Nirbhay Singh Suliya vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2026 INSC 7
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 24570 OF 2024)


NIRBHAY SINGH SULIYA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T


K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This case highlights the unfortunate plight of a judicial
officer (appellant herein) who, after 27 years of unblemished
service, was removed from service. The sole and exclusive
basis on which the appellant has been removed are four
judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties thereon
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2026.01.05
16:53:40 IST
Reason:
on bail. Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen other
Page 1 of 34


orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders Section
59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 (for short the
“Excise Act”) was not referred to, action has been taken.
According to the High Court, in the fourteen other orders the
appellant referred to the said Section implying thereby that he
was conscious of the existence of the said Section on the
statute. Section 59-A prescribes what has now famously come
to be known as “twin conditions” for grant of bail.
3. The question before us is whether on facts, based on the
four judicial orders of grant of bail per se and without anything
more, the authorities were justified in removing the appellant
from service?
4. The facts lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant
joined service on 31.10.1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in
the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The appellant scaled
the ladder up and in 2003 was promoted as Additional District
Judge and in September, 2008 was confirmed in the said post.
On 16.05.2011, he was transferred to Khargone, District
Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First Additional
Page 2 of 34


District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of his
duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail
applications under the Excise Act.
5. One Jaipal Mehta, a resident of Jaitapur, Khargone,
lodged a complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur. The complaint which did not
set out any details of the bail orders and which was in very
general terms reads as under:-
“Subject: Regarding disposal of cases under Section 34(2)
of IPC.
Sir,
In reference to above subject matter, it is requested that
First ADJ Sh. Suliya posted in Khargone, District-West
Nimar, Mandleshwar by taking bribe through his Steno
namely Anil Joshi, Clerk, is granting bails in the cases of
Section 34/2 of Excise Act i.e. of 50 Bulk Ltrs. of liquor,
whereas, ADJ/Sessions Judge has no power to allow said
bail applications. Said Bails are allowed by the High Court.
Anil Joshi, Steno challenges in each and every case that
either you bring case of 302, 307, Claim or Civil Case, I
have good setting with sir, I will get it resolved, rest you
have to pay money as per my wishes. Due to such corrupt
employee, the judiciary is getting defamed. Injustice is
being done with the aggrieved parties in place of giving
them justice. Who will be responsible for it? Previously in
the year 1995-196, the serious complaints of bribe were
also made against the said corrupt employee, on which, no
action was taken. Aforesaid employee is posted in
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Khargone since last 25 years and is earning money by
doing setting with Advocates openly. If the enquiry of his
account be conducted, then, the truth will be exposed. If,
the trust of public loses confidence in judiciary then, will
be possible of military rule jungle raj.”

6. It will be seen that according to the complaint, the
allegation was that the appellant was taking bribe through his
steno, namely, Anil Joshi for grant of bail in cases under the
Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk
liters or more; that the said Anil Joshi was claiming that he will
get the work done through the appellant for extraneous
consideration; that due to such corrupt employee, the
judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96, serious
complaints of bribery were made against the said employee
on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been
posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning
money through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.
7. It appears from the counter affidavit filed before this
Court by R-2 - the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, that a
preliminary inquiry was conducted by the District Judge (I &
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V), Indore Zone, Indore, against the appellant and on
06.10.2012, the Principal Registrar (I & V) put up a note based
on which it was decided to initiate departmental proceedings
against the appellant.

8. What emerges is that in the preliminary inquiry certain
orders passed by the appellant in bail proceedings seem to
have been examined and few orders pulled out. Two charges
were framed against the appellant of which the second charge
admittedly was held not proved by the inquiry officer. The
charges read as under:-
“Whereas, you Shri Nirbhay Singh Suliya while functioning
as Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, distt.
Mandleshwar, have committed following acts which if
proved would amount to grave misconduct:-

ARTICLE OF CHARGE - I
That, you, with corrupt of oblique motive or for some
extraneous considerations, while functioning as Additional
& Sessions Judge, allowed Bail Application No. 129/11
Lokesh Vs. State of MP vide order dated 1.8.11, Bail
Application No. 136/11 Babulal & Ors. Vs. State vide order
dated 4.8.11, Bail Application No.200/11 Mohan Vs. State of
MP vide order dated 7.12.11, Bail Application No. 123/12
Jitendra & Nantiya Vs. State & No. 122/12 Gulab & Ors. Vs.
State of MP, vide order dated 31-08-12, against the
provisions of Section 59-A of the M.P. Excise Act wherein
all the cases, quantity of seized liquor was 50 and more
Page 5 of 34


bulk litres. On the contrary, you rejected Bail Application
No.89/11 vide order dated 16.06.2011, Bail Application No.
92/11, vide order dated 23.06.11, Bail Application
No.104/11, vide order dated 1.7.2011, Bail Application
No.103/11, vide order dated 4.7.11, Bail Application no.
111/11, vide order dated 11.7.11, Bail Application No.
121/11, vide order dated 21.07.11, Bail Application
No.140/11, vide order dated 12.08.11, Bail Application No.
160/11 vide order dated 22.09.11 and six other bail
applications in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50
bulk litres or more. In this manner you have applied double
standard, malafidely, in allowing the aforesaid bail
applications.

ARTICLE OF CHARGE - II
That, you, with corrupt or oblique motive or for some
extraneous consideration allowed the first bail application
No. 101/2012 Pappu Vs. State of MP in Crime No. 101/2012
under section 439 of CrPC for offense punishable under
363, 366, 376(2)(g) of the IPC in a serious offence of gang
rape without assigning any sufficient reason, whereas the
accused was already facing trial in another similar crime
no. 103/2012 PS Oon for offence punishable under sections
363, 366, 376(2)(g) 3 of the IPC.

Your aforesaid acts being unbecoming of Judicial Officer
amount to grave misconduct under Rule 3 of M.P. Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and are punishable under
Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1966.”

9. A perusal of “Charge-I” reveals that the orders in the
following bail applications where Bail was granted to the
Page 6 of 34


applicants therein were the basis of the gravamen of the
charge:-
Bail Application Nos. Date of Order
129/2011 01.08.2011
136/2011 04.08.2011
200/2011 07.12.2011
123/2012 & 122/2012 31.08.2012


10. The charge was that for corrupt motive or that for some
extraneous consideration, bail applications were allowed
contrary to Section 59-A of the Excise Act. A contrast was
made with 14 other bail orders, where the appellant had
rejected bail. It is significant to note that among the five bail
orders, Bail Application No.200/2011 that was disposed of on
07.12.2011 was actually a case where the appellant had
rejected bail. Somehow that order also made its way into
“Charge-I”, as an order of grant of bail. Be that as it may. In
the list of witnesses, Jaipal Mehta was named apart from a
general statement – “any other witnesses that may be felt
necessary”.
11. The appellant gave his reply and dealt with each bail
order that was subject matter of the charge.
Page 7 of 34


12. We have perused the actual bail orders. In the bail order
in Bail Application No.129/2011 (60 liters of liquor) the
reasoning given was as under:-
“After hearing arguments of both the parties, Criminal
Case No.1685/11 Filed before Chief Judicial Magistrate
was perused. On perusal, it is clear that on 25.07.2011,
challan has been filed against both the Applicants/Accused
in violation of Section 34(2) of M.P. Excise Act, and
possibility of consuming time in it's trial cannot be
overruled. In view of the nature of crime, allegations, and
without commenting on the merits of evidences collected
in the present case i.e. Crime No. 232/11, and by placing
reliance on the said case laws, where trial is likely to take
time, and Applicant/Accused are theirselves [sic] being
permanent resident, there is no flight risk or tempering
evidences on their part, thereupon, it appears justifiable to
grant benefit of bail to these Applicants/ Accused Persons.
Due to this reason, the present Bail Application u/s 439
Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed.”

13. Similarly, in other orders, reasons like filing of challan,
the applicants being rural farmers with no flight risk were
mentioned. There was no express reference to the twin
conditions under Section 59-A(2) of the Excise Act.
14. At the inquiry, the complainant Jaipal Mehta was not
examined. Instead the executive clerk of ADJ, Khargone
Court, Gendalal Chauhan was examined as witness No.1, in
Page 8 of 34


support of the charge. The witness marked all the exhibits and
categorically deposed as under which actually was in favour
of the appellant :-
“It is correct to say that while passing orders, Anil Joshi was
posted as Steno in the Court of First Additional Sessions
Judge. He is posted in Khargone since last 7-8 years, whom
I know due to being my colleague. I never seen Anil (sic)
asking anyone that he has good relations with Suliya Sahab
and I will get done the work by doing setting. None of the
Advocates has told me that Anil Joshi has setting with Suliya
Sahab.”

15. The appellant in defense examined the prosecutor K.P.
Tripathi who appeared in all the 18 bail applications which
were subject matter of the charge. He deposed as under:-
“I did not feel that the double standard has been adopted
by the Court. If it would happen, then, I would give my
opinion to the State for taking action in Hon'ble High
Court. In Exh. P-19, only one Crime i.e. Crime No.102/12
is registered against Accused Pappu in P.S. Oon.
Moreover, as per my knowledge, no other crime is
registered against this accused. Because in Police Report,
there is no mention of registration of any other crime
against him. I find the functioning of Court to be
completely impartial.”

……


Page 9 of 34


“That, three Bail Applications of Excise Act have been
allowed, and out of the said Applications, 15 Applications
have been rejected. In my opinion, in the cases of Bail
marked as Exh. P-1, P-2 and P-4, those orders of allowing
bail application which have been passed in view of the
facts and circumstances of respective cases, nature of
crime, and in pursuance of the case laws of Hon'ble High
Court and Supreme Court, those orders are completely
based on merits and are relevant and true as per law.
Those 15 Bail Applications which have been rejected by
the Ld. Trial Court, out of those cases, in the orders
marked as Exh. P-9, Exh. P-12, Exh. P-13, Exh. P-17 and
Exh. P-18, the case was at the initial stage of
investigation.”

……

“Note: Question by Enquiry Officer:-

Question: The bail orders, in which bail applications have
been allowed, whether those orders according to your
goodself or in the opinion of Public Prosecutor, are proper
or improper? What you say in this regard.

Answer: In my opinion i.e. in the capacity of Public
Prosecutor, the orders of granting bail were absolutely
proper and on proper grounds.”

16. Notwithstanding the above evidence the inquiry officer
held “Charge-I”, proved by recording the following findings:-
“Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid analysis, as a final
conclusion, it is proved in favour of the Department that
Delinquent Officer Sh. N.S. Suliya in the capacity of
Additional Sessions Judge, not being impartial in the
Page 10 of 34


disposal of Bail Applications for the offences of Section
34(2), 49-A of the Excise Act, and with oblique motive and
by deliberately violating the mandatory provisions of
Section 59-A of the aforesaid Act, has committed
misconduct by allowing some Bail Application Nos.
129/11, 136/11, 123/12, 122/12 and by rejecting some bail
Applications by applying double standards in malafide
and arbitrary manner, who has violated Rule 3 of the M.P.
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 196, which is punishable
under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification,
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966.”

17. On 21.03.2014, a copy of the inquiry report was furnished
to the appellant and he was asked to show cause on the
punishment. The appellant filed a detailed reply by his letter
dated 10.04.2014.
18. On 02.09.2014, on the recommendation of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, order was passed by the Principal
Secretary, Government of M.P., Law & Legislative Affairs
Department, removing the appellant from service. A
representation/appeal filed against the said order was
rejected on 17.03.2016.
19. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (Writ Petition No.8623/2016)
challenging the order of removal and the order of the
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appellate authority and prayed for reinstatement with
consequential benefits.
20. By the impugned order dated 25.07.2024, the High Court
has dismissed the Writ Petition by recording the following
finding:-
“If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the
case referred to herein above, are taken note of, then a
reasonable finding arrived at by the Inquiring Authority in
the present case based on material available on record can
neither be interfered with by this Court nor can it termed
as perverse or unreasonable to such an extent that
interference can be made by this Court.

Considering the material available in the present case, it is
apparent that the petitioner was holding the post of
Additional Sessions Judge with which comes a great
responsibility and he was under obligation to conduct
himself in a manner befitting the post held by him. He was
under duty to conduct the proceedings of bail applications
in conformity with the provisions of law. He extended the
benefit of bail to some applicants relying on the
pronouncement of High Court and refused to grant bail to
others without considering those pronouncements. No
violation of principles of natural justice or error is found in
the procedure followed in the enquiry in the present case.
In the absence of any procedural illegality, irregularity in
the conduct of departmental enquiry, in the considered
opinion of this Court, no interference is warranted and after
considering the over all material available in the record
and in view of the settled position of law, we do not find any
reason to interfere in the order of punishment/removal
Page 12 of 34


dated 02.09.2014 and the order of rejection of appeal on
17.03.2016 and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.”

21. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
22.
We have heard Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned senior
counsel assisted by Mr. Kanu Agarwal, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Arjun Garg, learned counsel for the
respondent no. 2, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, who
ably presented the case of the said respondent. We have
perused the records, including the written submissions and
the compilation of case law filed by the parties.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: -
23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that
the allegations were directly against Anil Joshi – the
Stenographer; that neither the complainant – Jaipal Mehta nor
the Stenographer was produced as witnesses during the
Departmental Inquiry and that the bail orders which were
subject matter of the inquiry were passed on valid grounds.
Even in the case of special statute “bail is the rule and jail is the
exception”; that the Inquiry Officer has examined the legality
Page 13 of 34


and propriety of the orders of bail acting as an Appellate
Authority. That the departmental witness Gendalal Chauhan
and the public prosecutor in their deposition did not support
the charge and finally it was contended that merely because
on a given set of facts, a different conclusion is possible, is no
ground to indict a Judicial Officer. It was further submitted that
wrong exercise of jurisdiction or mistake of law or wrong
interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating
disciplinary proceedings.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2 – THE HIGH
COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH:-
24. The learned Counsel for the respondent no. 2 - the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh submitted that the procedure for
Inquiry has been duly followed; that the consistent view of this
Court has been that the Court will not function as an Appellate
Court over the Inquiry report and the only consideration was
whether the Inquiry had been fairly conducted after giving
due opportunity to the delinquent. It was further submitted
that Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act was not even referred to
Page 14 of 34


in the bail orders in question, while in the other bail orders it
was mentioned while rejecting bail. The learned counsel
submitted that the Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion
that the conduct of the appellant was not impartial and the
appellant violated the mandate of Section 59-A and applied
double standards in a mala fide and arbitrary manner. It was
submitted that a judicial officer is required to maintain a very
high standard of devotion to duty. So contending, it was
pleaded that the impugned order did not call for any
interference.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION: -
25. The questions for consideration are whether the order
removing the appellant from service based on the inquiry
report is justified in law and whether any good ground has
been made out for interference?
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: -
26. The present is the case of a Disciplinary Inquiry against
the senior Judicial Officer. Before we set out the parameters
laid down by this Court as to in what circumstances a Judicial
Page 15 of 34


Officer can be subjected to penalty in the discharge of his
duties, it is apposite to make certain preliminary
observations.
27. A fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent
judiciary, as much as an independent judiciary itself is the
foundation on which rule of law rests. A judicial Officer is
tasked with the onerous duty of deciding cases. Invariably
one party to the case would lose and go back unhappy.
Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting to settle scores
may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary also has
tremendous work pressure and works under trying working
conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most
of the Judicial Officers give their very best while discharging
their duties.
28. Instances have also emerged from different parts of the
country, where not just disgruntled parties but some
mischievous elements in the Bar have also resorted to
intimidatory tactics against the members of the Trial Judiciary
by engineering false and anonymous complaints. Strict and
Page 16 of 34


strong action in accordance with law should be taken against
such individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint against
a judicial officer and/or if found to be engineering the false
and frivolous complaints. Such proceedings would include in
appropriate cases, proceedings for contempt of court. In case
the person filing or engineering false and frivolous complaints
is a recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart from proceedings
for contempt of court, reference to the bar council should be
made for disciplinary action. Bar councils, on receipt of such
references, have to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
29. Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the
judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt action
to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no
leniency should be shown if the charges are established. Not
only this, in appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is
warranted against a judicial officer, the High Court should not
hesitate to have the same initiated. That is the only way to
weed out black-sheeps sullying the fair name of the judiciary.
Due care and caution must be exercised by the High Court in
Page 17 of 34


initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only
because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment,
without anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the
ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.

30. It is trite to recall the observations of this Court in Sadhna
1
Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another. :-
“20. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion
cannot constitute “misconduct”. Any “probability” of
misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary
material, even though, the standard of proof would
obviously not be on a par with that in a criminal trial. While
applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to
consider the existence of differing standards and
approaches amongst different Judges. There are
innumerable instances of judicial officers who are liberal in
granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT or for
acquired land, back wages to workmen or mandatory
compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such
relief-oriented judicial approaches cannot by
themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty
and integrity of an officer.

21. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours
being a country, wherein countless complainants are
readily available without hesitation to tarnish the image
of the judiciary, often for mere pennies or even cheap
momentary popularity. Sometimes, a few disgruntled
members of the Bar also join hands with them, and the
officers of the subordinate judiciary are usually the
easiest target. It is, therefore, the duty of the High Courts

1
(2020) 11 SCC 760
Page 18 of 34


to extend their protective umbrella and ensure that the
upright and straightforward judicial officers are not
subjected to unmerited onslaught.

26. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end
result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether
the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification
(monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by
extraneous considerations while conducting the process
is of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that
a judicial officer can indulge in conduct unbecoming of
his office whilst at the same time giving an order, the
result of which is legally sound. Such unbecoming
conduct can either be in the form of a Judge taking a case
out of turn, delaying hearings through adjournments,
seeking bribes to give parties their legal dues, etc. None
of these necessarily need to affect the outcome.
However, importantly in the present case, a perusal of the
charge-sheet shows that no such allegation of the process
having been vitiated has been made against the appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)

2
31. In Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Rajasthan , this Court
quoted with approval the observations in Sadhna Chaudhary
( supra ).
32. When false allegations fly thick and fast, the judicial
officers cannot react. Here is where the High Court which is
vested with the supervisory control has to exercise great

2
(2022) 13 SCC 1
Page 19 of 34


caution and circumspection. As to what the parameters are,
when the High Court on the Administrative side is faced with
such a scenario, has been felicitously set out by Chief Justice
D.Y. Chandrachud J. speaking for the Court in R.R. Parekh v.
3
High Court of Gujarat and Another as under: -
“16. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been
actuated by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be
determined upon a careful appraisal of the material on the
record. Direct evidence of corruption may not always be
forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of this
nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of law
or procedure may well be indicative in a given case of a
motivated, if not reckless disregard of legal principle. In the
absence of a cogent explanation to the contrary, it is for the
disciplinary authority to determine whether a pattern has
emerged on the basis of which an inference that the judicial
officer was actuated by extraneous considerations can be
drawn. Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer
have to be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust common
sense must guide the disciplinary authority. At one end of
the spectrum are those cases where direct evidence of a
misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to the
existence of an incriminating trail must be carefully
scrutinised to determine whether an act of misconduct is
established on the basis of legally acceptable evidence. Yet
in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being actuated
by a corrupt motive may not be available. The issue which
arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances from
which an inference that extraneous considerations have
actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such

3
(2016) 14 SCC 1
Page 20 of 34


an inference cannot obviously be drawn merely from a
hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. A wrong decision
can yet be a bona fide error of judgment. Inadvertence
is consistent with an honest error of judgment. A charge
of misconduct against a judicial officer must be
distinguished from a purely erroneous decision whether
on law or on fact. The legality of a judicial determination
is subject to such remedies as are provided in law for
testing the correctness of the determination. It is not the
correctness of the verdict but the conduct of the officer
which is in question. The disciplinary authority has to
determine whether there has emerged from the record
one or more circumstances that indicate that the
decision which forms the basis of the charge of
misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial
power. The circumstances let into evidence to establish
misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated with caution.
The threat of disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate
the honest and independent officer. Yet on the other hand,
there is a vital element of accountability to society involved
in dealing with cases of misconduct. There is on the one
hand a genuine public interest in protecting fearless and
honest officers of the District Judiciary from motivated
criticism and attack. Equally there is a genuine public
interest in holding a person who is guilty of wrongdoing,
responsible for his or her actions. Neither aspect of public
interest can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of
the integrity of the administration of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. As held in R.R. Parekh (supra) , it should be borne-in-
mind that inference of misconduct or about extraneous
considerations having actuated, the decision cannot be drawn
Page 21 of 34


merely from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. It has
been held that a wrong decision can yet be a bona fide error
of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with an honest
error of judgment. Ultimately, it is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the Officer in question which is
determinative.
34. It is apposite to recall the observations of this Court in
4
Union of India and Others vs. K.K. Dhawan , which has been
5
followed in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others . This Court
in K.K. Dhawan ( supra ) , while illustrating certain cases for
which disciplinary action can be initiated, took care to
administer a note of caution also. In K.K. Dhawan ( supra ), this
Court held:-
“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or
in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as
a Judge . Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has
to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the
present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or
legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of
the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer . The

4
(1993) 2 SCC 56
5
(2001) 6 SCC 491
Page 22 of 34

disciplinary action is not warranted and that each case will
Page 23 of 34


depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated.
What is significant to notice is that even though in the
illustrated case [para 28 (iv)] K.K. Dhawan ( supra ), cases of
omission of prescribed conditions which are essential for the
exercise of statutory powers may in a given case furnish a
ground for disciplinary enquiry, it is not an absolute rule and
each case will depend upon the facts. As observed in R.R.
Parekh ( supra ), the Disciplinary Authority has to examine
whether there has emerged from the record, one or more
circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms the
basis of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise
of judicial power.
36. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and
6
Haryana and Another , this Court highlighted how the
functioning of the Trial Judiciary would be seriously impacted
and fearless discharge of duties would become a casualty, if
inquiries are launched on ill-conceived or motivated

6
(1988) 3 SCC 370
Page 24 of 34


complaints. This Court in Ishwar Chand Jain ( supra ) held as
under:-
“14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control
over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that
control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide
and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial
officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil
courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters
relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld
by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer
would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to
discharge his duties in an honest and independent
manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine
qua non for rule of law. If judicial officers are under
constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling
matters and if High Court encourages anonymous
complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary
will not be able to administer justice in an independent
and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the
High Court should also take steps to protect its honest
officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated
complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and
litigants . Having regard to facts and circumstances of the
instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the resolution
passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was
wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Shri
Mehlawat and others were motivated which did not deserve
any credit. Even the vigilance Judge after holding enquiry
did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of
any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All
that was said against him was that he had acted improperly
in granting adjournments.”
[Emphasis supplied]

Page 25 of 34


37. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ramesh Chander
7
Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Another , wherein this
Court held as under:-
“12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the
practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against
officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the
judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The
appellate and revisional courts have been established
and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher
courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside
erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking
disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High
Court must take extra care and caution.

17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India [(1999)
7 SCC 409 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1299 : AIR 1999 SC 2881] this
Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-
judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong
interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating
disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer
conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation
or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material
to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his
duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a
party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive,
the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of
the Constitution may exercise its supervisory
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it
should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have
to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness
and maintenance of judicial independence are very
essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making

7
(2007) 4 SCC 247
Page 26 of 34


adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers
and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings
would ultimately harm the judicial system at the
grassroot level.”

38. Highlighting various options available before the High
Court to deal with judicial officers and the need for clearly
establishing misconduct and extraneous influences or illegal
gratification before resorting to disciplinary measures, this
8
Court in Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar and Others ,
had the following to say:-
“16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in
no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong
order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer
passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there
is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the
passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the
High Court should take is to record such material on the
administrative side and place it on the service record of the
judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into
consideration while considering career progression of the
judicial officer concerned. Once note of the wrong order is
taken and they form part of the service record these can be
taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion,
etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal
orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire
the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again
reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of
misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any

8
(2019) 10 SCC 640
Page 27 of 34


kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be
initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been
passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground
that the judicial order is incorrect.”
[Emphasis supplied]
39. That merely because a different conclusion was possible
is not an indicium for misconduct was highlighted in P.C. Joshi
( supra ).
“ 7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been
conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any
material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize
each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial
side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was
possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different
conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking
one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason
alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other
material, which would reflect on his reputation or
integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has
been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may
say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or
correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for
extraneous consideration that he had acted in that
manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate
court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to
be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary
will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of
writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary
enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act
independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution
are given in K.K. Dhawan case [(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24 ATC 1] and A.N. Saxena
case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 861 : (1992) 21
ATC 670] that merely because the order is wrong or the
Page 28 of 34


action taken could have been different does not warrant
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the
judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate
that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant in this case.”

40. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present
case, we find that the appellant has been held guilty of
misconduct only based on certain judicial orders granting bail
without anything more. We say so for the following reasons:-
(i) The complaint, as originally filed by Jaipal Mehta,
was primarily against Anil Joshi, the stenographer who
has been working in Khargone for a long time even
before the appellant assumed office in Khargone.
(ii) The complaint neither set out any particulars nor set
out any judicial order. It was general in nature.
(iii) The complainant was not examined in the inquiry.
The witnesses examined in support of the charge
Gendalal Chauhan did not support the charge.
(iv) The prosecutor who appeared in each of the 18 bail
orders was examined on behalf of the defence and even
Page 29 of 34


he deposed that the State accepted the orders granting
bail without mounting any challenge in the higher court.
He categorically deposed that the orders were
absolutely proper and were passed on proper grounds.

(v) A perusal of the four orders show that reasons have
been given, though there is no express mention Section
59-A (2) of the Excise Act. In one bail order, the appellant
mentions about the filing of the challan and the possibility
of the trial consuming lot of time. In fact, in the said order,
the appellant has relied on Article 21 though he has not
expressly mentioned the same. In the other bail orders,
he mentions about the applicants being rural farmers and
not being a flight risk and so on.
(vi) There is absolutely no material placed on record to
show that there are circumstances from which inference
could be drawn that extraneous considerations actuated
the passing of those orders of bail. The hypothesis was
drawn only on the basis that the order did not make
reference to the statutory provision expressly.
Page 30 of 34


(vii) The finding that in 14 other orders he referred to
Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act is by itself not enough
to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders
in question.

(viii) It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that
judgments and orders which do not refer expressly to
statutory provisions are per se dis-honest judgments.
41. The High Court has erred in not interfering with the
order. A valiant attempt was made by Mr. Arjun Garg to
sustain the impugned order by contending that a writ court or
this Court cannot act as an appellate court over the inquiry
report and the only consideration was whether the inquiry had
been fairly conducted. We are unable to accept the said
contention. In our opinion, for the reasons stated above, the
findings in the inquiry report are perverse and are not
supported by findings on record. We make bold to record a
finding that on the available material, no reasonable person
would have reached the conclusion that enquiry officer
reached.
Page 31 of 34


42. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and
9
Another , Saghir Ahmad, J. lucidly explained the principle
thus:-
“51.
It was lastly contended by Mr Harish N. Salve that this
Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has already
been scrutinised by the enquiry officer as also by the
Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High Court
or this Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, act as the
appellate authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and it is
not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The
proposition as put forward by Mr Salve is in very broad
terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well settled that
if the findings are perverse and are not supported by
evidence on record or the findings recorded at the
domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person
would have reached, it would be open to the High Court
as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep
Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 429 : JT (1998) 8 SC 603] this Court, relying upon
the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of
Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 458 : AIR 1978
SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708] , State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25]
, Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [AIR
1969 SC 983 : (1969) 2 LLJ 377] , Bharat Iron
Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [(1976) 1 SCC 518 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280] as
also Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC
635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR
866] laid down that although the court cannot sit in
appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary

9
(1999) 7 SCC 739
Page 32 of 34


authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental
enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can
the court interfere. It was observed that the power of
judicial review available to a High Court as also to this
Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the
domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere
with the conclusions reached therein if there was no
evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded
were such as could not have been reached by an
ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse.”
(Emphasis supplied)

43.
For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order
of removal dated 02.09.2015, the order of Appellate Authority
dated 17.03.2016 and the impugned order of the High Court
are all set aside. The appellant shall be deemed to have
continued in service till he attained the normal age of
superannuation. Since the appellant has been kept out of
service for no fault of his, we are of the opinion that full back
wages with all consequential benefits should be given to the
appellant. Let the monetary benefits be released within a
period of eight weeks from today with interest @ 6 per cent.
No order as to costs.

Page 33 of 34


44. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to all the
Registrar Generals of the respective High Courts in the
country, so as to enable them to draw the attention of the Chief
Justices of the High Courts to the same.


……….........................J.
[ J . B. PARDIWALA ]



……….........................J.
[ K. V. VISWANATHAN ]

New Delhi;
th
5 January, 2026
Page 34 of 34


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24570 OF 2024)


NIRBHAY SINGH SULIYA …..APPELLANT(S)


VERSUS


STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR. …..RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T


J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. My esteemed brother Justice K.V. Viswanathan has
penned an ineffable judgment. This judgment will go a
long way in protecting judicial officers of the district
judiciary from being subjected to departmental action for
alleged wrong or incorrect exercise of discretion in passing
orders of bail without anything more. Brother
Viswanathan has put it very pithily, saying that if the
complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer is
1


prima facie found to be true then, in such circumstances,
disciplinary proceedings must be taken, and no leniency
should be shown if the charges are established. In an
appropriate case, even criminal prosecution may be
instituted against a judicial officer. Such action is
necessary to weed out tainted judges from the judiciary. It
goes without saying that corruption in the judiciary at any
level is intolerable, as corruption severely undermines the
core of the administration of justice and erodes public
trust in the rule of law. However, the High Court, which is
vested with the supervisory control must keep in mind
that a judicial officer of the district judiciary works mostly
in a charged atmosphere. A mere wrong order or wrong
exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without
anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate
departmental proceedings.

2. Initiation of departmental proceedings on mere suspicion
is one of the primary causes why trial court judges are
reluctant when it comes to exercising discretion for the
purpose of grant of bail. It should not happen that because
2


of the lurking fear in the mind of a trial court judge, of
some administrative action being taken that even in a
deserving case, well within the principles of law, bail is
declined. This is one reason why the High Courts are
flooded with bail applications. The same is the scenario
even so far as the Supreme Court is concerned. Over a
period of time, the trial court judges have exhibited
tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial function and
responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion in
matters relating to bail. Courts of the district judiciary
wield powers necessary for the functioning of the justice
delivery system in India and when their autonomy is
compromised by higher courts and fear takes precedence
over judicial duties, democracy and the rule of law suffer.

3. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to
dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. As
held by this Court in M.S. Bindra versus Union reported
in (1998) 7 SCC 310 while evaluating the materials the
authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in
which the officer was held till recently. The maxim " Nemo
3


Firut Repente Turpissimus " (no one becomes dishonest all
of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still is a salutary
guideline to judge human conduct, particularly in the field
of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the
eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which
the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those
who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an officer into
the puddle of "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the
doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of
such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be
entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material.
Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it
would have happened. There must be preponderance of
probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt
regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification
to ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity’.


…………………………….J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI:
TH
5 JANUARY 2026.
4