YASHWANT vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 04-09-2018

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION RIMINAL PPEAL O S OF    C    A  N ( ). 385­386   2008   PPELLANT S Y ASHWANT   ETC .           …A ( ) ERSUS V T HE  S TATE   OF  M AHARASHTRA                 … R ESPONDENT ( S ) With   C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O ( S ). 299  OF  2008     C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O ( S ). 387­388  OF  2008     C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O ( S ). 182­187  OF  2009   J U D G M E N T   N. V. R AMANA , J.    “ With great power comes greater responsibility ” 1. At the outset it is important to note that our police force need Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2018.09.04 15:24:17 IST Reason: to develop and recognize the concept of ‘democratic policing’, wherein crime control is not the only end, but the means to 1 achieve this order is also equally important. Further the turn of events in this case obligates us to re­iterate herein that ‘be you ever so high, the law is always above you!’ 2. These   criminal   appeals   are   filed   against   the   impugned common order and judgment, dated 13.12.2007, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in Criminal Appeal Nos. 393, 394, 395, 397, 419 and 420 of 1995. As the incident is same and contentions canvassed individually,   being   similar,   we   proposed   to   deal   with   the judgment through this common order. 3. The prosecution’s case in brief are that on 23.06.1993, Police Inspector   (P.I)   Narule   ( )   was   on   duty,   when   one   head A­1 constable Telgudiya (PW­48), working at the concerned Police Station, Deolapar came to P.I Narule ( A­1 ) accompanied by three   persons   namely   Ganeshprasad,   Arunkumar   and Kashiram.   They   informed   P.I   Narule   ( A­1 )   that   they   were staying at India Sun Hotel and were looted eight days before. It may be relevant that they informed P.I Narule ( A­1 ) that they had not lodged any complaint concerning the incident.  2 4. On that night , the accused patrolling party which included P.I Narule ( ), Assistant Police Inspector Yashwant Mukaji A­1 Karade ( A­2 ), Sub­Inspector Rambhau Vitthalrao Kadu ( A­3 ), Police   constables   Jahiruddin   Bashirmiya   Deshmukh   ( A­4 ), Nilkanth   Pandurang   Chaurpagar   ( ),   Namdeo   Nathuji A­5 Ganeshkar   ( A­6 ),   Ramesh   Tukaram   Bhoyar   ( A­7 ),   Ashok Bhawani Gulam Shukla ( A­8 ), Sudhakar Marotrao Thakre ( )   and   Raghunath   Barkuji   Bhakte   ( ),   along   with 9 A­10 Ganeshprasad, Arunkumar and Kashiram, went to the house of   H.C.P   Telgudiya   ( )   at   Police   Lines,   Ajni.   In   the PW­48 meanwhile,   H.C.P   Telgudiya   (PW­48)   is   supposed   to   have found out that a Christian male by the name of ‘Anthony’ was responsible   for   the   looting.   Although,   the   H.C.P   Telgudiya ( ) confirmed that there was no ‘Anthony’, but he is PW­48 supposed to have revealed that one Joinus (deceased) lives nearby, who was a known suspect from earlier robbery case. H.C.P.   Telgudiya,   took   the   police   party   to   the   residential quarters of Joinus (deceased), who had already slept after having his dinner and consuming some alcohol.  3 5. It was around 1:00 AM in the night, the police party reached the house of Joinus (deceased). He was taken into custody and his residential quarters were searched. It is alleged that during this process, some of the police men are supposed to have   molested   Zarina   (PW­1),   wife   of   Joinus   (deceased). Thereafter,   the   police   party   tied   Joinus   (deceased)   to   an electric pole outside and was beaten by the police personnel with   sticks.   Later   Joinus   (deceased)   and   his   other   family members   were   taken   to   various   locations   including   Rani Kothi,   Hill   Top   restaurant   wherein   he   was   given   beatings intermittently. At about 3:55 AM he was brought back to the police Station, wherein he was locked­up with two other cell mates.  6. In the morning of 24.06.1993 at 7:30 AM, on duty police constables found Joinus (deceased) to be motionless and on examination he was found to be not breathing. Meanwhile, Magistrate   was   requested   to   conduct   an   inquest   and chemical analysis. The case was handed over to the State CID for   investigation   into  the   matter.   A  complaint  came  to  be registered against one Anthony, being Crime No. 238/1993 under Section 420 of IPC at 10:20 PM on 24.06.1993 after 4 the death of Joinus. Thereafter, post­mortem was conducted, and investigation was conducted by P.I. Oza. After requisite sanction was granted by the Government for prosecuting the accused,   the   investigating   officer   laid   charges   against   ten erring officers in the following manner­ 1.) That   you   all   the   accused   on   23.06.1993   at   about 23.00 hours made an entry in the Movement Register of Crime Branch at Sr. No. 26 that you left the Crime Branch Office   for   Night   Patrolling   and   thereafter   along   with Ganeshprasad   Thakur,   Arunkumar   Gupta,   Kashiram Barethia, Head Constable Madhorao Tenguriya drove in the police van Bearing No. MH­12/9887 and forcibly entered the house of the deceased Joinus Adam Yelamati at about 00.45 hours on 24.06.1993. The deceased was wearing his underwear and banian and was sleeping in his house. You all the accused in furtherance of your common intention pulled the deceased out of his house and took him on the road and tied him to the electric pole with a rope and he was given merciless beating with the stick. The deceased was made to sit in the said Crime Branch Vehicle and he was brought to the office of Crime Branch. You made him naked and also gave a heavy beating to the deceased with the stick in the Crime Branch office. At that time you all were aware that such merciless beating would cause the death of the deceased. You kept him in the lock up at about 3.55   a.m.   without   registering   any   offence   in   the   Crime Branch. In the morning, the deceased found dead. You did commit murder of Joinus Adam Yellamati and thereby you all committed an offence punishable u/s. 302 r/w. Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.  2.) Secondly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your   common   intention   entered   the   house   of   deceased Joinus Adam Yellamati at about 00.45 hours on 24.06.1993 and pretended to take the personal search of the wife of the deceased namely Zarina and under the pretext of taking search, touched the breasts of Zarina. Thereafter, you made her to sit in your police van and also took pinches on her body with an intention to outrage her modesty. Thereafter, she   was   brought   to   your   Crime   branch   office   and   you inserted   your   hand   in   the   petticoat   of   Zarina   with   an intention to outrage her modesty and by such assault you 5 all thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 354 r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my Cognizance. 3.)   Thirdly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your common intention, wrongfully confined two children of the deceased namely Kumari Stenlos aged 10 years and boy Jorge   aged   8   years   and   the   brother   of   Zarina   by   name Richard   Abraham,   aged   19   years   and   another   cousin brother by name Stenly Patrik, aged 19 years and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 342 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance. 4.) Fourthly, that you all the accused in furtherance of your common intention, on the aforesaid day, date, time and   place,   voluntarily   caused   hurt   to   Joinus   Adam Yellamati, aged 42 years and Zarina w/o Joinus Yellamati for the purpose of extorting from the said Joinus Yellamati and Zarina w/o Joinus Yellamati certain information which might lead to detection of offence of cheating committed at Hotel “India Sun”, Nagpur, in respect of one Ganeshprasad Babulal Thakur and one Arunkumar Gupta and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 330 r/w Sec 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.  5.) Fifthly, that  you  all the accused  in  furtherance of your common intention on the aforesaid day, date, time and place, assaulted Joinus Adam Yellamati and Zarina w/o Joinus  Yellamati,  intending   by   such  assault  to dishonor said   Joinus   Adam   Yellamati   and   Zarina   w/o   Joinus Yellamati   and   thereby   committed   an   offence   punishable u/s. 355 r/w Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. 7. All   the   accused   pleaded   not   guilty   and   claimed   trial.   The Sessions Court in Sessions Case No. 416 of 1993, by order dated 22.09.1995, passed following order­
ACCUSEDSECTIONPUNISHMENT/ACQUITTAL
Accused<br>No. 1­10302 of IPCAcquitted
Accused<br>No. 1­10330 r/w. 34<br>of IPCEach of them was convicted to suffer<br>rigorous imprisonment for three years and<br>to pay a fine of Rs. 500/­, in default three<br>months further rigorous imprisonment.
Accused354 r/w. 34Each of them was convicted to suffer
6
No. 1­10of IPCrigorous imprisonment for six months and<br>to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default three<br>months further rigorous imprisonment.
Accused<br>No. 1­10355 r/w. 34<br>of IPCEach of them was convicted to suffer<br>rigorous imprisonment for three years and<br>to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default one<br>month further rigorous imprisonment.
Accused<br>No. 1­10342 r/w. 34<br>of IPCEach of them was convicted to suffer<br>rigorous imprisonment for three years and<br>to pay a fine of Rs. 300/­, in default one<br>month further rigorous imprisonment.
The sentence was ordered to run concurrently. 8. The   reasons   provided   by   the   trial   court   for   the acquittal/conviction in short, are as follows­ i. That   reliance   is   placed   on   the   evidence   of   Dr. Kewalia/PW­49 (Ex. 296), to conclude that there was a possibility of death of the deceased, may have been due to asphyxiation. ii. That the post mortem report or the medical evidence clearly indicates that the injuries in the Column No. 17 did not correlate with the asphyxial death. iii. That the injuries sustained simple injuries and were not sufficient to cause death of an individual. iv. That   the   presence   of   the   accused­officers   are admitted and the same cannot be dislodged as the same is proved by the movement register. v. From the conspectus of other evidence it was clear that   injuries   were   caused   by   the   police   officer   to extract information, which would squarely fall under the four corners of Section 330 of IPC. 9. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, accused­Bhaskar [ ], Yashwant [ ], Raghunath [ ]) filed Criminal Appeal 1 A­2 A­10 No.   393   of   1995,   Jahiruddin   [ A­4 ],   Nilkanth   [ A­5 ]   and Namdeo [ A­6 ] filed Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1995, Ramesh 7 [ A­7 ], Ashok Bhavani Gulam Shukla [ A­8 ], Sudhakar [ A­9 ] filed Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 1995, Rambhau [ A­3 ] filed Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 1995, before the High Court. On the   other   hand,   State   of   Maharashtra   also   filed   Criminal Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 419 of 1995 against the judgment of acquittal and Criminal Appeal No. 420 of 1995 for enhancement of sentence. 10. By order dated 13.12.2007, the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the State being Criminal Appeal No (s). 419   and   420   of   1995,   but   partly   allowed   the   appeals preferred by the accused officer by acquitting accused no. 1 to 9 of the offences punishable under Sections 354, 355, 342 read with 34 of IPC, however, upheld the conviction under Section 330 of IPC. Moreover, Raghunath Barkuji Bhakte ( 10 ) was acquitted of all the offences. The High Court passed the aforesaid order on the following grounds­ i. That the injuries to the deceased are established by the   Post­mortem   report,   corroborated   by   the photographs taken during the investigation. ii. That the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death was   not   result   of   the   injuries   sustained   by   the accused,   should   enure   to   the   accused   appellants herein. 8 iii. Even though there are many discrepancies in the evidence of PW­1 [Zarina], the court separated the falsehood from the truth. iv. That offence under Section 355 of IPC is not proved beyond   reasonable   doubt   as   there   are   stark discrepancies in this regard. v. That the accused A­10’s presence is not proved and the   benefit   of   doubt   needs   to   be   given   to   him, thereby mandating his acquittal. 11. Still aggrieved by the High Court order, accused­Yashwant [ A­2 ]  and   Bhaskar   [ A­1 ]  filed   Criminal   Appeal  No.   385   of 2008, Rambhau [ A­3 ] filed Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 2008, Jahiruddin   [ ],   Nilkanth   [ ]   and   Namdeo   [ ]   filed A­4 A­5 A­6 Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2008, Ramesh [ A­7 ] and Ashok Bhavani Gulam Shukla [ A­8 ] filed Criminal Appeal No. 388 of 2008,   Sudhakar   [ A­9 ]   filed   a   Criminal   Appeal   No.   299   of 2008, State of Maharashtra filed Criminal Appeals No. 182­ 187 of 2009. This Court by order dated 22.02.2008, while issuing notice in these cases, the appellant­accused were also issued show cause notice for enhancement of sentence. It may not be out of context to note that accused A­1 is said to have passed away after filing of these appeals, accordingly, the name of accused A­1 was struck off and the conviction against him stands abated. 9 12.  When the matter was argued, learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Basant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, together contended that­ a. That the concurrent opinion of the court below, w.r.t non   applicability   of   Section   302   of   IPC,   need   not   be disturbed. b. The defence of superior orders were applicable for the other accused subordinate officers. c. That in any case the charge under Section 330 of IPC could have been attracted in this case. d. In alternative, he pleads that only Section 323 of IPC may be maintainable which would suffice a punishment of the period already undergone. e. In any case they plead that acquittal of Accused A­10 should not be interfered with. 13. On   the   other   hand,   Mr.   Nishant   Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, leaned counsel for the State of Maharashtra has brought to our notice that the evidence of PW­49, who has   categorically   stated   that   the   effect   of   death   was   the cumulative   effect   of   the   injuries   caused.   Further,   it   is contended that the number of injuries are sufficient to prove the causal connection. In the end, the State has argued that the   custodial   torture   needs   to   be   taken   seriously   and punished appropriately. Alternatively, State seeks to press for charges under Section 304 Part II of IPC, in case Section 302 of IPC is not made out. 14. Having   heard   learned   counsels   for   both   the   parties   and perusing the documents on record, we are of the opinion that 10 we need to address only four questions herein, as the High Court has sufficiently considered other questions, which we need   not  interfere  with.  The   first question  is  whether   the incident narrated above amounted to murder so as to attract Section 302 of IPC? 15. A brief narration of background facts may be necessary to understand   the   circumstances   in   which   this   contention arose.   That   it   has   been   established   by   PW­21   (Kishan Khadode), that the lock­up in which Joinus (deceased) was found   was   suffocating,   dirty   and   bottle   guard   seeds   were found vomited in the place where the body of the deceased was found. PW­49 (Dr. Kewaliya), the doctor who conducted post­mortem,   opines   that   the   cause   of   death   was   due   to asphyxia,  as there were indications for the same such as defecation, urethra discharge etc. Even though PW­49 was not subjected to detailed cross­examination on the aspect of choking due to vomiting, However, the doctor does accept the possibility   of   asphyxiation   due   to   such   choking   from   the contents   of   vomit.   The   other   circumstance   was   that   the deceased was found to be in an inebriated condition, which as   per   the   medical   evidence   decreases   the   resistance   to 11 stress. Moreover, it is on record that the deceased was earlier suffering from Tuberculosis.  16. It is a matter of record that both the courts below have taken a   concurrent   view   that   the   crime   narrated   above   did   not amount   to   culpable   homicide   as   the   cause   of   death   was asphyxiation and there was nothing on record to prove that the injuries were the cause of the death. It is well settled that in   order   to   be   called   a   murder,   it   needs   to   be   culpable homicide in the first place, that is to say all murders are culpable homicides, but the vice versa may not true in all cases.   Therefore,   we   need   to   ascertain   whether   a   case   of culpable homicide is made out herein in the first place. In this context, we need to observe Section 299 of IPC at the outset­
299. Culpable homicide.—Whoever causes
deathby doing an act with the intention of causing
death, or with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause
death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
( emphasis supplied ) 12 17. As   noted   above,   causation   is   an   important   ingredient   to determine as to whether a person commits culpable homicide in   the   first   place.   Causation   simply   means   “causal relationship between conduct and result”. In this respect we need to assess whether the contentions of the parties could stand the scrutiny of the law of the land. Section 299 of IPC indicates two types of causations, one the factual causation and the second the legal causation. Coming to the factual causation, it is a matter of fact as to whether the action of the accused caused death of the person. But the second aspect concerns itself, whether the death can be sufficiently imputed to the accused’s action as being responsible legally. In our considered   opinion   this   case   turns   on   the   second   leg   of causal relationship wherein, could the injuries caused by the police officers be sufficiently imputed to be the cause of death of Joinus herein? 18. It is settled under common law wherein the principle of ‘ take 1 their victim as they find them’  is followed,  meaning ‘A person who   does   any   act/omission   which   hastens   the   death   of another person who, when the act is done or the omission is 1  R v Blaue , [1975] 3 All ER 446 (CA) 13 made, is labouring under some disorder or disease arising from   another   cause,   is   deemed   to   have   killed   that   other person.’   This principle has been expressly ingrained under the Explanation 1 to the Section 299 of IPC. Without going into details on this aspect as this is not a case of multiple causation requiring us to consider the same, rather it is a case   wherein   the   deceased   died   of   asphyxiation   due   to contents of his vomit, hours later from the time when the injury   was   inflicted,   which   is   an   independent   reason   for cause of death herein.   19. As elucidated above, various other circumstances which dis­ associate the cause of death to the actions of the appellant officers are available. It is on record that the injuries noted in the post­mortem report clearly indicate that the nature of these injuries were not grievous. The head injury noted does not show any internal fracture to the skull bone. Therefore, when, on facts, it is concurrently inferred by the courts below that the cause of death was due to asphyxiation, we do not see any reasons for accepting a different factual inference herein, as the same is not perverse.  14 20. Further, we agree with the reasoning of the High Court on the aspect that the PW­1 (Zarina) has not been completely honest in her statements. She has at times deposed over­zealously, thereby   mandating   us   to   be   cautious   in   accepting   her evidence.   Further   no   witness   has   clearly   deposed   on   the aspect of injuries and how they happened to be, except for blank statements that ‘beatings were given to the deceased Joinus’.   Further   we   may   note   that   the   surrounding circumstances   also   strengthen   our   conclusions   such   as firstly, the condition of the deceased was said to be good as per the statements of PW­21 (cell­inmate) and PW­42 (head constable) although he was suffering from tuberculosis, when he was admitted in the lock­up. Secondly, Joinus (deceased) was heavily inebriated when he was arrested and thirdly, the aspect of asphyxiation which is a significant cause to break the chain of causal link between the death of Joinus and the injuries inflicted by the appellants herein. 21. As   discussed   above,   the   causal   link   between   the   injuries caused to the deceased by the erring officers and the death is not connected, therefore, Section 299 of IPC is not attracted. 15 Accordingly, there is no question of attracting Section 302 or 304 of IPC. 22. In any case this Court in catena of cases has taken a view that, as regards the inference of facts, when two Courts have acquitted the accused­appellant of charges under Section 302 of IPC, then it would not be appropriate upon this Court to overturn the factual finding, unless the view taken by the lower courts is shown to be highly unlikely or unreasonable or perverse. Although the learned counsel for the State has tried to argue that the cumulative effect of the injuries was responsible for the death, but the medical evidence itself, on the other hand affirms the high possibility of death due to asphyxiation. Further there is no material brought before us to portray that the courts below had taken a perverse view. In this   light,   when   two   reasonable   views   are   possible,   then reversal   of   concurrent   acquittal   would   not   be   appropriate
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka,(2007) 4
SCC 415;   Mahtab Singh v. State of U.P , (2009) 13 SCC 670]. 23. It   may   not   be   out   of   context   to   note   that   it   is   generally difficult   to   prosecute   the   custodial   torture   cases   as   the 16 evidence available on record may not sufficient. It is in this th context that Law Commission in its 113  Report published in 1985 had recommended inclusion of Section 114­B to the Evidence Act, but the same was never materialized into a statutory   law.     Further   this   Court   in   State   of   M.P.   v. Shyamsunder Trivedi , 1995 (4) SCC 262, appealed to the Parliament for considering such amendment.  24. The   Second   question   is   with   respect   to   the   defence   of superior order or infamously known as ‘Nuremburg defence’ pleaded by the accused­appellants (subordinate officers). The earliest known example, wherein such defence was pleaded was before an international ad hoc tribunal, can be traced to the trial of Peter Von Hagenbach for occupation of Breisach 2 on the orders of Duke of Burgundy in the year 1474.  We are aware of the fact that IPC allows such a defence if conditions provided under Section 76 of IPC are fulfilled. A three­Judge Bench   of   this   Court   in   State   of   West   Bengal   v.   Shew , AIR 1981 SC 1917, observed as Mangal Singh and Ors. under­ 2 Y. Dinstein, “The Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Law”, Leyden,  1965. 17 Section 76 of the Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who  by  reason  of   a  mistake   of  fact  and  not  by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself   to   be,   bound   by   law,   to   do   it.   The illustration to that section says that if a soldier fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law, he commits   no   offence.   The   occasion   to   apply   the provisions   of   the   section   does   not   arise   in   the instant case since the question as to whether the accused   believed   in   good   faith   on   account   of   a mistake of fact that he was bound by law to do the act which is alleged to constitute an offence, would arise only if, to the extent relevant in this case, the order or  command  of  the  superior  officer is  not justified or is otherwise unlawful. 25. It is a matter of record that accused A­1 has passed away and the matter against him stands abated. The other accused­ appellants, with a view to take advantage of this situation, as an after­thought have pleaded herein the defence that they were   merely   executing   the   orders   of   accused   A­1.   At   the outset we may indicate that it is not merely that the accused­ appellants have to prove that they have followed the order of the superior officer (accused A­1), rather they need to also prove to the Court that the aforesaid appellants   bonafidely believed that the orders issued by accused A­1 were legal. However,   our   attention   was   not   drawn   to   any   argument before the courts or evidence on record to this effect that the 18 accused­appellants were merely acting on the orders of their superiors on a  bonafide  belief that such orders were legal. It was not even their case from the beginning that the accused­ appellants were not aware of facts and circumstances, rather all   of   them   started   out   as   a   investigation   party   with   full knowledge and participation. On the perusal of the record, we may note that this argument is only taken before this court, to seek a re­trial and such attempt cannot be taken into consideration herein. 26. The third question concerns about the acquittal of Accused A­10 (Raghunath Bhakte). It would be necessary to deal with the individual liability of accused A­10, as he states that he was not present with the investigation party. Although some evidence points to his presence with the investigation party, but   the   fact   remains   that   all   the   other   accused   have unanimously stated that A­10 did not accompany them as he fell sick during the investigation and accordingly, went home. We need to examine the liability of accused A­10, with the above premise in mind. 27. It is wrought in our criminal law tradition that the Courts have the responsibility to separate chaff from the husk and 19 dredge out truth. It may not be out of context to note that the legal   maxim   ‘ falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus’   is   not applicable   in   India,   thereby   the   courts   are   mandated   to separate  truth from  falsehood.  [ refer   Kulwinder Singh v. ,   (2007) 10 SCC 455;   State of Punjab Ganesh v. State of Karnataka ,   (2008) 17 SCC 152;   Jayaseelan v. State of , (2009) 12 SCC 275] It is not uncommon that in Tamil Nadu some   cases   witnesses   in   the   jealousness   to   see   all   the accused get conviction, may stretch the facts or twist them. In   those   instances,   it   is   necessary   for   the   Courts   to   be cautious   enough   to   not   ‘rush   to   convict’   rather   uphold justice. It is clear from the statements of all the accused as well as the evidence of PW­41 (Driver Vijay Thengde), PW­48 (HC Telgudiya) and PW­66 (I.O Dy. SP. Godbole) that there exists a reasonable doubt as to the presence of A­10, during the   patrolling   party   and   thereafter.   Therefore,   we   are   not inclined to disturb the findings of the High Court on this aspect as well. 28. The fourth question, which we need to consider, concerns the punishment under Section 330 of IPC. At the outset, we need 20 to state that we do not find any material on record to interfere with   the   conviction   of   the   accused   under   the   aforesaid Section, except for the quantum of punishment, which we need to determine. 29. Recently, this Bench in   State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal 3 and Anr , following   Soman v. State of Kerala , (2013) 11 SCC   382   and   Alister   Anthony   Pareira   v.   State   of Maharashtra , (2012) 2 SCC 648 observed as under­ From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that   the   principle   governing   the   imposition   of punishment   will   depend   upon   the   facts   and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should   be   appropriate,   adequate,   just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind   while   imposing   the   sentence.   The   Court cannot   afford   to   be   casual   while   imposing   the sentence,   inasmuch   as   both   the   crime   and   the criminal are equally important in the sentencing process. The Courts must see that the public does not   lose   confidence   in   the   judicial   system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance. 3 Criminal Appeal No. 959 of 2018 21 30. From the facts portrayed it is clear that the police knew the identity of the deceased was different from the person, they wanted   to   investigate   initially.   The   manner   in   which   the deceased and his family members were taken into custody reflects   pure   act   of   lawlessness   and   does   not   befit   the conduct   of   the   Police.   The   High   Court   of   Lahore   in   Lal , AIR 1936 Lah 471, had observed Mohammad v. Emperor that there was a requirement to treat the crime under Section 330 with stringent punishments in order to have deterrent effect, in the following manner­ In my opinion, however, conduct of this sort by responsible   police   officers   engaged   in   the investigation of a crime, is one of the most serious offences   known   to   the   law.   The   result   of   third degree methods or of actual torture or beating such as   in   this   case   must   be   that   innocent   persons might well  be  convicted,  confession  being  forced from them which are false. In almost every case in which a confession is recorded, in criminal Courts, it is alleged by the defence that the police have resorted to methods such as these. It is seldom, however, that an offence of this nature is or can be proved. It clearly is the duty of the Courts when a case of this kind is proved to pass sentences which may have a deterrent effect. 22 th 31. In  Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes  (27  Ed.), the author while discussing the sentencing under Section 330 of IPC notes as under­ The   causing   of   hurt   by   a   responsible   police officer engaged in investigation of a crime is one of the most serious offences known to law and deterrent punishment should be inflicted on the offender. ( emphasis supplied ) 32. The factual narration of the events portrayed herein narrate a spiteful events of police excessiveness. The motive to falsely implicate Joinus for a crime he was alien to was not befitting the police officers investigating crimes. The manner in which Joinus   was   taken   during   late   night   from   his   house   for investigation   ignores   the   basic   rights   this   country   has guaranteed its citizen. It is on record that injuries caused to the individual were in furtherance of extracting a confession. The  mala fide  intention of the officers­accused to undertake such action are writ large from the above narration, which does not require further elaboration.  33. As the police in this case are the violators of law, who had the primary   responsibility   to   protect   and   uphold   law,   thereby mandating   the   punishment   for   such   violation   to   be 23 proportionately   stringent   so   as   to   have   effective   deterrent effect and instill confidence in the society. It may not be out of context to remind that the motto of Maharashtra State Police is " " (Sanskrit: "To Sadrakshnāya Khalanīghrahanāya protect   good   and   to   Punish   evil"),   which   needs   to   be respected.   Those,   who   are   called   upon   to   administer   the criminal law, must bear, in mind, that they have a duty not merely to the individual accused before them, but also to the State and to the community at large. Such incidents involving police usually tend to deplete the confidence in our criminal justice   system   much   more   than   those   incidents   involving private individuals. We must additionally factor this aspect while imposing an appropriate punishment to the accused herein. 34. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the punishment of three­year imprisonment imposed by the Trial Court under Section 330 of IPC, would be grossly insufficient and dis­ proportional. We deem it appropriate to increase the term of sentence to maximum imposable period under Section 330 of IPC   i.e.,   seven   years   of   rigorous   imprisonment,   while 24 maintaining the fine imposed by the Trial Court. Accordingly, we modify the sentence to this limited extent. 35. In   light   of   the   afore­said   discussion,   we   partly   allow   the Criminal Appeal Nos. 182­187 of 2009 in the afore­stated terms.   Further   Criminal   Appeal   Nos.   385­386   of   2008, Criminal Appeal Nos. 387­388 of 2008, Criminal Appeal No. 299 of 2008 stand dismissed. 36. The appellants­accused are directed to surrender before the authorities for serving out the rest of the sentence forthwith. ........................J.                            (N.V. RAMANA)                        ........................J.         (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) New Delhi, September 04, 2018    25