Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3892 OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.6546 of 2017]
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SEEMA SHARMA RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Indira Banerjee, J.
Leave granted.
This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 10.08.2016
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
(Indore Bench) dismissing Writ Appeal No. 301/2016 and upholding
the order dated 09.02.2016 passed by the Single Bench allowing Writ
Petition No. 14027/2010 filed by the respondent and directing the
Appellants to grant the Respondent-Writ Petitioner the benefit of
the University Grants Commission scale of pay from the date of her
initial appointment.
2. By an order No./EXT/91 Order No.480 dated 27.03.1991, the
Respondent was appointed to the post of Librarian-cum-Museum
Assistant, Government Dhanvantri Ayurvedic College, Ujjain, in the
pay scale of Rs. 950-25-1000-30-1210-40-1530 along with prevailing
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
GULSHAN KUMAR
ARORA
Date: 2022.07.07
16:10:02 IST
Reason:
dearness allowance from the date of joining. The basic pay of the
Respondent-Writ Petitioner was fixed at Rs.950/-.
3. The Respondent-Writ Petitioner was appointed on probation for
a period of one year. The respondent successfully completed her
probation and was duly confirmed in service.
4. After completion of 8 years of service, the Respondent-Writ
Petitioner claimed the UGC scale of pay as paid to the persons in
the senior scale of Librarian in colleges under the Higher
Education Department, as per the Madhya Pradesh Education Service
(Collegiate Branch), Recruitment Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred
to as the “1990 Rules”).
5. The request of the Respondent-Writ Petitioners for the higher
UGC scale of pay was not acceded to. The Respondent-Writ
Petitioner, therefore, filed the Writ Petition referred to above,
which has been allowed and the Respondent-Writ Petitioner has been
directed to be paid the UGC scale of pay as paid to the Librarians
of colleges under the Higher Education Department. An intra court
appeal filed by the Appellants has been dismissed.
6. In the High Court as also this Court, the Respondent-Writ
Petitioner contended that her service conditions were governed by
the 1990 Rules. The Appellants contend that the 1990 Rules were
never applicable to the Respondent. The 1990 Rules were applicable
to institutions under the Higher Education Department. The
Government Dhanvantri Ayurvedic College, where the Respondent-Writ
Petitioner was appointed was not under the Higher Education
Department, but under the Ayush Department of the Government of
Madhya Pradesh.
7. The Appellants pointed out that at the time of appointment,
the Respondent-Writ Petitioner was governed by the Madhya Pradesh
Public Health (Indian System of Medicine and Homeopathy), Class-
III, Clerical and Non-Clerical Services Recruitment Rules, 1987 and
not the 1990 Rules. The Appellants have made a specific averment
that the State Government has made the UGC scales applicable to
Colleges under the Higher Education Department, which are receiving
financial aid from the UGC.
8. It is the specific contention of the Appellants that the
Ayurvedic Colleges under the Ayush Department do not receive any
financial aid from the UGC. The Rules applicable to institutions
under the Ayush Department do not contain any provision that makes
the UGC scale of pay applicable to the employees of institutions
under the Ayush Department.
9. It is patently clear that the 1990 Rules, were not applicable
to the Respondent. The 1990 Rules have been annexed to the
Rejoinder filed by the appellants. The scale of pay of a Librarian
is specified in Schedule 1 to the said 1990 Rules. The scale of
pay of a Librarian, as specified in Schedule-I is Rs. 2200-75-2800-
100-4000. Significantly, there is no designated post of Librarian
cum Museum Assistant in the 1990 Rules.
10. The appointment letter of the respondent clearly shows that
she was appointed Librarian cum Museum Assistant at a pay of Rs.
950 in the pay scale of Rs. 950-25-1000-30-1210-40-1530 along with
the prevailing dearness allowance from the date of joining.
Even after completion of probation, and for a period of more than 8
years, the respondent-writ petitioner did not raise any dispute
with regard to her scale of pay.
11. Under the 1990 Rules, the senior scale of Librarian is Rs.
3000-100-3500-125-5000. The respondent-writ petitioner started
claiming the aforesaid scale of pay of Rs.3000-100-3500-125-5000/-
after completion of 8 years of service.
12. On the other hand, under the Madhya Pradesh Public Health
(Indian System of Medicine and Homeopathy), Class-III, Clerical and
Non-Clerical Services Recruitment Rules, 1987, the scale of pay of
the Museum Assistant-cum-Librarian, being the post to which the
respondent was appointed was Rs. 515-10-575-15-800-20-840. That
scale was revised. The Respondent-Writ Petitioner was granted the
revised pay scale. Significantly, as observed above, there was no
post of Museum Assistant-cum-Librarian under the 1990 Rules, but
there was a post of Museum Assistant-cum-Librarian under the 1987
Rules.
13. It appears that the Division Bench as also the Single Bench of
the High Court followed the judgment of the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 5438/2000 (State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. M.K.
Verma & four Ors.) heard with other writ petitions. The judgment
in the case of M.K. Verma (supra) pertained to librarians of
Engineering Colleges and Medical Colleges and is not applicable in
the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
14. Significantly, in M.K. Verma (supra), the Court found that
there had been complete parity in the pay scale applicable to the
librarians working in Medical/Engineering Colleges till 30.06.1969.
Thereafter, the UGC pay scales, accepted by the State Government
were made applicable to librarians working in general/higher
education colleges.
15. Be that as it may, the issues involved in this appeal are
squarely covered by the judgment dated 28.07.2009 of this Court in
Civil Appeal No. 5058/2009 arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.25682/2008, State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. vs. Ramesh
Chandra Bajpai reported in (2009) 13 SCC 635 arising out of Special
Leave Petition (Civil) No.25682/2008, where the Respondent, a
Physical Training Instructor in Government Ayurvedic College had
been claiming the UGC pay scale.
16. This Court took note of the submission of the learned counsel
for the State of Madhya Pradesh that the University Grants
Commission scales of pay had not been extended to the employees of
the Ayurvedic Colleges including the members of Teaching staff,
governed by the 1987 Rules.
17. The relevant findings of this Court are set out hereinbelow
for convenience :-
“9. It is not in dispute that Ayurvedic Colleges situated
in the State of Madhya Pradesh are under the control of the
Department of Medical Education. It is also not in dispute
that at present recruitment to the post of Physical
Training Instructor is regarded by the 1987 Rules. In
terms of rules 5, 6 and 8 read with the relevant entries of
Schedules I, II and III of the 1987 Rules, the post of
Physical Training Instructor is categorized as Class II
Non-Ministerial under the heading ‘Establishment of
Divisional Organization’ and the same is required to be
lifted 100 per cent by direct recruitment from amongst the
persons possessing the requisite educational qualification
of Diploma in Physical Training.
The post of Sports Officer finds mention in the four
Schedules appended to the 1990 Rules. By virtue of Rule 8
read with the relevant entries of Schedule II and III of
the 1990 Rules, the post of Sports Officer is required to
be filled as under :-
90% by direct recruitment and 10% by promotion from
amongst the Assistant Sports Officers.
10. The educational qualification prescribed for direct
recruitment to the post of Sports Officer is a Post
Graduate Degree in physical education with at least 55%
marks and at the degree level of physical education, the
percentage of total marks obtained should not be less than
50.
11. A comparison of the provisions of the 1987 Rules and
1990 Rules clearly establish that they not only deal with
different classes of employees but the educational
qualifications and scales of pay prescribed for the posts
enumerated in Schedules of two sets of Rules are entirely
different. While the 1987 Rules regulate recruitment to
Class III Ministerial and Non-Ministerial posts in various
colleges imparting education in India System of Medicine
including Ayurvedic the 1990 rules regulate recruitment to
different posts in the Educational Service (Collegiate
Branch) including that of Sports Officer. ”
18. In Ramesh Chandra Bajpai (supra), this Court further held that
it was well-settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work
could only be invoked when the employees were similarly
circumstanced in every way. Mere similarity of designation or
similarity or quantum of work was not determinative of equality in
the matter of pay scales. The Court had to consider all the
relevant factors such as the mode of recruitment, qualifications
for the post, the nature of work, the value of work,
responsibilities involved and various other factors.
19. In the instant case, it would be pertinent to note that the
eligibility criteria for appointment of Museum Assistant-cum-
Librarian under the 1987 Rules was different from the eligibility
criteria of appointment of Librarian under the 1990 Rules. Under
the 1987 Rules, the minimum qualification for the post of Museum
Assistant cum Librarian was graduate but under the 1990 Rules, the
minimum qualification was post graduate degree.
20. It is also well settled that there can be no equality to a
wrong and/or illegality. Just because a librarian may have been
erroneously granted the UGC pay scale, that would not entitle
others to claim the UGC pay scale, if not applicable under the
Rules.
21. On behalf of the Respondent-Writ Petitioner, it was forcefully
contended that the Respondent-Writ Petitioner had wrongly been
granted scale of pay as per the Madhya Pradesh Ayush Department
(Clerical and Non-Clerical), Class-III, Service Recruitment Rules,
2013, which came into force in 2013 could have no manner of
application to the respondents, who became eligible for the Senior
Scale in terms of the 1990 Rules. It was urged that specific Rules
for the employees of the Ayush Department were framed only in 2013
and such Rules could not retrospectively be applied. However, from
the recital of the Rules it is patently clear that the Rules have
been framed superseding the 1987 Rules.
22. This makes it absolutely clear that at all material points of
time the employees of the Ayush Department, Government of Madhya
Pradesh were governed by a separate set of Rules.
23. The fixation of scales of pay is a matter of policy, with
which the Courts can only interfere in exceptional cases where
there is discrimination between two sets of employees appointed by
the same authority, in the same manner, where the eligibility
criteria is the same and the duties are identical in every aspect.
24. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Saurabh Mishra, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants to a recent judgment
of this Court rendered on 07.04.2022 in Civil Appeal No. 2661/2015
(State of Uttarakhand vs. Sudhir Budakoti & Others) , where this
Court held as under :-
“14. A mere differential treatment on its own cannot be
termed as an “anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution”.
When there is a reasonable basis for a classification
adopted by taking note of the exigencies and diverse
situations, the Court is not expected to insist on absolute
equality by taking a rigid and pedantic view as against a
pragmatic one.
15. Such a discrimination would not be termed as
arbitrary as the object of the classification itself is
meant for providing the benefits to an identified group of
persons who form a class of their own. When the
differentiation is clearly distinguishable with adequate
demarcation duly identified, the object of Article 14 gets
satisfied. Social, revenue and economic considerations are
certainly permissible parameters in classifying a
particular group. Thus, a valid classification is nothing
but a valid discrimination. That being the position, there
can never be an injury to the concept of equality enshrined
under the Constitution, not being an inflexible doctrine.
16. A larger latitude in dealing with a challenge to the
classification is mandated on the part of the Court when
introduced either by the Legislature or the Executive as
the case may be. There is no way, courts could act like
appellate authorities especially when a classification is
introduced by way of a policy decision clearly identifying
the group of beneficiaries by analysing the relevant
materials.
17. The question as to whether a classification is
reasonable or not is to be answered on the touchstone of a
reasonable, common man’s approach, keeping in mind the
avowed object behind it. If the right to equality is to be
termed as genus, a right to non-discrimination becomes a
specie. When two identified groups are not equal,
certainly they cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. A
reasonable classification thus certainly would not injure
the equality enshrined under Article 14 when there exists
an intelligible diffrentia between two groups having a
rational relation to the object. Therefore, an
interference would only be called for on the court being
convinced that the classification causes inequality among
similarly placed persons. The role of the court being
restrictive, generally, the task is best left to the
concerned authorities. When a classification is made on
the recommendation made by a body of experts constituted
for the purpose, courts will have to be more wary of
entering into the said arena as its interference would
amount to substituting its views, a process which is best
avoided.
18. A long as the classification does not smack of inherent
arbitrariness and conforms to justice and fair play, there
may not be any reason to interfere with it. It is the
wisdom of the other wings which is required to be respected
except when a classification is bordering on arbitrariness,
artificial difference and itself being discriminatory. A
decision made sans the aforesaid situation cannot be tested
with either a suspicious or a microscopic eye. Good-faith
and intention are to be presumed unless the contrary
exists. One has to keep in mind that the role of the court
is on the illegality involved as against the governance.”
25. This Court cannot interfere with the policy decision taken by
the Government merely because it feels that another decision would
have been fairer; or wiser as held by this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Narmada Bachao Anadolan reported in (2011) 7 SCC 639
and relied upon and re-affirmed in Sudhir Budakoti & Others
(supra).
26. For the reasons discussed above, the Appeal is allowed. The
impugned orders of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh are set-aside.
27. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………………… J.
[INDIRA BANERJEE]
……………………………………………… J.
[C.T. RAVIKUMAR]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 12, 2022