DASHRATH SINGH CHAUHAN vs. C.B.I.

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 09-10-2018

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1276  OF 2010 Dashrath Singh Chauhan               ….Appellant(s) VERSUS Central Bureau of Investigation    ….Respondent(s)                   J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final judgment   and   order   dated   20.07.2009   passed   by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal   No.447   of   2001   whereby   the   High   Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.10.09 16:01:01 IST Reason: and upheld his conviction and sentence awarded by 1 order   dated   31.05.2001   passed   by   the   Special Judge, Delhi in C.C. No.53 of 1995 acquitting him of  the  charge under  Section 120­B of  the  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and convicting him for the charges under Sections 7,   13(2)   read   with   13(1)(d)   of   the   Prevention   of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC   Act”)  and   sentenced   him   to   undergo   rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.40,000/­ under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act cumulatively, in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for six months.   2) In order to appreciate the issues involved in this appeal, few facts need mention hereinbelow. 3) In short, the case of the prosecution is that the appellant was an employee of Delhi Electric Supply 2 Undertaking (DESU). At the relevant time, he was working on the post of Inspector.  4) On 28.03.1995, the complainant­Arun Kumar (PW­1)  lodged   an  FIR   under   Section   7   read   with Section 13(2) of the PC Act against the appellant and   another  employee  of  DESU namely,  Rajinder Kumar complaining  inter alia  that in January 1995, he applied for installation of an electric connection for   his   factory   and   for   that   purpose   he   met   the appellant in his office where he demanded from him Rs.4000/­ for doing the abovesaid work and told him that unless he pays a sum of Rs.4000/­ as bribe to him, it is not possible to install the electric connection.  5) On the basis of the said FIR, the CBI through its   Inspector­   Mr.   Kaul   (PW­6)   formed   a   raiding party on 29.03.1995 to implicate the appellant and 3 then reached to his office with one shadow witness Mahinder (PW­2).  6) On reaching the office, the Complainant told the   appellant   that   he   has   brought   Rs.4000/­   as demanded by him. The appellant, however, told the Complainant   to   give   the   said   money   to   Rajinder Kumar,   who   accepted   the   money   from   him.   No sooner Rajinder Kumar accepted the money, than PW­2 and PW­6 entered in the room and caught Rajinder Kumar with the bribe money. 7) This led to initiation of the prosecution of the appellant   and   co­accused   Rajinder   Kumar   for commission   of   the   offences   punishable   under Sections 7, 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act read with Section 120­B of IPC in the Court of Special Judge   Delhi.   The   prosecution   examined   their witnesses to prove the three charges framed against 4 both   the   accused.   The   appellant   also   adduced defense evidence.  8) By judgment dated 31.05.2001, the Trial Court (Special Judge) held that the prosecution failed to prove   the   case   of   any   conspiracy   between   the appellant (A­1) and co­accused Rajinder Kumar (A­ 2)   in   relation   to   the   offences   in   question   and, therefore,   the   charge   of   conspiracy   against   them under Section 120­B  IPC was held as not made out. Both the accused were, therefore, acquitted of the charge of conspiracy under Section 120­B  IPC.  9) The finding on this issue recorded by the Trial Court in Paras 14 and 16 reads as under:­  “ 14. In the case before us, there is not even slightest evidence about the existence of a criminal conspiracy between A­1 and A­2. Once this had been established, only then we could have read the statement of both the accused, not only against each one of them, but against the other of them and also for proving the existence of criminal conspiracy as such.  5 16.There is no such situation before us. There   are   certain   statements   only.   In   any case,   once   conspiracy   is   not   established, even the statement, made by A­1 against A­2 are vice­versa, cannot be read in evidence.”    10) The Trial Court then disbelieved the evidence of the Investigating Officer­Mr. Kaul (PW­6) on the ground that he himself was of a doubtful integrity because the High Court, in one case, had directed registration   of   a   bribe   case   against   him   and, therefore, his evidence in this case cannot be relied on (See Para 17 of the judgment of the Trial Court) but the Trial Court believed the evidence of shadow witness   (PW­2   ­   Mahinder   Lal)   for   holding   the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under the PC Act. 11)  The Trial Court accordingly acquitted Rajinder Kumar (A­2) from all the charges but convicted the appellant(A­1)   for   the   offences   punishable   under 6 Sections 7 and 13 (2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.  12) The State, however, accepted the judgment of the Trial Court and did not file any appeal against the acquittal of Rajinder Kumar nor even file any appeal against the acquittal of the appellant from the offence under Section 120­B IPC. 13) The   appellant   (A­1),   felt   aggrieved   by   his conviction   and   sentence   under   the   PC   Act,   filed criminal   appeal   in   the   High   Court   at   Delhi.   By impugned   order,   the   High   Court   dismissed   the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court which has given rise to filing of the present appeal by way of special leave by the appellant(A­1) in this Court. 14) Heard learned counsel for the parties. 15) Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant (A­1) while assailing the legality 7 and   correctness   of   the   impugned   order   mainly argued two points.  16) In the first place, learned counsel contended that   the   Trial   Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court having rightly acquitted both the accused (A­1 and A­2)   insofar   as   the   offence   of   conspiracy   under Section   120­B   is   concerned   and   further   having rightly acquitted Rajinder Kumar (A­2) from all the charges   under   the   PC   Act   but   erred   in   not acquitting   the   appellant(A­1)   from   the   offences under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of  the PC Act. 17) It was his submission that once the charge of conspiracy under Section 120­B IPC was held as "not proved" against the appellant(A­1) and the co­ accused Rajinder Kumar(A­2) and further its benefit was rightly extended to Rajinder Kumar (A­2) for his clean acquittal from the charges under the PC Act, 8 the same benefit should have been extended to the appellant(A­1) as well.  18) In   the   second   place,   the   learned   counsel contended that the appellant’s conviction is based only on the evidence of a shadow witness (PW­2) whereas  the   evidence  of   the  Investigation  Officer, Mr.   Kaul   (PW­6)   was   not   believed   due   to   his doubtful integrity.  19) It   was   his   submission   that   the   basic requirements   in   such   a   case,   namely,   proving   of "demand   of   bribe   and   its   acceptance   by   the appellant"   was   not   proved   much   less   beyond reasonable doubt. It was urged that at best what the prosecution was able to prove was the “demand" of bribe made by the appellant to the Complainant but not “its acceptance” because the evidence, in clear terms, established coupled with the findings of the Courts below that the appellant did not accept 9 the money but it was accepted and recovered from the possession of Rajinder Kumar(A­1).  20) It   was,   therefore,   urged   that   since   the acceptance of bribe money was not proved  qua  the appellant   and   nor   it   was   proved   that   Rajinder Kumar   accepted   it   for   and   on   behalf   of   the appellant, the appellant’s conviction under any of the   provisions   of   the   PC   Act   much   less   under Sections 7, 13(2) read with   Section 13(1)(d)   was not legally sustainable and hence it deserves to be set aside.   21) In reply, learned counsel for the respondent (CBI) supported the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two Courts below and contended that no case for any interference in the impugned judgment   is   made   out   and   hence   the   appeal   be dismissed.  10 22) Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 23) It is not in dispute that the prosecution had framed three charges against the appellant and co­ accused­Rajinder Kumar and two out of the three charges, namely, Charge Nos. 1 and 2 were based on the conspiracy. It is also not in dispute that the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence, held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge of conspiracy   under   Section   120­B   IPC   against   the appellant and Rajinder Kumar (A­1) and accordingly acquitted both of them from the said charge.  It is also   not   in   dispute   that   so   far   as   co­accused­ Rajinder   Kumar   (A­1)   is   concerned,   he   was acquitted from all the charges framed under the PC Act. It is also not in dispute that the State neither 11 challenged  the  clean acquittal  of  Rajinder  Kumar and   nor   challenged   the   part   acquittal   of   the appellant in the High Court by filing any appeal. This, therefore, attained finality.     24)   In substance, the charges against both the accused   were   that   the   appellant   entered   into   a criminal   conspiracy   with   Rajinder   Kumar   to demand   and   accept   illegal   bribe   money   of   Rs. 4000/­   from   the   Complainant­Arun   Kumar   as   a motive or reward for showing him official favour in the   matter   of   installation   of   electricity   power connection   and,   in   furtherance   thereof,   the appellant   on   28.03.1995   as   also   on   29.03.1995 around 11.30 AM to 11.55 AM in the DESU office demanded   Rs.4000/­   from   the   complainant   and directed   him   to   pay   the   said   money   to   Rajinder Kumar­co accused, who accepted the said money on his behalf. 12 25) In   our   considered   opinion,   when   the   charge against both the accused in relation to conspiracy was   not   held   proved   and   both   the   accused   were acquitted   from   the   said   charge   which,   in   turn, resulted in clean acquittal of Rajinder Kumar from all   the   charges   under   the   PC   Act,   a   fortiori ,   the appellant   too   was   entitled   for   his   clean   acquittal from the charges under the PC Act.  26) It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant had conspired with another person and even though the identity of the other person was not established,   yet   the   appellant   held   guilty   for   the offence under Section 120­B IPC. On the contrary, we find that the case of the prosecution was that the appellant conspired with one Rajinder Kumar to accept the sum of Rs.4000/­ as illegal gratification from Arun Kumar­the complainant.  13 27) Once   Rajinder   Kumar   so   also   the   appellant stood   acquitted   in   respect   of   the   charge   of conspiracy and further Rajinder Kumar­ co­accused was also acquitted from the charges under the PC Act,   the  charges  against  the  appellant  must  also necessarily fall on the ground. ( See Para 15 Bhagat Ram vs. State of Rajasthan,  (1972) 2 SCC 466).  28) Even   assuming   that   despite   the   appellant being acquitted of the charge relating to conspiracy and notwithstanding the clean acquittal of Rajinder Kumar from all the charges, the prosecuton failed ot prove   the   charge   against   the   appellant   under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.  29) It is for the reason that in order to prove a case against   the   appellant,   it   was   necessary   for   the prosecution   to   prove   the   twin   requirement   of “demand and the acceptance of the bribe amount by 14 the appellant”.  As mentioned above, it was the case of the prosecution in the charge that the appellant did not accept the bribe money but the money was accepted   and   recovered   from   the   possession   of Rajinder Kumar–co­accused (A­1).  30) In such circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that the appellant directly accepted the money from the Complainant. Since the plea of conspiracy against the appellant and Rajinder Kumar failed, it cannot be held that money (Rs.4000/­) recovered from the possession of Rajinder Kumar was as a fact the bribe money meant for the appellant for holding   him   guilty   for   the   offences   punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. It is more so when the benefit of such acquittal from the charge of conspiracy was given to Rajinder Kumar but was not given to the appellant.   15 31) In our view, the prosecution, therefore, failed to prove the factum of acceptance of bribe money of Rs.4000/­ by the appellant from the Complainant on 29.03.1995 as per the charges framed against him. 32)  Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections 7, 13(2) read 13(1)(d) of PC Act, the prosecution was under   a   legal   obligation   to   prove   the   twin requirements of “demand and acceptance of bribe money by the accused”, the proving of one alone but not the other was not sufficient.  The appellant is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges framed against him under the PC Act too. ( See para 8 of M.K. Harshan  vs.  State of Kerala,  (1996) 11 SCC 720) 33)     In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   the appeal   succeeds   and   is   accordingly   allowed.   The impugned judgment is set aside. The conviction and 16 the   sentence   awarded   to   the   appellant   under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act by the Courts below are set aside and the appellant is set free from the said charges.  34) If  the  appellant  is  already  on bail,  it is  not necessary for him to surrender.      ………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                            ...……..................................J.                     [INDU MALHOTRA] New Delhi; October 09, 2018  17