1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3602 OF 2020
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8343 of 2020]
Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank & Anr. .. Appellants
Versus
Anit Kumar Das .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Leave granted.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 22.11.2019 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Writ Appeal No.
278 of 2019, by which the Division Bench of the High Court has
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Date: 2020.11.03
16:57:10 IST
Reason:
dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant herein and has
2
confirmed the judgment and order dated 13.03.2019 passed by the
learned single Judge of the High Court in W.P. (C) No. 19261 of
2016, by which the learned single Judge allowed the said writ
petition preferred by the respondent herein and directed the
appellant Bank to allow the respondent herein – original writ
petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon as per the appointment
order dated 03.10.2016, the employer – Punjab National Bank has
preferred the present appeal.
2. Applications were invited by the appellant Bank for the post of
Peon by publishing an advertisement in the local newspaper. The
eligibility criteria mentioned in the said advertisement was that a
th
candidate should have passed 12 class or its equivalent with basic
reading/writing knowledge of English. It specifically provided that
a candidate should not be a Graduate as on 01.01.2016. A
candidate was also required to submit the biodata as per the
prescribed format. The respondent herein, though a Graduate,
applied for the said post. However, neither in the application nor in
the biodata, he disclosed that he was a graduate. At this stage, it
required to be noted that the eligibility criteria and the educational
3
qualification prescribed above was as per the Circular Letter No. 25
of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 issued by the Human Resources
Development Division (for short “HRD Division”) of the Bank
specifying the guidelines for recruitment of staff in subordinate
cadre in the bank and prescribing the eligibility criteria. That on
the basis of the information provided by the applicants in their
applications, a list of eligible candidates was prepared on the basis
th th
of the marks obtained in 10 Class and 12 Class. As per Circular
dated 04.03.2016 issued by the HRD Division of the Bank, the
selection of the peons was required to be made on the basis of the
th
percentage of marks obtained by the candidates in 10 standard
th
and 12 standard. That so far as the respondent herein – original
writ petitioner is concerned, based on the information provided by
him in his application, his name appeared in the selected
candidates of Balsar District. That an order of appointment was
issued. It appears that while scrutiny of the documents was going
on, the appellant Bank came to know about a graduate certificate
showing that the respondent – original writ petitioner was a
graduate since 2014. Thus, it was noticed and found that he was
4
not eligible as per the advertisement and the Circulars and that the
respondent deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressed the
fact that he was a graduate. Therefore, his candidature was
cancelled and he was not allowed to join the bank in subordinate
cadre. That, thereafter, the respondent filed the writ petition before
the High Court, being Writ Petition (C) No. 19261 of 2016, for an
appropriate order to allow him to discharge his duties as Peon as
per the appointment order dated 03.10.2016 and to further direct
that his appointment may not be cancelled on the ground that he
has possessed higher qualification. That the said petition was
opposed by the bank by filing a detailed affidavitinreply. It was
specifically pointed out that the eligibility criteria and the
educational qualification was fixed as per the Circular letter No. 25
of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 issued by the HRD Division of the Bank.
It was also pointed out that on 04.03.2016 the HRD Division issued
another Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 pursuant to the decision of the
Bank’s Board in their meeting dated 29.02.2016, by which it was
decided that the selection of the Peons will be made on the basis of
th
the percentage of marks obtained by the candidates in 10
5
th
standard and 12 standard. It was also submitted that the
respondent deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressed the
material fact that he was a graduate. It was pointed out that had it
been known to the bank that he was a graduate, he would not have
at all been considered for selection as a peon in the bank. Despite
the above, the learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the
said writ petition solely relying upon the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 69034 of 2019 [ Pankaj Kumar
], in which the Allahabad High
Dubey v. Punjab National Bank
Court referring to the judgment and order passed by this Court in
Civil Appeal No. 1010 of 2000 dated 11.02.2000 [ Mohd. Riazul
) held that a
Usman Gani v. District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur
candidate cannot be denied the appointment solely on the ground
that he is possessing a higher qualification. The learned single
Judge directed the bank to allow the respondent herein to discharge
his duties as a Peon as per the appointment order dated
03.10.2016.
2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the learned single Judge allowing the aforesaid writ
6
petition and directing the bank to allow the respondent –original
writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon as per the
appointment order dated 03.10.2016, the appellant Bank preferred
the writ appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. By the
impugned judgment and order, which as such is a nonspeaking
and unreasoned order, the Division Bench of the High Court has
dismissed the appeal and has not interfered with the judgment and
order passed by the learned single Judge. Hence, the present
appeal.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Bank
has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of
the case, more particularly, when in the advertisement it was
specifically mentioned that a candidate should not be a graduate as
on 01.01.2016 and that it specifically provided that a candidate
th
should have passed 12 class or its equivalent with basic
reading/writing knowledge of English and the educational
qualification/eligibility criteria mentioned in the advertisement was
as per Circulars dated 06.11.2008 and 04.03.2016 issued by the
HRD Division of the Bank and admittedly the respondent – original
7
writ petitioner was a graduate as on 01.01.2016 and therefore not
eligible even to apply, both, the learned single Judge as well as the
Division Bench of the High Court have materially erred in directing
the appellant Bank to allow the original writ petitioner to perform
his duties as a Peon pursuant to the appointment order dated
03.10.2016.
3.1 It is further submitted on behalf of the appellant Bank that in
the present case the original writ petitioner did not challenge the
eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the
advertisement. He never challenged the circular prescribing the
educational qualification/eligibility criteria. It is submitted that
once having not challenged the eligibility criteria/educational
qualification mentioned in the advertisement, and thereafter having
participated in the recruitment process, it is not open for him to
contend that he cannot be denied appointment on the ground of
having higher qualification.
3.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant Bank that the High Court has clearly erred
in relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court, in which
8
the decision of this Court in Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani (supra)
was relied upon. It is submitted that in the case of
Mohd. Riazul
Usman Gani (supra) this Court has specifically stated in Para 21
that the said decision is on the facts of the case in hand and should
not be understood as laying down a rule of universal application.
| 3.3 | | It is submitted that even otherwise it is required to be noted |
|---|
that the said Circulars dated 06.11.2008 and 04.03.2016 were
issued prescribing the eligibility criteria/educational qualification
on the basis of the decision approved by the Board of the Bank and
considering the nature of the post – Peon/subordinate cadre and a
conscious decision was taken by the bank that a candidate having
the qualification of graduation shall not be eligible and the
| candidate who passed in 12 | th | standard or its equivalent with basic |
|---|
reading/writing knowledge of English shall only be eligible. It is
submitted therefore apart from the fact that the original writ
petitioner did not challenge the eligibility criteria/educational
qualification mentioned in the advertisement, once a conscious
decision was taken by the employer – bank prescribing a specific
qualification, thereafter unless it is found to be most arbitrary, the
9
same cannot be the subjectmatter of a judicial review. Reliance is
| placed on the decisions of this Court in the cases of | J. |
|---|
| Rangaswamy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh | (1990) 1 SCC |
|---|
| 288, | Yogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi | (2003) 3 SCC |
|---|
| 548 and a recent decision of this Court in the case of | Zahoor |
|---|
| Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad | (2019) 2 SCC 404. |
|---|
| 3.4 | | It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on |
|---|
behalf of the appellant Bank that even otherwise on the ground that
the respondent – original writ petitioner deliberately and willfully
suppressed the material fact of having been graduate and did not
disclose the same even in the biodata which was required to be
submitted in the prescribed form, the High Court has materially
erred in directing the appellant Bank to allow the respondent –
original writ petitioner to perform his duties as a Peon as per the
appointment order dated 03.10.2016 which, as such, was already
cancelled. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the
| cases of | State of Orissa v. Bibhisan Kanhar | (2017) 8 SCC 608 |
|---|
| and in the case of | Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan |
|---|
10
| Yadav | (2003) 3 SCC 437. It is submitted that had it been known to |
|---|
the bank that he was a graduate, he would not have at all been
considered for selection as a Peon in the bank. It is submitted that
based on the biodata and the application submitted by him, in
| which he gave the particulars of having passed 12 | th | standard, his |
|---|
candidature was accepted. It is submitted that before he was
permitted to resume/join the duty, the bank came to know that he
was a graduate since 2014 and therefore was not eligible at all and
thereafter his candidature was cancelled and he was not allowed to
join the duty. It is submitted that therefore the High Court has
erred in directing the appellant bank to allow the respondent –
original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as Peon as per the
appointment order dated 03.10.2016.
| 4. | | The present appeal is vehemently opposed by the learned |
|---|
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – original writ
petitioner. It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the respondent –
original writ petitioner that as rightly held by the High Court relying
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Riazul Usman
Gani (supra) and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the
11
case of Pankaj Kumar Dubey (supra), the higher qualification
cannot be a disqualification. It is submitted that in the case of
(supra), this Court has deprecated the
Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani
criteria of maximum qualification for the post of Peon. It is
submitted that therefore, as such, the High Court has not
committed any error in directing the appellant Bank to permit the
respondent – original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a
Peon pursuant to the appointment order dated 03.10.2016. It is
submitted that the appointment of respondent – original writ
petitioner was cancelled mainly/solely on the ground that he was
having a higher qualification. It is submitted that in the present
case the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in
th
the advertisement was 12 standard and cannot be said to be a
maximum educational qualification and therefore merely because
the respondentoriginal writ petitioner was having a higher
th
qualification than 12 standard, his candidature could not have
been cancelled.
4.1 Making the above submission it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
12
5. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length. The appellant Bank invited the
applications for the post Peon by giving an advertisement in the
local newspaper. In the advertisement itself, it was specifically
th
mentioned that a candidate should have passed 12 class or its
equivalent with basic reading/writing knowledge of English and
should not be a graduate as on 01.01.2016. Thus, as per the
eligibility criteria mentioned in the advertisement, a candidate who
was having qualification of graduate was not eligible even to apply.
From the counter filed on behalf of the Bank before the High Court,
it appears that the educational qualification mentioned in the
advertisement was as per Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated
06.11.2008 issued by the HRD Division of the bank. The relevant
portion of the Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008 reads
as under:
“Age Minimum – 18 years
Maximum – 24 years with applicable relaxations.
th
Education: Pass in 12 Standard or its equivalent with
basic reading/writing knowledge of English (Graduates
are not eligible)”
13
5.1 It appears that thereafter on 04.03.2016 the HRD Division of
the Bank issued another Circular Letter No. 6 of 2016 indicating
therein that the process of conducting interviews for recruitment of
posts in subordinate cadre has since been discontinued, the Bank’s
Board in its meeting 29.02.2016 has approved an alternative
mechanism in lieu of interviews for recruitment of Peons in
subordinate cadre selection on the basis of percentage of marks
th th
obtained by the candidates in 10 standard and 12 standard.
Therefore, the appointments to the post of subordinate staff/Peons
were required to be made strictly in accordance with the eligibility
criteria mentioned in the Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated
06.11.2008 and the selection of the Peons was required to be made
as per Circular letter No. 6 of 2016 dated 04.3.2016.
5.2 It is not in dispute that pursuant to the said advertisement,
respondent herein – original writ petitioner applied for the post of
Peon. However, in the application/biodata, he did not disclose that
he is a graduate from 2014. He only mentioned his qualification as
th
12 pass. On the basis of the information provided by him in his
application, his application was entertained and he was selected on
14
th th
the basis of the marks obtained in 10 class and 12 class.
Therefore, the respondent – original writ petitioner deliberately,
wilfully and intentionally suppressed the fact that he was a
graduate. Had it been known to the bank that he was a graduate,
he would not have at all been considered for selection as a Peon in
the bank. That thereafter and before the original writ petitioner
was permitted to resume his duty pursuant to the appointment
order dated 03.10.2016, the bank came to know that he was a
graduate. That thereafter when scrutiny of the document was going
on, the original writ petitioner produced the graduate certification
showing that he was a graduate since 2014, the bank found that he
was not eligible as he did not fulfill the criteria mentioned in the
advertisement, and that he suppressed the material fact that he
was a graduate, his candidature came to be cancelled and he was
not allowed to join the bank in the subordinate cadre/Peon.
5.3 The learned Single Judge of the High Court by the judgment
and order allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondent and
directed the appellant Bank to allow the original writ petitioner to
discharge his duties as a Peon as per appointment order dated
15
03.10.2016 on the ground that as held by the Allahabad High Court
in the case of Pankaj Kumar Dubey (supra), in which the decision
of this Court in the case of (supra) was
Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani
relied upon, the higher qualification cannot be the qualification for
the post of Peon. Decision of the learned Single Judge has been
continuing by the Division Bench by impugned nonspeaking and
unreasoned order. Therefore, the short question which is posed for
consideration of this Court is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case and despite the fact that there was
suppression of the material fact by the respondent – original writ
petitioner in not disclosing in the application/biodata that he was
a graduate, the High Court is justified in directing the appellant
Bank to allow the respondent – original writ petitioner to discharge
his duties as a Peon as per appointment order dated 03.10.2016
which, as such, was cancelled?
6. It is required to be noted that the eligibility
criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the advertisement
inviting the applications was as per Circular letter No. 25 of 2008
dated 06.11.2008, the relevant portion of which is reproduced
16
hereinabove. As stated in the counter to the writ petition, a
conscious decision was taken by the bank providing eligibility
criteria/educational qualification that a graduate candidate shall
not be eligible for the post of Peon/subordinate staff. The said
decision was taken consciously looking to the nature of the post. At
this stage, it is required to be noted that the original writ petitioner
never challenged the eligibility criteria/educational qualification
mentioned in the advertisement. He participated in the recruitment
process on the basis of the advertisement, without challenging the
eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the
advertisement. Therefore, once having participated in the
recruitment process as per the advertisement, thereafter it is not
open for him to contend that acquisition of higher qualification
cannot be a disqualification and that too when he never challenged
the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in the
advertisement.
7. Even otherwise, prescribing the eligibility criteria/educational
qualification that a graduate shall not be eligible to apply was a
conscious decision taken by the Bank and the same was as per the
17
Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008. In the case of J.
| Rangaswamy | (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that it |
|---|
is not for the court to consider the relevance of qualifications
prescribed for various posts.
| 7.1 | | In the case of | Yogesh Kumar | (supra), it is observed and held |
|---|
by this Court that recruitment to public service should be held
strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the
recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to
ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have
competed for the post.
| 7.2 | | In a recent decision of this Court in the case of | Zahoor |
|---|
| Ahmad Rather | (supra), this Court has distinguished another |
|---|
| decision of this Court in the case of | Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public |
|---|
| Service Commission | (2010) 15 SCC 596 taking the view that in a |
|---|
case where lower qualification is prescribed, if a person has
acquired higher qualifications, such qualification can certainly be
stated to presuppose the acquisition of the lower qualifications
prescribed for the post. In the said decision, this Court also took
| note of another decision of this Court in the case of | State of |
|---|
18
| Punjab v. Anita | (2015) 2 SCC 170, in which case, this Court on |
|---|
| facts distinguished the decision in the case of | Jyoti K.K. | (supra). |
|---|
| While distinguishing the decision in the case of | Jyoti K.K. | (supra), |
|---|
it is observed in paras 25 and 26 as under:
| “25. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala<br>Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3<br>SCC (L&S) 664] has been considered in a judgment of<br>two learned Judges in State of Punjab v. Anita [State of<br>Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)<br>329] . In that case, applications were invited for JBT/ETT<br>qualified teachers. Under the rules, the prescribed<br>qualification for a JBT teacher included a Matric with a<br>two years' course in JBT training and knowledge of<br>Punjabi and Hindi of the Matriculation standard or its<br>equivalent. This Court held that none of the respondents<br>held the prescribed qualification and an MA, MSc or<br>MCom could not be treated as a “higher qualification”.<br>Adverting to the decision in Jyoti K.K. [Jyoti<br>K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC<br>596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] , this Court noted that<br>Rule 10(a)(ii) in that case clearly stipulated that the<br>possession of a higher qualification can presuppose the<br>acquisition of a lower qualification prescribed for the<br>post. In the absence of such a stipulation, it was held<br>that such a hypothesis could not be deduced: (Anita<br>case [State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015)<br>1 SCC (L&S) 329] , SCC p. 177, para 15) | |
|---|
| “15. It was sought to be asserted on the basis of<br>the aforesaid observations, that since the private<br>respondents possess higher qualifications, then the<br>qualification of JBT/ETT, they should be treated as<br>having fulfilled the qualification stipulated for the<br>posts of JBT/ETT Teachers. It is not possible for us |
19
| to accept the aforesaid submission of the learned<br>counsel for the private respondents, because the<br>statutory rules which were taken into consideration by<br>this Court while recording the aforesaid observations<br>inJyoti K.K. case [Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service<br>Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S)<br>664] , permitted the aforesaid course. The statutory<br>rule, in the decision relied on by the learned counsel<br>for the private respondents, is extracted hereunder:<br>(SCC p. 598, para 6) | | |
|---|
| | | |
| ‘6. Rule 10(a)(ii) reads as follows:<br>10. (a)(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained<br>in these Rules or in the Special Rules, the<br>qualifications recognised by executive orders or<br>Standing Orders of Government as equivalent to<br>a qualification specified for a post in the Special<br>Rules [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has<br>been emphasised in original.] and such of those<br>higher qualifications which presuppose the<br>acquisition of the lower qualification prescribed for<br>the post shall also be sufficient for the post.’ | | ‘6. Rule 10(a)(ii) reads as follows: | |
| | | |
| | | 10. (a)(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained<br>in these Rules or in the Special Rules, the<br>qualifications recognised by executive orders or<br>Standing Orders of Government as equivalent to<br>a qualification specified for a post in the Special<br>Rules [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has<br>been emphasised in original.] and such of those<br>higher qualifications which presuppose the<br>acquisition of the lower qualification prescribed for<br>the post shall also be sufficient for the post.’ |
| (emphasis supplied) | | | |
| A perusal of the Rule clearly reveals that the<br>possession of higher qualification would presuppose<br>the acquisition of the lower qualification prescribed for<br>the posts. Insofar as the present controversy is<br>concerned, there is no similar statutory provision<br>authorising the appointment of persons with higher<br>qualifications.” | | |
| (emphasis supplied) | | | |
| | | |
| 26. We are in respectful agreement with the<br>interpretation which has been placed on the judgment | | | |
20
in Jyoti K.K. [ Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service
Commission , (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S)
664] in the subsequent decision in Anita [ State of
Punjab v. Anita , (2015) 2 SCC 170 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
329] . The decision in [ v.
Jyoti K.K. Jyoti K.K. Kerala
Public Service Commission , (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3
SCC (L&S) 664] turned on the provisions of Rule 10( a )( ii ).
Absent such a rule, it would not be permissible to draw
an inference that a higher qualification necessarily
presupposes the acquisition of another, albeit lower,
qualification. The prescription of qualifications for a post
is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as the
employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a
condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function
of judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the
prescribed qualifications. Similarly, equivalence of a
qualification is not a matter which can be determined in
exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a
particular qualification should or should not be regarded
as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting
authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K. [ Jyoti
K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission , (2010) 15 SCC
596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 664] turned on a specific
statutory rule under which the holding of a higher
qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower
qualification. The absence of such a rule in the present
case makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome.
In this view of the matter, the Division Bench [ Imtiyaz
Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather , LPA (SW) No. 135 of
2017, decided on 12102017 (J&K)] of the High Court
was justified in reversing the judgment [
Zahoor Ahmad
Rather v. State of J&K , 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936] of the
learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion
that the appellants did not meet the prescribed
qualifications. We find no error in the decision [ Imtiyaz
Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather , LPA (SW) No. 135 of
21
2017, decided on 12102017 (J&K)] of the Division
Bench.”
That thereafter it is observed in para 27 as under:
While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the
27.
State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several
features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes
requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the
functionality of a qualification and the content of the
course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a
qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to
assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies of
administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of
administrative decisionmaking. The State as a public
employer may well take into account social perspectives
that require the creation of job opportunities across the
societal structure. All these are essentially matters of
policy. Judicial review must tread warily. That is why the
decision in Jyoti K.K. [ Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service
Commission , (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S)
664] must be understood in the context of a specific
statutory rule under which the holding of a higher
qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a
lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the
post. It was in the context of specific rule that the
decision in Jyoti K.K. [ Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service
Commission , (2010) 15 SCC 596 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S)
664] turned.
7.3 Thus, as held by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is for
the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability
of the qualifications for any post and it is not for the Courts to
22
consider and assess. A greater latitude is permitted by the Courts
for the employer to prescribe qualifications for any post. There is a
rationale behind it. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view
the need and interest of an Institution or an Industry or an
establishment as the case may be. The Courts are not fit
instruments to assess expediency or advisability or utility of such
prescription of qualifications. However, at the same time, the
employer cannot act arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing
qualifications for posts. In the present case, prescribing the
eligibility criteria/educational qualification that a graduate
candidate shall not be eligible and the candidate must have passed
| 12 | th | standard is justified and as observed hereinabove, it is a |
|---|
conscious decision taken by the Bank which is in force since 2008.
Therefore, the High Court has clearly erred in directing the
appellant Bank to allow the respondentoriginal writ petitioner to
discharge his duties as a Peon, though he as such was not eligible
as per the eligibility criteria/educational qualification mentioned in
the advertisement.
23
| 8. | | Even on the ground that respondent – original writ petitioner |
|---|
deliberately, wilfully and intentionally suppressed the fact that he
was a graduate, the High Court has erred in directing the appellant
Bank to allow the respondent – original writ petitioner to discharge
his duties as a Peon. In the application/biodata, the respondent
original writ petitioner did not mention that he was a graduate.
Very cleverly he suppressed the material fact and declared his
qualification as H.S.C., whereas as a matter of fact, he was holding
a degree in the Bachelor in Arts. Had it been known to the bank
that he was a graduate, he would not have at all been considered
for selection as a Peon in the bank. That thereafter when scrutiny
of the documents was going on and when the respondent – original
writ petitioner produced a graduation certificate, at that time, the
bank came to know that he was a graduate and therefore not
eligible and therefore the bank rightly cancelled his candidature
and he was not allowed to join the bank in the subordinate cadre.
Therefore, on the aforesaid ground alone, the High Court ought not
to have allowed the writ petition when it was a clear case of
24
suppression of material fact by the original writ petitioner. An
employee is expected to give a correct information as to his
qualification. The original writ petitioner failed to do so. He was in
fact overqualified and therefore ineligible to apply for the job. In
fact, by such conduct on the part of the respondent –original writ
petitioner, one another righteous candidate has suffered for his
| mischievous act. As held by this Court in the case of | Ram Ratan |
|---|
| Yadav | (supra), suppression of material information and making a |
|---|
false statement has a clear bearing on the character and
antecedents of the employee in relation to his continuance in
service. A candidate having suppressed the material information
and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continuance in
service. Thus, on the ground of suppression of material information
and the facts and as the respondent – original writ petitioner even
otherwise was not eligible as per the eligibility criteria/educational
qualification mentioned in the advertisement which was as per
Circular letter No. 25 of 2008 dated 06.11.2008, the bank rightly
25
cancelled his candidature and rightly did not permit him to resume
his duty.
| 9. | | On reading the judgment and order passed by the learned |
|---|
single Judge it appears that the learned single Judge has not at all
considered the aforesaid aspect of suppression of material fact and
information. So far as the impugned order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court, as such it is a nonspeaking and
unreasoned order, without even stating any facts.
| 10. | | In view of the above and for the reasons state above, the |
|---|
impugned order dated 22.11.2019 passed by the Division Bench of
the High Court and the judgment and order passed by the learned
single Judge of the High Court dated 13.03.2019 in W.P. (C) No.
19261 of 2016 directing the appellant Bank to allow the respondent
– original writ petitioner to discharge his duties as a Peon as per
appointment order dated 03.11.2016 is unsustainable and deserves
to quashed and set aside and are accordingly quashed and set
aside. The appeal is allowed. However, considering the fact that
the post in question was a subordinate staff post/Peon, and despite
26
the fact that because of the mischievous act on the part of the
original writ petitioner, one candidate could not get the job, we
refrain from imposing the cost and leave the matter there.
…………………………..J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
………………………….J.
(R. SUBHASH REDDY)
…………………………..J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi,
November 3, 2020
