Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
V RAJLAL MANILAL & CO.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
10/03/1964
BENCH:
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
BENCH:
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
SHAH, J.C.
SIKRI, S.M.
CITATION:
1964 AIR 1643 1964 SCR (7) 97
CITATOR INFO :
D 1987 SC1802 (29)
ACT:
Mines and Minerals-State Government refuses to renew
Certificate of approval-Review petition to Central
Government -Central Government receives report and
information from the State Government behind the back of the
appellants-Central Government acting quasi-judicially-
Violation of natural justice -Mines and Minerals (Regulation
and Development) Act, 1948 (No. XLIII of 1948)-Mines
Concession Rules, 1949 rr. 57, 59.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants constitute a partnership engaged in mining
and they held a prospecting license as well as a certificate
of approval from the State Government under the Mineral
Concessions Rules, 1949 framed under the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1948. The approval
certificate was granted for one year and until December 1955
it had been renewed from year to year when the State
Government refused to renew it on the ground that the
partners composing the firm had changed. Thereupon the
appellants applied under r. 57 of the Minerals Concession
Rules to the Union Government for the review of the order of
the State Government refusing to renew the certificate of
approval. While this application Was pending the Union
Government corresponded with the State Government and
gathered information and received the latter’s remarks
-regarding the merits of the matter behind the appellants’
back. The request made by the appellants for copies of the
correspondence and for an opportunity to be heard was
refused by the Union Government. Ultimately the Union
Government refused the review application on the ground that
there was no valid ground to interfere with the decision of
the State Government. The present appeal was filed on
special leave granted by this ’Court. On behalf of the
appellants it was contended that the Union Government while
disposing of an application under r. 57(2) in terms of r. 59
acts as a quasi-judicial authority and the ,order which was
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passed taking into consideration the report of the State
Government behind the appellants’ back and without affording
a reasonable opportunity for presenting their case was
contrary to natural justice and was therefore void.
Held:(i) The Union Government when disposing of an ap-
plication for review under r. 59 is functioning as a quasi-
judicial authority.
Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India, [1960] S.C.R. 775,
relied ,on.
(ii)Though Shivji Nathubhai’s case was concerned with a case
where an order had been passed prejudicial to the respon-
dents before the Central Government without affording them
L/P(D)1 SCI-4..
98
an opportunity to meet the case of an applicant for review
the same principle would apply even where a petition for
review is rejected based on materials which were not made
available to the applicant for review.
(iii) Applying the above principle to the present case the
order of the Central Government is vitiated as being
contrary to the principles of natural justice in that the
decision was rendered without affording to the appellants a
reasonable opportunity of being heard which is a sine qua
non of a fair hearing.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 11 5 & 116
of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and
orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union
of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and
the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively.
G.S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the.
appellant (in both the appeals).
S. G. Patwardhan and B. R. K. G. Achar, for respondent No. 1
(in both the appeals).
I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 116/1963).
March 10, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-Civil Appeal No. 115 is by special leave
granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and
is against an order of the Union of India (Ministry of
Steel, Mines and Fuel) dated July 9, 1958 rejecting an
application filed by the appellants under rule 57 of the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 to review an order passed by
the Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting their application
for the renewal of the Certificate of Approval granted to
them. The appellants filed a petition to the High Court
Punjab under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ
of certiorari to quash the above order of the Union of
India. This petition was dismissed by the High Court in
limine and Civil Appeal No. 116 of 1963 is by special leave
of this Court against this order of the High Court, Punjab.
It would thus be seen that both the appeals are directed to
challenge the validity of the same order and we shall
therefore deal with them together.
The appellants, who constitute a partnership, are engaged
inter alia in the business of mining and they held a
prospecting licence in the State of Madhya Pradesh. They
hold concessions in regard to prospecting and working
minerals in several areas of the State to the details of
which it is not necessary to refer. Under the scheme of the
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948
(Act No. XLIII of 1948) and the Mineral Concession Rules,
1949 framed thereunder, in order that a prospecting licence
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may be granted to a person he has
99
to hold a certificate of approval from the State Government
concerned and similarly the rules provide that no mining
lease shall be granted to any person unless he held a
similar certificate of approval. To enable them to do the
prospecting in lands in which they had obtained mineral
concessions, the appellants applied for and obtained from
the Government of Madhya Pradesh a certificate of approval
under the Mineral Concession Rules from 1952 onwards. The
duration of the certificate is one calendar year and the
same has to be renewed every year, if it is to be in force.
The original certificate granted to the appellants for the
year 1952 was being renewed from year to year and as a
result they held a valid certificate of approval up to the
period ending on December 31, 1955. Being desirous of
having the same renewed for the following calendar year 1956
they made an application to the Government of Madhya Pradesh
on November 22, 1955. The information required by the form
of application prescribed by the rules was furnished and the
necessary documents were filed and this application was
recommended by the District Officer, Bhandara. The State
Government, however, by an order dated September 21, 1956
rejected the application, the reason given being that the
partners composing the firm had changed. This order was
communicated to the appellants on October 6, 1956 and
thereupon the appellants made an application on November 15,
1956 to the Union Government for a review of the order of
the State Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession
Rules. Rule 57(2) which was invoked by the appellants
provides:
"Where a State Government has failed to
dispose of an application for grant of renewal
of a certificate of approval or prospecting
licence or a mining lease within the period
prescribed therefor in these Rules, such
failure shall, for the purpose of these rules,
be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew
such certificate, licence or lease, as the
case may be, and any person aggrieved by such
failure may, within two months of the expiry
of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central
Government for reviewing the case."
The procedure for review is laid down by rule
59 which ,reads:
,,Review-Upon receipt of such application, the
Central Government may, if it thinks fit, call
for the relevant records and other information
from the State Government, and after
considering any explanation that may be
offered by the State Government cancel or
revise the order of the State Government, or
pass such order as the Central Government may
deem just and proper."
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Thereafter correspondence seems to have ensued between the
Central Government and the Government of Madhya Pradesh in
regard to the propriety of granting the application for
review. The appellants having come to know from a letter
addressed to them by the Government of India that the State
Government had been required to send a report of their
remarks in connection with their application for review made
enquiries as to what had happened and also requested that
they might be informed as to the progress of their
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application and that they might be given an opportunity of a
personal hearing at which they would be able to satisfy the
Government about the genuineness of their case. Some
portions of this correspondence between the Government of
India. and the Government of the State as to the merits of
the appellants’ application are now on record but it is
common ground that the appellants were not informed of these
documents prior to the order now impugned rejecting the
application for review was passed. On July 9, 1958 the
application of the appellants was rejected by the Union
Government, the order stating:
"The Central Government have come to the
conclusion that there is no valid ground for
interfering with the decision of the
Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting your
application for renewal of a certificate of
approval for the year 1956."
The appellants thereafter applied to the Government of India
requesting for a copy of the report of the State Government
on the basis of which the application was rejected. The
reply that the appellants received was that the Government
of India regretted their inability to accede to their
request. It is the validity of this order dated July 9,
1958 that is challenged in appeal No. 115 of 1963.
Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted
that the Union Government when disposing of an application
under s. 57(2) in terms of rule 59 is acting as a quasi-
judicial authority and the order which was passed taking
into consideration the report of the State Government and
without their knowing the contents of the report and without
affording them a reasonable opportunity of presenting their
case was contrary to natural justice and was therefore void.
In this connection learned Counsel relied on the decision of
this Court: Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India(1). Mr.
Pathak is well-founded in his submission as to the nature of
the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government when
disposing of an application for review under Rule 59 and the
decision referred to does
(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775.
101
support him that the Central Government acting under the
rule referred to is functioning as a quasi-judicial
authority. It does follow therefore that they could not act
on the basis of material as regards which the appellants had
no opportunity to make their representation. No doubt, the
decision in Shivji Nathubhai v The Union of India and
Ors.(1) was concerned with a case where an order had been
passed prejudicial to the respondents before the Central
Government without affording them an opportunity to meet the
case of an applicant for review but the same principle
would, in our opinion, apply even where a petition for
review is rejected based on materials which were not made
available to the applicant for review.
As we have already indicated, the State Government had
refused renewal of the certificate of approval because they
considered that there had been a change in the composition
of the firm which destroyed its identity. On the other
hand, the case of the appellants was that the terms of the
partnership deed made express provisions for the continuance
of the identity of the firm, notwithstanding changes in the
persons composing the firm by death, retirement or because
of the accession of new members to replace deceased or
retiring partners or even otherwise. If the report of the
State Government made any points against the representations
made by the appellants, and these were being taken into
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consideration by the Union Government, in common fairness,
the appellants were entitled to be informed as to what these
were and an opportunity to point out how far they militated
against the contentions raised by them.
Learned Counsel for the respondent-Union of India, did not
seek to support the position taken by the Central Government
that they were justified in refusing to disclose the con-
tents of the report they obtained from the State Government
which afforded them the factual basis on which they rejected
the application for review. We have therefore no hesitation
in holding that the order of the Central Government now
under appeal is vitiated as being contrary to the principles
of natural justice, in that the decision was rendered
without affording to the appellants a reasonable opportunity
of being heard which is a sine qua non of a fair hearing.
The learned Judges of the Punjab High Court dismissed the
petition filed before them under Art. 226, apparently be-
cause they proceeded on the view that the exercise of
jurisdiction of the Central Government under rules 57 and 59
of the Mineral Concession Rules was really administrative in
character so that the reasonable opportunity that is an
essential requisite of quasi-judicial procedure was not
attracted to the
(1) 1960 2 S.C.R. 775.
102
case. That was the view taken by that Court in the Shivji
Nathubhai v. The Union of India and Ors.(1) which decision
was reversed by this Court. It might be mentioned that the
decision of this Court was rendered subsequent to their
judgment now under appeal and therefore the learned Judges
had not the advantage of the pronouncement of this Court.
The result is that the appeals are allowed and order of the
Central Government dated July 9, 1958 and of the High Court
dated September 24, 1958 are set aside. The Central Govern-
ment will consider the review application afresh and dispose
of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the
observations contained in this judgment. The appellants are
entitled to their costs in this Court (Hearing fee one set).
Appeals allowed.
(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775.
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