Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M. P. IRRIGATION KARAMCHARI SANGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF M. P. AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT27/02/1985
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
DESAI, D.A.
ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)
CITATION:
1985 AIR 860 1985 SCR (2)1019
1985 SCC (2) 103 1985 SCALE (1)322
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1987 SC 695 (5)
E&R 1989 SC1565 (13,14,16)
ACT:
Reference of disputes to Courts/Tribunal by the
appropriate Government under section 10 (1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Nature scope of the
jurisdiction of he State Government under section 10 read
with section 17 (5) of the Act.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant is a trade union registered under the
Trade Unions Act. It represents employees in the Chambal
Project of Government of Madhya Pradesh in Gwalior Division.
The union raised three demands, namely, (1) Chambal
allowance; (2) Dearness allowance equal to that of the
Central Government employees; and (3) Wages for the period
of strike lasting 20 days in the year 1966 and served
notices of these demands on the Deputy Chief Engineer, Major
Project Chambal Since the attempts for settlement by the
canciliation officer failed, a full report of the dispute
under section 12 (4) of the Act was sent to the State
Government which, by its order dated 15. 3. 1969, refused to
refer the matter to the concerned Tribunal. The appellant
took the matter before the High Court by filing
Miscellaneous Petition No 29169 for a mandamus to the State
Government to refer the matter for adjudication. The High
Court allowed the writ petition, and directed the State
Government to consider the question whether a reference was
necessary or not. The Government again refused to
refer the dispute to the Tribunal, taking the stand that
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were not
applicable to the workmen in the Chambal Scheme as it was
not Industry’. The appellant approached the High Court for
the second time by filing Miscellaneous Petition No. 45 of
1970 and challenged the said orders. The High Court allowed
the petition and directed the Government to take suitable
action under section 12 (5) of the Act. The Government
challenged the said decision before the Supreme Court by
filing SLP No. 933 of 1972 without success. Later, by its
order dated 13. 1. 72, the State Government referred to the
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Tribunal only the third question of payment of wages for the
strike period and declined to refer the other two questions
for the reasons that (a) the Government was not in a
position to bear the additional burden and (b) the grant of
the special allowance claimed would invite similar demands
by other employees which would affect the entire
administration. The appellant was perforced
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to approach the High Court, for the third time, by way of a
miscellaneous Petition No. 127 of 1972 for a direction to
the State to refer the other two demands also. In the
meanwhile, the Supreme Court by its decision dated July 20,
1978 confirmed the High Court’s order that Chambal Project
was a ’industry’ within the meaning of the Act. whereupon
the Government reviewed the matter and passed an order on 3.
79 giving additional reasons for declining to refer the
dispute for adjudication namely, (a) the State Government
was not in a position and therefore cannot pay Central DA to
any of its employees in any department and (b) the work
charged employees who get a consolidated salary are not
entitled to Chambal allowance under the rules. The High
Court, by its decision dated 8th August 1980 dismissed the
petition holding that the reasons given by the Court are
germane and relevant. Hence the appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
^
HELD: 1.1 The reasons given by the State Government
to decline reference are beyond the powers of the Government
under the relevant sections of the Industrial Disputes Act.
[1026C]
1.2 While conceding a very limited jurisdiction to
the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of the
demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that adjudication
of demands made by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to
decide. Section 10 permits appropriate Government to
determine whether dispute ’exists or is apprehended" and
then refer it for adjudication on merits. The demarcated
functions are (1) reference, (2) adjudication. [1025H;
1026A]
1.3 When a reference is rejected on the specious plea
that the Government cannot bear the additional burden, it
constitutes adjudication and thereby usurpation of the power
of a quasi judicial Tribunal by an administrative authority
namely the Appropriate Government. What the State Government
had done in this case is not a prima facie examination of
the merits of the question involved. To say that granting of
dearness allowance equal to that of the employees of the
Central Government would cost additional financial burden on
the government is to make a unilateral decision without
necessary evidence and without giving an opportunity to the
workmen to rebut this conclusion. This virtually amounts to
a final adjudication of the demand itself. The demand can
never be characterized as other perverse or frivolous. The
conclusion so arrived at robs the & employees of an
opportunity to place evidence before the Tribunal and to
substantiate the reasonableness of the demand. [1026B-E]
1.4 What exactly are the conditions of service of the
employees and in what manner their conditions of service
could be improved are matters which are the special preserve
of the appropriate Tribunals to be decided in adjudicatory
processes and are not once to be decided by the Government
on a prima facie examination of the demand. The question
whether the emp-
1021
loyees were/were not entitled to the Chambal allowance as
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they are in A receipt of a consolidated pay relates to the
conditions of service of the employees Further this demand
also cannot be said to be either perverse or frivolous.
[1026F-G]
1.5 However, there may be exceptional cases in which
the State Government, may, on a proper examination of the
demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either
perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference.
Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of
the demand with a view to decline reference and Courts will
always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp
the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid
disputes. To allow the Government to do so would be to
render section 10 and section 12 (5) of the Industrial
Disputes Act nugatory. [1026G-H; 1027A] C
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay AIR
1964 SC 1617, explained and followed.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8454
(NL) Of 1983.
From the Judgment and order dated the 8th August, 1980
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench at Gwalior in Civil
Miscellaneous Petition No. 127 of 1972.
H.K. Puri, for the Appellant.
A.K. Sanghi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHALID. J. This is an appeal, by special leave,
against the Judgment dated 8th August, 1980, by the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Civil Miscellaneous
Petition No. 127 of l972.
2. The appellant is a trade union registered under the
Trade Union Act. It represents employees in the Chambal
Hydel Irrigation Scheme under the Department of Chambal
Project of Government of Madhya Pradesh in Gwalior Division.
The union raised three demands and served notices of these
demands on the Deputy Chief Engineer, Major Project,
Chambal, Bhopal. The demands were: (1) Chambal allowance;
(2) Dearness allowance equal to that of the Central
Government employees; and (3) Wages for the
1022
period of strike lasting 20 days in the year 1966. Copies of
these notices were sent to the Assistant Labour
Commissioner, Indore and the Secretary, Government of Madhya
Pradesh. The Deputy Chief Engineer did not respond to the
demands. There-upon, the Assistant Labour Commissioner,
Gwalior, at the instance of the union tried for a
settlement, but did not succeed. He sent a report under
Section 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The State
Government, the first respondent in the appeal refused to
refer the matter to the concerned Tribunal by its order
dated 15.3.1969. The appellant took the matter before the
High Court by filing Miscellaneous petition No 29/69 for a
mandamus to the State Government to refer the dispute for
adjudication. The High Court allowed the writ petition.
quashed the order of the State Government dated 15th March,
1969, and directed it to consider the question whether a
reference was necessary or not. When the matter went back to
the Government, the Government took the stand that the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were not
applicable to the workmen in the Chambal Hydel Irrigation
Scheme since the Scheme was not an Industry and hence again
refused to refer the dispute to the Tribunal. The appellant
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pursued the matter further by filing miscellaneous petition
No. 45 of 1970 before the High Court. The High Court allowed
the petition and directed the Government to take suitable
action under Section 12(5 of the Act. The Government
challenged this decision before this Court by filing
S.L.P.No. 933 of 1972, without success. The matter,
therefore, went back to the Government again. ’By its order
dated 13.1.1972, the State Government referred only one
question to the Tribunal and that related to the wages for
the strike period but declined to refer the other two
questions. The reason given for this was: (1) that the
Government was not in a position to bear the additional
burden; and (2) that grant of the special allowance claimed
would invite similar demands by other employees which would
affect the entire administration. Miscellaneous Petition No.
127 of 1972 was, therefore, filed for a direction to the
State to refer the other two demands also. In the meanwhile,
this Court as per its decision dated July 20, 1978, bad
confirmed the decision of the High Court that Chambal
Project was an Industry within the meaning of the Industrial
Disputes Act. After this decision was rendered by this
Court, the Government reviewed the matter and passed an
order on 3.5.1979 giving additional reasons for refusing to
refer the dispute for adjudication. The reasons stated were
as under:
1023
"(1) That the State Government was not in a
position A to pay dearness allowance equal to that of
Central Government employees. In the present situation
the State Government would not pay dearness allowance
equal to that of Central Government employees to any
particular department. the question of such payment to
the petitioners, therefore, does not arise. B
(2) The work charged employees were already
given a consolidated pay. Therefore, there was no
justification for paying such employees the Chambal
allowance. The rules regulating the service conditions
of the work-charged employees of the Chambal division
do not provide for payment of Chambal allowance to
them.’’
3. Before the High Court, it was contended by the
appellant that the State Government had by refusing to refer
the dispute to the Tribunal giving the above reasons taken
upon itself the power to decide the dispute and had usurped
the powers of the Tribunal. It was further contended that
the question raised related to the conditions of service of
the employees and was, therefore, a matter primarily to be
decided by the Tribunal- The High Court repelled the
contention and held as follows:
"It is now 12 years that the matter has been
pending. But it would appear from the history of the
case that the delay has been mostly due to the fact
that the case was pending before various Courts. The
Government has not materially changed its stand. As
regards Chambal allowance, they were, from the very
inception, taking the stand P that the work-charged
employees of the Project were given a consolidated
salary and the service conditions did not warrant
payment of extra allowance. Now the rules regulating
service conditions of the work-charged employees of the
project did not contain the provision for payment of
Chambal allowance to them. The Government was of the
opinion that prima facie no case arises, particularly,
when the extra benefit was already being granted to
them. The Government undoubtedly could no decide the
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matter finally, but they could certainly consider
whether a prima facie case for reference has been made
out on merits. If no case is made out, it would be open
to the Government to refuse
1024
to refer such a question and it could not be said that
the Government was usurping the functions of the
Tribunal and deciding the case finally. In our opinion,
the State Government’s order could not be said to be
punitive and it takes into account the entitlement of
the Chambal employees for the Chambal allowance.
As regards the other question, the State
Government are on a firmer ground. Since the Government
is not paying dearness allowance equal to that of the
Central Government employees to the employees in any
other department in the State, there is no reason to
discriminate and pay the same to the Chambal employees.
This is what the State Government have stated and we
think that if the allowance at the rate payable to the
Central Government employees is not paid to any one in
the State, the Government was justified in holding that
no prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner
for referring this dispute to the Tribunal. The State
Government have also considered the question of
expediency that by payment of such allowance to the
Chambal employees alone, there would be dissatisfaction
amongst the other employees of the State. Both these
reasons are germane and relevant. The Government here
was not deciding the case finally. It has to decide
question of expediency and whether a prima facie case
has been made out.. "
In support of this conclusion the High Court relied
upon the observations made by this Court in Bombay . Union
of Journalists P v. State of Bombay(l) and held that the
Government was not precluded from making a prima facie
examination of the merits of the dispute while considering
whether a reference was necessary or not. It was further
held that "the two reasons given by the State Government
fulfilled necessary test laid down by the orders of this
Court earlier and the various Supreme Court decisions cited
by the petitioners."
4. In the appeal before us, it was contended that the
approach made by the High Court was erroneous and that the
High Court had failed to properly delineate the jurisdiction
of the Government under Section 10 read with Section 12(5)
of the Industrial Disputes
(1) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617.
1025
Act. It was contended before us that the question raised by
the appellant had to be decided by the Tribunal on evidence
to be adduced before it and it could not be decided by the
Government on a prima facie examination of the facts of the
case. This submission was met with the plea that the
Government had in appropriate cases at least a limited
jurisdiction to consider on a prima facie examination of the
merits of the demands, whether they merited a reference or
not.
5. We have considered the rival contentions raised
before us The High Court apparently has relied upon the
following passage in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of
Bombay, (Supra) C
".. ...But it would not be possible to accept
the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded
from considering even prima facie the merits of the
dispute when it decides the question as to whether its
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power to make a reference should be exercised under
Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5) or not. If the
claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly
belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make
a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on
the general relations between the employer and the
employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the
appropriate Government may take that into account in
deciding whether a reference should be made or not.’’
We find that the approach made by the High Court was
wrong and the reliance on the above passage on the facts of
this case, is misplaced and unsupportable. This Court had
made it clear in the same Judgment in the sentence preceding
the passage quoted above that it was the province of the
Industrial Tribunal to decide the disputed questions of
fact.
".. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact,
the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach
final conclusions, for that again would be the province
of the Industrial Tribunal.. "
Therefore, while conceding a very limited jurisdiction
to the State Government to examine patent frivolousness of
the demands, it is to be understood as a rule, that
adjudication of demands made
1026
by workmen should be left to the Tribunal to decide. Section
10 permits appropriate Government to determine whether
dispute ’exists or is apprehended’ and then refer it for
adjudication on merits. The demarcated functions are (1)
reference, (2) adjudication when a reference is rejected on
the specious plea that the
Government cannot bear the additional burden, it
constitutes adjudication and thereby usurpation of the power
of a quasi judicial Tribunal by an administrative authority
namely the Appropriate Government. In our opinion, the
reasons given by the State Government to decline reference
are beyond the powers of the Government under the relevant
sections of the Industrial Disputes Act. What the State
Government has done in this case is not a prima facie
examination of the merits of the question involved. To say
that granting of dearness allowance equal to that of the
employees of the Central Government would cost additional
financial burden on the Government is to make a unilateral
decision without necessary evidence and without giving an
opportunity to the workmen to rebut this conclusion. This
virtually amounts to a final adjudication of the demand
itself. The demand can never be characterised as either
preverse or frivolous. The conclusion so arrived at robs the
employees of an opportunity to place evidence before the
Tribunal and to substantiate the reasonableness of the
demand.
6. Same is the case with the conclusion arrived at
by the High Court accepting the stand of the State
Government that the employees were not entitled to the
Chambal allowance as the same was included in the
consolidated pay. This question, in fact, relates to the
conditions of service of the employees. What exactly are the
conditions of service of the employees and in what manner
their conditions of service could be improved are matters
which are the special preserve of the appropriate Tribunals
to be decided in adjudicatory processes and are not ones to
be decided by the Government on a prima facie examination of
the demand. This demand again can never be said to be either
perverse or frivolous.
7. There may be exceptional cases in which the State
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Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come
to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or
frivolous and do not merit a reference. Government should be
very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a
view to decline reference and Courts will always be vigilant
whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the
Tribunal for adjudication of valid dis-
1027
putes. To allow the Government to do so would be to render A
Section 10 and Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act
nugatory.
8. We have no hesitation to hold that in this case,
the Government had exceeded its jurisdiction in refusing to
refer the dispute to the Tribunal by making its own
assessment unilaterally of the reasonableness of the demands
on merits. The High Court erred in accepting the plea of the
Government that refusal to refer the demands in this case
was justified. The demands raised in this case have
necessarily to be decided by the appropriate Tribunal on
merits.
9. In the result, we set aside the Judgment of the
High Court, allow this appeal and direct the State
Government to refer all the questions raised by the
appellant to the appropriate Tribunal. The appeal is allowed
with costs to the appellant quantified at Rs.2,500 n
S.R. Appeal allowed.
1028