Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 281 OF 2003
Lakhwant Singh …Appellant
Versus
Jasbir Singh and Ors. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing
the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Cr.P.C.’). Respondents had filed
an application praying for quashing the First Information
Report (in short the ‘FIR’) registered against them for alleged
commission of theft on 13.7.1999. Statement in the FIR was
that while executing the order in their favour possession of
land of the complainant was illegally taken in execution of
warrant of possession. The High Court accepted the prayer
holding that the aforesaid aspect of the matter can be
examined if any objections are filed before the concerned
Court that warrant officer/bailiff acted beyond the warrant of
possession, and this could not give rise to registration of the
crime and, therefore, the matter is before us.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant had referred to
document appearing at Annexure R/6 and submitted that
without even analyzing the factual and legal aspects, by an
abrupt conclusion the learned Single Judge should not have
quashed the proceedings. With reference to the objections filed
before the High Court it was pointed out that the challan had
already been filed in the Court, and learned Judicial
Magistrate, Ist Class had committed the case to the court of
Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Certain other factual aspects have
also been referred to. It was further pointed out that while
considering the application filed in terms of Section 438
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Cr.P.C., learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar had
passed a detailed order highlighting the role played by
respondents 1 to 5.
3. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 supported the
judgment of the trial Court.
4. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case of
this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only
saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
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from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.
That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section
which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in
the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right
and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on
the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id
sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not
function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction
under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself.
It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone
courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so
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as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow
any action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve
the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When
a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.
5. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866), this
Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is
a legal bar against the institution or
continuance e.g. want of sanction;
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(ii) where the allegations in the first
information report or complaint taken at
its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an
offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly
or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
6. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily
embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the
trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an
instrument of oppression or needless harassment. Court
should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion
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and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time
the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code
and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise
its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The
illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
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(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a Police Officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155
(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High
Court being the highest Court of a State should normally
refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the
Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court
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will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
proceeding at any stage. (See : The Janata Dal etc. v. H.S.
Chowdhary and others, etc. (AIR 1993 SC 892), Dr. Raghubir
Saran v. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1964 SC 1)). It would
not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on
such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are
to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded
with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the
inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in
a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in
the complaint do not constitute the offence of which
cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the
High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not, however,
necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case
before the trial to find out whether the case would end in
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conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a
whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in
the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant
that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed
and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala
fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of
secondary importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate
of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be
the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs.
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990
SC 494), State of Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, I.A.S.
and another (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj
(Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995
(6) SCC 194), State of Kerala and others v. O.C. Kuttan and
others (1999 (2) SCC 651), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996
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(7) SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada
(1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) and another (1999 (8) SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State
NCT of Delhi and others AIR 1999 SC 1216).
8. These aspects were highlighted in State of Karnataka v.
M. Devendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89).
9. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1974 (4) SCC 522) while
considering a case under Section 561-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short “the Old Code”)
corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, it was observed as
follows: (AIR p.1146)
“Where at the date of filing the petition under
Section 561-A, no charge-sheet or a complaint
has been laid down in court and the matter is
only at the stage of investigation by police, the
court cannot, in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 561-A, interfere
with the statutory powers of the police to
investigate into the alleged offence, and quash
the proceedings. Even assuming that the
allegations in the FIR are correct and
constitute an offence so as to remove the legal
bar to institute proceedings in court, the court
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cannot at that stage appraise the evidence
collected by the police in their investigation.
Any petition under Section 561-A at such a
stage is, therefore, premature and
incompetent.” (SCC p. 526, paras 16-18)
10. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete
and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to
look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a
matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it
was a trial court. Even when charge is framed at that stage,
the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about the
existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate
material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate
evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to
conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not
for convicting the accused. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal
(1992 (3) SCC 317), it was observed that when the materials
relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference
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can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the
complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on
annexures to the petitions under Section 482 CrPC, which
cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and
proved.
11. These aspects are highlighted in State of Orissa v. Saroj
Kumar Sahoo (2005 (13) SCC 540).
12. Practically non-reasoned order of the High Court does
not reveal that the parameters relating to exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were kept in view. The inevitable
conclusion is that order of the High Court deserves to be set
aside. We direct accordingly.
13. The appeal is allowed.
…………………….……..J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
………………………..….J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
New Delhi,
September 16, 2008
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