Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1453
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.15786 of 2024)
Kiran
...Appellant
Versus
The State of Karnataka
...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. A widow, with five children was torched to death, for
not having responded to the lustful advances of the accused,
a relative by marriage.
3. This Court had issued notice on 08.11.2024, limited to
the question as to whether the trial court was correct in
imposing life imprisonment meaning that it will be till the
end of his natural life and directing the accused to be not
granted the benefit of remission under Section 428 of the
1
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 .
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2025.12.18
17:05:43 IST
Reason:
1
for short, the Cr.PC
Page 1 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
4. Despite the limited notice, we have gone through the
evidence to convince ourselves on the conviction,
especially since the witnesses, including the daughter of the
deceased, an eyewitness turned hostile. The crime was
committed on 01.01.2014 at 11:30 pm when the accused was
alleged to have entered the shanty in which the deceased
was living with her daughters. The woman having not
succumbed to the sexual advances made, which had been
continuing for some time earlier, the accused poured
kerosene over her and set her ablaze. The woman was
rushed to the hospital, taken to a higher center but later,
after ten days, she succumbed to death. That the death was
due to 60% burns caused, has been established by the
medical evidence, making a clear case of homicide.
5. The crucial witnesses, who were close relatives,
including the father and daughter of the deceased, PW-1
and PW-7, turned hostile. PW-1 though did not support the
allegation against the accused, deposed on the incident and
spoke of the deceased having been taken to the hospital
after having sustained burns, to which she succumbed. As
found by the High Court, PW-7 though turned hostile with
Page 2 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
respect to the allegation against the accused, admitted the
presence of PW-8 and PW-24, neighbors who had come to
the crime scene immediately after it occurred, hearing the
hue and cry. PW-24 was the brother-in-law of the deceased
who shifted her to the hospital along with PW-8, a neighbor,
who also spoke of this factum. PW-24, additionally spoke of
having seen the accused running away from the scene of
occurrence, known to him as a relative by marriage. The
presence of PW-24 having been spoken of by the other
prosecution witness, the presence of the accused and his
flight from the scene of occurrence is established.
6. One other compelling circumstance is the dying
declaration made by the deceased. Though there was a
dying declaration made to PW-1, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11
they resiled from their statements. However, it has been
established from the testimony of PW-9, the sister of the
deceased that the victim was conscious and could speak at
the time when she was admitted in the Hospital and
continued as an inpatient. Exhibit P-27 is the dying
declaration given by the deceased on 02.01.2014 at Nikhil
Hospital, Hyderabad to PW-25, the Head Constable
Page 3 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
deputed on medical intimation having been received from
the Government Hospital, Bidar, to which place the
deceased was first taken before transferring her to
Hyderabad. PW-25 categorically stated that he was the
Station House Officer of Santapur Police Station and on
receiving intimation from the Government Hospital, Bidar,
he had gone there when he was informed of the victim
having been taken to Hyderabad. He then, after obtaining
sanction from the higher authorities, proceeded to
Hyderabad where he recorded Exhibit P-27, the dying
declaration, categorically pinning the crime on the accused.
He also stated that at Hyderabad he submitted a request to
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to record the dying
declaration which request was produced as Exhibit D-1. In
Exhibit D-1, the recital was of a suicide having been
committed by pouring kerosene over oneself. However, this
was explained insofar as the crime scene was in the
northernmost part of Karnataka and the victim having been
taken to Hyderabad within the then State of Andhra Pradesh.
It was the deposition of PW-25 that he could not
communicate in Telugu, which resulted in the police at
Page 4 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
Hyderabad not being properly communicated with the
offence; resulting in a mistaken intimation of suicide being
made in the request to the CJM, written in Telugu.
7. In any event, the Magistrate was examined as PW-21
who clearly spoke of Exhibit P-23, the dying declaration in
a question-and-answer form, on the very next day of
admission, again implicating the accused, in accordance
with the prosecution story, as also speaking of the
detestable prior conduct of the accused, resistance to which
was the motive projected. The dying declaration was taken
in the presence of PW-22, the duty doctor, who signed on
the declaration and fully corroborated in the box. PW-22
also confirmed that the deceased was conscious and
coherent when the statements were given. In the totality of
circumstances, as coming out from the case records, we are
convinced that the conviction was entered into properly.
8. Now, the question remains as to whether the Sessions
Court was competent to award a sentence of imprisonment
for life till the remainder of life and prohibit the benefit of
set-off as provided under Section 428 of the Cr.PC.
Page 5 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
9. The sentence of life imprisonment no doubt means the
entire life, subject only to the remission and commutation
provided under Cr. PC and also to Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution of India, which cannot be curtailed by a
Sessions Court. Nor can the Sessions Court, a creation of the
Cr.PC curtail the provision under Section 428, Cr.PC,
available in the Code which created it.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the
2
decision in Navas Alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala in
which the principle under Swamy Shraddananda (2) v.
3
State of Karnataka was employed to confirm the sentence
imposed by the High Court of a life sentence without
remission but modifying the period of 30 years
imprisonment to that of a period of 25 years of imprisonment
without remission.
3
11. In Swamy Shraddananda , this Court held that: -
“ 56. But this leads to a more important
question about the punishment
commensurate to the appellant's crime. The
sentence of imprisonment for a term of 14
2
(2024) 14 SCC 82
3
(2008) 13 SCC 767
Page 6 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
years, that goes under the euphemism of life
imprisonment is equally, if not more,
unacceptable. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hegde
informed us that the appellant was taken in
custody on 28 March, 1994 and submitted that
by virtue of the provisions relating to
remission, the sentence of life imprisonment,
without any qualification or further direction
would, in all likelihood, lead to his release
from jail in the first quarter of 2009 since he
has already completed more than 14 years of
incarceration. This eventuality is simply not
acceptable to this Court. What then is the
answer? The answer lies in breaking this
standardisation that, in practice, renders the
sentence of life imprisonment equal to
imprisonment for a period of no more than 14
years; in making it clear that the sentence of
life imprisonment when awarded as a
substitute for death penalty would be carried
out strictly as directed by the Court. This
Court, therefore, must lay down a good and
sound legal basis for putting the punishment
of imprisonment for life, awarded as
substitute for death penalty, beyond any
remission and to be carried out as directed by
the Court so that it may be followed, in
Page 7 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
appropriate cases as a uniform policy not only
by this Court but also by the High Courts,
being the superior Courts in their respective
States” (sic-para 56).
12. An alternative measure was brought in, to break the
standardisation in sentencing in such cases wherein the
crime is heinous, dastardly and brutal. Though life sentence
literally denotes imprisonment till the last breath, it
operates only as an imprisonment for 14 years with the
power of remission and commutation conferred on the
Government. Balancing, the need to provide proportionate
punishment at least in crimes which shocks human society,
with the need to avoid death; an irreversible penalty, a
middle ground was found. A measure by which, in crimes
possible of categorisation as ‘rarest of the rare’, the Courts
even then finds a need to avoid death, on mitigating
circumstances, could award life imprisonment without
remission. Also, when the case falls short of the ‘ rarest of the
rare’ category, thus excluding imposition of death sentence,
but by the nature of crime the normal sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission or commutation,
Page 8 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
working out to a term of 14 years would not suffice and
would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate, again
this measure could be employed. It was in such
circumstances that this Court considered the possibility of
expanding the options so as to cover the ‘ vast hiatus between
14 years imprisonment of life and death’ (para 92). The Court
thus, substituted the death sentence awarded by the Trial
Court and confirmed by the High Court, with imprisonment
for life and directed that the accused shall not be released
till the rest of his life.
13. This Court, hence, as evident from the extract
hereinabove, clearly held that in appropriate cases as a
uniform policy, punishment of imprisonment for life beyond
any remission can be awarded, substituting the death
penalty; not only by the Supreme Court but also by the High
Courts. The power to impose punishment of imprisonment
for life without remission was conferred only on the
Constitutional Courts and not on the Sessions Courts.
Page 9 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
14. In Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and
4
Others , a Constitution Bench of this Court by majority
reaffirmed the alternative option as laid down in Swamy
3
Shraddananda (2) restricting the principle to be applied
only by the Constitutional Courts, the Supreme Court and
the High Courts. While upholding the principle of
alternative sentencing, it was also held that this would not
affect the power conferred under Articles 72 & 161 of the
Constitution of India. It is on the same principle that we say,
the Sessions Court is not competent to interfere with or
curtail the effect of the provisions of the Cr.PC.
15. Going by the decisions cited, it has to be held that life
imprisonment awarded would be for the rest of the life, the
power to grant remission and commutation under Sections
432 to 435 Cr.PC cannot be curtailed by the Sessions Court,
when the remission as provided under the Constitution was
declared to be not permissible of interference by the
Constitutional Courts. The power of alternate sentencing to
cover the hiatus between 14 years and death, cannot be
4
(2016) 7 SCC 1
Page 10 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
applied by the Sessions Courts. Hence, the sentence of life
imprisonment cannot be directed to be till the end of natural
life, by the Sessions Court which direction would be in
conflict with the provisions of the Cr. PC. The power of
remission or commutation conferred on the State cannot be
taken away and the sentence as awarded by the trial court
and confirmed by the High Court for the offence under
5
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is confirmed as
imprisonment for life.
16. Now, we come to the question of set-off under Section
428, Cr. PC having been curtailed. The learned Government
Advocate brought to our notice a refence made by a
Division Bench of this Court, in The Superintendent of
Prison and Anr. v. Venkatesan @ Senu @ Srinivasan @
6
Baskaran @ Radio @ Prakasam . Therein the question
referred was the principle of set-off being made applicable
insofar as the period of detention with respect to other
offences, suffered in the course of a separate investigation
inquiry and trial. In the present case, no such question arise
5
for short, ‘the IPC’
6
2025 INSC 541
Page 11 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
insofar as the direction of the trial court is not to grant the
set-off for the period of detention undergone by the accused
in the course of the investigation and trial of the same case.
The statutory imprimatur in Section 428, Cr. PC is that the
period of detention undergone by an accused during the
investigation, inquiry or trial of a case, before the date of
conviction in the case shall be set-off against the term of
imprisonment imposed on the accused, as the sentence on
such conviction. The direction of the Sessions Court not to
grant set-off under Section 428, Cr. PC will stand deleted, as
there is no escape from it.
17. The learned Government Advocate also relied on
7
Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) , in which this Court
3
following the decisions in Swamy Shraddananda and V.
4
Sriharan alias Murugan , upheld the special category of
sentence of a life term for 20 years as imposed by the trial
court, finding it to be fit and proper in the circumstances of
the case. We do not think the offence herein requires the
same treatment.
7
(2024) 2 SCC 323
Page 12 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
18. The appeal stands partly allowed, modifying the
sentence to imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC
and permitting set-off, as provided under Section 428, Cr.
PC as also confirming the sentence under the other
offences, which would run concurrently. The accused would
be entitled to avail of remission/commutation, in due
course, but subject to the decision being taken by the
Government as per its policy.
19. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
……...…….……………………. J.
(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)
………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 18, 2025.
Page 13 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. of 2025
(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.15786 of 2024)
Kiran
...Appellant
Versus
The State of Karnataka
...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. A widow, with five children was torched to death, for
not having responded to the lustful advances of the accused,
a relative by marriage.
3. This Court had issued notice on 08.11.2024, limited to
the question as to whether the trial court was correct in
imposing life imprisonment meaning that it will be till the
end of his natural life and directing the accused to be not
granted the benefit of remission under Section 428 of the
1
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 .
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
VARSHA MENDIRATTA
Date: 2025.12.18
17:05:43 IST
Reason:
1
for short, the Cr.PC
Page 1 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
4. Despite the limited notice, we have gone through the
evidence to convince ourselves on the conviction,
especially since the witnesses, including the daughter of the
deceased, an eyewitness turned hostile. The crime was
committed on 01.01.2014 at 11:30 pm when the accused was
alleged to have entered the shanty in which the deceased
was living with her daughters. The woman having not
succumbed to the sexual advances made, which had been
continuing for some time earlier, the accused poured
kerosene over her and set her ablaze. The woman was
rushed to the hospital, taken to a higher center but later,
after ten days, she succumbed to death. That the death was
due to 60% burns caused, has been established by the
medical evidence, making a clear case of homicide.
5. The crucial witnesses, who were close relatives,
including the father and daughter of the deceased, PW-1
and PW-7, turned hostile. PW-1 though did not support the
allegation against the accused, deposed on the incident and
spoke of the deceased having been taken to the hospital
after having sustained burns, to which she succumbed. As
found by the High Court, PW-7 though turned hostile with
Page 2 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
respect to the allegation against the accused, admitted the
presence of PW-8 and PW-24, neighbors who had come to
the crime scene immediately after it occurred, hearing the
hue and cry. PW-24 was the brother-in-law of the deceased
who shifted her to the hospital along with PW-8, a neighbor,
who also spoke of this factum. PW-24, additionally spoke of
having seen the accused running away from the scene of
occurrence, known to him as a relative by marriage. The
presence of PW-24 having been spoken of by the other
prosecution witness, the presence of the accused and his
flight from the scene of occurrence is established.
6. One other compelling circumstance is the dying
declaration made by the deceased. Though there was a
dying declaration made to PW-1, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11
they resiled from their statements. However, it has been
established from the testimony of PW-9, the sister of the
deceased that the victim was conscious and could speak at
the time when she was admitted in the Hospital and
continued as an inpatient. Exhibit P-27 is the dying
declaration given by the deceased on 02.01.2014 at Nikhil
Hospital, Hyderabad to PW-25, the Head Constable
Page 3 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
deputed on medical intimation having been received from
the Government Hospital, Bidar, to which place the
deceased was first taken before transferring her to
Hyderabad. PW-25 categorically stated that he was the
Station House Officer of Santapur Police Station and on
receiving intimation from the Government Hospital, Bidar,
he had gone there when he was informed of the victim
having been taken to Hyderabad. He then, after obtaining
sanction from the higher authorities, proceeded to
Hyderabad where he recorded Exhibit P-27, the dying
declaration, categorically pinning the crime on the accused.
He also stated that at Hyderabad he submitted a request to
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to record the dying
declaration which request was produced as Exhibit D-1. In
Exhibit D-1, the recital was of a suicide having been
committed by pouring kerosene over oneself. However, this
was explained insofar as the crime scene was in the
northernmost part of Karnataka and the victim having been
taken to Hyderabad within the then State of Andhra Pradesh.
It was the deposition of PW-25 that he could not
communicate in Telugu, which resulted in the police at
Page 4 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
Hyderabad not being properly communicated with the
offence; resulting in a mistaken intimation of suicide being
made in the request to the CJM, written in Telugu.
7. In any event, the Magistrate was examined as PW-21
who clearly spoke of Exhibit P-23, the dying declaration in
a question-and-answer form, on the very next day of
admission, again implicating the accused, in accordance
with the prosecution story, as also speaking of the
detestable prior conduct of the accused, resistance to which
was the motive projected. The dying declaration was taken
in the presence of PW-22, the duty doctor, who signed on
the declaration and fully corroborated in the box. PW-22
also confirmed that the deceased was conscious and
coherent when the statements were given. In the totality of
circumstances, as coming out from the case records, we are
convinced that the conviction was entered into properly.
8. Now, the question remains as to whether the Sessions
Court was competent to award a sentence of imprisonment
for life till the remainder of life and prohibit the benefit of
set-off as provided under Section 428 of the Cr.PC.
Page 5 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
9. The sentence of life imprisonment no doubt means the
entire life, subject only to the remission and commutation
provided under Cr. PC and also to Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution of India, which cannot be curtailed by a
Sessions Court. Nor can the Sessions Court, a creation of the
Cr.PC curtail the provision under Section 428, Cr.PC,
available in the Code which created it.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the
2
decision in Navas Alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala in
which the principle under Swamy Shraddananda (2) v.
3
State of Karnataka was employed to confirm the sentence
imposed by the High Court of a life sentence without
remission but modifying the period of 30 years
imprisonment to that of a period of 25 years of imprisonment
without remission.
3
11. In Swamy Shraddananda , this Court held that: -
“ 56. But this leads to a more important
question about the punishment
commensurate to the appellant's crime. The
sentence of imprisonment for a term of 14
2
(2024) 14 SCC 82
3
(2008) 13 SCC 767
Page 6 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
years, that goes under the euphemism of life
imprisonment is equally, if not more,
unacceptable. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hegde
informed us that the appellant was taken in
custody on 28 March, 1994 and submitted that
by virtue of the provisions relating to
remission, the sentence of life imprisonment,
without any qualification or further direction
would, in all likelihood, lead to his release
from jail in the first quarter of 2009 since he
has already completed more than 14 years of
incarceration. This eventuality is simply not
acceptable to this Court. What then is the
answer? The answer lies in breaking this
standardisation that, in practice, renders the
sentence of life imprisonment equal to
imprisonment for a period of no more than 14
years; in making it clear that the sentence of
life imprisonment when awarded as a
substitute for death penalty would be carried
out strictly as directed by the Court. This
Court, therefore, must lay down a good and
sound legal basis for putting the punishment
of imprisonment for life, awarded as
substitute for death penalty, beyond any
remission and to be carried out as directed by
the Court so that it may be followed, in
Page 7 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
appropriate cases as a uniform policy not only
by this Court but also by the High Courts,
being the superior Courts in their respective
States” (sic-para 56).
12. An alternative measure was brought in, to break the
standardisation in sentencing in such cases wherein the
crime is heinous, dastardly and brutal. Though life sentence
literally denotes imprisonment till the last breath, it
operates only as an imprisonment for 14 years with the
power of remission and commutation conferred on the
Government. Balancing, the need to provide proportionate
punishment at least in crimes which shocks human society,
with the need to avoid death; an irreversible penalty, a
middle ground was found. A measure by which, in crimes
possible of categorisation as ‘rarest of the rare’, the Courts
even then finds a need to avoid death, on mitigating
circumstances, could award life imprisonment without
remission. Also, when the case falls short of the ‘ rarest of the
rare’ category, thus excluding imposition of death sentence,
but by the nature of crime the normal sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission or commutation,
Page 8 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
working out to a term of 14 years would not suffice and
would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate, again
this measure could be employed. It was in such
circumstances that this Court considered the possibility of
expanding the options so as to cover the ‘ vast hiatus between
14 years imprisonment of life and death’ (para 92). The Court
thus, substituted the death sentence awarded by the Trial
Court and confirmed by the High Court, with imprisonment
for life and directed that the accused shall not be released
till the rest of his life.
13. This Court, hence, as evident from the extract
hereinabove, clearly held that in appropriate cases as a
uniform policy, punishment of imprisonment for life beyond
any remission can be awarded, substituting the death
penalty; not only by the Supreme Court but also by the High
Courts. The power to impose punishment of imprisonment
for life without remission was conferred only on the
Constitutional Courts and not on the Sessions Courts.
Page 9 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
14. In Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and
4
Others , a Constitution Bench of this Court by majority
reaffirmed the alternative option as laid down in Swamy
3
Shraddananda (2) restricting the principle to be applied
only by the Constitutional Courts, the Supreme Court and
the High Courts. While upholding the principle of
alternative sentencing, it was also held that this would not
affect the power conferred under Articles 72 & 161 of the
Constitution of India. It is on the same principle that we say,
the Sessions Court is not competent to interfere with or
curtail the effect of the provisions of the Cr.PC.
15. Going by the decisions cited, it has to be held that life
imprisonment awarded would be for the rest of the life, the
power to grant remission and commutation under Sections
432 to 435 Cr.PC cannot be curtailed by the Sessions Court,
when the remission as provided under the Constitution was
declared to be not permissible of interference by the
Constitutional Courts. The power of alternate sentencing to
cover the hiatus between 14 years and death, cannot be
4
(2016) 7 SCC 1
Page 10 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
applied by the Sessions Courts. Hence, the sentence of life
imprisonment cannot be directed to be till the end of natural
life, by the Sessions Court which direction would be in
conflict with the provisions of the Cr. PC. The power of
remission or commutation conferred on the State cannot be
taken away and the sentence as awarded by the trial court
and confirmed by the High Court for the offence under
5
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is confirmed as
imprisonment for life.
16. Now, we come to the question of set-off under Section
428, Cr. PC having been curtailed. The learned Government
Advocate brought to our notice a refence made by a
Division Bench of this Court, in The Superintendent of
Prison and Anr. v. Venkatesan @ Senu @ Srinivasan @
6
Baskaran @ Radio @ Prakasam . Therein the question
referred was the principle of set-off being made applicable
insofar as the period of detention with respect to other
offences, suffered in the course of a separate investigation
inquiry and trial. In the present case, no such question arise
5
for short, ‘the IPC’
6
2025 INSC 541
Page 11 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
insofar as the direction of the trial court is not to grant the
set-off for the period of detention undergone by the accused
in the course of the investigation and trial of the same case.
The statutory imprimatur in Section 428, Cr. PC is that the
period of detention undergone by an accused during the
investigation, inquiry or trial of a case, before the date of
conviction in the case shall be set-off against the term of
imprisonment imposed on the accused, as the sentence on
such conviction. The direction of the Sessions Court not to
grant set-off under Section 428, Cr. PC will stand deleted, as
there is no escape from it.
17. The learned Government Advocate also relied on
7
Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) , in which this Court
3
following the decisions in Swamy Shraddananda and V.
4
Sriharan alias Murugan , upheld the special category of
sentence of a life term for 20 years as imposed by the trial
court, finding it to be fit and proper in the circumstances of
the case. We do not think the offence herein requires the
same treatment.
7
(2024) 2 SCC 323
Page 12 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024
18. The appeal stands partly allowed, modifying the
sentence to imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC
and permitting set-off, as provided under Section 428, Cr.
PC as also confirming the sentence under the other
offences, which would run concurrently. The accused would
be entitled to avail of remission/commutation, in due
course, but subject to the decision being taken by the
Government as per its policy.
19. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
……...…….……………………. J.
(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)
………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 18, 2025.
Page 13 of 13
Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024