Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 435
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS._______ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.16483-85 of 2015)
PREM PORWAL AND OTHERS ETC. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
JAGDEESH CHANDRA PRAJAPATI
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO._______ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.16469 of 2015)
J U D G M E N T
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Out of the four present Appeals, those three
preferred by the private Appellants are the Appeals directed
against judgment and order dated 20.04.2015 in Writ
Petition No. 6079 of 2014, and against orders dated
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.04.30
17:35:13 IST
Reason:
15.05.2015 in Review Petition Nos. 123 of 2015 and 125 of
Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 16483-85 of 2015
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2015, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The
1
fourth Appeal is filed by Nagar Palika, Khachrod , in which
the Nagar Palika-original respondent No. 6 in the petition
has challenged the aforesaid judgment and order dated
20.04.2015.
2.1 Writ Petition No. 6079 of 2014, which was filed by
respondent No.1 herein, styling it as a Public Interest
2
Litigation , came to be allowed by the High Court directing
the authorities concerned to remove all the shops
constructed by the Municipal Council, which shops were
allotted to the private Appellants herein, accepting the case
that the said constructed shops were erected on the land
known as ‘ Dussehra Maidan’ reserved for Dussehra festival
and related cultural events.
2.2 The private appellants herein who are the allottees
of the shops in question and in occupation and possession
thereof, were not arraigned as parties in the public interest
petition. In view that the direction was issued to remove
their shops in their absence, they in two batches of 12 and
1
Hereinafter, ‘Municipal Council’.
2
Hereinafter, “PIL”.
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14 in numbers respectively, filed two review petitions, which
came to be dismissed by the High Court.
3. The public interest petitioner-respondent No. 1
herein, projecting himself to be a social worker and an
agriculturist, contended inter alia that the land comprised
in Survey Nos. 4228/1, 4228/2 and 4229/1 admeasuring
total 3.260 Hectares at Khachrod, District Ujjain, was a
government land known as ‘Dussehra Maidan’ and that the
same was reserved to be utilised only for the purpose of
holding cultural events on Dussehra to celebrate the
Festival. A case was put forward that the Municipal Council
had unauthorisedly constructed the shops because of which
the area of the ‘Dussehra Maidan’ was eaten up and that it
would hamper the cultural activities.
3.1. It appears that the public interest petitioner lodged
3
a complaint before the Tehsildar, Khachrod, Ujjain , who
forwarded the same to the Revenue Inspector and a report
of inspection was prepared stating inter alia that 54 shops
were built by the Municipal Council. The Inquiry Report
3
Hereinafter, “Tehsildar”.
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further mentioned that in addition to the shops, also stood
a school building and a hostel at the place. In the report, it
was observed that it was not possible to ascertain as to
whether the possession was legal or illegal.
3.1.1. In the prayers advanced in the said public interest
petition, a direction was asked for against the respondent
authorities to demolish the construction on the said land, to
initiate administrative enquiry against erring officers and to
take out criminal proceedings against the persons
responsible. The public interest petitioner further prayed to
restore the land as ‘Dussehra Maidan’ asserting the use
claimed to have been earmarked for the said land.
3.2. The facts in the background were that an
advertisement dated 04.03.2005 was issued by the
Municipal Board, Khachrod for auctioning seven newly
constructed shops at the place in question and a document
of ‘Conditions of Auction' came to be issued on 16.03.2005.
An Allotment Letter dated 21.03.2005 was issued to one of
the appellants and a Rent Agreement dated 19.05.2005 in
respect of a newly built shop was executed. The allottee-
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appellant deposited Rs. 1,07,000/- towards the premium
amount. It is stated that between the years 2005 and 2014,
several rent agreements in respect of the shops which came
to be constructed from time to time, were executed. The
allottees-appellants remained in continuous possession of
their shops.
3.2.1. It further appears that the project of construction of
shops at the place was under contemplation of the
Municipal Council as back as in the year 1995, when it had
passed Resolution No. 82 of 1995 for constructing shops at
Ujjain Darwaja, on the boundary of ‘Dussehra Maidan’ . For
some reason, the work could not be executed. The decision
was reaffirmed in the subsequent decisions dated
13.12.2002 and 05.06.2003 by passing Resolution Nos. 45
and 21 afresh. In the year 2005 and onwards, the
constructed shops were auctioned by the Municipal Council
and came to be allotted upon executing necessary
documents.
3.2.2. It appears that during the pendency of the public
interest petition, the High Court passed order dated
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06.01.2015, to direct the Tehsildar to conclude the
proceedings of Case No. 03-A/68/13-14 within stipulated
period and submit a report. The Tehsildar proceeded ex
parte against the Municipal Council and ordered immediate
demolition and removal of all the 54 shops on the said land
which according to the Tehsildar were constructed illegally
by the Municipal Council.
3.3. The High Court accepted the case of the public
interest petitioner, did not find favour with the defence of
the Municipal Council, and allowed the petition issuing
direction to remove the shops. As stated, the appellants
herein, who were the allottees-in-occupation and in
possession of the said shops, were not made parties in the
said petition. They, therefore, filed the review petitions. The
High Court refused to entertain the prayer for review.
3.4. The stand of the Municipal Council evinced in the
reply affidavit in the public interest proceedings was that by
virtue of Section 100 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities
4
Act, 1961 , the land in question had vested in the
4
Hereinafter, “Municipalities Act”.
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Municipality. It was stated that the ‘Dussehra Maidan’ land
was adjacent to the areas which fell within the municipal
limits. It was suggested that provisions of Section 48 of the
Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, Section 36 of the
Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam,
1973 as well as the provisions of the Gwalior State
Municipalities Act had also the effect of vesting the said land
in the municipality. The Municipal Council thus asserted
that the land having vested in it, the ownership thereof was
with the Municipality, and it could legally utilise the land to
construct the shops in larger public interest.
3.4.1. Also, in the affidavit filed in the present
proceedings, the Municipal Council reasserted the very
stand adding that the land was transferred to the
Municipality as per the Gwalior Government Gazette, dated
14.09.1929, and that the Municipality has been maintaining
the land out of the municipal funds. Circular No. 3, Samvat
1998 of the Revenue Department titled as ‘Domestic
Boundary Document’, produced along with the reply, was
referred to which provided that the open land in the
municipal area would vest in the municipality wherever the
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municipality has been established. Yet another letter dated
16.12.1933 was mentioned to support the say that the land
stood vested in the municipality. The petition was contested
by contending further that the petitioner had an alternative
efficacious remedy under the Municipalities Act.
3.4.2. As regards the case of the public interest petitioner
that the constructions were made on the land belonging to
Najul Department, it was stated by the Municipal Council
that in the Khachrod municipal area, there was no Najul
land, that the subject matter land was the property of Nagar
Palika, requiring no permission to be taken from the Najul
Department. It was an unequivocal stand of the respondent
Municipal Council that the construction alleged as illegal
was neither unlawful nor was in the nature of obstruction
for conducting the cultural activities, and that no complaint
was ever received that the standing of shops adversely
affected the Dussehra cultural activities.
3.5. The State Government in the affidavit reply filed in
the present proceedings rivally claimed that the land in
question belonged to the State Government and that Khasra
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of the year 2003 onwards went to suggest that the land was
known as ‘ Dussehra Maidan’ and was earmarked for
cultural and other public programmes. It was contended
that since the land was owned by the State Government, any
construction thereon without prior approval of the
competent State authority was not permissible and that in
the present case no such sanction or approval was obtained.
It was stated that the State authority was also required to
initiate proceedings against private individuals as well as the
Municipal Council by issuing notices for unauthorised
possession of and construction on the land.
4. Heard learned counsel Mr. Divyakant Lahoti for the
private appellants, learned Additional Solicitor General Mr.
Brijender Chahar for the respondent State, learned
Additional Advocate General Ms. Manisha T. Karia for the
respondent Khachrod, Municipal Council–the appellant in
the other appeal, and learned counsel Mr. Arjun Garg for
original public interest petitioner-respondent No. 1, with all
other respective assisting advocates, at length.
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5. While the contours of the controversy were drawn
as above, the High Court while proceeding to allow the
petition, seriously erred on two fronts in exercising its
jurisdiction. These errors of the High Court may be
considered at the outset, before adverting to the main
substratum.
5.1. Firstly, in rejecting the review petitions filed by the
appellants herein, the High Court committed a manifest
mistake. The review was preferred with a crystal pleading
and the admitted fact that the appellants who were in the
capacity of allottees-cum-occupants-cum-possessors of the
shops since long were not impleaded as parties. They were
not heard by the High Court before passing the order dated
20.04.2015 for demolition of shops allotted to them.
5.2. It may be true that the exercise of review
jurisdiction by the courts takes place on limited grounds,
therefore, not to be a routine exercise. It is nevertheless well
settled that review powers under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or inherent review powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution, could be exercised on
Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 16483-85 of 2015
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the grounds permissible for the purpose. One of the
accepted grounds is that the review of a judgment and order
can be undertaken when there exists an ‘error apparent on
the face of record’ or any other sufficient ground.
5.2.1. An error apparent on the face of record is thus a
ground for invoking the review jurisdiction, and in a given
case where such apparent error exists, reviewing of the
judgment or order becomes imperative. An error apparent
on the face of record is one when in comprehending such
error, elaborate reasoning is not required. It is one which
does not involve debatable issues.
5.3. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and
5
Others vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale , this Court
observed in paragraph 17, ‘an error which has to be
established by long drawn process of reasoning on points
where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be
said to be an error apparent on the face of record.’ The
observations in T.S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer,
Company Circle IV, Bombay vs. M/s. Volkart Brothers,
5
1959 SCC OnLine 10
Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 16483-85 of 2015
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6
Bombay , in which the scope of rectification under Section
154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was under interpretation,
this Court furthered its reasoning as to what could be
treated as an error apparent, observing that ‘a mistake
apparent on record must be an obvious and patent mistake
and not something which can be established by a long-
drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may
conceivably be two opinions.’
5.4. In Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari
7
Choudhury , this Court stated that an error apparent on
the face of record must be such an error which strikes on
mere looking at the record. More recent decisions in S.
8
Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy and Others ,
9
in S. Murali Sundaram vs. Jothibai Kannan and Others
and in Arun Dev Upadhyaya vs. Integrated Sales Service
10
Limited and Another , similarly explained and reiterated
the connotation ‘an error apparent on the face of record’.
6
(1971) 2 SCC 526
7
(1995) 1 SCC 170
8
(2022) 17 SCC 255
9
(2023) 13 SCC 515
10
(2023) 8 SCC 11
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5.5. Thus, an error which is self-evident and which can
be detected without resorting to a long-drawn process of
reasoning, is classified as ‘an error apparent on the face of
record’. The error of this kind and nature justifies the court
to exercise its powers of review. The purpose of exercise of
any statutory power and exercise of all kinds of
jurisdictions, in their ultimate analysis, is to do justice to
the party who stands prejudiced or seriously discounted for
its rights by virtue of the judgment or order affecting such
party, by curing the error committed by the court. When ‘an
error apparent on the face of record’ is noticed or found to
exist, the court should not hesitate to exercise the review
powers to set right the injustice and restore the justice to
the aggrieved party.
5.6. Keeping in view the above parameters to be applied
for reviewing any judgment and order, when by impugned
judgment and order dated 20.04.2015, the High Court
directed the demolition of the shops, the persons who were
the allottees of shops through auction, who had paid the
auction price and who had remained in possession of the
shops for long period, were indispensably required to be
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heard. They were the necessary parties. They were not
arraigned as parties, yet the directions against them were
issued by the High Court.
5.7. These persons-the review petitioners were directly
affected parties who were to suffer the consequences of the
order and the directions without their representation in the
proceedings and without opportunity to put forth their case.
For them their Fundamental Right to do trade and business
was at stake getting infringed. They were indeed necessary
parties in absence of whom, the order and the directions of
the kind and nature could not have been passed by the High
Court. The order of the High Court was not just in breach of
natural justice but was also one which resulted into
extremely serious civil consequences finally smothering the
rights of the third parties-the review petitioners.
5.8. A judgment and order which is passed in absence
of the necessary parties, without joining them and directions
are issued by which they stand directly affected in terms of
their rights, making them suffer the prejudice and the civil
consequences, has to be treated as tainted with the vice of
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‘an error apparent on the face of record’. In the present case,
the High Court ought to have exercised its review
jurisdiction. The High Court took the view that as the
petition was pending, the review petitioners must be aware
of the same and further observed that there was no error
apparent on record, completely misconceiving the law and
misdirecting itself.
6. In the second place, before the High Court in the
public interest writ proceedings, both the Municipal Council
and the State Government claimed and asserted their
respective ownership over the land on which the shops were
constructed. When it comes to deciding and adjudicating the
questions relating to the title or ownership of the property,
it is well settled that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution cannot be exercised to address the questions
of such nature.
11
6.1. As back as in Sohan Lal vs. Union of India , while
examining the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution, this Court observed that before it, there
11
(1957) 1 SCC 439
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was a serious dispute on questions of fact between the
parties and also the question whether one Jagan Nath had
acquired in law any title to the property in dispute. This
Court further stated that the proceedings by way of a writ
were not appropriate in as much as the decision of the Court
would amount to a decree declaring the title and deciding
the rival claims of title to the property in dispute.
6.2. The writ court could not have entered into the field
of such investigation and a remedy before the civil court or
any other remedy available in law would be the correct
recourse, emphasised this Court. In State of Rajasthan vs.
12
Bhawani Singh , and also in Shalini Shyam Shetty vs.
13
Rajendra Shankar Patil , while delineating the limits of
writ jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court reiterated that
the disputed questions relating to title cannot be
satisfactorily gone into or adjudicated in a writ petition.
6.3. Given this well settled law, it is to be observed that
a writ court would not be justified in granting the relief in a
writ petition where grant of such relief is to be considered by
12
1993 Supp (1) SCC 306
13
(2010) 8 SCC 329
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necessarily touching upon and forming an opinion, directly
or indirectly, on the aspects and issues concerning the title
or ownership of the property. The public interest jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Courts stems from plenary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, and a public interest
petition, for its substance, procedure and purpose, is a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore,
travelling into the area to adjudicate the titular issues would
be a wrongful exercise of public interest jurisdiction.
6.4. In the present case, the High Court while directing
the demolition of the shops allotted to the appellants-
allottees, in the backdrop, had to form an opinion that the
land did not belong to the Municipal Council. In respect of
vesting and ownership of the land on which the shops were
constructed by Municipal Council, the conflicting claims
were asserted by the Municipality and the State
Government. In holding that the constructed shops were
unauthorised and illegal construction by the Municipality,
the High Court indeed intruded in the realm of ownership
dispute between the Municipal Council and the State
Government. Taking a view on this score was not
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permissible for the High Court in a writ exercise or in a
public interest jurisdiction.
7. On the core aspect of the question of construction
of shops by the Municipal Council and alleged reduction of
the ‘Dussehra Maidan’ and alleged obstruction to the
cultural activities carried out on the Maidan , the High Court
misjudged the facts and the entire issue in ordering the
demolition of the shops.
7.1. While in the very initial report given by the
Tehsildar, it was stated that it could not be ascertained as
to whether the construction of shops was legal or otherwise,
the ground position could be clinched from the map
produced by the Municipal Council along with its reply
depicting the geographical locations at the area. The map
was a certified map authenticated by Superintendent
Engineer and Chief Municipal Officer of the Nagar Palika.
The court could go through and see the map and locations
indicated therein with the help of learned counsel for the
parties.
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7.2. What was shown in the map was not in dispute. The
map clearly reflected that the disputed line of constructed
shops opened towards and abut the public road. The shops
are on the boundary of the Maidan and across the road of
the Maidan . It was further clear that right behind the line of
the shops, there stands buildings of a Sanskar Kendra, a
community hall and boys’ hostel. On the other side of the
Sanskar Kendra, the construction of a hall is shown. Other
constructions of school etc. are also there just behind the
Sanskar Kendra, followed by a large open area of the
Maidan .
7.3. The structures of the shops are far away from the
actual ground-the area of ‘Dussehra Maidan’ . As stated
above, there are constructions of a school, a community
centre and a hostel in between. In no way it is possible to
merge or treat any part of the ‘Dussehra Maidan’ with the
strip of land on which shops are constructed. A large area
for ‘Dussehra Maidan’ exists unhindered. There is ample
open space available to be used as Maidan to conduct the
cultural activities and Dussehra festival programmes,
Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 16483-85 of 2015
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without being affected in any manner by the existence of the
shops in question.
7.4. It could be well noticed from the map that the shops
are at much distance from the actual open area of Maidan .
The question of reduction of or obstruction to the open
Maidan area does not arise. It is to be observed that the
festival of Dussehra is celebrated by the people in the
Maidan every year and there has been no complaint from the
residents about any obstruction being caused by the shops.
8. Any public interest litigation in its outcome aims at
promoting a larger public interest. The public interest
petition is a medium to achieve and preserve public good.
An order passed or directions issued in a public interest
petition should not operate to derecognise or to damage
legitimate private interest or the lawful rights enjoyed by the
citizens or those third persons who may not be party to the
proceedings. An order in the public interest petition should
not become antithetic to the very idea and object underlying
the public interest jurisdiction.
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8.1. The private appellants before this Court in whose
absence the High Court passed directions to demolish, were
the allottees-occupants of the shops. They could not have
been treated to be encroachers or illegal occupants in that
sense in as much as they had entered into occupation and
possession pursuant to participation in the auction process
and upon payment of price, as also after executing the lease
documents with the Municipal Council. Several allottees
occupied the shops since 2005 onwards and have been
paying the rent to the Municipal Council. They were to be
availed in the minimum, their right to defend and establish
their case. The kind and nature of the directions to demolish
the shops and the manner in which such directions were
passed by the High Court operated to defeat the very idea of
public interest.
9. Amidst the say of the Municipality that the public
interest petitioner was a disgruntled person, one who was
not allotted the shop, the petition smacked to have been
instituted with oblique motive, which ended up,
unfortunately by becoming detrimental to the notion of
public interest and to the injustice of the private appellants.
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It is advisable that the court always remains cautious and
disciplined in dealing with and in disposing of the public
interest petitions.
10. As a result of the forgoing reasons and discussion,
the impugned judgment and order dated 20.04.2015 passed
in Writ Petition No. 6079 of 2014 as well as orders dated
15.05.2015 passed in Review Petition Nos. 123 of 2015 and
125 of 2015 by the High Court are set aside. The PIL petition
before the High Court is dismissed.
10.1. It would, however, be open to State to take
appropriate action, if it can, under law against the
Municipality for raising illegal constructions. This Court
does not express any opinion on the merits on that count.
11. All the four appeals are allowed accordingly.
…………………………...J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
………………………….J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]
NEW DELHI;
th
March 19 , 2026.
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