Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 952
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 575 OF 2014
STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAMVEER SINGH ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
1. Heard.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the State of
1
Madhya Pradesh for assailing the judgment dated
nd
22 June, 2010, passed by the Division Bench of the
2
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 465 of 2005 whereby, the High
Court accepted the appeal preferred by the accused-
3
respondent i.e., Ramveer Singh under Section 374(2)
1
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-State”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “accused-respondent”.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2025.08.11
11:53:27 IST
Reason:
1
4
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and set
th
aside the judgment dated 8 July, 2005 passed by
the learned Special Judge (Atrocities) and Additional
5
Sessions Judge, Morena in Special Case No. 159 of
2003. Vide judgment of conviction and order of
th
sentence dated 8 July, 2005, the trial Court had
convicted the accused-respondent for the offences
punishable under Sections 449 and 302 of the Indian
6
Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment as below: -
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 575 OF 2014
STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAMVEER SINGH ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
1. Heard.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the State of
1
Madhya Pradesh for assailing the judgment dated
nd
22 June, 2010, passed by the Division Bench of the
2
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in
Criminal Appeal No. 465 of 2005 whereby, the High
Court accepted the appeal preferred by the accused-
3
respondent i.e., Ramveer Singh under Section 374(2)
1
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-State”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “accused-respondent”.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2025.08.11
11:53:27 IST
Reason:
1
4
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and set
th
aside the judgment dated 8 July, 2005 passed by
the learned Special Judge (Atrocities) and Additional
5
Sessions Judge, Morena in Special Case No. 159 of
2003. Vide judgment of conviction and order of
th
sentence dated 8 July, 2005, the trial Court had
convicted the accused-respondent for the offences
punishable under Sections 449 and 302 of the Indian
6
Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment as below: -
| Sections | Sentence Awarded |
|---|---|
| 449 IPC | Rigorous imprisonment for<br>10 years along with fine of<br>Rs. 1,000/- and in default to<br>undergo 3 months additional<br>imprisonment. |
| 302 IPC | Life imprisonment along<br>with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and<br>in default to undergo 3<br>months additional<br>imprisonment. |
4
For short, ‘CrPC’.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.
6
For short, ‘IPC’.
2
3. As noted above, the High Court in appeal
reversed the judgment rendered by the trial Court
and acquitted the accused-respondent of the charges
levelled against him. The appellant-State has filed the
present appeal with special leave for assailing the
acquittal of the accused-respondent as recorded by
the High Court.
4. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced by Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel
representing the appellant-State and have gone
through the impugned judgment as well as the
judgment rendered by the trial Court and so also the
records of the case.
5. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that
th
on 10 March, 2003, a dehati nalishi (Ex. P-7) was
recorded by ASI Janved Singh (PW-6) based on the
statement of Poona Bai (PW-10) alleging inter alia
that at about 4:00 pm, on the same day the accused-
3
respondent forced his way into their house carrying
a container having kerosene oil in it. He poured the
kerosene on the body of her grand-daughter Badami
7
Bai and set her on fire with an intention of killing
her. On seeing the attack, the witness (PW-10)
started screaming and, as a result thereof, the
accused-respondent fled away from the place of
occurrence. On hearing the fervent cries of the
informant, the neighbours and other family members
assembled in the house.
6. It was further alleged that 12 days prior to the
incident, Raju, son of the accused-respondent, had
committed rape upon the victim and the matter was
reported to the police by Ramveer Singh, son of Poona
Bai (PW-10). Bearing this grudge in his mind, the
accused-respondent had set the victim to fire. Based
7
Hereinafter, referred to as “victim” or “deceased-victim”.
4
8
on the said statement of Poona Bai (PW-10), an FIR
came to be registered against the accused-
respondent at Police Station Dimni, Morena for the
offences punishable under Sections 307 and 450 of
IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
9
1989 .
7. The victim who was barely alive, was taken to
the District Hospital, Morena for treatment. The
prosecution claims that the dying declaration (Ex. P-
13) of victim was recorded by the Executive
Magistrate/Naib Tehsildar, Anil Singh Raghav (PW-
10
8) at the hospital. The victim succumbed to the
burn injuries at about 8:30 pm, upon which, Section
302 of IPC was added to the case.
8
Crime No. 28 of 2003.
9
For short, “SC/ST Act”.
10
Hereinafter, referred to as “Naib Tehsildar (PW-8)”.
5
8. The accused-respondent was arrested, and after
investigation, a chargesheet was filed against him in
the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambah,
who committed the case to the Court of Sessions from
where it was made over to the Special Court for trial.
Charges were framed against the accused-
respondent for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 449 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of
SC/ST Act. He abjured his guilt and claimed trial.
The trial Court recorded the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and questioned the accused-
respondent under Section 313 CrPC. The accused-
respondent denied the prosecution allegations and
claimed to be innocent. Upon hearing the arguments
advanced by learned Public Prosecutor and the
defence, and after evaluation of the evidence on
record, the trial Court held the accused-respondent
guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 449
6
th
and 302 of IPC vide judgment dated 8 July, 2005.
However, the accused-respondent was acquitted of
the charge framed under Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act.
9.
It is pertinent to note that the trial Court in its
judgement, recorded pertinent findings at Para 34 to
38, doubting the presence of Poona Bai (PW-10) at
the place of incident and discarded her claim of being
an eye-witness and having seen the accused-
respondent setting the deceased-victim to fire. The
High Court affirmed the aforesaid finding of the trial
Court that Poona Bai (PW-10) did not witness the
incident.
10. Apart from the evidence of the so-called eye-
witness, Poona Bai (PW-10) who has been disbelieved
by both the Courts below, the prosecution heavily
placed reliance on the oral and written dying
declarations of the deceased-victim to show that the
prosecution succeeded in bringing home the charges.
7
The High Court, while deciding the appeal against
conviction, discussed the evidence of Naib Tehsildar
(PW-8) who admitted in his cross-examination that at
the time of tendering the dying declaration, the victim
was conscious and was able to answer the questions,
but her voice was very feeble and not clear at all.
11. The High Court also noted that Dr. A.K. Gupta
(PW-13) who was present at the time of recording of
the alleged dying declaration (Ex. P-13) and made an
endorsement on the same to the effect that the victim
was conscious and was able to answer the questions
put to her, admitted in his testimony that he had
recorded the said endorsement after the dying
declaration had been recorded. Furthermore, both
Naib Tehsildar (PW-8) and Dr. A.K. Gupta (PW-13)
admitted in their evidence that they found it difficult
to decipher the dialect in which the injured victim
spoke. The victim was able to speak very feebly, and
8
the witness (PW-8) had to bend down in order to
grasp whatever she was trying to say.
12. The High Court doubted the dying declaration
on considering the admissions as appearing in the
evidence of Mango Bai (PW-12), who stated that when
the dying declaration was being recorded, she and
her mother-in-law i.e., Poona Bai (PW-10) were
present there and they told the concerned officer on
behalf of the victim as to how the incident had taken
place.
13. The High Court also found that the timing of
requisition issued by the Investigating Officer for
recording the dying declaration was doubtful. It was
observed that the victim had been admitted in the
hospital at 7:25 pm. Thereafter, the dehati nalishi
was recorded at the instance of Poona Bai (PW-10)
and the victim ultimately succumbed to death at 8:30
9
pm which made the entire sequence in which the
dying declaration was recorded, difficult to believe.
14. The High Court further noted that the victim
was having 100% burns and Dr. A.K. Gupta (PW-13)
admitted that the general condition of the victim was
extremely poor. It was further admitted by the Doctor
that when the dying declaration was being recorded,
neither the pulse nor the blood pressure of the victim
were measurable which convinced the High Court
that it was totally unsafe to rely on the dying
declaration.
15. The High Court also noted that so far as the
theory of oral dying declaration was concerned, the
same became questionable considering the fact that
there was no reference to any oral dying declaration
in the dehati nalishi lodged by Poona Bai (PW-10).
This omission was treated to be creating a doubt on
the prosecution case.
10
16. Taking into account the overall impact of the
contradictions and inherent improbabilities
appearing in the prosecution evidence, the High
Court held that the dying declaration was not free
from doubt and hence, it would be hazardous to place
reliance on the same for convicting the accused-
respondent.
17. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid
observations and findings of the High Court and are
of the firm view that the circumstances surrounding
the recording of the dying declaration create a grave
doubt making the said evidence unworthy of
credence. On a perusal of the testimony of Dr. A.K.
Gupta (PW-13), we are convinced that the victim was
in such a precarious physical condition that it would
have been virtually impossible for her to have
narrated the story in the manner claimed by the
prosecution. It may be noted that the Doctor
11
admitted that neither the pulse nor the blood
pressure of the victim were recordable. The Naib
Tehsildar (PW-8) admitted that the victim’s voice was
barely audible when he was trying to record the dying
declaration (Ex. P-13). Thus, the very factum of
recording of the dying declaration (Ex. P-13) comes
under a grave doubt making it totally unreliable.
18. The High Court also found that the complainant
Poona Bai (PW-10) being the author of dehati nalishi
admitted that there were several persons having the
name Ramveer and hence, there was a serious doubt
as to whether accused-respondent was the same
Ramveer who had set the deceased-victim on fire and
whose name was mentioned in the dying declaration.
19. The High Court further found that as per the
evidence of Poona Bai (PW-10) even before she gave
the dehati nalishi , an earlier report had been taken
from her by the police at the village which was not
12
brought on record and had been supressed by the
prosecution.
20. Considering all these facts cumulatively, the
High Court felt it unsafe to place reliance upon the
dehati nalishi (Ex. P-7) and dying declaration (Ex. P-
13) which essentially formed the bulwark of the entire
prosecution case. Since no other evidence was led by
the prosecution to connect the accused-respondent
with the crime, the High Court went on to allow the
nd
appeal vide judgment dated 22 June, 2010,
thereby, acquitting him of the charges levelled.
21. We may note that the present appeal is one
against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of
judgments of this Court that in an appeal against
acquittal unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on
the face of the record and the only possible view
based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of
the accused only in such an event, should the
13
appellate Court interfere with a judgment of
acquittal. Where two views are possible i.e., one
consistent with the acquittal and the other holding
the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse
to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference
in this regard may be made to the judgments of this
Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda
11
Rudragoudar & Ors. v. State of Karnataka ;
12
H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka and
13
Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. .
22. In view of the facts and circumstances noted
above, we are convinced that the present is not a case
wherein it can be said that no view other than the
guilt of the accused-respondent is possible. The
prosecution case is full of material contradictions and
inherent improbabilities and there do not exist any
11
(2024) 8 SCC 149.
12
(2023) 9 SCC 581.
13
(2022) 3 SCC 471.
14
valid or substantial reasons to interfere with the
acquittal of the respondent as recorded by the High
nd
Court. The impugned judgment dated 22 June,
2010, does not suffer from any error or infirmity
warranting interference. Hence, the appeal lacks
merit, and is dismissed as such.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(ARAVIND KUMAR)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 30, 2025.
15