Full Judgment Text
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 511
CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.2466 of 2020)
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. APPELLANT
VERSUS
GOPU & ANR. RESPONDENTS
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against an order dated
01.03.2019, passed by the High Court of Kerala in MACA No.627 of
2016, by which the compensation awarded to the claimants by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha (for short, `the
Tribunal’) was enhanced.
3. On 02.06.2000 at 3.00 P.M., the deceased was riding
st
pillion on a motorcycle being driven by one V.G. Shibu, 1
respondent before the Tribunal. Near the Avalookunnu Post office,
respondent No.1 applied sudden brake to save a cyclist and the
deceased fell and was injured. Ultimately, the deceased succumbed
to her injuries on 07.06.2000 at the Medical College Hospital. It
is alleged that the accident was due to the rash and negligent
driving by the bike driver. The owner and driver were ex-parte in
the Tribunal.
4. The legal representatives of the deceased, husband
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.04.19
10:33:41 IST
Reason:
and two minor children, preferred a claim petition under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.6,53,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh
2
Fifty Three Thousand only). Against the award dated 23.11.2006,
after 10 years, in 2016, the children alone preferred an appeal
before the High Court. The High Court of Kerala enhanced the
compensation from Rs.6,53,000/- to Rs.14,95,000/- and further
directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay interest @ 7% p.a.
interest. This is the order which has been challenged before us.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
perused the material placed on record.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submits
the deceased was working as a Junior Public Health Nurse at PHC,
Thenipalam and was getting an amount of Rs.5,955/- per month. The
appellants Gopu and Goukul are her children, who were minors, when
the deceased aged 32 died as a result of the accident. Learned
counsel submits that just amount was not awarded by the Tribunal;
as after the death of Rasimol (the deceased), three Pay Commission
Reports dated 25.03.2006, 26.02.2011 and 20.01.2016 were
implemented. And a considerable increase in the salary was
recommended in the Pay Commission. Learned counsel contends that
the future prospects and the hike in salary was not considered by
the Tribunal while awarding compensation.
7. Per contra , learned counsel for the appellant-
Insurance Company submits that there are discrepancies in the
judgment of the High Court in apportioning the enhanced
compensation and that the cause of action had occurred in the year
2000, hence the salary received at the time of accident alone can
be considered. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment
passed by the High Court is not sustainable in the eye of law as
3
respondent No.1-Gopu himself attained majority in the year 2011 as
per his affidavit filed with the MAC appeal in year 2016 and he has
not given any satisfactory explanation as to why the MAC Appeal was
not filed immediately thereafter; when he attained majority. The
respondents/claimants have filed the MAC appeal after 10 years of
the award and further after about 8 years (2877 days) from the date
of attaining majority.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents rely upon
Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which read as under:
“6.Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to
institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is, at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane,
or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the disability
has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from
the time specified therefor in the third column of the
Schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two
such disabilities, or where, before his disability has
ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may
institute the suit or make the application within the
same period after both disabilities have ceased, as
would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified.
(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of
that person, his legal representative may institute the
suit or make the application within the same period
after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed
from the time so specified.
(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-
section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person
whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the
rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply.
(5) Where a person under disability dies after the
disability ceases but within the period allowed to him
under this section, his legal representative may
institute the suit or make the application within the
same period after the death, as would otherwise have
been available to that person had he not died.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’
includes a child in the womb.
4
7.Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of
several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or
make an application for the execution of a decree is
under any such disability, and a discharge can be given
without the concurrence of such person, time will run
against them all; but, where no such discharge can be
given, time will not run as against any of them until
one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge
without the concurrence of the others or until the
disability has ceased.
Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from
every kind of liability, including a liability in
respect of any immovable property.
Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the
Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the
Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a
discharge without the concurrence of the other members
of the family only if he is in management of the joint
family property”
9. Section 6, of the Limitation Act, 1963, as is evident
from the extract enables a person disabled, by reason of minority,
insanity or idiocy, to institute a suit or make an application for
the execution of a ‘ decree’, within the period of limitation
provided, after the disability has ceased. The provision applies
only with respect to a suit or an application for the execution of
a decree and not in an appeal or any other proceeding. Here, we
must notice the definition clause, Section 2(l) which though does
not define a suit but provides that ‘ a suit does not include an
appeal or an application ’. An appeal, an application and a suit are
hence dealt with differently insofar as the Limitation Act is
concerned, as evidenced from Section 3 also. In this context, we
have also to notice the distinction, insofar as Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, providing for admission of an appeal, or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions
5
of Order XXI of the C.P.C., even after the prescribed period, if
sufficient cause is shown to satisfy the Court.
10. It is pertinent that till the Act of 1963 came into
effect applications for execution of the decree were not
specifically excluded from the purview of the provision allowing
condonation of delay, (Section 5(b) of the Limitation Act of 1871
and Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908) which was excluded for
the first time under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. It has been held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit in
1
Ajay Gupta v. Raju . Likewise legal disabilities specified in
Section 6 creates an exemption and enables the period of limitation
to run from the date on which the disability has ceased, only in
the case of a suit or an application for the execution of a decree;
the last of which we already noticed is excluded under Section 5.
11. In this context, we refer to the decision of the
Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah
2
Khan [ILR (1890) 12 All 461 (FB)] and make the following extract
from Mahmood, J’s opinion which was concurred by all the other
three Hon’ble Judges:
“What effect the minority of some of the defendants
has upon the case is the subject of the second
question as enunciated by me. And upon this point, I
am of the opinion that the defendants-respondents have
no case. It is true that some of them are minors, but
they are duly represented by guardians whose interests
are the same as theirs, and the fact of minority could
not prevent the guardians from showing due diligence
on behalf of the minors. It is noticeable that Section
7 of the Limitation Act, in extending the period of
limitation on account of minority, refers only to
suits and applications and makes no mention of
1 (2016) 14 SCC 314
2 1890 SCC OnLine All 1
6
appeals, and its provisions are, therefore,
unavailable to the minor defendants.”
Section 7 referred to in the above extract is from the: Limitation
Act (XV of 1877) and the provisions we are concerned with also is
similarly worded, without any mention of appeals.
3
12. In Musthafali v. Subair , the High Court of Kerala
considering the word ‘suit’ used in Section 6 and defined in the
Limitation Act held that the proceedings under Section 110A of the
Motor Vehicles Act are in the nature of a suit under the Code of
Civil Procedure; since the lis is instituted by presentation of an
application, which is more or less like a plaint. The Division
Bench of the High Court relied on a Constitution Bench decision of
this Court in H.H. Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of
4
Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan which held
“A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or
petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claimant is
not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil
court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within
Section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure..” [sic paragraph 5].
Impliedly, the exemption by reason of a disability applies to the
institution of an original proceeding or an application for
execution of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of an
appeal. Appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and if,
as is the case here, when the original proceeding was instituted at
the time of minority, why should there be a subsequent disability
inferred, when the natural guardian, the father, who instituted the
appeal was alive and did not suffer from any disability himself,
3 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 269
4 1963 SCC OnLine SC 119
7
even when the appeal period stood expired. The above observation of
ours may not be taken as Section 6 being applicable to appeals,
which the legislature did not intend.
13. In the present case, the father as the natural guardian
has instituted the original proceeding before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, filed for compensation on the death of his wife in
a motor vehicle accident, with both the minor children in the party
array of claimants, represented by the father, the natural
guardian. The father did not choose to file an appeal from the
award. In fact, as per Annexure P-4, it is seen that the Insurance
Company had filed an appeal from the award of the Tribunal on the
ground of the policy not covering the risk of a pillion rider,
which stood dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court, based
on a clarification issued by the Insurance Regulatory Development
Authority that a package policy will also cover the risk of a
pillion rider. In the said appeal the father and the two minor
children were made parties, and they appeared through counsel. The
father did not choose to file a cross appeal seeking enhancement of
the claim amounts. The father who is the natural guardian took a
conscious decision not to file an appeal and was satisfied with the
award. The statements made in the application for condonation of
delay, that; the father had married again; the children were
abandoned; who were in the care of their grandparents are not
substantiated. We make this observation fully conscious of the fact
that any substantiation would also have not enabled the filing of
an appeal under Section 6, the exemption under which, based on a
disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution of
8
a decree. The intention of the legislature being very clear, it is
not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced
sympathies. Even Section 5 has no application in the facts of the
case, insofar as the long delay occasioned, especially when in the
original proceedings, the children were represented by the father,
the natural guardian.
14. On the above reasoning, we set aside the judgment of the
learned Single Judge finding the appeal filed to be grossly delayed
and hence not maintainable. The appeal stands allowed.
.........................J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
........................J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 08, 2025.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2025 INSC 511
CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.2466 of 2020)
THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. APPELLANT
VERSUS
GOPU & ANR. RESPONDENTS
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against an order dated
01.03.2019, passed by the High Court of Kerala in MACA No.627 of
2016, by which the compensation awarded to the claimants by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha (for short, `the
Tribunal’) was enhanced.
3. On 02.06.2000 at 3.00 P.M., the deceased was riding
st
pillion on a motorcycle being driven by one V.G. Shibu, 1
respondent before the Tribunal. Near the Avalookunnu Post office,
respondent No.1 applied sudden brake to save a cyclist and the
deceased fell and was injured. Ultimately, the deceased succumbed
to her injuries on 07.06.2000 at the Medical College Hospital. It
is alleged that the accident was due to the rash and negligent
driving by the bike driver. The owner and driver were ex-parte in
the Tribunal.
4. The legal representatives of the deceased, husband
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.04.19
10:33:41 IST
Reason:
and two minor children, preferred a claim petition under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.6,53,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh
2
Fifty Three Thousand only). Against the award dated 23.11.2006,
after 10 years, in 2016, the children alone preferred an appeal
before the High Court. The High Court of Kerala enhanced the
compensation from Rs.6,53,000/- to Rs.14,95,000/- and further
directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay interest @ 7% p.a.
interest. This is the order which has been challenged before us.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully
perused the material placed on record.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent-claimants submits
the deceased was working as a Junior Public Health Nurse at PHC,
Thenipalam and was getting an amount of Rs.5,955/- per month. The
appellants Gopu and Goukul are her children, who were minors, when
the deceased aged 32 died as a result of the accident. Learned
counsel submits that just amount was not awarded by the Tribunal;
as after the death of Rasimol (the deceased), three Pay Commission
Reports dated 25.03.2006, 26.02.2011 and 20.01.2016 were
implemented. And a considerable increase in the salary was
recommended in the Pay Commission. Learned counsel contends that
the future prospects and the hike in salary was not considered by
the Tribunal while awarding compensation.
7. Per contra , learned counsel for the appellant-
Insurance Company submits that there are discrepancies in the
judgment of the High Court in apportioning the enhanced
compensation and that the cause of action had occurred in the year
2000, hence the salary received at the time of accident alone can
be considered. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment
passed by the High Court is not sustainable in the eye of law as
3
respondent No.1-Gopu himself attained majority in the year 2011 as
per his affidavit filed with the MAC appeal in year 2016 and he has
not given any satisfactory explanation as to why the MAC Appeal was
not filed immediately thereafter; when he attained majority. The
respondents/claimants have filed the MAC appeal after 10 years of
the award and further after about 8 years (2877 days) from the date
of attaining majority.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents rely upon
Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which read as under:
“6.Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to
institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is, at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane,
or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the
application within the same period after the disability
has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from
the time specified therefor in the third column of the
Schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the
prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two
such disabilities, or where, before his disability has
ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may
institute the suit or make the application within the
same period after both disabilities have ceased, as
would otherwise have been allowed from the time so
specified.
(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of
that person, his legal representative may institute the
suit or make the application within the same period
after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed
from the time so specified.
(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-
section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person
whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the
rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply.
(5) Where a person under disability dies after the
disability ceases but within the period allowed to him
under this section, his legal representative may
institute the suit or make the application within the
same period after the death, as would otherwise have
been available to that person had he not died.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’
includes a child in the womb.
4
7.Disability of one of several persons.—Where one of
several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or
make an application for the execution of a decree is
under any such disability, and a discharge can be given
without the concurrence of such person, time will run
against them all; but, where no such discharge can be
given, time will not run as against any of them until
one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge
without the concurrence of the others or until the
disability has ceased.
Explanation I.—This section applies to a discharge from
every kind of liability, including a liability in
respect of any immovable property.
Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, the
Manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the
Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a
discharge without the concurrence of the other members
of the family only if he is in management of the joint
family property”
9. Section 6, of the Limitation Act, 1963, as is evident
from the extract enables a person disabled, by reason of minority,
insanity or idiocy, to institute a suit or make an application for
the execution of a ‘ decree’, within the period of limitation
provided, after the disability has ceased. The provision applies
only with respect to a suit or an application for the execution of
a decree and not in an appeal or any other proceeding. Here, we
must notice the definition clause, Section 2(l) which though does
not define a suit but provides that ‘ a suit does not include an
appeal or an application ’. An appeal, an application and a suit are
hence dealt with differently insofar as the Limitation Act is
concerned, as evidenced from Section 3 also. In this context, we
have also to notice the distinction, insofar as Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, providing for admission of an appeal, or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions
5
of Order XXI of the C.P.C., even after the prescribed period, if
sufficient cause is shown to satisfy the Court.
10. It is pertinent that till the Act of 1963 came into
effect applications for execution of the decree were not
specifically excluded from the purview of the provision allowing
condonation of delay, (Section 5(b) of the Limitation Act of 1871
and Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1908) which was excluded for
the first time under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. It has been held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit in
1
Ajay Gupta v. Raju . Likewise legal disabilities specified in
Section 6 creates an exemption and enables the period of limitation
to run from the date on which the disability has ceased, only in
the case of a suit or an application for the execution of a decree;
the last of which we already noticed is excluded under Section 5.
11. In this context, we refer to the decision of the
Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah
2
Khan [ILR (1890) 12 All 461 (FB)] and make the following extract
from Mahmood, J’s opinion which was concurred by all the other
three Hon’ble Judges:
“What effect the minority of some of the defendants
has upon the case is the subject of the second
question as enunciated by me. And upon this point, I
am of the opinion that the defendants-respondents have
no case. It is true that some of them are minors, but
they are duly represented by guardians whose interests
are the same as theirs, and the fact of minority could
not prevent the guardians from showing due diligence
on behalf of the minors. It is noticeable that Section
7 of the Limitation Act, in extending the period of
limitation on account of minority, refers only to
suits and applications and makes no mention of
1 (2016) 14 SCC 314
2 1890 SCC OnLine All 1
6
appeals, and its provisions are, therefore,
unavailable to the minor defendants.”
Section 7 referred to in the above extract is from the: Limitation
Act (XV of 1877) and the provisions we are concerned with also is
similarly worded, without any mention of appeals.
3
12. In Musthafali v. Subair , the High Court of Kerala
considering the word ‘suit’ used in Section 6 and defined in the
Limitation Act held that the proceedings under Section 110A of the
Motor Vehicles Act are in the nature of a suit under the Code of
Civil Procedure; since the lis is instituted by presentation of an
application, which is more or less like a plaint. The Division
Bench of the High Court relied on a Constitution Bench decision of
this Court in H.H. Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of
4
Udaipur v. State of Rajasthan which held
“A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or
petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claimant is
not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil
court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within
Section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure..” [sic paragraph 5].
Impliedly, the exemption by reason of a disability applies to the
institution of an original proceeding or an application for
execution of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of an
appeal. Appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and if,
as is the case here, when the original proceeding was instituted at
the time of minority, why should there be a subsequent disability
inferred, when the natural guardian, the father, who instituted the
appeal was alive and did not suffer from any disability himself,
3 1991 SCC OnLine Ker 269
4 1963 SCC OnLine SC 119
7
even when the appeal period stood expired. The above observation of
ours may not be taken as Section 6 being applicable to appeals,
which the legislature did not intend.
13. In the present case, the father as the natural guardian
has instituted the original proceeding before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, filed for compensation on the death of his wife in
a motor vehicle accident, with both the minor children in the party
array of claimants, represented by the father, the natural
guardian. The father did not choose to file an appeal from the
award. In fact, as per Annexure P-4, it is seen that the Insurance
Company had filed an appeal from the award of the Tribunal on the
ground of the policy not covering the risk of a pillion rider,
which stood dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court, based
on a clarification issued by the Insurance Regulatory Development
Authority that a package policy will also cover the risk of a
pillion rider. In the said appeal the father and the two minor
children were made parties, and they appeared through counsel. The
father did not choose to file a cross appeal seeking enhancement of
the claim amounts. The father who is the natural guardian took a
conscious decision not to file an appeal and was satisfied with the
award. The statements made in the application for condonation of
delay, that; the father had married again; the children were
abandoned; who were in the care of their grandparents are not
substantiated. We make this observation fully conscious of the fact
that any substantiation would also have not enabled the filing of
an appeal under Section 6, the exemption under which, based on a
disability, is confined to suits and applications for execution of
8
a decree. The intention of the legislature being very clear, it is
not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced
sympathies. Even Section 5 has no application in the facts of the
case, insofar as the long delay occasioned, especially when in the
original proceedings, the children were represented by the father,
the natural guardian.
14. On the above reasoning, we set aside the judgment of the
learned Single Judge finding the appeal filed to be grossly delayed
and hence not maintainable. The appeal stands allowed.
.........................J.
(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)
........................J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 08, 2025.