Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5426 of 1997
PETITIONER:
APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY & COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. VARSHABEN BHARATBHAI SHAH & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/2001
BENCH:
S.P. Bharucha,, N. Santosh Hegde & Y.K. Sabharwal
JUDGMENT:
BHARUCHA, J.
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The Revenue is in appeal by special leave against the
judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of
Gujarat. The judgment and order was passed on a writ
petition filed by the first respondent in the following
circumstances.
On 12th August, 1995, the second and third respondents
entered into an agreement to sell to the first respondent
immovable property situated in Ahmedabad for the sum of
Rs.47 lakhs. The appropriate authority of the Revenue came
to the conclusion that the apparent consideration in respect
of the said immovable property under the said agreement was
less than the market value thereof by 15% or more.
Accordingly, a notice dated 6th November, 1995 was issued to
the respondents to show cause why the said immovable
property should not be subjected to pre-emptive purchase
under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The
respondents showed cause, but the order of pre-emptive
purchase was made by the appropriate authority. This order
was challenged in the writ petition.
Before the High Court, it was contended that what had
been transferred by the second and third respondents to the
first respondent were their equal half shares in the said
immovable property and that they owned such equal half
shares was indicated in their income tax returns and in the
said agreement, which stated that the earnest money had been
paid by two separate cheques to the second and third
respondents. The High Court said, There may be one
agreement for transfer of property where the transferors may
be co-owners or joint owners. It may be that the share of
the transferor is not specified. It may happen that there
may be one transferee or more than one. The question to be
examined is whether the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the
Act would be attracted or not in a case where co-owners have
agreed to transfer their property rights and each co-owner
is to be paid an amount of consideration which is less than
the amount specified, i.e., each co-owner-transferor will
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get less than Rs.25 lakhs as per the agreement. The High
Court followed the judgment of the Madras High Court in K.V.
Kishore & Anr. vs. Appropriate Authority & Ors. (189
I.T.R. 264). It held that it was in the case before it
clear that what was agreed to be transferred was the
individual undivided share in the said immovable property
and the value of each such share was less than Rs.25 lakhs.
The transferors were co-owners and each co-owner was getting
an apparent consideration that was less than the limit
prescribed, that is, less than Rs.25 lakhs. The provisions
of Chapter XX-C were not attracted even though the amount
that all the co- owners received exceeded Rs.25 lakhs.
Before the High Court, it was not disputed on behalf of the
Revenue that all the reports obtained by it in regard to the
valuation of the said immovable property had not been
supplied to the respondents. For that reason, the High
Court came to the conclusion that the principles of natural
justice had not been followed. The High Court characterized
as perverse a finding of the appropriate authority in regard
to the case of the first respondent that no unaccounted
money had figured in the sale transaction. For all these
reasons, the High Court quashed the order of pre-emptive
purchase.
In K.V. Kishore & Anr. vs. Appropriate Authority &
Ors. (189 I.T.R. 264) a learned Single Judge of the Madras
High Court held, more or less on similar facts, thus :
After giving deep consideration to these rival
submissions, the following facts would clinchingly establish
the case in favour of the petitioners. It is not denied or
it is not disputed that the original allottee, A.
Srinivasan, died in the year 1962. He being a Hindu,
governed by the Hindu Succession Act, on his death, his wife
and children acquired a vested right to the definite
quantified shares in the property left behind by him. As
owners of their respective shares, they were competent to
enter into a family arrangement which they did on April 8,
1987, under the terms of which, each one of respondents
Nos.4 to 8 were allotted a definite share in the property.
After April 8, 1987, they were individual owners of definite
shares in the property. Each one could deal with only his
respective share and he cannot deal with the share of
another. The property which so fell to the share of each
individual will come definitely within the definition of the
words property. Such a sharer was entitled to transfer
his property to a third person. Merely because a plurality
of such individual owners joined together to enter into one
single agreement to transfer their respective shares in
favour of one or more persons, that would not make any
difference to the main issue that what each transferred is
his definite share in the property. Viewed from that
perspective, the agreement entered into between the
petitioners and respondents Nos.4 to 8 is to be understood
only as an agreement to convey the respective undivided
shares of respondents Nos.4 to 8. It is not in dispute that
the value of each such share is less than Rs.10,00,000. The
recitals in the agreement in more than one place refer to
the fact that what is sold, is the individual undivided
share in the property. Consequently, the impugned order
made under Chapter XX-C of the Act taking the total
consideration, the collective shares, cannot be sustained
.
The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was
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followed by that High Court in N.C. Rangesh & Ors. Vs.
Inspector General of Registration & Ors. (189 I.T.R. 270)
and by the Karnataka, Calcutta and Delhi High Courts in the
cases of Appropriate Authority & Ors. Vs. J.S.A. Raghava
Reddy & Ors. (199 I.T.R. 508), Surinder Gupta Vs. Chief
Commissioner of Income-Tax & Ors. (221 I.T.R. 375) and
Webster Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (225
I.T.R. 924) respectively.
The Bombay High Court has taken the contrary view in
Jodhram Daulatram Arora & Ors. Vs. M.B. Kodnani & Ors.
(221 I.T.R. 368). In this case the vendor was one and
there were three purchasers. It was contended that under
the agreement in question the vendor had agreed to sell to
each of the purchasers an undivided 1/3rd interest in the
flat and each of the purchasers individually had agreed to
buy an undivided 1/3rd share in the flat from the vendor for
the total consideration of Rs.14,06,000/-; that
consideration for the purchase of each such interest in the
flat should be valued at Rs.4,68,667/-, which was less than
the limit of Rs.10 lakhs; and that, in the circumstances,
the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to proceed
under Chapter XX-C. The judgments of the Madras High Court
in the cases of K.V. Kishore and N.C. Rangesh were cited.
The Bombay High Court did not accept the contention and it
distinguished these judgments. The agreement in question
before it, it said, was a composite agreement in respect of
the flat. There was nothing in the agreement which
indicated that the purchasers had agreed to buy individually
an undivided 1/3rd share of the flat from the vendor. All
the concerned parties had filed Form No.37-I and, therefore,
it was not open to them now to contend that Section 269- UD
had no application and the appropriate authority had no
jurisdiction.
Section 269-UA defines certain terms for the purposes of
Chapter XX-C, which deals with the purchase by the Central
Government of properties in certain cases of transfer. An
agreement for transfer is defined by clause (a) thereof to
mean an agreement for the transfer of any property.
property is defined by clause (d) to mean any land or any
building or part of a building and any rights in or with
respect to any land or any building or a part of a building.
Transfer in relation to any property means, by reason of
clause (f), the transfer of such property by way of sale or
exchange or lease for a term of not less than twelve years.
Apparent consideration is defined by clause (b) to mean,
if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of
sale, the consideration for such transfer as specified in
the agreement of transfer. Section 269- UC places
restrictions on the transfer of immovable property. What
are relevant for our purpose are sub-sections (1), (2) and
(3) of Section 269-UC and they read thus :
269-UC(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or in any other
law for the time being in force, no transfer of any property
in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees,
as may be prescribed, shall be effected except after an
agreement for transfer is entered into between the person
who intends transferring the property (hereinafter referred
to as the transferor) and the person to whom it is proposed
to be transferred (hereinafter referred to as the
transferee) in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(2) at least [four] months before the intended date of
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transfer.
(2) The agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall
be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of
the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to
such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of
the other parties.
(3) Every statement referred to in sub-section
(2) shall, -
i) be in the prescribed form;
ii) set forth such particulars as may be
prescribed; and
iii) be verified in the prescribed manner,
and shall be furnished to the appropriate
authority in such manner and within such time
as may be prescribed, by each of the parties to
such transaction or by any of the parties to such
transaction acting on behalf of himself and on
behalf of the other parties.
Section 269 UD, so far as it is relevant, reads thus:
269UD.(1) [Subject to the provisions of sub- section
(1A) and (1B), the appropriate authority], after the receipt
of the statement under sub-section (3) of section 269UC in
respect of any property, may, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law or any instrument or any
agreement for the time being in force, make an order for the
purchase by the Central Government of such property at an
amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration :
[(1A) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the
appropriate authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the transferor, the person in occupation of
the property if the transferor is not in occupation of the
property, the transferee and to every other person whom the
appropriate authority knows to be interested in the
property.
(1B) Every order made by the appropriate authority under
sub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is
made.]
(2) The appropriate authority shall cause a copy of its
order under sub-section (1) in respect of any property to be
served on the transferor, the person in occupation of the
property if the transferor is not in occupation thereof, the
transferee, and on every other person whom the appropriate
authority knows to be interested in the property.
Rule 48-K of the Income Tax Rules states that the value
of any property for the purposes of sub-section (1) of
Section 269-UC shall be, where the agreement for transfer
prescribed under the said sub- section is entered into after
31st July, 1995, Rs.25 lakhs for the city of Ahmedabad.
In C.B. Gautam Vs. Union of India & Ors. [1993(1) SCC
78] a Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the
constitutionality of the Chapter XX-C. Paragraph 21 of the
judgment reads thus :
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21. The legislative history of Chapter XX-C, the stand
taken by the Union of India and the Central Board of Direct
Taxes as shown in the main counter-affidavit and the
affidavit of H.K. Sarangi, which has been filed after
obtaining instructions from the Income Tax Department and
the Central Board of Direct Taxes make it clear that the
powers of compulsory purchase conferred under the provisions
of Chapter XX- C of the Income Tax Act are being used and
intended to be used only in cases where in an agreement to
sell an immovable property in an urban area to which the
provisions of the said Chapter apply, there is a significant
undervaluation of the property in such areas as set out
earlier, the apparent consideration shown in the agreement
for sale is less than the fair market value by 15 per cent
or more it may draw a presumption that this undervaluation
has been done with a view to evade tax. Of course, such a
presumption is rebuttable and the intended seller or
purchaser can lead evidence to rebut such a presumption.
Moreover, an order for compulsory purchase of property under
the provisions of Section 269- UD required to be supported
by reasons in writing and such reasons must be germane to
the object for which Chapter XX-C was introduced in the
Income Tax Act, namely, to counter attempts to evade tax.
What, in our opinion, therefore, has to be seen for the
purposes of attracting Chapter XX-C is: what is the
property which is the subject matter of transfer and what is
the apparent consideration for such transfer. This has to
be seen in a real light with due regard to the object of the
chapter and not in an artificial or technical manner. If
the apparent consideration for the transfer is more than the
limit prescribed for the relevant area under Rule 48- K,
what has then to be seen is whether the apparent
consideration for the property is less than the market value
thereof by 15% or more. If so, the notice for pre-emptive
purchase can be issued and it is then for the parties to the
transaction to satisfy the appropriate authority that the
apparent consideration is the real consideration for the
transfer.
Now, in the present case, the said agreement is for the
sale of the said immovable property. That the equal shares@@
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of the second and third respondents therein are to be@@
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transferred to the first respondent is a necessary incident
of such sale. The parties to the transaction filed Form
No.37-I with the appropriate authority and, correctly,
stated that what was being sold was the said immovable
property and not the one half shares of the second and third
respondents therein. It also stated, correctly, that the
total apparent consideration for the transfer of the said
immovable property was Rs.47 lakhs. This leaves us in no
doubt at all that what was to be transferred was the said
immovable property and that the consideration for such
transfer was the sum of Rs.47 lakhs. It is of no
consequence that the second and third respondents owned the
said immovable property as tenants in common or that this is
how they had shown their ownership in their income tax
returns. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High
Court was in error in concluding that what had been sold by
the second and third respondents to the first respondent was
their equal share in the said immovable property, that the
apparent consideration was, therefore, less than Rs.25 lakhs
and that, therefore, the provisions of Chapter XX-C would
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not apply.
We should add that even if the agreement of transfer had
been so drawn as to show the transfer of the equal shares of
the second and third respondents in the said immovable
property, our conclusion would have been the same for,
looked at realistically, it was the said immovable property
which was the subject of the transfer.
We are of the opinion that the judgments of the Madras,
Karnataka, Delhi and Calcutta High Courts referred to above
are based on a wrong approach and are erroneous. We approve
of the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Jodhram
Daulatram Aroras case.
As we have pointed out, it was conceded before the High
Court on behalf of the Revenue that all the relevant reports
pertaining to the valuation of the said immovable property
had not been disclosed to the respondents. We think, in
these circumstances, that the matter should go back to the
appropriate authority for hearing the matter afresh. It is
not, therefore, necessary to deal with the finding of the
High Court about perversity.
The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under
appeal is set aside. The matter is remanded to the
appropriate authority. The Revenue shall make available to
the respondents all the material, including reports, that it
relied upon in regard to the valuation of the said immovable
property. The appropriate authority shall then hear the
parties afresh and pass an appropriate order. It shall do
so without taking into account any observation of the High
Court in the impugned judgment. In respect of the
proceedings upon remand, no objection in regard to
limitation may be raised.
No order as to costs.