STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. vs. JAGGU .

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 05-07-2019

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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPERME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8094 OF 2011 STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. …..Appellant(s) VERSUS JAGGU & ORS. ETC.  .Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8334 OF 2011 J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. 1. The present appeals arise from the proceedings initiated by the workers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 who had been in employment after issuance of the prohibition notification dated th 17   March   1993   under   the   Contract   Labour(Regulation   and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2019.07.05 16:50:07 IST Reason: Abolition) Act, 1970(hereinafter being referred to as “CLRA Act”) 1 upto April, 1996 in the captive mine of the Steel Authority of India(hereinafter   called   as   “SAIL”)   in   Kuteshwar   Limestone Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur. 2. The indisputed facts which has come on record are that th after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17   March, 1993 by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,1970 no fresh agreement, in the interregnum period th (17   March,   1993   to   April,   1996)   was   executed   between   the appellant and the contract labour and the agreement in existence was extended from time to time by the competent authority and the contract labour was allowed to continue on the same terms & conditions till their services were terminated by the contractor after they had proceeded on strike in the month of April, 1996.   3. The   contract   labours   (2040   employees)   of   Kuteshwar limestone mines who had worked in the establishment of SAIL th after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17   March, 1993 filed their claim applications in the year 1998 on different dates under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.    2 4. Before   we   advert   to   the   question   raised   in   the   instant appeals, it may be relevant to take the brief history of the matter for   proper   appreciation.     The   erstwhile   contract labourers(respondents herein) worked at the captive Limestone and Dolomite mines in the establishment of the appellant SAIL initially   filed   writ   petitions   claiming   regularisation   with   back wages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court   in   the   case   of   Air   India   Statutory   Corporation   and 1 Others Vs. United Labour Union and Others        wherein it was held that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate consequences would be  that the  erstwhile  contract  labourer  covered   by  the sweep of such abolition for the activities concerned would be entitled   to   be   treated   as   direct   employee   of   the   employer   on whose establishment they were earlier working and they would be entitled to be treated as regular employees from the day on which the contract labour system in the establishment for the work which they were doing gets abolished.  The aforesaid judgment of 1 1997(9) SCC 377 3 this Court was subsequently overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in  Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others Vs. 2 .   National Union Waterfront Workers and Others   5. The Single Judge of the High Court earlier allowed the writ petitions but the matter was finally remitted back to the High Court to decide as per the law laid down in the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in  Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra).  and Others 6. It is to be noted that the application filed by Jaggu was considered to be the lead application which has been placed on record (Annexure P­1 of the paper book) and the only fact stated by him in the application was that the applicant was employed in the   Captive   Mine   of   the   SAIL   in   Kuteshwar   Limestone st Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur on 1   September, 1984 and   was   still   in   that   employment   at   the   time   of   filing   of   an application and worked as a skilled workman and was working as Sikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader and that the employment of Kuteshwar Limestone Mines is a scheduled employment within 2 2001(7) SCC 1 4 the meaning of Section 2(e ) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and rates of wages of the workers of SAIL are governed by various settlements/agreements entered into between the management and the Union which are legally binding and are the wages to which employees of SAIL are entitled on the basis of contract of service, agreement and/or otherwise. 7. The   extract   pleadings   of   his   application   on   the   basis   of which   he   claimed   wages   and   other   benefits   payable   to   an employee vis­à­vis those who are regular employee employed in SAIL are as under:­ “1.The applicant is employed in the Captive Mine of the Steel Authority of India (hereinafter called as SAIL’) in Kuteshwar Limestone Mines (Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur from 01.09.1984 and is still in employment. He   is   a   skilled   workman   and   is   working   as Sikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader. 6. The rates of wages of workers of Steel Authority of India are governed by various settlements/Agreements entered into between the management and the Union which are legally binding and is the wages to which employees of Steel Authority are entitled on the basis of contract of services, agreement and or otherwise. The Applicant is entitled to wages and all other benefits as   per   settlement.   The   agreement   also   prohibit employment of contract labour on job of permanent and perennial nature. 7. The   management/opponent   has   been   reusing   to make   payment   to   the   employees   as   per   wage agreement   which   is   their   minimum   wages   Sri 5 Bachchan   Nayak   and   other   office   bearers   of   the Applicant’s Union repeatedly represented the matter of the   Assistant   Labour   Commissioner,   Chief   Labour Commissioner Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Hon’ble Minister for Steel, Chairman, Steel Authority of India and even the Prime Minister, for payment of wages as regular   employees.   Because   of   the   strong   and persistent opposition of one of the opponent, Minimum Wages is denied to the Applicant. 12. The applicant has been reporting for work on all   the   working   days   from   17/3/1993   onwards. However, after May, 1996 he was refused work even when the reports for duty. The applicant was always ready and willing to work. There was no termination of services of the applicant. The applicant will be deemed to   be   in   service   and   entitled   to   all   the   benefits, including wages. 16. The applicant has not been paid the wages as per   Minimum   Wages   from   17/3/1993.   The   exact figures of amount due i.e. difference etc. are available with   the   management   and   within   their   special knowledge. The opponents are in possession of all the records and details of the payment due as per wage agreement and other details. They are liable to produce the   same   before   this   Hon’ble   Authority   to   make appropriate and proper calculation. In case they fail to produce the documents an adverse inference is liable to be taken against them. 17. The applicant therefore pray that a direction may be issued under Section 20 [3] of the Act for: [i] payment  of  difference of  wages  payable under   the   Minimum   Wages   Act   and   the wages actually paid as per details given in Annexure­A. [ii]compensation   of   10   times   amounting   to Rs. 24,86,130­00. [iii]delay if any, in filing the petition may be condoned.” 6 8. The complaint of the applicant Jaggu (annexure P­1) in his application under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before the prescribed authority of which a reference has been made, appears to be that the rates of wages of SAIL which were governed by various settlements/agreements entered between the management and the registered Union of regular employees of SAIL are legally enforceable and the applicant is also entitled to the   wages   and   such   other   service   benefits   as   per   those settlements after a prohibition notification has been published by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. 9. The   matter   was   contested   between   the   parties   and   the prescribed   authority   after   holding   a   summary   enquiry   as contemplated under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 under its nd Order dated 2  December, 2003 allowed the claim petitions with five times of compensation in favour of 2040 contract employees who   have   been   represented   by   Ispat   Khadan   Janta   Mazdoor Union, Koteshwar Limestone Mine, Gairtalai, Katni.   nd 10. The   order   of   the   Payment   of   Wages   Authority   dated   2 December, 2003 came to be challenged by the appellant SAIL by 7 way of writ petition before the Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur which was partly allowed vide Order th dated 24  January, 2006 holding that the justice would be met if the   respondents(employees)   are   allowed   6%   interest   on   the amount payable to each of them as compensation from the date of passing of the impugned order of the authority till its payment. It was further challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court that came to be dismissed vide impugned judgment dated th 11  December, 2006 with a modification that instead of grant of 6% interest as compensation, a consolidated sum of Rs. 5 crore be paid towards compensation to the aggrieved employees, which is a subject matter of challenge in these appeals before us. 11. Learned senior counsel for the appellants Mr. Ranjit Kumar and Mr. Parag P. Tripathi submit that the parity of wages was one of the issue nos. 5 & 6 based on the pleadings of the parties framed   by   CGIT   pursuant   to   the   reference   made   by   the appropriate   Government   and   both   the   issues   have   been th negatively answered under its award dated 16  September, 2009 holding   that   respondents   are   not   entitled   to   wages   as   per National   Joint   Committee   for   the   Steel   Industries(NJCS)   vide 8 th memorandum   of   agreement   dated   30   July,   1975   which   is applicable only to direct/regular employees of SAIL.   12. The submission of the learned counsel is that at least the parallel   proceedings   which   are   summary   in   nature   initiated under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 keeping the reference made for   adjudication   to   the   CGIT   at   bay   were   unwarranted   and despite their objection  being  raised, it was  overruled and  the applications of the workmen came to be decided under Order nd dated 2  December, 2003 by the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which was without jurisdiction and such applications filed at the instance of the workmen was not maintainable under the law. 13. Learned counsel further submits that it is nowhere pleaded by the respondents that the principle of equal pay for equal work was applicable and they were entitled for the wages payable to the regular employees on the basis of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the CLRA Rules, 1971.   The burden to prove was on the respondents to show that the contract labour was discharging the same and similar nature of duties and work as performed by the regular 9 employees   of   the   establishment   but   such   facts   were   neither pleaded   nor   established   by   the   respondents   either   before   the prescribed   authority   or   before   the   High   Court   in   writ petition/letters patent appeal and has not adverted to any finding that the respondents were performing same or similar nature of work as that of the regular employees of the appellant SAIL.  In the absence thereof, the contract labour was not entitled for the wages payable to the employees who were directly employed by the SAIL for a work which is neither same nor similar as being performed by the respondent contract labourers. 14. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   the   tripartite agreement which was entered between the contract labourers, contractor   and   appellant   SAIL   in   presence   of   the   labour th authorities dated 12   November, 1991 specifically takes care of the Rule 25(2)(iv) & (v) of the CLRA Rules, 1971 and indisputedly, each   of   the   worker   was   paid   Rs.   11.65/­   per   day   over   the minimum   wages   notified   by   the   appropriate   Government,   as agreed   between   the   parties.     The   tripartite   agreement   was st th effective   from   1   April   1991   although   it   was   entered   on   12 10 November, 1991 but wages were paid to each of the contract worker in terms of the tripartite agreement.   15. Learned counsel submits that it was never the case of the th respondents that the tripartite agreement dated 12   November, 1991 has not been complied with.  In fact, the arrears were paid over the minimum wages notified by the appropriate Government in   terms   of   Rule   25(2)(v)(a)   of   the   CLRA   Rules,   1971   and appellant became liable to pay the minimum wages agreed in terms   of   the   agreement   after   issuance   of   the   prohibition notification   under   Section   10(1)   of   the   CLRA   Act,   since   the contract stood automatically extinct, it became the liability of the employer to see that every workmen who is working thereafter must have been paid his due wages in terms of the agreement which   has   been   signed   in   presence   of   the   concerned   labour th authorities   dated   12   November,   1991   and   binding   upon   the parties. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in th sequel to the notification dated 12  November, 1991, the Ministry th of Labour, Government of India, vide its notification dated 12 11 July, 1994 revised the minimum rate of wages payable to the workers   employed   in   the   mines   appended   Clause   5   to   the explanation   that   in   case   the   existing   rates   of   wages   of   any employee as per agreement are more than the minimum notified rates shall be protected and be treated as the minimum rates of wages and that according to the appellants have been paid to each of the workmen who had served the establishment of the th appellants after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17 March,  1993  till their   services   came  to be  terminated  by  the contractor in April 1996. 17. Learned counsel further submits that the State of Madhya Pradesh   under   its   Act   No.   23   of   1961   has   made   certain amendments   to   the   Minimum   Wages   Act,   1948.     These amendments as explained in its object and reasons was enacted as validating legislation.   The validation arose in the context of the High Court of Rajasthan quashing its notifications pertaining to fixing of minimum rates of wages.  The said amendment Act is merely to validate fixation and has no applicability to the dispute having raised  by the  respondents in the  proceedings initiated under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and in support thereof, 12 learned   counsel   has   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this Court in  Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding 3 ;     Officer,   Labour   Courts,   Hubli   and   Others,   Etc.   BHEL Workers   Association,   Hardwar   and   Others  Vs.  Union   of 4  and    India and Others   Hindustan Steel Works Construction 5 Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Labour and Ors.     . 18. Per contra, Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel for the respondents in support of the judgment of the High Court submits that after issuance of the prohibition notification dated th 17   March, 1993, it is an admitted position that the contract labourers had continued to work in the same capacity in the establishment of SAIL and that would make them entitled for the wages which are being notified by the SAIL from time to time payable   to   its   regular   employees   for   the   period   the   contract labour had worked after the issuance of prohibition notification th dated   17   March,   1993   till   April,   1996   and   clause(v)   of   the th notification prescribing minimum wages dated 6   March, 1990 th and 12   July, 1994 clearly stipulates that the existing rate of 3 1969(1) SCC 873 4 1985(1) SCC 630 5 1996(10) SCC 599 . 13 wages   to   any   employee   based   on   contract   or   agreement   or otherwise if higher than the rates notified herein, the higher rate shall be protected and be treated as rate of wages payable for the purpose of its notification and once this fact has been admitted that   there   was   an   agreement   entered   into   between   union   of regular employees and the management of the establishment, at least   the   lowest   rate   of   wages   in   the   establishment   of   the appellant payable to a regular and permanent employee became the benchmark of minimum wages payable to the contract labour who had worked in the establishment of the appellant SAIL as an th employee after issuance of notification dated 17   March, 1993 until   termination   of   service   and   this   what   the   prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has computed towards arrears of each of the 2040 employee who have, inter alia, filed applications for legitimate wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 19. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   as   regards   their absorption and regularisation of service, it was indeed a subject matter of adjudication in a reference made by the appropriate th Government   under   its   notification   dated   27   January,   2003 14 nd followed with 22  February, 2005 but so far as their minimum wages   payable   to   the   employees   are   concerned,   it   was   an independent   issue   having   no   relationship   to   the   terms   of reference pending before the CGIT at the relevant point of time th and after issuance of prohibition notification dated 17    March, 1993 under CLRA Act, such of the contract workers who had served thereafter in the establishment of the appellants became their employee and can no longer be treated as contract workers. 20. Learned counsel submits that after the contract of service agreement stands extinguished indisputedly the work discharged by the employees(earlier contract workers) is same and similar as of the regular employees and it is not open for the appellant to have   two   different   wage   structures   for   the   employees   of   the establishment of SAIL and it was indeed arbitrary and violative of Article 14  &  39(d) of   the   Constitution  of  India  and  the  wage structure applicable to the employees of SAIL has rightly been extended by the prescribed authority under the mandate of the Minimum   Wages   Act,   1948   and   since   the   respondents   have th demanded lowest rate of wages in terms of settlements dated 6 th March, 1990 and 12  July, 1994, no further finding was required 15 to be recorded with respect to the same or similar nature of work being discharged and at least those rates of wages are applicable to the present employees(earlier casual labourers) and this what has   been   computed   by   the   prescribed   authority   under   the Minimum Wages Act and confirmed by the High Court under the impugned   judgment   and   in   support   of   submission,   learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar and Others (supra). 21. We  have  heard learned counsel for the parties and  with their assistance perused the material available on record. 22. To appreciate the rival submissions made by the respective counsels, it is considered appropriate to first take note of the indisputed facts and the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948   &   CLRA   Act   emerged   from   the   records   are   that   the appellant SAIL is a Government of India Undertaking and is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India having   its   steel   plants   in   different   parts   of   India   and   was   a registered establishment under Section 7 of the CLRA Act and the contractor through whom the service of the contract labour was 16 engaged was holding its licence as envisaged under Section 12 of the CLRA Act.   The tripartite memorandum of settlement dated th st 12  November, 1991 which became effective from 1  April, 1991, was   signed   by   the   appellant,   contractor   and   the   respondent through   Union   before   the   Assistant   Labour   Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur.   Under the said settlement, it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/­ per day over and   above   the   minimum   wages   notified   by   the   appropriate Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.  Indisputedly, each of the member of the union was paid his wages in terms of th the memorandum of settlement dated 12  November, 1991.  At the later stage, the appropriate Government issued a prohibition th notification of employment of contract labour dated 17   March, 1993 and the fact remains that the contract labour which was engaged   prior   to   the   prohibition   notification   was   allowed   to continue in the establishment of the appellant(SAIL) on the same terms and conditions with no change in their service conditions under the agreement which was executed prior to the prohibition th notification dated 17   March, 1993, was extended from time to time by the competent authority and the services of the contract 17 labour came to be terminated by the respective contractor in the month of April, 1996 after they went on strike. 23. After discontinuance of the service of the contract labour by the   respective   contractor   in   April,   1996,   2040 employees/contract   labour   through   their   union   filed   their respective applications in the year 1998 under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before the prescribed authority to claim parity with the wages payable to the employees who were direct/regular employees of the establishment of SAIL under the Minimum Wages Act. 24. After issuance of a prohibition notification under the CLRA th Act   dated   17   March,   1993,   the   erstwhile   contract labourers/respondents   herein   filed   writ   petitions   to   claim regularisation of service and backwages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court in  Air India Statutory Corporation and Others case (supra) wherein it was held that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate consequences were that the erstwhile regulated contract labourer covered by the sweep of 18 such abolition for the activities concerned would be entitled to be treated as direct employee of the employer on the day on which the   contract   labour   system   in   the   establishment   has   been abolished.   But the theory of automatic absorption of contract labour   by   the   principal   employer   in   the   establishment   on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the Act was later overruled by the Constitution Bench   of   this   Court   in   Steel   Authority   of   India   Ltd.   and (supra). Others 25. It   is   necessary   to   point   out   that   Ministry   of   Labour, th Government of India vide its notification dated 12   July, 1994, while revising minimum rate of wages payable to the employees employed in the mines had also specifically mentioned in clause 5 to the explanation that in case the existing rate of wages of any employee as per the agreement are higher than the minimum rates,   the   higher   rates   shall   be   protected   and   treated   as minimum rates of wages.  Relevant para of the said notification is quoted herein as under:­ “Where the existing rates of wages of any employee, based on contract or agreement or otherwise are higher than the rates notified herein, the higher rates shall be 19 protected and treated as the minimum rates of wages applicable for the purpose of this notification to such employees.” 26. Such rate  of wages as agreed  in its  tripartite agreement th dated 12  November, 1991 were paid at Rs. 11.65/­ per day over st and above the minimum wages with effect from 1   April, 1991 and   that   was   indisputedly   complied   with   and   each   of   the employee   (contract   labour)   who   had   served/worked   in   the establishment had been paid his due wages until their services came to be terminated  by  the respective contractors in  April, 1996. 27. The claim of the respondents in their application filed under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was that as they had discharged the same or similar nature of work as that of direct employee of the establishment, it makes them entitled for the   wages   which   are   payable   to   an   employee   who   is directly/regularly appointed in the establishment to whom wages are paid in terms of NJCS memorandum of Agreement dated 30th July, 1975. 20 28. It is to be noted that National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry (NJCS) started its functioning initially in the name of JWNC(Joint Wage Negotiating Committee) in October 1969 and was primarily established in pursuance of the decision taken by the industrial committee on iron & steel in October, 1969.  The Committee   has   now   changed   its   name   as   National   Joint Committee for the Steel Industry (NJCS).  The scope of the NJCS presently covers :­ i) Negotiations   for   wage   agreement   and   its implementation. ii) Matters pertaining to and steps to be taken for increase in production, productivity, improvement in quality, reduction of cost and wastage etc. iii) Review of welfare amenities and facilities. iv) Matters   on   which   it   is   necessary   to   draw   the attention of the government; and v) Any other matter pertaining to steel industry and its employees as may be agreed to in the NJCS, from time to time. 29. The membership of NJCS comprises 21 union leaders­ three each from four national centres of trade unions: INTUC, AITUC, CITU and HMS, one each from recognized unions of the steel plants like Bhilai, Durgapur, Rourkela, Bokaro, TISCO, IISCO, Alloy   Steels,   Salem   and   VISL,   and   12   management   staff 21 managing   directors   of   the   steel   plants   of   Bhillai,   Rourkela, Durgapur, Bokar and IISCO, Bumpur; executive directors of Alloy Steels Plant, Salem Steel Plant and VISL; Vice­President(HRM), TISCO;   Vice­Chairman   and   Directors(Finance)   of   SAIL.     The Director(Personnel)   of   SAIL   is   the   Convenor­Member   of   the Committee.   It is a permanent bipartite committee whose scope extends beyond wage negotiations to implementation aspects and other matters of concern to the industries and its employees.  It is applicable to the wage structure across the steel industries in the country. 30. It may be noticed that there are no pleadings on record and primarily   the   burden   was   on   the   respondent   applicants   to establish that the duties discharged by each of the employee was same   or   similar   to   that   of   a   regular/direct   employee appointed/employed   by   the   establishment   and   this   can   be discerned from the facts pleaded in the application filed by one Jaggu of which a reference has been made.   In absence of the initial   burden   being   discharged   in   the   first   instance   by   the respondent   employees,   the   onus   could   not   have   been   shifted upon   the   appellant   SAIL   to   counter   the   nature   of   work 22 discharged by each of the workmen as to whether it was the same or similar to that of a permanent/regular employee of the establishment and how far the principles of equal pay for equal work claimed as enshrined under Article 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India would be attracted in the facts of the case. 31. In this backdrop of the matter, it would be apposite to first take note of the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.  If we look into the objects and reasons of the scheme of the Act, it clearly manifests that the main object of the Act is to provide minimum rates of wages for certain scheduled employment and also provides for fixation and revision of minimum wages of the workers, overtime rates, remuneration for the work done on a day of rest, just to ensure that the employee has enough to provide to his family and to ensure a decent living standard that pertains to a social comfort of the employee and the cost of living index.  The procedure for fixing and revising minimum rate of wages, which has to be prescribed, is supported by the recommendation of Advisory   Committees/Advisory   Board/   Central   Advisory   Board being constituted under Sections 7 and 8 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948  and   the   appropriate   Government  on  its  acceptance 23 notified the minimum wages which are payable to the category of employees referred to under Section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 32. Indisputedly, in the first place, the minimum wages which were notified by the appropriate Government from time to time th under tripartite memorandum of agreement dated 12  November, 1991, signed by the appellant SAIL and the respondents before the Assistant Labour Commissioner(Central), Jabalpur effective st from 1  April, 1991, it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/­ per day over and above the notified minimum st wages   with   effect   from   1   April,   1991   which   has   been indisputedly paid by the appellant SAIL till the employees were allowed to work in the establishment i.e. April, 1996 when their services came to be terminated by the contractor. 33. The exposition of scheme of the minimum wages Act, 1948 and its jurisdiction to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act has been examined by this Court in  Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, Etc. (supra). 24
“7. The long title and the preamble to the Minimum<br>Wages Act show that this Act was passed with the object<br>of making provision for fixing minimum rates of wages in<br>certain employments. The word “wages” has been given a<br>wide meaning in its definition in Section 2(h) of that Act<br>and, quite clearly, includes payment in respect of<br>overtime and for work done on weekly off­days which are<br>required to be given by any employer to the workmen<br>under the provisions of that Act itself. Section 13(1),<br>which deals with weekly off­days, and Section 14(1),<br>which deals with overtime, are as follows:
13.   (1)   In   regard   to   any   scheduled employment   minimum   rates   of   wages   in respect of which have been fixed under this Act, the appropriate Government may— (a) fix   the   number   of   hours   of   work which   shall   constitute   a   normal working   day,   inclusive   of   one   or more specified intervals; provide for a day of rest in every (b) period of seven days which shall be allowed to all employees or to any specified class of employees and for the   payment   of   remuneration   in respect of such days of rest; (c) provide for payment for work on a
14. (1) Where an employee, whose minimum<br>rate of wages is fixed under this Act by the<br>hour, by the day or by such a longer wage­<br>period as may be prescribed, works on any<br>day in excess of the number of hours<br>constituting a normal working day, the<br>employer shall pay him for every hour or for<br>part of an hour so worked in excess at the<br>overtime rate fixed under this Act or under<br>any law of the appropriate Government for<br>the time being in force, whichever is higher.
25 In   order   to   provide   a   remedy   against breach of orders made under Sections 13(1) and 14(1), that Act provides a forum and the manner of seeking the remedy in Section 20 which is as follows: 20. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification   in   the   Official   Gazette   appoint any   Commissioner   for   Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour   Commissioner   or   any   other   officer with experience as a Judge of a civil court or as   a   stipendiary   Magistrate   to   be   the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than   the   minimum   rates   of   wages   or   in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause ( b ) or clause ( c ) of sub­section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate   under   Section   14,   to   employees employed or paid in that area. (2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1),   the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any   official   of   a   registered   trade   union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub­section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub­section (2): Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on   which   the   minimum   wages   or   other amount became payable: Provided further that any application may be   admitted   after   the   said   period   of   six months   when   the   applicant   satisfies   the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 26
(3) ….
(4)….
(5)….
(6)….
(7)….
We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum<br>Wages Act, because the language used at all stages in<br>that Act leads to the clear inference that that Act is<br>primarily concerned with fixing of rates — rates of<br>minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment for<br>work on a day of rest — and is not really intended to be<br>an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which<br>provision is made in other laws, such as the Payment of<br>Wages Act, 4 of 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act 14<br>of 1947. In Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also,<br>provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims<br>arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of<br>wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days<br>of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or<br>clause (c) of sub­section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at<br>the overtime rate under Section 14. This language used<br>in Section 20(1) shows that the Authority appointed<br>under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction<br>for deciding claims which relate to rates of wages,<br>rates for payment of work done on days of rest and<br>overtime rates. If there be no dispute as to rates<br>between the employer and the employees, Section 20(1)<br>would not be attracted. The purpose of Section 20(1)<br>seems to be to ensure that the rates prescribed under<br>the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the<br>employer in making payments and, if any attempt is<br>made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen<br>are given the right to invoke the aid of the Authority<br>appointed under Section 20(1). In cases where there is<br>no dispute as to rates of wages, and the only question is<br>whether a particular payment at the agreed rate in<br>respect of minimum wages, overtime or work on off­days<br>is due to a workman or not, the appropriate remedy is<br>provided in the Payment of Wages Act. If the payment is<br>withheld beyond the time permitted by the Payment of<br>Wages Act even on the ground that the amount claimed<br>by the workman is not due, or if the amount claimed by<br>the workman is not paid on the ground that deductions<br>are to be made by the employer, the employee can seek<br>his remedy by an application under Section 15(1) of the
27 Payment of Wages Act. In cases where Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy, the remedy can be sought either under Section 33­C of the Act or by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having  it decided under  the various provisions of that Act. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the   submission   made   by   Mr   Sen   on   behalf   of   the appellant that Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act should be interpreted as intended to cover all claims in respect   of   minimum   wages   or   overtime   payment   or payment for days of rest even though there may be no dispute as to the rates at which those payments are to be claimed. It is true that, under Section 20(3), power is given to the Authority dealing with an application under Section   20(1)   to  direct   payment   of   the  actual   amount found due; but this, it appears to us, is only an incidental power granted to that Authority, so that the directions made   by   the   Authority   under   Section   20(1)   may   be effectively carried out and there may not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The power to make orders for payment  of  actual amount  due to an  employee under Section   20(3)   cannot,   therefore,   be   interpreted   as indicating  that  the jurisdiction  to the  Authority  under Section   20(1)   has   been   given   for   the   purpose   of enforcement   of   payment   of   amounts   and   not   for   the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the various rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation; in our   opinion,   also   harmonises   the   provisions   of   the Minimum Wages Act with the provisions of the payment of Wages Act which was already in existence when the Minimum Wages Act was passed. In the present appeals, therefore, we have to see whether the claims which were made by the workmen in the various applications under Section 33­C(2) of the Act were of such a nature that they could   have   been   brought   before   the   Authority   under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they raised disputes relating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work done on weekly off­days.” (Emphasis supplied) 34. The scheme of the Act of which reference has been made by this Court clearly manifests that the Act is primarily concerned with   fixing   rates   of   minimum   wages,   overtime   rates,   rate   for 28 payment of work on a day of rest and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision has been made in other laws such as the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  Section 20 of the Minimum   Wages   Act,   1948   is   primarily   enacted   to   resolve disputes about the rates of wages, rates of payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates and to ensure that the rates of wages   which   are   notified   by   the   appropriate   Government   for various categories of employees under the Minimum Wages Act are   to   be   strictly   complied   with   by   the   employer   in   making payments and if any payment is made at the rates lower than the minimum   rates   of   wages   prescribed   by   the   appropriate Government,   the   remedy   has   been   provided   to   the workmen/employee to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act and being a self­contained   Code   and   a   beneficial   legislation,   it   is   a   social protection   to   ensure   and   secure   adequate   living   wage   in   the interest of public and looking to the nature of enquiry postulated under the scheme of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, there appears no scope of enquiry to examine the principles of equal pay for equal work which is a dispute to be determined by a adjudicatory mechanism provided under the law.  29 35. It was not the case of the respondent employees(2040 in number) that the minimum rates of wages which were notified by the   appropriate   Government   from   time   to   time   or   as   agreed between the parties under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 have not been paid.  But their claim in the application under Section 20(1) of the Act, was that, once they have been allowed to work th after   the   prohibition   notification   dated   17   March,   1993   has come   into   force,   pursuant   to   which   their   status   as   contract labour   in   the   establishment   ceased   to   operate   as   a   result   of contract of principal employer with the contractor in regard to the contract   labour having   been   statutorily   extinguished,   their   relationship   stood automatically   converted   into   the   employer   (i.e.,   SAIL   in   the instant case) and the employee (i.e. contract labour) making them entitled for wages which are notified by the NJCS as per the memorandum of agreement which is payable to direct/regular employees of SAIL. 36. The Division Bench of the High Court has also relied on the scheme   of   CLRA   Rules,   1971   and   Rules   25(iv)   and   (v)   in 30 particular while arriving to a conclusion that the workmen since were allowed to continue to work by the principal employer after th the prohibition notification dated 17  March, 1993 has come into force, and they were discharging same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the principal employer in the establishment, makes them entitled for similar wages admissible to   the   regular   employees   appointed/engaged   by   SAIL.     Rules 25(iv) and (v) of Rules, 1971 are extracted hereunder:­ (iv) the rates of wages payable to the workmen by the contractor shall not be less than the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), for such   employment   where   applicable   and   where   the rates   have   been   fixed   by   agreement,   settlement   or award, not less than the rates so fixed;  (v) (a) in cases where the workman employed by the contractor perform the same or similar kind of work as the   workmen   directly   employed   by   the   principal employer   of   the   establishment,   the   wage   rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be the same as applicable to the workmen directly employed by  the principal employer of the establishment on the same or similar kind of work: Provided  that   in  the  case  of   any   disagreement   with regard to the type of work the same shall be decided by 1 [the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central)];  (b) in other cases the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be such as may be specified in this behalf by 1 [the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central)];  31 Explanation.   —While   determining   the   wage   rates, holidays,   hours   of   work   and   other   conditions   of services   under   (b)   above,   the   Deputy   Chief   Labour Commissioner (Central) shall have due regard to the wage   rates,   holidays,   hours   of   work   and   other conditions of service obtaining in similar employments; 37. The submission, in our view, is misplaced for the reason that the CLRA Act is a complete code in itself and regulate the employment   of   contract   labour   in   certain   establishments   and provide for its abolition in certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith.  The title of the Act itself indicates that the Act does not provide for total abolition of the contract labour, but only for its abolition in certain circumstances, and to regulate the employment of contract labour in the establishments which are registered under Section 7 and working through the contractors who are holding licence under Section 12 of the Act.  Section 8 provides for the revocation of registration in certain cases and Section 9 provides the effect of non­registration.   Section 10 is one of the back bone of the Act which provides for prohibition of employment of contract labour in any establishment and we are fortified in our view supported by the Judgment of this Court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. (supra).       32 38. In the instant case, the establishment was duly registered under Section 7 of the Act and the contractor through whom the contract   labour   was   engaged   was   holding   its   licence   under Section  12  of the  Act  but in  the  changed circumstances, the appropriate Government took a decision to put a prohibition in making employment of contract labour in scheduled employment for various reasons which is not a subject matter of enquiry in the   instant   case   and   in   consequence   of   the   prohibition th notification   dated   17   March,   1993   published   under   Section 10(1)   of   the   CLRA   Act,   the   contract   labour   working   in   the establishment ceased to function and the contract between the principal employer and contractor stands extinguished. 39. To make  it further clear,  Rule  25  of the  Rules, 1971  of which there was an emphasis before the High Court, may not come to the rescue of the respondent employees for the reason that it was an obligation upon the contractor who are holding a licence under Section 12 of the Act and as per the terms and conditions of the licence granted under sub­rule (1) of Rule 25 or renewed   under   Rule   29,   to   comply   with   certain   conditions enumerated under sub­rule (2) of Rule 25 of  the Rules 1971 33 which includes clause (iv) and (v) to be complied with by the contractor and, if at all, there is any breach of the conditions of licence, complaint can be made to the prescribed authority and its consequences are imbedded under the Scheme of the CLRA Act, 1970.    40. At   the   same   time,   an   obligation   to   provide   amenities conferred by the Act to the workers has been referred to under Chapter V of the CLRA Act and the primary responsibility is of a contractor that each worker employed by him as contract labour has to be paid his due wages before the expiry of such period as may   be   prescribed   with   an   exception   provided   under   Section 21(4) of the Act, in case the contractor fails to make payment of wages within the prescribed period or makes short payment, then the principal employer shall be liable to make payment of wages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the contract   labour   employed   by   the   contractor   and   recover   the amount so paid from the contractor under any of the methods prescribed by law. 34 41. In   the   instant   case,   after   issuance   of   the   prohibition th notification dated 17   March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act having being published, in our considered view, the provisions of the CLRA Act or CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder   would   not   be   available   to   either   of   the   party   to strengthen   its   claim.     As   stated   earlier,   minimum   wages   as prayed   for   in   the   application   filed   by   respondents   before   the prescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 could be claimed independently under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which indisputedly in the instant case was Rs. 11.65/­  per   day   over   the   minimum   wages   to  be   paid   by   the appellant to each of the respondent (2040 employees) in terms of the agreement executed between the parties and that was indeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit.   42. The   submission   made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the respondents that the respondent workmen were doing the jobs of perennial in nature and the contract labour was banned under agreements entered between SAIL and the workers union from 1970 onwards and their performance of same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the principal employer 35 make them entitled for wages in terms of NJCS Memorandum of agreement is without substance for the reason that for fixation of Minimum Wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, there are number of considerations which are to be kept in mind by the committees while prescribing the minimum rate of wages payable to the workmen of a different category.  Under Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 the appropriate Government may fix minimum wages for time work, minimum rate of wages for piece work, minimum wages in respect of overtime work defined under sub­Section 2 of Section 3 of the Act and the amendment made in   Section   3   of   the   Act   also   take   note   of   different classes/categories of employees in such employment while the notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 came to be published by the appropriate Government.   43. In the given circumstances, a mere assertion of fact that the contract   labour   which   was   allowed   to   continue   after   the th prohibition notification came to be published dated 17   March, 1993 in the establishment of the appellant SAIL performing same or  similar  kind   of  work  in  the   establishment of   the   principal employer is not sufficient to endorse their entitlement of claiming 36 wages   notified   by   the   NJCS   memorandum   of   agreement   for direct/regular   employees   of   the   establishment   applicable universally to all the steel industries.  The Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in     BHEL    Workers Association, Hardwar and Others   (supra) may not be of any assistance in the facts of the instant case for the reason that it was a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the workers union seeking declaration from this Court for   abolition   of   contract   labour   and   be   treated   as   direct employees   of   the   establishment   and   entitled   to   equal   pay   as workmen of the BHEL but that being a matter of enquiry by the competent authority, their petition came to be dismissed with the direction  to   the   Union  of  India  to  examine   their  grievance   in accordance with law. 44. In   addition   to   it,   in   terms   of   reference   made   by   the th appropriate   Government   dated  27   January,   2003   read   with th nd Corrigendum dated 9   April, 2003 followed with 22   February, 2005, the CGIT framed various issues including issue nos. V & VI and answered it accordingly. Issue nos. V & VI are reproduced as under:­ 37 “V. Whether   lime   stone   mines   violated   the provision   of   Clause­8   of   the   memorandum   of agreement signed between the SAIL, New Delhi and their   Unions   and   employing   workers   through contractors on jobs of permanent and perennial nature was justified, legal and fair? VI. Whether   the   workmen/heirs   are   entitled   to the wages to the post in which they were engaged with parity of wages with that of regular employees of the management with all consequential benefits?” It has been answered as under:­ “It is evident that it is not established that the alleged contract labours were the employees of the SAIL, as such they were not entitled to any wages as per the agreement.  Moreover they were not regular employees of the management and the said agreement appears to be for the regular employees of the management.  Thus these issues are also decided against the Union and in favour of the management.” 45. The   answer   thereto   has   been   upheld   by   us   in   the independent proceedings. 46. In our considered view, the order of the prescribed authority nd under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated 2  December, 2003 and confirmed by the High Court under the impugned judgment th dated 11  December, 2006 are unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. 38 47. Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 8094 of 2011 filed by Steel Authority of India Ltd. is accordingly allowed and order of the prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1948 and Judgment of the High Court are hereby set aside. 48. Civil Appeal No. 8334 of 2011 filed by the employees(Jaggu & Others) is dismissed.  No costs. 49. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. ………………………………..J. (A.M. KHANWILKAR) ..………………………………J. (AJAY RASTOGI) New Delhi July 05, 2019 39