neeraj alias
11
Vikkysharma v. State of M.P. , held that parity cannot
be the sole ground for considering the prayer for bail,
even at the stage of the second or third application for
11
2019 SCC OnLine MP 7023
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 11 of 17
bail. It was further observed that “Failure of justice may
be occasioned if bail is granted to an accused on the
basis of parity with another co-accused whose bail order
does not contain any reason.”
13.6 Once again, turning to the Delhi High Court- in
12
Pradeep v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) it was held by
a learned Single Judge that the grant of bail to a co-
accused in itself does not grant other accused a ground
for bail. Even when parity as a ground is urged, the sum
total of circumstances is to be looked into.
13.7 Recently, the Calcutta High Court in Subires
13
Bhattacharya v. CBI also took the same view in the
following terms:
“ 30. Parity cannot be the sole ground for
granting bail even at the stage when the bail
application of a co-accused is allowed. The
Court has to satisfy itself that, on consideration
of more materials placed, further developments
in the investigations and other different
considerations, there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail. In deciding the
aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused
persons, their position in relation to the incident
and to the victims is of utmost importance.
Court cannot proceed on the basis of parity on
a simplistic assessment, which again cannot
pass muster under the law.”
12
2023 SCC OnLine Del 4307
13
2024 SCC OnLine Cal 11889
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 12 of 17
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been
referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the
High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground
on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct
position in law. The word ‘parity’ is defined by the Cambridge
14
Dictionary as “equality, especially of pay or position.” When
weighing an application on parity, it is ‘ position’ that is the
clincher. The requirement of ‘position’ is not met only by
involvement in the same offence. Position means what the
person whose application is being weighed, his position in
crime, i.e., his role etc. There can be different roles played -
someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an
instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other
side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who
fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will
be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with
someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by
the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to
hack away at the opposer’s limbs with a weapon.
15. In this case, the respondent-accused was the instigator of
the moment, asking accused Aditya to shoot Sonveer. Suresh
Pal, was a member of the mob yielding a weapon, as per the FIR.
He had been the original conveyor of the threat at the time of the
14
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/parity
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 13 of 17
original altercation/ verbal spat. The roles of these two people at
the time of the shooting of the deceased cannot be said to be the
same, even though they may be holding a common intention of
causing harm to the other side. In that view of the matter,
consideration of bail, on parity, is misplaced. That apart, there
remains no parity to be weighed since Suresh Pal, too, we
assume, as a consequence of our order, is behind bars.
16. In that view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, and the
judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Respondent-
accused Rajveer is directed to surrender before the concerned
Court within two weeks from the date of this judgment. It stands
clarified here that any observations made hereinabove are only
for the adjudication of this appeal against the grant of bail, and
nothing further. It shall not be construed as a comment on the
merits of the matter.
Crl.A. No.…..of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.)No. 8866 of 2025
17. This appeal assails an order granting bail to a co-accused
namely Prince, in the same sequence of events and offence, i.e.,
the alleged murder of deceased Sonveer. The High Court of
th
Judicature at Allahabad by order dated 18 December 2024 in
Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 46196 of 2024 directed the
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 14 of 17
release of the respondent-accused Prince in connection with
Case Crime No. 159 of 2024.
18. It is noted at the outset that since the background of the
case is the same as the one discussed above, no purpose would
be served in describing the same once more. The impugned
order of the High Court runs into four pages, but however, does
not disclose any reason whatsoever which weighed with the
Court in granting bail to the respondent-accused Prince.
Reference simpliciter is made to Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI
15 16
and Anr. and to Manish Sisodia v. CBI , however, such a
reference to the above-mentioned pronouncements of this Court
is not followed by any justification as to what in these cases as
held by us, applies to the instant case.
17
19. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar and Anr. ,
Nagarathna J., writing for a bench of three learned judges
considered a host of previous decisions of this Court held as
under:
“36. … As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is
not necessary for a court to give elaborate reasons
while granting bail particularly when the case is at the
initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the
accused would not have been crystalised as such.
There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an
impression that the case is one that would result in a
15
(2022) 10 SCC 51
16
(2024) 12 SCC 691
17
(2022) 4 SCC 497
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 15 of 17
conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while
passing an order on an application for grant of bail.
At the same time, a balance would have to be struck
between the nature of the allegations made against the
accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations
are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result
in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering
of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the
prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and
a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the
charge against the accused.
37. Ultimately, the court considering an application
for bail has to exercise discretion in a judicious
manner and in accordance with the settled principles
of law having regard to the crime alleged to be
committed by the accused on the one hand and
ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other.
38. Thus, while elaborating reasons may not be
assigned for grant of bail, at the same time an order
dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons
cannot result in grant of bail. It would be only a non-
speaking order which is an instance of violation of
principles of natural justice. In such a case the
prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the
order before a higher forum.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Clearly, the High Court, in the impugned order has been
unable to assign reasons, even briefly. As such, the order
impugned is set aside and in that view of the matter, the question
of bail to the respondent-accused Prince is remanded to the High
Court to be considered afresh, keeping in view the gravity of the
offence, the role of the instant accused and all other relevant
factors, as delineated time and again in various judgments of this
Court.
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 16 of 17
21. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to dispatch a
copy of this judgment to the learned Registrar General, High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, for necessary action and
compliance.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………………………...…...J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
……………………………………..…..…...J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
November 28, 2025
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 17 of 17
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8865 of 2025)
SAGAR … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UP & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8866 of 2025)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.11.29
17:35:13 IST
Reason:
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 1 of 17
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave granted.
Crl.A. No.........of 2025@ SLP (Crl) No. 8865 of 2025
2. The appellant-complainant is aggrieved by an order
granting bail in connection with Case Crime No. 0159 P.S.
th
Hastinapur, dated 28 June, 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149,
1
302, 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860 , to one Rajveer by order
rd
dated 3 January 2025 in Cr. Misc. Bail Application No. 44876
of 2024 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
2
3. A perusal of the First Information Report reveals that the
genesis of the instant proceedings was a verbal spat between the
appellant-complainant and one Suresh Pal and his son Aditya,
who were his co-villagers. The former’s father, Sonveer, opposed
the escalation of the dispute, resulting in threats from the latter.
On the day of lodging of the FIR, while the appellant-
complainant and his parents were, for matters unrelated to the
accused, on their way to the land of one Ravindra, then allegedly,
the accused persons namely Suresh Pal, Rajveer, Saurav, Aditya,
1
Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
2
FIR for short
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 2 of 17
Prince, and Bijendra, armed with pistols came forward to block
their way and prevent them from proceeding further. The
respondent-accused Rajveer came forward and threatened them
to the effect that they would all, particularly Sonveer, be taught a
lesson for opposing them. Suresh Pal, then instigated the accused
Aditya to shoot Sonveer, which he did, and the bullet hit him on
the chest below the shoulder, making him fall to the ground and
meet his end.
4. Consequent to the FIR, accused Rajveer was arrested. The
record speaks about his applications for regular bail being
rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 7, Meerut
on at least two occasions. It is the second order of rejection dated
th
12 September 2024, which was challenged before the High
Court and resulted in the impugned order. The reasoning given
by the Additional Sessions Judge, in rejecting the bail
application, was the presence of ante mortem injuries resulting
in, more particularly, the gunshot wound and two lacerated
wounds. It was observed that the nature of the crime of which the
accused had been charged is serious and, in these circumstances,
bail had to be rejected.
5. The High Court, in terms of the impugned order, observed
thus:-
“4. It is argued by the learned counsel or the applicant
that co-accused Suresh Pal has been released on bail
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 3 of 17
by this Court vide its order dated 22.11.2024 passed
in Miscellaneous Bail Application No.36116 of 2024.
It is further argued that since the role of the applicant
is similar to that of the co-accused who has already
been released on bail, therefore, on the basis of parity,
the applicant is also entitled to get bail. The applicant
has no criminal history. He has been in jail since
29.06.2024. It is also argued that if he is released, he
will not misuse the bail.
5. Bail has been opposed on behalf of the plaintiff
and the State, though the factual aspect of similarity
of the applicant with the co-accused has not been
contested.
6. The principles enunciated by this Court in Nanha
Putra Nabha Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1993
Criminal Law Journal 938 and by the Supreme Court
in Paras Ram Bishnoi v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation MANU/SCOR/22410/2021 and
Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation & Ors., 2022 INSC 690, without
expressing any opinion on the facts and
circumstances and merits of the case, In the opinion
of the court, the applicant is entitledto get bail on the
basis of equality. The bail application of the applicant
is accepted on the basis of equality.”
{{{{{
6. The only two observations on the merit of the bail
application are that the respondent-accused has no criminal
antecedent(s) and that his father had been released on bail by the
nd
order of the High Court dated 22 November 2024 in Misc. Bail
Application No. 36116 of 2024. In essence, however, parity with
his father was the only ground to grant the respondent-accused
bail.
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 4 of 17
7. The reasons given by the High Court in releasing accused
Suresh Pal on bail was that the prosecution could not present any
circumstance suggestive of him fleeing from justice or creating
further trouble by repeating the offences that he has been accused
of. The learned Judge also took note of the ‘ strong alibi ’ of him
being a class-IV employee at BSA Office, Meerut along with
inability of the prosecution to explain the presence of lacerated
wounds.
8. The appellant-complainant aggrieved by such an order had
carried the matter in appeal before us, and by way of our order
rd
dated 03 March 2025 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1200 of
2025, we had set aside the order granting bail, observing thus:-
“6. As is evident from the impugned order, the High
Court has not assigned any reason, whatsoever, in
allowing the application, granting bail, save and
except observing that “there is no material particulars
or circumstances suggestive of the applicant fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice”. The
least that was expected of the High Court was to have
appreciated the facts and applied the settled principles
of law, more so in a case involving allegations of
murder, in granting bail.
7. As such, we quash and set aside the order dated
22.11.2024 in CRMBA No. 36116/2024 titled
“Suresh Pal Vs. State of U.P.” passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad and direct the
respondent No.2-Suresh Pal to surrender forthwith.”
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 5 of 17
9. It is also required to be noted that Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No. 26358 of 2025 filed by the third accused-Aditya
th
stands rejected by the High Court by order dated 07 August
2025.
10. The question that arises for consideration is whether, as
done by the High Court in the impugned order, parity with the
co-accused persons can be the sole reason for granting bail. Bail
has often been stated to be the rule, and jail, the exception. This
cannot be emphasized enough. At the same time, this, however,
does not mean that the relief of bail is to be granted without due
regard to the circumstances involved in the alleged offence for
which the accused person has been arrested. In this regard, it has
to be noted that a Court, while granting bail, has to consider a
number of aspects. Judgments too many to count, delivered by
this Court have delineated the relevant considerations to be kept
in mind. A recent reiteration thereof was in Ashok Dhankad v.
3
State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. The relevant extracts thereof are
as under :-
“ 19. The principles which emerge as a result of the
above discussion are as follows:
(i) An appeal against grant of bail cannot be
considered to be on the same footing as an
application for cancellation of bail;
3
2025 SCC Online SC 1690
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 6 of 17
(ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a
threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by
prosecution. The merits of such evidence must not
be adjudicated at the stage of bail;
(iii) An order granting bail must reflect application
of mind and assessment of the relevant factors for
grant of bail that have been elucidated by this
Court.
[See: Y v. State of Rajasthan (Supra)
; Jaibunisha v. Meherban and Bhagwan
Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu ]
(iv) An appeal against grant of bail may be
entertained by a superior Court on grounds such as
perversity; illegality; inconsistency with law;
relevant factors not been taken into consideration
including gravity of the offence and impact of the
crime;
(v) However, the Court may not take the conduct
of an accused subsequent to the grant bail into
consideration while considering an appeal against
the grant of such bail. Such grounds must be taken
in an application for cancellation of bail; and
(vi) An appeal against grant of bail must not be
allowed to be used as a retaliatory measure. Such
an appeal must be confined only to the grounds
discussed above.”
11. It is clear from the perusal of the above factors that the
High Court failed to consider all that was relevant. On parity, it
is necessary to refer to Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai
4
Hirabhai Makwana(Koli) and Anr. . This Court observed that
while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the same must focus
on the role of the accused and cannot be utilized solely because
4
(2021) 6 SCC 230
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 7 of 17
another accused person was granted bail in connection with the
same offence, and neither can this ground be claimed as a matter
of right. [ See also: Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director
5
Directorate of Enforcement ; Sabita Paul v. State of West
6
Bengal and Anr. ]
12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have erroneously
granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of
parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application
as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the
accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only
common factor between the accused persons. On this count alone
we can set aside the impugned judgment and order. However, we
propose not to do so and proceed to delve further.
13. In an attempt to clarify the position of law qua parity as a
ground, we may refer to certain judgments of the High Court to
appreciate whether there is convergence or divergence of
opinion/understanding.
13.1 The Allahabad High Court in Nanha v. State of
7
U.P. , observed as under :-
24. My answer to the points referred to us is that
parity cannot be the sole ground for granting bail
even at the stage of second or third or subsequent
5
2023 SCC Online SC1486
6
2024 SCC Online SC 374
7
1992 SCC OnLine All 871
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 8 of 17
bail applications when the bail applications of the
co-accused whose bail application had been
earlier rejected are allowed and co-accused is
released on bail. Even then the court has to satisfy
itself that, on consideration of more materials
placed, further developments in the
investigations or otherwise and other different
considerations, there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail. If an examination
of a given case, it transpires that the case of the
applicant before the court is identically similar to
the accused on facts and circumstances who has
been bailed out, then the desirability of
consistency will require that such an accused
should be also released on bail. As regards the
second part of the referred question my answer is
that it is not at all necessary for an accused to
state in his application that the application of a
co-accused had been rejected previously.
(emphasis supplied)
8
13.2 The Delhi High Court in Harbhajan Singh v. State ,
while holding that parity cannot be the sole ground for the
grant of bail, observed:
“ 15. ... In this regard, this Court thinks fit to
reiterate the settled principle that in a criminal
jurisprudence, every case stands on different
footings and no straightjacket formula can be
adopted in the facts of each case. No doubt, the
weight of judicial parity should be followed, but
on the other hand, this Court is of the conscious
opinion that the word ‘parity’ connotes a state
when a person is placed on the same footing as
of the other person. This court is also of the
opinion that that parity cannot be the sole
ground for granting bail in a case where the bail
8
2016 SCC OnLine Del 4920
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 9 of 17
applications of other co-accused whose bail
applications had been allowed and are released
on bail. It is purely a discretion of the court.
Before granting or refusing bail, the court must
satisfy itself after considering the material
placed on record and further developments in
the investigations or otherwise and other
peculiar circumstances of each case, which
show that there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail If on
examination of any case, it transpires that the
case of the applicant before the court is
identically similar to the accused on facts and
circumstances, who has been bailed out, then
the desirability of consistency will require that
such an accused should be also released on bail.
(emphasis supplied)
13.3 The Himachal Pradesh High Court in Abhay
9
Gupta v. State of H.P . held that:
“ It is more than settled that parity alone cannot
be the sole ground for granting of bail. It is only
one of the grounds for consideration of the
question of bail. There is no absolute hide
bound rule that bail must necessarily be granted
to the co-accused when another co-accused has
been granted bail. If on careful scrutiny in a
given case it transpires that case of the bail
petitioner is identically similar to the accused
and facts and circumstances of the case who has
been bailed out, then desirability of consistency
will require that such an accused should also be
released on bail.”
13.4 The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Shri
10
Narayanaswamy v. State of Karnataka , speaking
9
2016 SCC OnLine HP 1758
10
2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1066
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 10 of 17
through Aravind Kumar J., ( as he then was ) observed as
hereinbelow:
“ 24. The law of Parity would be applied in
granting bail to an accused, where the co-
accused has been granted bail on similar set of
circumstances. Law of Parity is a desirable rule
where the case of accused/petitioner is identical
with the co-accused, who is already enlarged on
bail. Simply because the co-accused has been
granted bail also cannot be the sole criteria for
granting bail to another accused if they are
standing on different footings.
25. Parity cannot be the sole ground for
granting bail and if on scrutiny and examination
of records in a given case it transpires that the
case of the petitioner before the Court is
identically similar to the accused, who has
already been granted bail, then it would be
desirable that petitioner should also be enlarged
on bail. However, if material placed by the
prosecution and further developments in the
investigation unraveling changed
circumstances, this aspect also requires to be
taken into consideration and in such
circumstances the principle of Parity as an
universal application or a straight jacket
formula cannot be applied.
(emphasis supplied)
13.5 The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Neeraj alias
11
Vikkysharma v. State of M.P. , held that parity cannot
be the sole ground for considering the prayer for bail,
even at the stage of the second or third application for
11
2019 SCC OnLine MP 7023
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 11 of 17
bail. It was further observed that “Failure of justice may
be occasioned if bail is granted to an accused on the
basis of parity with another co-accused whose bail order
does not contain any reason.”
13.6 Once again, turning to the Delhi High Court- in
12
Pradeep v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi) it was held by
a learned Single Judge that the grant of bail to a co-
accused in itself does not grant other accused a ground
for bail. Even when parity as a ground is urged, the sum
total of circumstances is to be looked into.
13.7 Recently, the Calcutta High Court in Subires
13
Bhattacharya v. CBI also took the same view in the
following terms:
“ 30. Parity cannot be the sole ground for
granting bail even at the stage when the bail
application of a co-accused is allowed. The
Court has to satisfy itself that, on consideration
of more materials placed, further developments
in the investigations and other different
considerations, there are sufficient grounds for
releasing the applicant on bail. In deciding the
aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused
persons, their position in relation to the incident
and to the victims is of utmost importance.
Court cannot proceed on the basis of parity on
a simplistic assessment, which again cannot
pass muster under the law.”
12
2023 SCC OnLine Del 4307
13
2024 SCC OnLine Cal 11889
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 12 of 17
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been
referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the
High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground
on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct
position in law. The word ‘parity’ is defined by the Cambridge
14
Dictionary as “equality, especially of pay or position.” When
weighing an application on parity, it is ‘ position’ that is the
clincher. The requirement of ‘position’ is not met only by
involvement in the same offence. Position means what the
person whose application is being weighed, his position in
crime, i.e., his role etc. There can be different roles played -
someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an
instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other
side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who
fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will
be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with
someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by
the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to
hack away at the opposer’s limbs with a weapon.
15. In this case, the respondent-accused was the instigator of
the moment, asking accused Aditya to shoot Sonveer. Suresh
Pal, was a member of the mob yielding a weapon, as per the FIR.
He had been the original conveyor of the threat at the time of the
14
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/parity
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 13 of 17
original altercation/ verbal spat. The roles of these two people at
the time of the shooting of the deceased cannot be said to be the
same, even though they may be holding a common intention of
causing harm to the other side. In that view of the matter,
consideration of bail, on parity, is misplaced. That apart, there
remains no parity to be weighed since Suresh Pal, too, we
assume, as a consequence of our order, is behind bars.
16. In that view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, and the
judgment of the High Court is set aside. The Respondent-
accused Rajveer is directed to surrender before the concerned
Court within two weeks from the date of this judgment. It stands
clarified here that any observations made hereinabove are only
for the adjudication of this appeal against the grant of bail, and
nothing further. It shall not be construed as a comment on the
merits of the matter.
Crl.A. No.…..of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.)No. 8866 of 2025
17. This appeal assails an order granting bail to a co-accused
namely Prince, in the same sequence of events and offence, i.e.,
the alleged murder of deceased Sonveer. The High Court of
th
Judicature at Allahabad by order dated 18 December 2024 in
Criminal Misc Bail Application No. 46196 of 2024 directed the
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 14 of 17
release of the respondent-accused Prince in connection with
Case Crime No. 159 of 2024.
18. It is noted at the outset that since the background of the
case is the same as the one discussed above, no purpose would
be served in describing the same once more. The impugned
order of the High Court runs into four pages, but however, does
not disclose any reason whatsoever which weighed with the
Court in granting bail to the respondent-accused Prince.
Reference simpliciter is made to Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI
15 16
and Anr. and to Manish Sisodia v. CBI , however, such a
reference to the above-mentioned pronouncements of this Court
is not followed by any justification as to what in these cases as
held by us, applies to the instant case.
17
19. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar and Anr. ,
Nagarathna J., writing for a bench of three learned judges
considered a host of previous decisions of this Court held as
under:
“36. … As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is
not necessary for a court to give elaborate reasons
while granting bail particularly when the case is at the
initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the
accused would not have been crystalised as such.
There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an
impression that the case is one that would result in a
15
(2022) 10 SCC 51
16
(2024) 12 SCC 691
17
(2022) 4 SCC 497
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 15 of 17
conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while
passing an order on an application for grant of bail.
At the same time, a balance would have to be struck
between the nature of the allegations made against the
accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations
are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result
in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering
of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the
prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and
a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the
charge against the accused.
37. Ultimately, the court considering an application
for bail has to exercise discretion in a judicious
manner and in accordance with the settled principles
of law having regard to the crime alleged to be
committed by the accused on the one hand and
ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other.
38. Thus, while elaborating reasons may not be
assigned for grant of bail, at the same time an order
dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons
cannot result in grant of bail. It would be only a non-
speaking order which is an instance of violation of
principles of natural justice. In such a case the
prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the
order before a higher forum.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Clearly, the High Court, in the impugned order has been
unable to assign reasons, even briefly. As such, the order
impugned is set aside and in that view of the matter, the question
of bail to the respondent-accused Prince is remanded to the High
Court to be considered afresh, keeping in view the gravity of the
offence, the role of the instant accused and all other relevant
factors, as delineated time and again in various judgments of this
Court.
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 16 of 17
21. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to dispatch a
copy of this judgment to the learned Registrar General, High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, for necessary action and
compliance.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………………………...…...J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
……………………………………..…..…...J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
November 28, 2025
Cr.A @SLP (Crl) Nos. 8865-8866 of 2025 Page 17 of 17