Full Judgment Text
2024 INSC 361
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No.1842 of 2024
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 396 of 2019)
Balveer Batra …Appellant (s)
Versus
The New India Assurance
Company & Anr. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
Leave granted.
1. This appeal by Special Leave is directed against
the judgment and order dated 28.11.2016 passed by the
High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Appeal from
Order No. 414 of 2010.
2. The appellant is the father of the victim of a motor
vehicle accident. His son, the victim, met with the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.05.01
16:50:41 IST
Reason:
unfortunate accident causing his death while underway
Page 1 of 38
on his motorcycle from Dineshpur to Gadarpur and
stopped it in the midway to urinate. A tractor bearing
number UP-02A-2213 being driven recklessly and
negligently by the first respondent hit him and his
motorcycle and he died instantaneously. The incident
occurred on 07.03.2006 at about 07.30 pm. The
appellant filed an application under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘MV Act’ only) for
compensation before the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal at Nainital as MACP No.137/2006. The
Tribunal dismissed the application for lack of territorial
jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant
herein preferred an appeal before the High Court and
the same also met with the same fate. Hence, this
appeal.
3. Heard learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and the counsel appearing for the
respondent-insurance company.
Page 2 of 38
4. A brief reference to the facts which led to the
concurrent, adverse decisions, as mentioned above, is
required for an appropriate disposal of this appeal. As
a matter of fact, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein /
opposite parties 1 and 2 in the claim petition, filed a
joint written statement, inter alia, raising the question of
maintainability on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction. The averments therein, taken note of the
Claims Tribunal in its award, would reveal that even
while raising such objection they would admit the death
of the appellant’s son in the accident involving the
aforementioned tractor though they disputed the nature
of its occurrence. In paragraph 3 of the award of the
Tribunal such averments are noted down thus:-
“that on the day of alleged accident, the driver of
Tractor was being driven the tractor in its side, but
deceased himself hit by driving motorcycle rash and
negligently, consequently he received injuries; that on
the day of accident, they opposite party No.1 was
driving the tractor with valid driving licence; that the
Page 3 of 38
Tractor in question is insured with O.P. No.3, the New
India Insurance Company.”
5. The first-respondent viz., the opposite party No.3
too, raised the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction
to adjudicate the claim petition and over and above in
the written statement respondent No.1 herein stated
thus, as can be seen from paragraph 4 of the award of
the Tribunal:-
“that the sole cause of accident is rash and negligent
driving of the motor vehicle bearing registration No.
UA06(A)-9229, which was also involved in the
accident, that in case of involvement of two motor
vehicles in the alleged accident, the tribunal has to
determine the composite/contributory negligence of
each driver thereof and its effects; that the answering
party has not been given any information as provided
under Section 158 (6) of the Motor Vehicle Act and the
petition is bad for non-joinder of the party.”
6. It is based on such pleadings that the Tribunal had
framed seven issues as hereunder:-
“1. Whether on 07.03.2006 at around 7.30 when
deceased Rohit Batra on his Motorcycle No.UA06A9229
Page 4 of 38
was going from Dineshpur to Gadarpur then near
Village Varkheda, PS Gadarpur, District Udham Singh
Nagar, Tractor No. UP2A-2213, being driven recklessly
and negligently by the driver hit his motorcycle from
behind, due to which the deceased suffered serious
injuries and his death was caused due to such injuries,
as has been stated in the claim petition?
2. Whether the said accident was caused by the
deceased himself driving his motorcycle No.UA6A
9229 recklessly and negligently, as has been stated by
the Defendant No.1, 2 & 3 in their Written Statements?
3. Whether the said accident was caused due to
contributory negligence of both the drivers as has
been stated by Defendant No.3 in his written
statement?
4. Whether the claim is effective due to not making
insurance company of the motorcycle No.UA06A-9229,
which is a necessary party, a party in the case?
5. Whether this Tribunal does not have the territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the claim as has been stated by
the Defendant No.1,2 & 3 in their written statement?
6. Whether the tractor in question at the time of
accident was insured with the defendant No.3,
insurance company and whether it was being run in
accordance with the terms and condition of the
insurance policy?
Page 5 of 38
7. Whether the claimants are entitled to any
compensation and if yes, then how much and who is
liable to be paid?”
7. After framing issues as above, the Tribunal firstly
considered issue No.5, pertaining to the territorial
jurisdiction, assigning the reason that the rest of the
issues are dependent on the decision on issue No.5.
Nonetheless, the indisputable position is that by that
time four years, since filing of the claim petition, had
lapsed and in the meanwhile both sides had also
examined witnesses. While being examined as PW-1,
the appellant deposed that at the time of accident in
question he was a resident of Haldwani, District
Nainital, and the accident had occurred within the limits
of the adjoining district of Udham Singh Nagar. True
that at the time of filing the claim petition he was not
residing in Haldwani. The Tribunal, based on the said
factual position of evidence, came to the conclusion that
the claimant is not residing within its territorial
Page 6 of 38
jurisdiction. It also took note of the fact that the
opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 are also not residing within
its jurisdiction and proceeded to consider its territorial
jurisdiction. In that regard, the Tribunal has also held
that the mere fact that the insurance company got an
office within the jurisdictional limits of the Tribunal
could not confer jurisdiction on it. Based on such
conclusions and findings, answered issue No.5 to the
effect that it lacks territorial jurisdiction. Thereupon, as
relates the other issues it was held thus:-
“21. ISSUES NO.1, 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7:
At the main issue (issue no.5) for territorial jurisdiction
of this tribunal has been decided against the claimants,
hence there is no occasion to examine the other issues
on merits. In view of above issue No.1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7
are also decided against the claimants and in favour of
the opposite parties.”
(Underline supplied)
8. After answering the issues as above, the claim
petition was dismissed. As noted above, the High Court
confirmed the judgment/award solely considering the
Page 7 of 38
question of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
9. The core contention of the appellant revolves
around the decision of this Court in Malati Sardar v.
1
National Insurance Company Ltd . Though the same
was relied on by the Appellant before the High Court, it
distinguished the decision on facts and held it
inapplicable. A bare perusal of the said decision would
reveal the very question formulated and answered by
this Court in Malati Sardar’s case (supra). The same
assumes relevance in the context of the rival
contentions and it reads as follows:-
“The question raised in this appeal is whether the High
Court was justified in setting aside the award of the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kolkata only on the
ground that the Tribunal did not have the territorial
jurisdiction”.
10. Paragraph 10 of the decision in Malati Sardar’s
case is also relevant for the purpose of knowing the
factual position under which such a question was
1
(2016) 3 SCC 43
Page 8 of 38
formulated and answered. It reads thus-
“The question for consideration thus is whether the
Tribunal at Kolkata had the jurisdiction to decide the
claim application under Section 166 of the Act when
the accident took place outside Kolkata jurisdiction
and the claimant also resided outside Kolkata
jurisdiction, but the respondent being a juristic person
carried on business at Kolkata. Further the question is
whether in absence of failure of justice, the High Court
could set aside the award of the Tribunal on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.”
(underline supplied)
11. Noticeably, in that case the Tribunal entertained
the claim petition and awarded compensation and the
High Court, at the instance of the insurance company,
considered and reversed the decision on the question
of territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal of
the insurance company was allowed and the party was
directed to refund of the amount deposited / paid, if
any, to the appellant insurance company. After framing
the said question in the above factual backdrop, it was
answered in Malati Sardar’s case by placing reliance
Page 9 of 38
on the earlier decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v.
2
Chaman Paswan . This Court held that the provision in
question is a benevolent provision for the victims of
accidents of negligent driving and in such
circumstances, it has to be interpreted with the object
of facilitating remedies for the victims of accidents.
Furthermore, it was held in paragraph 16 thereof, thus:-
“……Hyper technical approach in such matters
can hardly be appreciated. There is no bar to a
claim petition being filed at a place where the
insurance company, which is the main contesting
party in such cases, has its business. In such
cases, there is no prejudice to any party. There is
no failure of justice”.
(underline supplied)
12. Malati Sardar’s case was decided after referring
to the decisions in Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental
3
Insurance Company Ltd. and in Kiran Singh’s case
(supra), as mentioned above. A bare perusal of the
2
AIR 1954 SC 340
3
(2009) 2 SCC 244
Page 10 of 38
decisions in Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra), Kiran
Singh’s case (supra) and Malati Sardar’s case (supra)
would reveal that in all those decisions the objection
regarding territorial jurisdiction was overruled by the
Tribunal concerned and thereafter compensation was
awarded. It is only at the appellate stage that the
respondents’ objection as to the territorial jurisdiction
was upheld and the award was upturned. Evidently, in
all those cases this Court referred to Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (for short the ‘CPC’ only) and it
reads thus:-
“21. Objections to jurisdiction.— [(1)] No objection as
to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate
or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in
the Court of first instance at the earliest possible
opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at
or before such settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.”
13. A bare perusal of Section 21, CPC would reveal
that objection as to the place of suing is not to be
Page 11 of 38
entertained by any Appellate or Revisional Court if it
was not taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice. While looking into the
object and reasons for the aforesaid provision it is very
clear as to why lack of territorial jurisdiction by itself
was not recognized under it as a reason to make a
judgment/decree a nullity. It is to be noted that it is
quite different and distinct from inherent lack of
jurisdiction which would strike at the very authority of
the Court to try a case and pass a judgment/decree and
would make it a nullity. On a careful consideration of
the provisions under Section 21, CPC, we are of the
considered view that the provisions would undoubtedly
make it clear though taking of an objection as to the
lack of territorial jurisdiction before the Court of first
instance at the earliest opportunity is a condition
required to raise that objection before an appellate or
Page 12 of 38
revisional Court satisfaction of such condition by itself
would not make an award granting compensation a
nullity inasmuch as in such cases there would not be
inherent lack of jurisdiction in Court in regard to the
subject matter. Therefore, in such cases, correction by
a Court is open, only if it occasions in failure of justice.
The provision thus, reflects the legislative intention that
all possible care should be taken to ensure that the
time, energy and labour spent by a Court did not go in
vain unless there has been a consequent failure of
justice.
14. In the above view of the matter the decision in
Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra) and Malati Sardar’s case
(supra) that objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction in
an appeal against an award granting compensation
could not be entertained in the absence of consequent
failure of justice, according to us, should be followed
with alacrity and promptitude.
Page 13 of 38
15. The question in the instant case is, however,
slightly different inasmuch as, here the Tribunal’s
decision itself is to the effect that it lacks territorial
jurisdiction and it was that finding which obtained
conformance under the impugned judgment of the High
Court. A glance at the factual matrix is profitable for
considering the moot point involved in the case on
hand. Firstly, it is to be noted that the claim petition
under Section 166 of the M.V. Act filed in the year 2006
was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction only on 06.10.2010. Thus, it is evident that
the Tribunal which was obliged to decide the question
of jurisdiction at the threshold, finding it difficult to
decide the same without letting the parties to adduce
evidence permitted parties to adduce their evidence.
The materials on record would reveal that before the
Tribunal, on behalf of the claimants PW1 to PW3 were
examined and on behalf of opposite party Nos. 1 and 2
Page 14 of 38
viz., respondents 2 and 3 herein, opposite Party No. 1
Mr. Tula Singh was examined as DW1. Paragraph 7 of
the Tribunal’s judgment would further reveal that the
first respondent herein viz., the insurance company
which was opposite party No. 3 therein, did not
examine any witness in support of its pleadings, but
cross-examined prosecution witnesses. Add to it, it is a
fact that the first respondent-Insurance Company got its
branch within the limits of the Tribunal where the
subject claim petition was filed.
16. In the context of the question emerging for
consideration it is apposite to refer to the relevant
provisions prescribing the forum for adjudication of
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature
specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 of the M.V.
Act and also the provision prescribing the options
available to a claimant in regard to place(s) for suing for
such compensation viz., sub-section (1) of Section 165
Page 15 of 38
and sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the M.V. Act. They
read thus:-
“165. Claims Tribunals.—(1) A State Government may,
by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or
more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in
this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such
area as may be specified in the notification for the
purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation
in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily
injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor
vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party
so arising, or both.
166. (1)........
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be
made, at the option of the claimant, either to the
Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in
which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the
claimant resides or carries on business or within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides,
and shall be in such form and contain such particulars
as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no claim for compensation under
section 140 is made in such application, the
Page 16 of 38
application shall contain a separate statement to that
effect immediately before the signature of the
applicant.”
17. The words ‘at the option of the claimant’
employed in Section 166(2) and the options available to
a claimant in regard to places for suing for such
compensation under Section 166 (2), assume relevance
for consideration of the moot question. Indubitably, the
statute indicates that option lies with the claimant to
make application for compensation either to the Claims
Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the
accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or
carries on business or within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the defendant resides. There can be no
doubt with respect to the position that if more than one
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute it will be
open to the party concerned to choose one of the
competent Courts to decide his dispute. Thus, it is
Page 17 of 38
obvious that merely because the claimant made the
application for compensation not to the Claims Tribunal
having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident
occurred or not to the Claims Tribunal within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction he resides or carries on
business, is no reason to dismiss the application
provided it is filed before a Claims Tribunal where it is
otherwise maintainable. This aspect calls for
consideration not solely confining to strict construction
of the rest of the provision under Section 166 (2) of the
M.V. Act, but by looking into various other authorities,
as well.
18. In the aforementioned context, it is not
inappropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in
4
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta ,
wherein it was held that an award by Tribunal could not
be seen as adversarial adjudication between litigating
parties to a dispute and in troth, it is a statutory
4
(2011) 10 SCC 509
Page 18 of 38
determination of compensation on the occurrence of an
accident, after due enquiry.
19. In the decision in Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra)
after extracting sub-section (2) of Section 166, M.V. Act,
in paragraph 11 thereof, this Court held that M.V. Act is
a special statute and the jurisdiction of the Claims
Tribunal having regard to the terminologies used
therein must be held to be wider than the civil Court.
20.
In the contextual situation it is relevant to note that
in Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra) while considering
predominantly the scope of appellate interference in
view of Section 21, CPC, even after referring to Section
166 (2) of the M.V. Act, this Court made certain
observations which could be, rather, should be attuned
to the situation obtained in the case on hand. This
Court held that a distinction must be made between the
jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter of the suit
and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and
Page 19 of 38
further that in the case falling within the former
category the judgement would be in nullity and in the
latter category it would not be. In paragraph 18 thereof,
this Court held thus:-
“18. The Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High
Court. An appeal against the Tribunal lies before the
High Court. The High Court, while exercising its
appellate power, would follow the provisions
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure or akin
thereto. In view of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory
on the part of the appellate court to pose unto itself the
right question viz. whether the first respondent has
been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has
not suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of
justice had occurred, the High Court should not have
entertained the appeal on that ground alone.”
21. Section 173 of the M.V. Act provides for filing
appeal by any person aggrieved by an award by a
Claims Tribunal. In the decision in Sharanamma and
Page 20 of 38
5
Others v. M.D., Divisional Contr. Nekrtc , this Court
held that a bare reading of Section 173 shows that there
is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the
appellate court to consider the entire case on facts and
law. When that be the position, indubitably, it could be
said that consideration of the question of sufferance or
prejudice in regard to a finding on territorial
jurisdiction besides its correctness is required in
appeals against awards declining compensation
upholding the objection on territorial jurisdiction of the
opposite parties. Since the provisions for grant of
compensation under Section 166 is one of benevolence
if an illegality resulting in failure of justice is
discernable from the materials on record, even if in
respect of which no specific pleading is taken, the
Court is bound to take it into consideration.
22. The further support of the above view can be
taken from paragraph 16 of the decision in Malati
5
(2013) 11 SCC 517
Page 21 of 38
Sardar’s case (supra), extracted hereinbefore, wherein
this Court held that provision under Section 166 for
grant of compensation in respect of an accident of the
nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 being
a benevolent provision for the victims of accidents of
negligent driving, the provision for territorial
jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent with the
object of facilitating remedies for the victims of
accident. Furthermore, it was held in the said decision
that hyper technical approach in such matters could
hardly be appreciated and there would be no bar to a
claim petition being filed at a place where the
insurance company, which is the main contesting party
in such cases, has its business.
23. In the aforementioned context, it is worthwhile to
note the prejudice rather, failure of justice caused to the
applicant in the case on hand, is evident from the very
award of the Claims Tribunal though it escaped the
Page 22 of 38
attention of the High Court. The claim petition filed in
the year 2006 was dismissed on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction not at the threshold, but only on
06.10.2010. Dismissal, simpliciter of a claim petition on
the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction would not
and could not disable the claimant concerned to initiate
another proceeding before the Claims Tribunal of
competence. However, a bare perusal of the award
passed by the Tribunal, to be precise paragraph 21
would reveal that after returning an adverse finding on
the question of territorial jurisdiction against the
claimant, the Tribunal proceeded further and decided
all other issues framed for the consideration viz., issues
No.1 to 4, 6 and 7 (extracted hereinbefore) against the
claimant and in favour of the opposite parties, that too,
after making it clear that it had no occasion to examine
such issues on merits. Paragraph 21 of the award reads
thus:-
Page 23 of 38
“21. ISSUES NO.1, 2, 3, 4, 6 & 7:
At the main issue (issue no.5) for territorial
jurisdiction of this tribunal has been decided against
the claimants, hence there is no occasion to examine
the other issues on merits. In view of above issue
No.1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are also decided against the
claimants and in favour of the opposite parties.”
24. There cannot be any dispute with respect to the
fact that when such a finding is entered in respect of
those issues framed, may be after making an
observation that the Tribunal got no occasion to
examine such issues on merits, the claimant would not
be in a position to initiate another proceeding before
another Claims Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction.
In this regard it is to be noted that lacking territorial
jurisdiction cannot be a reason, in view of Section 165
(1), M.V. Act, to say that Claims Tribunal was not having
competence to adjudicate the subject-matter of the
claim petition. Since issues were framed and decided
against the claimant and in favour of the opposite
Page 24 of 38
parties, whether or not such findings were returned
after examining such issues on merits it would cause
legal trammel in view of the principle of res judicata .
We have already found that a decree dismissing a suit
on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction is not a
nullity. Though Section 168, M.V. Act, carrying the
caption ‘Award of the Claims Tribunal’ on perusal, at
the first blush may appear to mean only a decision of
the Claims Tribunal granting compensation to the
claimant concerned. However, that certainly is not the
correct construction of the said provision. Section
169(2), M.V. Act, clothes a Claims Tribunal with all the
powers of a Civil Court. In the decision in Morgan
6
Securities & Credit (P) Ltd. v. Modi Rubber Ltd. this
Court observed and held that the expression ‘award’
has a distinct connotation and it envisages a binding
decision of a judicial or a quasi-judicial authority. That
apart, Section 173, M.V. Act, provides an appeal against
6
(2006) 12 SCC 642
Page 25 of 38
an award of a Claims Tribunal to the High Court subject
to sub-Section (2) thereof, and it entitles any person
aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal to prefer it
to the High Court.
25. We have already referred to the error, rather an
illegality committed by the Claims Tribunal in deciding
issues 1 to 4, 6 and 7 against the claimant and in favour
of the opposite parties viz., the respondents herein
even after making it clear it had no occasion to examine
them on merits and solely because it returned a
negative finding on the question of its territorial
jurisdiction to maintain the subject claim petition. This
error or mistake that resulted in great prejudice
escaped the attention of the High Court while
exercising the power under Section 173, M.V. Act, in
the appeal filed by an appellant herein against the
award of the Tribunal.
26. In this context, it is to be noted that the materials
Page 26 of 38
on record and the discussions of the evidence by the
Claims Tribunal would reveal that there was no serious
dispute regarding the occurrence of accident in
question in which the appellant’s son lost his life and
also of the fact that in the said accident involving the
vehicle insured with the first respondent-the insurance
company. It is true that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have
disputed the nature of its occurrence. There seems to
be no dispute regarding the fact that the deceased
sustained injuries and succumbed to it instantaneously.
We have already noted that it was after keeping the
claim petition filed in 2006 for about 4 years i.e. only on
06.10.2010 that it was dismissed on the ground of
lacking territorial jurisdiction and that the appeal filed
against the same in the year 2010 was dismissed,
confirming the award passed by the Tribunal, after
about 6 years viz. on 28.11.2016. We have no hesitation
to hold that in the totality of the circumstances, revealed
Page 27 of 38
from the indisputable factual position there was
absolutely no justification for the High Court to confine
its consideration only on the question of correctness of
the finding on territorial jurisdiction and at the same
time, to hold all the other issues against the claimant(s)
and in favour of the opposite parties.
27. In the above context, it is to be noted that for the
purpose of deciding the issue of territorial jurisdiction,
the Tribunal permitted the parties to adduce evidence
before it. The position obtained in the case would
reveal that the Tribunal had actually proceeded with the
claim petition despite holding the view that it got no
territorial jurisdiction. In such indisputable position, it
is only apposite to refer to Order XIV, Rule 2 of CPC
which mandates a Court to pronounce a judgment on all
the issues. The said provision reads thus:-
“2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues .—(1)
Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a
preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the
Page 28 of 38
provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all
issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the
same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or
any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law
only, it may try that issue first if the issue relates to—
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time
being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit,
postpone the settlement of the other issues until after
that issue has been determined, and may deal with the
suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.”
28. True that in terms of the said provision, the issues
regarding territorial jurisdiction ought to be tried as
primary issues but when it is evident that the issue
could not be decided solely based on the pleadings in
the plaint (here claim petition) and when parties are
permitted to adduce evidence upon finding that it is a
mixed question of law and facts there was absolutely no
justification for not pronouncing an award on all the
issues framed besides the one pertaining to its
Page 29 of 38
territorial jurisdiction. There cannot be any doubt with
respect to the fact that when evidence was permitted to
be let in, may be for such issues the possibility of re-
appreciation and consequent reversal of finding(s) of
the Tribunal cannot be ruled out. But then, if the award
was pronounced not at threshold, but after a very long
lapse of time and confining consideration only on the
issue of territorial jurisdiction and then, answering the
other issues as well against the claimant without
examining them on their own merits, but solely because
of the negative finding on the issue of territorial
jurisdiction, as occurred in the case on hand, it would
defeat the very purpose of the benevolent legislation
providing for grant of compensation under Section 166
of the M.V. Act. As noticed hereinbefore in this case,
the question of territorial jurisdiction was decided by
the Tribunal after about 4 years since the filing of the
claim petition and the appeal filed in 2010 was
Page 30 of 38
dismissed, confirming the dismissal of the claim petition
after about 6 years. We have also already noted that in
the case on hand a great illegality or error has been
committed by the Tribunal even after observing that it
got no occasion to examine the other six issues but then
deciding those six issues against the claimant and in
favour of the opposite parties. Since a Claims Tribunal
constituted under Section 165, M.V. Act even when
lacking territorial jurisdiction cannot be said to be
lacking jurisdiction on the subject matter in a claim
petition and the award would not be a nullity and
therefore, the findings on other issues would be
binding on the parties. Hence, in the first instance,
failure of justice occurred as the award of the Tribunal
virtually rendered the claimant remediless. In cases of
this nature, sometimes a remand may also be a futility
as passage of such long period may make witnesses
unavailable for examination or re-examination for
Page 31 of 38
various reasons. Such reasons may also include death
of the witness(s). Since the present imbroglio is
created because of a mistake or error on the part of the
Tribunal, either in proceeding further after returning a
negative finding on the question of territorial
jurisdiction or in not pronouncing award on all issues,
we are of the considered view that the said mistake not
entering on merits and into a findings on issues No.1 to
4, 6 and 7 at paragraph 21 against the claimant and in
favour of the opposite parties without examining them
on merits and hence, they are liable to be set aside in
the light of the salutary maxim ‘ Actus Curiae neminem
gravabit’ , as no party shall be put to suffer for the
mistake of a Court.
29. We have already referred to the provision under
Order XIV, Rule 2, CPC, observed and held while in
certain circumstances it would be inevitable to
pronounce judgment/award on all issues as mandated
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thereunder. We are not oblivious of the provision
under Section 169 of the M.V. Act. In this regard, it is
apt to refer to paragraph 15 of the decision in Mantoo
Sarkar’s case (supra) where this Court held as under:-
“15. No doubt the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction
having regard to the ingredients laid down under sub-
section (2) of Section 166 of the Act. We are not
unmindful of the fact that in terms of Section 169 of the
Act, the Tribunal, subject to any rules, may follow a
summary procedure and the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure under the Act have a limited
application but in terms of the rules “save and except”
any specific provision made in that behalf, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply.
Even otherwise the principles laid down in the Code of
Civil Procedure may be held to be applicable in a case
of this nature.”
30. Since, there is no specific provision to deal with a
situation akin to the situation in the case on hand, the
said observation in Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra)
would apply to the case on hand with all its force.
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31. In view of the nature of this case, as observed in
Mantoo Sarkar’s case (supra), we would have even
exercised our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice
between the parties by determining the question of
compensation as the accident in question occurred on
07.03.2006. Despite the death of the son of the
appellant in the said accident the fact is that the
claimant did not get compensation despite the passage
of more than 18 years. We have already noted that all
relevant issues were framed by the Tribunal for the
purpose of determination of compensation. However,
even after deciding to permit the parties to adduce
evidence the Tribunal in the instant case, appears to
have confined it for the purpose of deciding the only
question of territorial jurisdiction and therefore, in the
absence of evidence on necessary ingredients for
determination of compensation payable, we are not in a
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position to determine the compensation as in view of
the factual position obtained in the instant case
sufficient to apply the decisions in Mantoo Sarkar’s
case (supra) as also Malati Sardar’s case (supra) to
reverse the finding on territorial jurisdiction. The High
Court has fallen in error in not picking up the illegalities
resulting in failure of justice and to resolve them
appropriately. For the purpose of determining the
compensation in respect of a case of this nature the
relevant factors and dates necessary for computing
ultimately the quantum of compensation, are not
available on record, before us. Though, we are pained
and peeved, we have no option, but to remand the
matter after a long period of 18 years, which could have
been avoided had the Tribunal followed Order XIV,
Rule 2, CPC. Taking note of such circumstances and the
prejudice already caused to the claimant(s) and further
that directing the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at
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Nainital to restore MACP No.137/2006 and fix a date for
the appearance of the parties and then proceed to
consider the question of grant of compensation,
ignoring its finding on territorial jurisdiction would
have no prejudice to the parties as they had already
examined witnesses before the Claims Tribunal, we are
inclined to remand the matter to the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal at Nainital. We hold that it would not
cause any prejudice to the opposite parties as they
have already filed the written statements before the
Tribunal despite objecting to the territorial jurisdiction
and even thereafter have chosen to adduce oral
evidence before the Tribunal, to some extent. It is also
a fact that the first respondent-insurance company got
its office in Nainital or in other words it is conducting its
business within the limits of Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal at Nainital and the fact is that cross-
examination of witnesses were done on its behalf as
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well. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the fact
that the subject matter of claim is within jurisdiction of
the Claims Tribunal, at Nainital.
32. For all these reasons, we set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 28.11.2016 passed by the
High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in appeal from
order No.414 of 2010 arising from the Award in MACP
No.137/2006 and also the award dated 06.10.2010
passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at
Nainital. To enable the Tribunal to proceed further and
to decide the claim petition on merits, MACP
No.137/2006 is restored into its file and in view of the
long lapse of time there will be a further direction that
the Tribunal shall conclude the entire exercise after
permitting parties to adduce further evidence, if any,
within a period of six months from the date of receipt of
a copy of this judgment.
33. The parties shall appear before the Tribunal either
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in person or through counsel on 20.05.2024 and
thereupon, the Tribunal shall conclude the proceedings
within the above stipulated time. In the peculiar
circumstances to comply with the direction, the Registry
shall forward copies of this judgment to all the parties.
The appeal is disposed of as above.
...............................J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
.............................J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
New Delhi;
February 08, 2024
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