Full Judgment Text
Reportable
2025 INSC 1067
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2025
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 8169 OF 2025)
KIRAN …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN & ANR.
…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Leave granted.
1.1 With the consent of learned counsels for the
parties and upon their joint request, the appeal was taken
up for final hearing today.
2. By way of present appeal, what is called in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NISHA KHULBEY
Date: 2025.09.02
18:03:03 IST
Reason:
question is judgment and order dated 29.04.2025 of the
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High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at
Aurangabad, in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025, whereby
the High Court allowed the pre-arrest bail to respondent
No.1 under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, which was refused by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Paranda.
3. FIR No.255/2024 came to be registered by the
appellant-complainant with the Paranda Police Station,
District Dharashiv on 26.11.2024 against accused-
respondent No.1 herein and others in respect of alleged
commission of offenses punishable under Sections 118
(1), 115(1), 189(2), 189(4), 190, 191(2), 191(3), 333, 324(4),
76, 351(3) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
and under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
3.1 The relevant and material part of the contents of
the said FIR is extracted below.
“Today on 25.11.2024 at around 11:00 AM, while I and my
mother Mohini were at home, Bahubali Masalkar, a peon
from the Gram Panchayat Office, Kapilapuri, came in front
of my house and started abusing us, asking why we did
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not vote in yesterday's assembly elections as we had
asked. At that time, I tried to tell him that voting was my
only concern, but he abused me and then rushed at me.
At that time, we got into a fight. After that we got into a
fight. After that he left from there.
Then at 11:20 in the morning, my village’s known, namely
Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh Awani, Jayghosh
Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav Awani, Nabiraj Awani,
Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra Wasgadekar, Anil
Wasgadekar, Ranjit Rajkumar Jain, Jagdish Jain, all
residents of Kapilapuri (all Jains), came in front of our
house. At that time, Rajkumar Jain said to me, "Mangtyano,
you have become much arrogant", you are staying in the
village and voting against me, so he hit me on the head
and back with an iron rod." At that time, I fell down. After
that, Kishore Jain and Vaibhav Awani entered my house,
pushed my mother Mohini and aunt Rekha, grabbed the
saree of mother Mohini and pulled it, threatened that
"Mangtyano, you have become arrogant, we will not let
you stay in the village, we will burn your houses," beat
them with an iron rod and even punched them giving
internal injuries. In it, a one-tola gold mangalsutra from
mother Mohini's fortune necklace fell somewhere in the
scuffle. The household utensils were damaged by the
rioters, causing total damage to our household items.
Seeing us being beaten up, my friend Yashwant Bodre
from the village came to the house to resolve the dispute.
Rajkurhar Jain also said to him that you Ramoshi have also
become arrogant, that you voted for someone else in
yesterday's assembly elections without listening to us; so
he beat Yashwant on the left hand and back with an iron
rod in his hand. At that time, some of them had petrol
bottle in their hands and were shouting and threatening
repeatedly that they would burn our houses and not let us
stay in the village. Due to the noise of this commotion,
three of our villagers, Avinash Masgude, Appa Masgude,
Omkar Mane, came to the house and rescued us from the
clutches of these men. After that, when approached to the
Paranda police station to file a complaint, the police
immediately gave us a letter for medical treatment and
sent us to the Paranda Sub-District Hospital for medical
treatment.
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On 25.11,2024 between 11:00 AM to 11.20 AM, the names
of Rajkumar Jain, Jaykumar Jain, Bharatesh Awani,
Jayghosh Jain, Kishore Awani, Vaibhav Awani, Nabiraj
Awani, Bahubali Masalkar, Jitendra Wasgadekar, Anil
Wasgadekar, Ranjeet Rajkumar Jain, Jagdish Jain, all
residents of Kapilapuri, angry that I voted against them in
yesterday's assembly elections, even though they knew
that I and my family belongs to the Matang community,
they abused us in caste terms, beat us with an iron rod and
injured us, and they also entered my house and beat my
mother and aunt abusing in filthy language, and they
pulled my mother's saree and molested her, so I have a
complaint against them.
I am giving my above statement with full of my
consciousness and after reading it, I found it completely
correct as per my narration.”
3.2 What is narrated in the FIR disclosed certain
manifest aspects. On 25.11.2024 in the morning, the
respondent-accused along with others went to the house
of the appellant and standing outside and in front of
appellant’s house stated to the appellant “ Mangtyano, you
have become much arrogant, you are staying in the village
and voting against me ”. The appellant was attacked with
an iron rod. The mother and aunt of the appellant were
addressed with the same set of words as above and that
they all were beaten with the iron rod and were punched
inflicting internal injuries, the Mangalsutra of the mother
fell somewhere in the scuffle. The accused had in their
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hands petrol bottles and were repeatedly shouting and
threatening that they would burn the house of the
appellant. The injured appellant lodged the FIR from the
hospital.
3.3 The evident reason for this incident was
animosity generated in the mind of the accused in respect
of appellant’s act of not voting in favour of particular
candidate in the assembly elections which had concluded
on the previous day. The exhibition of enmity by the
accused, their utterances as above and the conduct of
beating the appellant and hurling castiest abuses and
threats were in public view, outside the house of the
appellant. The appellant belonged to the Scheduled
Caste community whose caste was “Mang” or “Matang”;
whereas the respondent accused was not the member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. He
hailed from ‘Jain’ community.
3.4 While rejecting the prayer of respondent-
accused for anticipatory bail, the Additional Sessions
Judge, Paranda recorded findings in paragraph 8 of his
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order inter alia that there was a specific allegation against
the accused and that the accused had abused the
complainant by referring to his caste, that the caste
certificate confirmed that the complainant-informant
belonged to the Scheduled Caste community and further
that the incident was witnessed by independent
witnesses. On the basis of statements in the FIR and the
material available, the court concluded that the
ingredients of the offences punishable under Section 3 of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the
SC/ST Act”) as alleged were made out.
3.5 When the order rejecting the anticipatory bail
was challenged before the High Court by the accused, the
High Court took the view to record that there were
inconsistencies in the prosecution story as could be
gathered from the account of eye-witnesses. According to
the High Court, the entire prosecution case appeared to
be exaggerated and false. What weighed with the High
Court was also the aspect that the incident took place
immediately after the declaration of results of the
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assembly elections, therefore, it had political overtures.
Resting on such considerations, the High Court concluded
that the appellant was falsely implicated. Further
referring to the nature of the injuries and allegations, the
High Court granted anticipatory bail.
4. Mr. Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant-herein assailed the
judgment and order of the High Court to submit that the
High Court not only misdirected itself in exercise of the
discretion to grant bail to respondent No.1, but it plainly
overlooked the provisions of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act.
Highlighting the contents of and the allegations in the FIR,
it was submitted that the accused used abusive language
referring to caste and the appellant who was the member
of the Scheduled Caste community was thereby subjected
to derogation and insult. The appellant was intimidated
and his mother and aunt were also abused with castiest
slur and were threatened. Learned counsel for the
appellant further submitted that the castiest slur and the
castiest abuse employed against the appellant clearly
made out the offence under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act as
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alleged and since the offence was prima facie committed,
the pre-arrest bail could not have been granted by the
High Court in view of the provision of Section 18 of the Act.
4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the
decision of Vilas Pandurang Pawar vs . State of
1
Maharashtra to submit that at the stage of the
consideration of grant of bail or otherwise, the High Court
was not expected to conduct a mini trial. It was submitted
that the reasoning of the High Court was not acceptable.
Regarding bar created by virtue of Section 18 of the SC/ST
Act, learned counsel pressed into service the decision of
2
this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs. Union of India .
4.2 On the other hand, learned counsel for
respondent No.1 seeking to defend the order of the High
Court, submitted that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act did not
create an absolute bar to grant anticipatory bail. He
proceeded to submit that in subsequent decision of this
3
Court in Shajan Skaria vs . The State of Kerala & Anr. ,
1
(2012) 8 SCC 795
2
(2020) 4 SCC 727
3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249
Page 8 of 23
it was observed that the court needed to undertake an
exercise to find out whether there was a prima facie
substance in the allegations. According to learned
counsel for respondent No.1, the allegations in the FIR
were made for the sake of making and were out of anger
regarding casting of vote in the assembly elections. He
tried to submit that it was wrong to give a castiest colour
to the allegations to conclude that any offence under the
SC/ST Act was committed by the accused.
4.3. The respondent-State of Maharashtra filed the
counter affidavit and opposed the grant of pre-arrest bail
to respondent No.1 accused by emphasising the
operational ambit of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act. It was
highlighted that when prima facie material existed in the
form of allegations in the FIR and other attendant factual
aspects, the respondent No.1 could not have been
granted the anticipatory bail by the High Court.
5. Amongst the offences alleged in the FIR,
included those under Sections 3(1)(o), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and
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3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act. The relevant extract of Section
3 of the SC/ST Act is as under.
“ 3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— (1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,
(b) to (n) … … …
(o) commits any offence under this Act against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe
for having voted or not having voted for a particular
candidate or for having voted in a manner provided
by law;
(p) … … …
(q) … … …
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within
public view;
(t) … … …
(u) … … …
(v) … … …
(w) (i) intentionally touches a woman belonging to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that
she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe, when such act of touching is of a sexual nature
and is without the recipient’s consent; (ii) uses
words, acts or gestures of a sexual nature towards a
woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
5.1. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act is reproduced:
“18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons
committing an offence under the Act.— Nothing in
section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any
case involving the arrest of any person on an
accusation of having committed an offence under this
Act.”
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5.1.1 Section 18A in its sub section (1) of the Act
provides that for the registration of an FIR against any
person, preliminary enquiry shall not be required. It is
further stated that the investigating officer shall not be
required to take approval for the arrest, if necessary, of
any person against whom an accusation about the
commission of an offence under this SC/ST Act has been
made. Sub section (2) of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act
mentions that the provisions of Section 438 of the Cr.PC
shall not apply to a case under this Act notwithstanding
any judgment or order or direction of any Court.
5.2 It is evident from the above provision of Section
18 that it expressly excludes the applicability of Section
438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“hereinafter
referred to as “the Cr.PC”). In another words, in relation
to any case involving arrest of a person who is facing the
accusation about committing offence under this Act,
protection of Section 438, Cr.P.C. would not be available.
The Legislature has taken away the benefit of anticipatory
bail in respect of the arrest for the offences alleged under
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the SC/ST Act. The bar in Section 18 of the SC/ST Act
would operate.
5.3. While upholding the Constitutional validity of
Section 18 of the Act, this Court in State of M.P. & Anr.
4
vs . Ram Krishna Balothia & Anr. observed as under,
“… The offences enumerated under the said Act fall
into a separate and special class. Article 17 of the
Constitution expressly deals with abolition of
‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form.
It also provides that enforcement of any disability
arising out of ‘untouchability’ shall be an offence
punishable in accordance with law. The offences,
therefore, which are enumerated under Section 3(1)
arise out of the practice of ‘untouchability’.”
(Para 6)
5.3.1 The court proceeded to observe,
“The exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection
with offences under the Act has to be viewed in
the contest of the prevailing social conditions
which give rise to such offences, and the
apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities
are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims
and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution
of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to
avail of anticipatory bail as pointed out in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. In
these circumstances, if anticipatory bail is not
made available to persons who commit such
offences, such a denial cannot be considered as
unreasonable or violative of Article 14, as these
offences form a distinct class by themselves and
cannot be compared with other offences”
(para 6)
4
(1995) 3 SCC 221
Page 12 of 23
5.4 The aforesaid bar is held to be not violative of
Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh vs . State of
5
Punjab it was stated that taking away the right of pre-
arrest bail under Section 438 of the Cr.PC, under Section
18 of the SC/ST Act would not infringe the right to
personal liberty.
5.5 In Vilas Pandurang Pawar vs . State of
6
Maharashtra , this Court explained the bar under
Section 18 of the SC/ST Act against grant of anticipatory
bail in the following words,
“Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for
invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is
cast on the court to verify the averments in the
complaint and to find out whether an offence under
Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie
made out. In other words, if there is a specific
averment in the complaint, namely, insult or
intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with
caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to
anticipatory bail.” (Para 9)
5.5.1 It was further stated in Vilas Pandurang Pawar
(supra) ,
“Moreover, while considering the application for
bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and
5
(1994) 3 SCC 569
6
(2012) 8 SCC 795
Page 13 of 23
other material on record is limited. The court is
not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the
evidence on record. When a provision has been
enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons
who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in
granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the
provision in the Special Act cannot be easily
brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the
evidence.” Para 10)
5.6 A three judge bench of this Court in Prathvi Raj
Chauhan (supra) expressed itself thus,
“… exclusion of Section 438 CrPC in connection
with offences under the Act has to be viewed in
the context of the prevailing social conditions
which give rise to such offences, and the
apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities
are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims
and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution
of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to
avail of anticipatory bail as pointed out in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act.”
(Para 6)
5.6.1 This Court emphasised in Prithvi Raj Chauhan
(supra) that anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a
matter of right. It was stated that bail is essentially a
statutory right and cannot be said to be an essential
ingredient of Article 21of the Constitution. It was further
observed that if anticipatory bail is not made available to
persons who commit such offences, such a denial cannot
Page 14 of 23
be considered as unreasonable or violative of Article 14,
as these offences form a distinct class by themselves and
cannot be compared with other offences.
5.7 The aforesaid provision of Section 18 and the bar
created thereunder has to be seen in the context of the
object and purpose with which the Parliament enacted the
SC/SC Act, 1989. This legislation was brought into force
with an avowed object of implementing the measures to
improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who have remained a
vulnerable class in the society. The underlying idea is to
ensure that the persons belonging to these classes are not
denied their civil rights, are not subjected to indignities
and are insulated from humiliation and harassment.
5.7.1 The provisions of Section 18 in its ultimate
analysis, furthers the very object of the enactment.
Seemingly a stricter provision, it underscores the
Constitutional idea of availing social justice and to ensure
the same pedestal for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe community people with other classes in the society.
Page 15 of 23
5.8 The decision of this Court in Shajan Skaria
(supra) sought to be pressed into service on behalf of
respondent No.1 take no different view. In that case, the
Bench of two Judges of this Court elaborated the law in
respect of grant of anticipatory bail, then highlighted and
recognised the bar created under Section 18 of the SC/ST
Act to observe that only in the cases where the offence
could not be said to have been made out on a very prima
facie consideration, the court may exercise the discretion
to grant pre-arrest bail to the accused.
5.8.1 In Shajan Skaria (supra) case the appellant-
accused who was an Editor of an Online news channel
who had published a video on YouTube levelling certain
allegations against the complainant who belonged to
“Pulaya” community and who was a Member of Kerala
State Legislative Assembly representing the constituency
which seat was reserved for the member of Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe community. An attentive
reading of the broadcast made on YouTube which was a
subject matter in that case, would go to indicate that there
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was no reference therein to the caste name, which aspect
becomes clear from the very translation itself, narrated in
the judgment by the Court. The caste word “Pulaya” was
not even referred to in the complaint also, what was only
stated by complainant the subject matter was on
Scheduled Caste community. In the totality of the
circumstances thereby this Court in Shajan Skaria
(supra) took the view that the contents of the YouTube
video displayed by the accused were not intended to
denigrate the complainant as a member of the Scheduled
Caste and that it could not be said to be with castiest slur.
5.9 In Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand &
7
Anr. as well as in Ramesh Chandra Vaish vs. State of
8
U.P. this Court stated that intimidation or insult amounts
to an offence under Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
should have been targeted intentionally to the member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community and
also because he is member of the Scheduled Caste or
7
(2020) 10 SCC 710
8
2023 SCC OnLine SC 668
Page 17 of 23
Scheduled Tribe community. In Swarn Singh (supra), it
was stated that for making out the offence under Section
3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, 1989, it requires that the insult or
intimidation should be at a place within public view.
6. In light of the parameters in relation to the
applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from
afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the
proposition could be summarised that as the provision of
Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes,
Act, 1989 with express language excludes the
applicability of Section 438, Cr.PC, it creates a bar against
grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in relations to
the arrest of a person who faces specific accusations of
having committed the offence under the Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of anticipatory bail
for such an accused is taken off.
6.1 The absolute nature of bar, however, could be
read and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case
where on the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the
Act is found to have not been made out and that the
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accusations relating to the commission of such offence are
devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has a room to
exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the
accused under Section 438 of the Code.
6.2 Non-making of prima facie case about the
commission of offence is perceived to be such a situation
where the Court can arrive at such a conclusion in the first
blush itself or by way of the first impression upon very
reading of the averments in the FIR. The contents and the
allegations in the FIR would be decisive in this regard.
Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to whether a
prima facie offence is made out or not, it would not be
permissible for the Court to travel into the evidentiary
realm or to consider other materials, nor the Court could
advert to conduct a mini trial.
7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the
respondent-accused was not a member of Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. The appellant
belonged to scheduled caste community known as
“Mang” or “Matang”. The allegations made in the FIR
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lodged by the complainant was that he was addressed by
the accused with abusive casteist utterance “Mangatyano,
you are became very arrogant, you are staying in the village
and voting against” . The appellant was addressed as
above by the accused outside the house of the appellant
where others were present
7.1 The accused persons beat the complainant with
iron rod and threatened to burn the house. The mother
and aunt of the appellant-complainant were also meted
out similar treatment with intimidation and were
addressed with same casteist slur. The use of the word
“ Mangatyano ” was with a clear intention to humiliate the
complainant because he belonged to the said Scheduled
Caste community. In the said abusive utterances and
conduct by the accused, the caste nexus was established.
The complainant was humiliated with casteist and abusive
approach for the reason that he did not vote in favour of
particular candidate one Bahubali-accused No.8 in the
Assembly Election as desired by the respondent-
accused.
Page 20 of 23
7.2 The incident as above took place outside the
house of the complainant, it was a place within public
view. The term “any place within public view” was
considered by this Court in Swarn Singh (supra) and
Hitesh Verma (supra) was also subsequently referred to
in the decision of this Court in Karuppudayar vs. State
Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalguid
9
Trichy & Ors. wherein the Court drew distinction
between “public place” and “any place within public
view”. It was held that if the offence is committed outside
the building, for example in the lawn outside the house,
and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or
lawn outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view.
8. In the present case, as noted above, the incident
took place outside the house of the appellant which could
be viewed by anybody. It was indeed a place within
public view. There is no gainsaying that in the facts of the
case all ingredients necessary to prima facie constitute
9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2015
Page 21 of 23
offences under Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged in the FIR stood
satisfied. Furthermore, the occurrence of incident was
fortified by recovery of clothes and weapons.
9. In the above view, there is no escape from the
conclusion that offence under the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is
made out from the bare reading of the FIR. The High Court
in proceeding to evaluate the testimony of witnesses and
to opine on that basis that there were certain
discrepancies, no offence was made out, committed a
manifest error. The anticipatory bail granted by
overlooking of and disregarding the bar of Section 18 of
the Act was a clear illegality and jurisdictional error
committed by the High Court. The order of the High Court
could not be sustained in the eye of law.
10. In the result, the judgement and order dated
29.04.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.201 of 2025 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at
Aurangabad is hereby set aside. The Appeal is allowed.
Page 22 of 23
The anticipatory bail granted to respondent No. 1 stands
cancelled.
10.1 It is clarified at this stage that the observations
and findings recorded in this judgment are of prima facie
nature, limited for the purpose of deciding the question of
grant of anticipatory bail. The trial shall proceed
independently on its own merits, uninfluenced by any
observations herein.
In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all the
interlocutory applications as may be pending stands
disposed of.
………………………………..,CJI.
[ B.R. GAVAI]
………………………………….., J.
[ K. VINOD CHANDRAN ]
………………………………….., J.
[ N.V. ANJARIA ]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 1, 2025.
(VK)
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