Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 70 of 2003
PETITIONER:
U. Dhar & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
The State of Jharkhand & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/01/2003
BENCH:
M.B. Shah & ARUN KUMAR
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARUN KUMAR, J.
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 71 OF 2003
(Arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 2698 of 2002
(Arising out of SLP (CRL.) NO.2654 OF 2002
February 17, 2003.
#
N Santosh Hegde & B P Singh.
$
Crl.A.No. 70 of 2003 @ SLP(Crl)No.2654 of 2002 :
Leave granted.
This Appeal is filed by U. Dhar, Managing Director and
Mr. Asis Ray, Vice President (Operation), both of Tata
Construction & Project Ltd. against an order dated 3rd May,
2002 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand in Crl.M.P.
No.4780/2001 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition
filed by the appellant herein for quashing an order dated 19th
June, 2001 whereby cognizance was taken of offence
against the appellants under Sections 403, 406, 420 and
120B of Indian Penal Code by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bokaro.
Briefly, the facts are that Bokaro Steel Plant, a unit of
Steel Authority of India Limited (for short, SAIL) awarded a
contract to M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (for short, TISCO),
Growth Shop for certain works. TISCO growth shop
completed supply part of the work and erection part of the
work was entrusted by it to M/s. Tata Construction &
Projects Ltd. (for short TCPL). TCPL in turn issued Tender
Enquiry and awarded the work to M/s. Singh Construction
Co., the complainant. According to the complainant after
completing the work it demanded payment of the balance
amount under the contract from TCPL. The appellants
herein are the Managing Director and President (Operations)
of TCPL. When the complainant failed to receive the
payment for the work done, they filed a complaint on 11th
January, 2001 under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120B IPC
at Bokaro. The concerned Magistrate took cognizance of
the alleged offences and issued summons vide order dated
19.6.2001 to the appellants. The appellants challenged the
said order by filing a Crl.M.P.4780/2001 in the High Court of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3
Jharkhand at Ranchi. The impugned order was passed by
the High Court dismissing the said petition on 3rd May, 2002.
The present appeal has been filed against the said
order of the High Court whereby the High court refused to
quash the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
taking cognizance of the alleged offences against the
appellants. The learned counsel for the appellants argued
that a perusal of the complaint would show that no case is
made out against the appellants for the alleged offences,
and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate is wholly without jurisdiction. According
to the learned counsel for the appellants, the controversy
relates to purely a civil dispute regarding payment of money
and no case for criminal complaint for the alleged offences is
made out. We have been taken through the complaint as
well as our attention has been drawn to the impugned order
passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the confirming
order of the High Court. After careful consideration of the
facts placed on record, it appears to us that the dispute
between the parties is of a purely civil nature. The
grievance of the complainant is about the failure of TCPL to
pay the balance amount under the contract even though
according to it the work stands completed. The appellants
have disputed this.
In our view, what is relevant is that the contract
between TCPL and the complainant is an independent
contract regarding execution of certain works and even
assuming the case of the complainant to be correct, at best it
is a matter of recovery of money on account of failure of
TCPL to pay the amount said to be due under the contract.
The complainant has alleged that TCPL has already
received the money from SAIL for the work in question and it
has misappropriated the same for its own use instead of
paying it to the complainant and it is for this reason that the
offences are alleged under Sections 403, 406 and 420 etc.
The courts below have overlooked the fact that the
contract between Bokaro Steel (a unit of SAIL) and TCPL is
a separate and independent contract. The contract between
complainant and TCPL is altogether a different contract.
The contractual obligations under both the contracts are
separate and independent of each other. The rights and
obligations of the parties i.e. the complainant and TCPL are
to be governed by the contract between them for which the
contract between TCPL and Bokaro Steel (SAIL) has no
relevance. Therefore, even if Bokaro Steel has made the
payment to TCPL under its contract with the latter, it will not
give rise to plea of misappropriation of money because that
money is not money or movable property of the complainant.
Further Section 403 uses the words ’dishonestly’ and
’misappropriate’. These are necessary ingredients of an
offence under Section 403, IPC. Neither of these ingredients
are satisfied in the facts and circumstance of the case. In
para 14 of the complaint, the complainant has stated as
under:
".Release of payments to complainant was
never depended on the payment released by
Bokaro Steel Plant a Unit of SAIL to TISCO
growth shop and TCPL".
Thus admittedly, the two contracts are independent of
each other and payment under one has no relevance qua
the other. It cannot be said that there is any dishonest
intention on the part of appellants nor it can be said that
TCPL or the appellants have misappropriated or converted
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3
the movable property of the complainant to their own use.
Since the basic ingredients of the relevant Section in the
Indian Penal Code are not satisfied, the order taking
cognizance of the offence as well as the issue of summons
to the appellants is wholly uncalled for. Such an order brings
about serious repercussions. So far as the appellants are
concerned when no case is made out for the alleged
offences even as per the complaint filed by the complainant,
there is no reason to permit the appellants to be subjected to
trial for the alleged offences. Hence, the appeal is allowed.
The impugned orders of the High Court as well as of Chief
Judicial Magistrate are hereby ordered to be quashed.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 71 OF 2003 @ SLP(CRL)NO.2698/2002:
In view of the above judgment, this appeal is also
allowed.