Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BHAI ARDAMAN SINGH & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/05/1968
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
CITATION:
1969 AIR 13 1969 SCR (1) 283
ACT:
Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Act 8 of 1953, s. 43(1)(b)-
scope of-if has retrospective operation conditions precedent
for exercise of jurisdiction by collector-whether order can
be passed on subjective satisfaction or on judicial
determination.
HEADNOTE:
Certain tenants of land applied to the Collector, Sangrur
and Bhatinda, alleging that they had been forcibly deprived
of the lands in May/June, 1943 and sought an order for
restoration of possession under s. 43 of the Pepsu Tenancy
and Agricultural Act 8 of 1953. The Collector granted the
applications and ordered possession to be restored to the
tenants. His orders were confirmed by the Commissioner who
was of the view that an order under s. 43 could be passed by
the Collector on his subjective satisfaction that a person
was in wrongful or unauthorised possession of land. The
Financial Commissioner also confirmed the orders on the
ground that substantial justice had been done by the
subordinate revenue authorities.
The first respondent challenged these orders by a writ
petition but this was dismissed by a Single Bench holding
that the Act 8 of 1953 was a code in itself and provided for
a complete machinery for the decision of disputes like the
resent one. But a Division Bench in appeal allowed the
petition and held that Act 8 of 1953 which came into force
on December 13, 1953, had no retrospective operation.
On appeal to this Court
HELD, dismissing the appeals
(i) Apart from the allegation of the tenants that the first
respondent was in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the
lands previously occupied by them, it was further necessary
to establish that under cl. (b) of s. 43(1) the person in
wrongful or unauthorised possession was not entitled to the
use and occupation of the lands under the provisions of the
Act. There was no provision which disentitled the first
respondent to the use and occupation of the lands. Section
43 (1) (b) therefore had no application in the present case.
The condition precedent to the investment of jurisdiction in
the Collector being absent, the revenue authorities had no
power to pass the order in ejectment which they purported to
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pass.
(ii) The proceedings of the Collector are judicial in
character and although the trial is summary, the Collector
is bound to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him not on a
subjective satisfaction, as the Commissioner assumed, but on
a judicial determination of facts which invest him with
jurisdiction to pass an order in ejectment. When the
condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not
exist the Collector cannot clothe himself with authority to
pass the impugned orders. Furthermore, the High Court had
rightly held the terms of cl. (b), s. 43(1) had no
retrospective operation.
(iii) If the Collector had no jurisdiction except in the
special condition prescribed by s. 43, his order could not
be sustained merely because
284
another authority may, if the proceeding were before that
authority, on the findings recorded, have granted relief to
the tenants of restoration to possession of their respective
lands. Authorities which are vested with powers-judicial or
quasi-judicial--can exercise their power within the limits
of their jurisdiction and their actions without jurisdiction
cannot be sustained merely because another body or
authority, which if lawfully approached, may have
jurisdiction to pass the order complained of.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1016 to
1050, 1052 to 1075 and 1077 to 1084 of 1964.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated
May 14, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in L. P. Appeal No.
148 of 1 9 6 8 etc.
N. S. Bindra and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
M. C. Chagla and R. V. Pillai, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. In this group of appeals the dispute relates to
agricultural lands situate in village Dialpura-Bhaika,
District Bhatinda in the former State of Pepsu and now in
the State of Punjab. The lands originally belonged to Bhai
Arjan Singh. On his death in 1946 the lands devolved upon
his son Bhai Ardaman Singh, the first respondent in these
appeals. Alleging that Bhai Arjan Singh forcibly deprived
them of the lands some time in May-June 1943, seventy
tenants applied to the Collector Sangrur and Bhatinda for an
order for restoration of possession tinder s. 43 of the
Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Act 8 of 1953. The Collector
granted the applications and ordered that possession be
restored to the tenants. The orders were confirmed in
appeal by the Commissioner. The Commissioner was of the
view that the order under S. 43 could be passed by the
Collector on his subjective satisfaction that a person was
in wrongful or unauthorised possession of lands. The
Financial Commissioner confirmed the order of the
Commissioner on the ground that substantial justice had been
done by the subordinate revenue authorities, and no inter-
ference with the. orders was called for.
Bhai Ardaman, Singh then filed writ petitions in the High
Court of Punjab challenging the orders passed by the
Financial Commissioner. The petitions were heard by Gosain,
J. In the view of the learned Judge Act 8 of 1953 was a
complete code in itself and provided for a complete
machinery for the decision of disputes like the dispute
before him. He observed :
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"Under this law Tribunals of special
jurisdiction have been created and invested
with powers which should enable them to
effectively deal with disputes not on
ly those
which arise between the landlord and the
tenant, but also those which arise between
persons
285
entitled to possession and persons wrongly
dispossessing them. It may be that in the
latter case the enquiry contemplated to be
made by the Collector is only summary and that
the aggrieved party may be able to have re-
course finally to the civil court but the
jurisdiction to make, enquiry and to order
eviction has been given by the law to the
Collector."
In appeals under the Letters Patent the High Court reversed
the order passed by Gosain, J. The High Court was of the
opinion that Act 8 of 1953 which came into force on December
13, 1953, had no retrospective operation and that Gosain,
J., was in error in making an order for possession of the
lands when dispossession had taken place before the Act was
brought into force. The High Court also held that the
proceedings of the Collector were vitiated because the
Collector declined to give to the first respondent
opportunity to lead evidence which he desired to lead. With
certificate granted by the High Court, these appeals have
been preferred by the State of Punjab.
Section 43 of the Pepsu Act 8 of 1953 provides
"(1) Any person who is in wrongful or
unauthorised possession of any land
(a) the transfer of which either by the act
of parties or by the operation of law is
invalid under the provisions of this Act, or
(b) to the use and occupation of which be is
not entitled under the provisions of this Act,
may, after summary enquiry, be ejected by the
Collector who may also impose on such person a
penalty not exceeding five hundred rupees.
Clause (a) has evidently no application. It is not the case
of any party that there was any transfer of the lands which
was invalid by virtue of the provisions of the Act. The
tenants alleged that the first respondent was in wrongful or
unauthorised possession of the lands previously occupied by
them. But in order that the jurisdiction of the Collector
to hold a summary enquiry and to pass the order complained
of may be attracted, it was further necessary to establish
that under el. (b) of S. 43(1) the person in wrongful or
unauthorised possession was not entitled to the use and
occupation of the lands under the provisions of the Act.
Counsel for the State of Punjab is unable to invite our
attention to any provision which renders the first
respondent disentitled by virtue of the provisions of the
Act to the use and occupation of the lands. Section 43 (1)
(b) has, therefore, no application. The condition precedent
to the investment of jurisdiction in the Collector being
absent, the revenue authorities had no power to pass the
order in ejectment which they purported to pass.
LI 2 Sup. CI/68-4
286
We must point out that the proceedings of the Collector are
judicial in character. The trial is summary, but the
Collector is bound to exercise the jurisdiction vested in
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him not on a subjective satisfaction, as the Commissioner
assumed, but on a judicial determination of facts which
invest him with jurisdiction to pass an order in ejectment.
When the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction
does not exist the Collector can not clothe himself with
authority to pass the impugned orders. We also agree with
the High Court that in view of the terms of cl. (b), S. 43
had no retrospective operation. On the view we take, it is
unnecessary to consider the argument advanced by Mr. Chagla
on behalf of the first respondent that S. 43 has no
application to cases in which a dispute relating to tenancy
of land arises between the landlord and his tenant.
It is also not necessary to consider in this group of
appeals whether the proceedings of the Collector were
vitiated, because as alleged by the first respondent the
Collector did not afford sufficient opportunity to lead
evidence on the first respondent’s plea that there had been
no wrongful dispossession of the tenants.
Mr. Bindra on behalf of the State contended that in any
event this Court should not countenance interference with
the impugned orders of the revenue authorities, even if
erroneous, because those authorities have in passing the
orders done substantial justice. Counsel contended that the
tenants had been wrongfully deprived of possession of the
lands by the use of force by the first respondent and the
order passed by the Collector though not strictly warranted
by law was not liable to be disturbed by the High Court in
exercise of their jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari. We are unable to agree with that contention.
If the Collector had no Jurisdiction except in the special
conditions prescribed by S. 43, his order could not be
sustained merely because another authority may, if the
proceeding were before that authority, on the findings
recorded, have granted relief to the tenants of restoration
to possession of their respective lands. Authorities which
are vested with powers--judicial or quasi-judicial-can
exercise their power within the limits of their jurisdiction
and their actions without _jurisdiction cannot be sustained
merely because another body or authority which if lawfully
approached, may have jurisdiction to pass the order
complained of.
The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs. One hearing
fee.
R.K.P.S. Appeals
dismissed.
287